Opinion
No. 335974
07-18-2017
In re V. N. BRANSON, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 16-522653-NA Before: MURPHY, P.J., and TALBOT, C.J., and O'CONNELL, J. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father, E. Pruett, appeals by right the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his minor child VNB pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent's act caused physical injury, physical abuse, or sexual abuse to child), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if the child returned to the parent). We affirm.
Respondent has a second minor child: JLT. In transcripts submitted to this Court, the trial court also concluded that it had jurisdiction over JLT, that there were statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights to JLT, and that termination of respondent's parental rights was in JLT's best interests. However, the trial court referenced a separate case number, 16-522790-NA, for JLT's case. The order terminating respondent's parental rights to VNB contains only her name and case number 16-522653-NA. Respondent's claim of appeal only lists VNB as the child affected by the appealed order and case number 16-522653-NA. Therefore, respondent's appeal only addresses his parental rights to VNB.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleged that respondent physically, sexually, emotionally, and verbally abused VNB. Therefore, DHHS filed a petition asking the trial court to remove VNB from respondent's care, take jurisdiction over VNB, and terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial court authorized the petition and ordered VNB to be placed in DHHS's care and supervision. A DHHS worker testified that it placed VNB in the care of her paternal grandmother. The trial court then ordered DHHS to initiate termination proceedings. The case proceeded to a combined bench trial, where the trial court took jurisdiction over VNB, and dispositional hearing, where the trial court determined that there were statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights and that termination was in VNB's best interests. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights to VNB.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for clear error the trial court's factual findings, In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), determinations regarding statutory grounds for termination, id., and determinations regarding a child's best interests, In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). A finding is clearly erroneous if we have "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it found that there were statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights. We disagree.
The trial court must find clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory ground listed in MCL 712A.19b(3) to terminate parental rights. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).
In this case, the trial court determined that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), and (j). None of these conclusions were clearly erroneous.
A trial court may terminate a respondent's parental rights to a child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]he parent's act caused the [child] physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home."
Petitioner presented evidence that respondent physically injured and abused VNB. VNB testified that respondent hit her with his hand and belt, slapped her, pushed her, choked her, and threw her. VNB testified that respondent's action sometimes left a mark. If they did, respondent prohibited her from going to school until they cleared. She explained that the abuse started when she was eight years old and continued until she was 13. The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that VNB would suffer from further abuse if placed in respondent's home, citing the length of time that the abuse has occurred. Respondent argues on appeal that VNB's testimony was not credible because she had a propensity to lie. However, the trial court chose to rely on her testimony, and we defer to the trial court's special ability to evaluate witness credibility. In re White, 303 Mich App at 711. Further, another witness corroborated VNB's testimony of physical injury and abuse. The witness testified that she witnessed respondent punch VNB, saw VNB with a chipped tooth, and saw bruises on VNB.
Petitioner also presented evidence that respondent sexually abused VNB. For example, VNB described an incident where respondent told her to take her pants off and get into bed with him, she fell asleep, and she woke up with respondent's finger inside her "private part." Therefore, we do not have a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred when finding statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to subsection (b)(i).
Respondent cites no authority to support his argument that VNB's testimony must be corroborated with physical evidence, contrary to his requirement to do so. See MCR 7.212(C)(7). --------
A trial court may terminate a respondent's parental rights to a child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that a "parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age." Here, the trial court determined that it had statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights because of VNB's testimony that he physically abused her, evidence that respondent sexually abused VNB, and testimony from multiple witnesses that respondent's home lacked food. Evidence that a parent repeatedly physically and sexually abused a child can support termination pursuant to subsection (g). See In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 52; 501 NW2d 231 (1993). Therefore, we do not have a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred when finding statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to subsection (g).
Respondent argues that the trial court should have given him services through a parent agency treatment plan instead of finding statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights pursuant to subsection (g). However, DHHS requested termination of respondent's parental rights at the initial disposition. A trial court should not order reunification services for a respondent in such a situation so long as it finds grounds to assume jurisdiction, that facts alleged in the petition are true, statutory grounds exist to terminate parental rights, and that termination is in the child's best interests, as occurred here. See In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90-92; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).
A trial court may terminate a respondent's parental rights to a child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent." Here, the trial court determined that it had statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to subsection (j) in light of the evidence of respondent's physical and sexual abuse of VNB. Evidence that a parent physically injured his child, In re England, 314 Mich App 245, 254-255; 887 NW2d 10 (2016), had a history of failing to protect a child from physical abuse, In re Archer, 277 Mich App 71, 75-76; 744 NW2d 1 (2007), and had a history of exposing a child to sexual abuse, In re Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors, 305 Mich App 623, 636-637; 853 NW2d 459 (2014), supports termination pursuant to subsection (j). Therefore, we do not have a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred when finding statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights to VNB pursuant to subsection (j).
IV. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination was in VNB's best interests. We disagree.
After a trial court finds statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, it must determine whether termination is in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). A trial court should weigh all available evidence and may consider many factors, including "the parent's parenting ability," "the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality," "the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home," a child's "well-being while in care," "the possibility of adoption," In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (citations and quotations omitted), and the child's need for safety from an abuser, see In re Brown/Kindle/Muhammad, 305 Mich App at 638. The trial court must consider whether the child is placed with a relative, a factor that weighs against termination. In re Mason, 486 Mich at 164. If the trial court then determines that termination is in the child's best interests by a preponderance of the evidence, it must terminate respondent's parental rights. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676 (2016).
The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination was in VNB's best interests. The trial court found that VNB was placed with her grandmother and determined that this was the only factor that weighed against termination. The trial court determined that VNB needed permanency, found that VNB's grandmother was willing to adopt VNB, and determined that this adoption would create permanence, stability, and finality for VNB. The trial court determined that VNB needed safety and respondent could not provide safety. Rather, respondent presented a serious risk of harm to VNB, and VNB could be at risk of further physical or sexual abuse if returned to respondent's care. Therefore, the trial court determined that termination was in VNB's best interests. We do not have a definite and firm conviction that the trial court's determination was erroneous.
We affirm.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell