Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. DPSQ046050, DPSQ076322
RAYE, J.
Appellant, the father of M.M., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Appellant claims the court erred by denying him reunification services at the dispositional hearing and by denying him visitation prior to the termination of parental rights. We shall affirm.
M.M.’s sibling (A.V.) is not appellant’s child. The children’s mother also appealed but filed a brief pursuant to In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, and her appeal has been dismissed as abandoned.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2007 the Sutter County Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a dependency petition concerning four-month-old M.M., as well as her half sister A.V. (aged two and a half), based on drug use by the mother and her husband. The mother allegedly had failed to reunify with several other children, although she successfully reunified with A.V. in January 2006 after completing a case plan. According to the petition, the mother frequently left A.V. and M.M. with appellant’s mother (Paula N.) or a great aunt. The petition also alleged that appellant had a criminal history involving a variety of crimes.
At the detention hearing, appellant’s attorney informed the juvenile court that appellant resided with Paula N. and that the minors had been in her care “at least half the time since [M.M.] was born.” The attorney inferred that appellant had also been caring for M.M. and requested that she be placed with him.
The juvenile court ordered the minors detained, ordered the parents to submit to hair and urine testing with visitation contingent on clean tests, and gave DHS discretion to place M.M. with appellant. Appellant’s hair strand test was positive for methamphetamine and his urine test came back positive for opiates. Another drug test the following week was positive for amphetamines. Prior to the jurisdictional hearing, the minors were placed with Paula N.
The jurisdictional report contained information about appellant’s criminal record, which included a conviction approximately 10 years earlier for possession of a controlled substance after appellant failed to complete drug diversion. Appellant had a 10-year-old son who had been removed in 1998, after which appellant was offered six months of reunification services to address his substance abuse. Appellant’s services were terminated, and the child eventually was adopted by Paula N. The social worker reported that appellant also had been involved in A.V.’s prior dependency case and “was advised of the seriousness of his substance abuse and how this impacts his children” but “continued to use illegal drugs.”
At the jurisdictional hearing the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition, with amendments not relevant here, and continued the matter for a dispositional hearing.
Appellant was present on the date originally set for the dispositional hearing, but the hearing was continued at the request of the mother’s attorney. Notices of the new date were sent to appellant at an address at which he previously had received notice but were returned marked “refused” and “return to sender.” Later, notice of the hearing was sent to appellant at a post office box, and a return receipt was signed by appellant.
According to the dispositional report, appellant had stated during an intake interview that in order to reunify, he would need assistance in maintaining his sobriety. Paula N. reported that appellant recently had physically assaulted her and had become aggressive with her at the jurisdictional hearing. A day later, a trailer belonging to Paula N. in which appellant had been living was intentionally burned down. Aside from reports that appellant was “staying somewhere in Yuba City,” his whereabouts were unknown and he had not contacted DHS to request visits or to submit to further testing.
According to an addendum filed on the date of the dispositional hearing, appellant’s whereabouts remained unknown, although he reportedly had left a message with his sister stating he was moving to Las Vegas. The addendum reported that appellant had not played an active role in raising M.M. or her sister, and the social worker recommended that reunification services be denied to him based on his failure to reunify with his other child. As appellant had tested positive for controlled substances during the current dependency proceedings, the social worker concluded he “ha[d] made no effort to address his substance abuse issues since [his other child’s] detention in 1998.” The social worker also recommended an order for no visitation.
Appellant was not present at the dispositional hearing, and his attorney “submit[ted]” the matter. The juvenile court denied reunification services on the basis proposed by the social worker. In addition, the court ordered no visitation. The court set M.M.’s matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for her, noting that “an appellate packet” would need to be sent to appellant. Notice was sent to appellant at his previous address rather than to the post office box at which he last had received notice.
The dispositional hearing as to A.V.’s father was continued, and at the later hearing, her matter was scheduled for a section 366.26 hearing on the same date as M.M.’s hearing.
Appellant’s whereabouts were still unknown by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, and he was not present at the hearing. Meanwhile, M.M. and her sister had been assessed as adoptable, with Paula N. and her husband as the prospective adoptive parents. Appellant’s attorney submitted the matter, and the juvenile court terminated parental rights and ordered a permanent plan of adoption.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant challenges orders from the hearing at which the section 366.26 hearing was set. Generally, a party is precluded from challenging such rulings on appeal from a section 366.26 hearing unless he or she sought an extraordinary writ following the setting of the section 366.26 hearing. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(A).) However, the juvenile court is required to advise the parties of this requirement when it sets the section 366.26 hearing -- orally to all parties present and by first-class mail to the last known address of parties not present. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.600.) “Where the court fails to give a party notice of writ review, the party’s claims on appeal are not limited by the provisions of section 366.26, subdivision (l)(1) and (l)(2).” (In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 448; see In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722.)
Here, a writ advisement was not sent to appellant at his last known address. DHS concedes, and we agree, that appellant is not precluded from raising issues stemming from the hearing at which the section 366.26 hearing was set as a result of his failure to file a writ petition following that hearing.
II
Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order denying reunification services. His claim is without merit.
Reunification services need not be provided to a parent when clear and convincing evidence establishes that parent’s rights over a sibling have been permanently severed and the parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11).) Appellant’s parental rights to another child had been terminated after he was offered reunification services to address his substance abuse. Thus, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer that appellant’s substance abuse was at least one of the problems underlying that child’s removal. More recently, appellant had tested positive for opiates and methamphetamine after M.M. and her sister were removed, after which he failed to submit to further drug testing. Additionally, he admitted during his intake interview that he would need assistance in maintaining his sobriety in order to achieve reunification. A reasonable inference can be drawn from these circumstances that appellant had not made reasonable efforts to address his substance abuse following the termination of his parental rights in the prior proceeding. We conclude this evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services.
Appellant bases his claim on the lack of information concerning his efforts to treat the problems leading to the removal of his other child. In light of appellant’s failure to contact the social worker, submit to drug testing or request visitation after his positive drug tests, and the fact that his whereabouts were unknown during most of the proceedings, we find this claim disingenuous. The fact that appellant was still using controlled substances and stated he needed assistance with sobriety was sufficient to establish that he had not made reasonable efforts to address his substance abuse problem. He presented no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, we reject his claim.
III
Appellant argues the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard when it denied him visitation pending the section 366.26 hearing. By failing to object in the juvenile court to the social worker’s recommendation for no visitation, appellant has forfeited the claim.
“In dependency litigation, nonjurisdictional issues must be the subject of objection or appropriate motions in the juvenile court; otherwise those arguments have been waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558.) The reason for the rule requiring a party to raise an issue in the juvenile court is to afford the court an opportunity to modify its order. In general, “[i]t is unfair to the trial court and the adverse party to give appellate consideration to an alleged procedural defect which could have been presented to, and may well have been cured by, the trial court.” (Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 810-811.)
Here, appellant’s attorney failed to state any objection to the proposed no-visitation order. The juvenile court reasonably could have assumed that appellant’s failure to object signified his consent to that portion of the recommendations, particularly when coupled with his failure to request visitation during the months preceding the hearing in question. (See In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1476, and In re Daniel C. H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814, 838.)
Appellant contends we should exercise our discretion to consider his claim despite his failure to raise it before the juvenile court because “the lack of visitation is contrary to the goal of family reunification, and the absence of visitation could necessarily lead to the erosion of the parent-child relationship.” While it is true that an appellate court has “discretion to excuse forfeiture . . . in cases presenting an important legal issue” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293), we can conceive of no reason to do so here. As the goal in the present matter was no longer family reunification when the no-visitation order was entered, and as appellant already had taken the helm in eroding whatever relationship he had with M.M. by failing to visit her when he had the opportunity, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider this claim.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, Acting P. J., BUTZ, J.