Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
Super. Ct. No. JD223524.
NICHOLSON, J.
C.N. (appellant), the mother of B.H. (the minor), appeals in pro per from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Elf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further statutory references to sections of an undesignated code are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant claims she “deserve[s] another chance towards being a mother to [her] son.” We affirm the judgment (order terminating parental rights).
Respondent Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) notified this court that it would not be filing a respondent’s brief in this matter.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 20, 2005, DHHS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the five-month-old minor, alleging: (1) appellant and the minor’s father had substance abuse problems which rendered them incapable of providing adequate care and supervision for the minor; and (2) appellant and the minor’s father failed to provide adequate care and supervision for the minor in that both were “found by law enforcement to be in possession of cookware and chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine,” and the minor “was present where the cookware and chemicals were located.” (§ 300, subd. (b).)
The juvenile court sustained the allegations, adjudged the minor a dependent child, and granted appellant reunification services.
The minor was initially placed in a confidential foster home. In February 2006, he was placed with his maternal grandmother.
The six-month review hearing was held in October 2006. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) Appellant tested positive for THC in December 2005, missed six support groups in January 2006, failed to test once in March 2006 and once in July 2006, and was arrested for burglary, conspiracy to commit a crime, receiving stolen property, and possession of burglary tools in June 2006. On a more positive note, she completed a parenting class, was attending Specialized Treatment and Recovery Services (STARS), and was participating in counseling. She visited the minor twice a week for two hours and was eventually allowed one unsupervised visit a week. During the visits, she “interact[ed] with the child, fe[d] him and change[d] him.” The minor cried when appellant left the room.
The 12-month review hearing was held in January 2007. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) Appellant did not appear at the hearing, and her whereabouts were unknown. She had not drug tested since October 2006, had reportedly relapsed, and failed to report to jail as ordered on December 6, 2006, to serve 90 days in connection with her June 2006 arrest. Her visits with the minor had become sporadic, and she had very little contact with him. The juvenile court terminated appellant’s reunification services and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing (§ 366.26).
The selection and implementation hearing was held in May 2007. The minor was progressing well in placement, was developmentally on target, and had “a very strong bond and attachment to his maternal grandmother,” who was willing to adopt him. While he has a foot deformity, he was able to walk, jump, and climb. His foot was examined in August 2006, and “surgery was not recommended at that time.” Appellant visited the minor sporadically between Christmas 2006 and May 2007. When she did visit, the minor recognized her and appeared happy to see her.
Appellant did not appear at the selection and implementation hearing, and her counsel could not explain her absence. Appellant’s counsel objected generally to the termination of appellant’s parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was likely to be adopted and terminated appellant’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Appellant claims she deserves another chance to be a mother to the minor. In doing so, she asserts that “[h]e hasn’t forgotten who I am, we still share a bond and he loves me very much.”
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child. [Citation.]” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368, original italics; § 366.26 (c)(1).) There are only limited circumstances that permit the court to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child . . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(e)(3).)
Effective January 1, 2008, the Legislature amended and renumbered section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). Because the proceedings at issue here occurred before the statutory change, we refer to the earlier version of the statute. (Stats. 2006, ch. 838, § 52.)
The only exception to the termination of parental rights arguably advanced by appellant in her opening brief is the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, which applies where “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
As a preliminary matter, appellant forfeited her right to raise this exception on appeal since she failed to object to the termination of her parental rights at the selection and implementation hearing. (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 402-403.) Such a failure “not only . . . deprive[s] the juvenile court of the ability to evaluate the critical facts and make the necessary findings, but it also deprives this court of a sufficient factual record from which to conclude whether the trial court’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Allowing the [parent] to raise the exception for the first time on appeal would be inconsistent with this court’s role of reviewing orders terminating parental rights for the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 403; see also In re Melvin A., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1252 [juvenile court has no obligation to consider applicability of beneficial relationship exception sua sponte].)
Appellant’s counsel’s general objection to the termination of appellant’s parental rights was insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal. In the absence of evidence, or even argument, as to why the court should consider applying the exception, the juvenile court had no basis upon which to make its determination -- and we have no basis upon which to perform our role. The issue is therefore forfeited.
Even if the issue is not forfeited, the evidence does not support the application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception here. First, we question whether appellant’s visitation, which was sporadic at best during the six-month period preceding the termination of her parental rights, was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.
Second, while there is evidence the minor and appellant had a positive relationship, evidence of a significant parent-child attachment by itself does not suffice. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) “Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . . The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (Ibid.)
At the time of the selection and implementation hearing, the minor was 22 months old. He had been removed from appellant’s care 17 months earlier. While the minor enjoyed appellant’s visits, the record does not support a finding that the benefit to the minor outweighed the well-being he would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. Substantial evidence supports the court’s decision to terminate appellant’s parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order terminating parental rights) is affirmed.
We concur:
BLEASE, Acting P.J., HULL, J.