Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD225241
ROBIE, J.
Appellant E. S. challenges the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested dispositional hearing denying him visitation with his infant son A. V. Appellant contends the order denying visitation was an abuse of discretion. We shall reject the contention and affirm.
BACKGROUND
When A. V. was born on December 16, 2006, both he and his mother tested positive for amphetamine and THC and the mother abandoned the infant at the hospital the next day. A dependency petition was filed by the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) on December 19, 2006, alleging jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) due the mother’s drug dependency and on section 300, subdivision (g) based on her abandonment of A. V. The infant was detained at the home of relatives after a December 20, 2006, detention hearing.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
The jurisdictional and dispositional report, filed January 10, 2007, related that the mother’s location was unknown. Appellant had a two-month relationship with the mother, and was in juvenile hall awaiting trial for murder. Appellant was to be tried as an adult on the murder charge, and a district attorney told the social worker appellant admitted to the killing, which was gang related.
Appellant told the social worker he had used alcohol since he was 12 and cocaine once a week until his arrest for murder. Appellant also said he was a “‘full blooded Pomo-mono Native American’” registered in Pinoleville.
The Pinoleville Rancheria of Pomo Indians of California was notified of the dependency proceedings and informed Department that appellant was not an enrolled member of the tribe and A. V. was not eligible for membership. The mother claimed to have unspecified Indian heritage. The juvenile court found Department gave adequate notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) with respect to the mother’s claim. Appellant does not challenge the court’s ICWA findings.
The report indicated the mother had run away from her group home multiple times while she was pregnant. She had gang associations and was alleged to have an outstanding arrest warrant.
On February 28, 2007, the juvenile court ordered services for appellant, but ordered no contact between appellant and A. V. The court made the same rulings at a May 9, 2007, hearing.
On April 8, 2006, the mother was transported to juvenile hall. In the fourth addendum report, filed on May 9, 2007, Department related the mother had been released from juvenile hall around April 18, 2006, to a youth guidance center. She had a bench warrant in Sacramento County for grand theft and admitted to having been “‘on the run,’” but turned herself in because it was the right thing to do.
The fifth addendum report stated the mother ran away from her group home on May 16, 2007. Appellant was now in the Sacramento County Jail awaiting his murder trial, and the social worker at the jail stated the only services available in his wing would be psychological counseling, which the social worker recommended since appellant was facing a potential life sentence.
Department filed a first amended petition on July 20, 2007, alleging jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) on the basis of the mother’s unresolved drug dependency, her abandonment of the infant, and repeated running away, and under section 300, subdivision (g) alleging appellant provided no means of supporting the infant during his incarceration. The juvenile court dismissed the original petition as superseded by the first amended petition.
A combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing was held on July 27, 2007. In a contested matter with no witnesses, appellant entered general denials, renewed his request for visitation, and objected to the termination of his services. The juvenile court dismissed the section 300, subdivision (g) allegation, sustained the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations, and declared the infant a dependant child. The court ordered services for the mother, continued placement with the relatives, but denied reunification services for appellant pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (a) and (e). The court continued the no contact order for appellant, but said if appellant were acquitted of the murder charge then Department would have to reassess visitation for appellant.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not allowing him to have one visit with his infant son while he was in jail awaiting trial for murder. We disagree.
Appellant does not contest the denial of reunification services. Visitation for a parent who has been denied reunification services is governed by section 361.5, subdivision (f), which provides in relevant part that “[t]he court may continue to permit the parent to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” We review the juvenile court’s order denying visitation for abuse of discretion. (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459.) “‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Since appellant was denied reunification services, it was not necessary for the juvenile court to first establish visitation would be detrimental before denying visitation. The use of the term “may” in section 361.5 subdivision (f) is “permissive, i.e., as giving the juvenile court discretion to permit or deny visitation when reunification services are not ordered, unless of course it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child, in which case it must deny visitation.” (In re J.N., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 458.)
Visitation would not benefit A. V., an infant, who has no bond with a father he never met and is too young to appreciate a visit. Defendant did not establish visitation could take place under circumstances minimizing any risk to his son’s well-being.
The unsworn statement of trial counsel that the jail had facilities for face-to-face visits is not evidence, contrary to appellant’s contention. (In re Zeth H. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414, fn. 11.)
Appellant’s claim that he is being treated unfairly as compared to the mother is without merit. He and the mother are not similarly situated. Unlike appellant, the mother is being offered reunification services and is not facing a potential life sentence for murder. The juvenile court, which said visitation for appellant would be reviewed if he is acquitted of the murder charge, has been neither arbitrary nor unfair to appellant.
A “court may deny visitation to an incarcerated parent who has been denied reunification services, even in the absence of any showing that continued visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (In re J.N., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 460.) Since there was no showing that visitation would benefit the infant, denial of visitation was not an abuse of discretion. On this record, appellant’s contention is frivolous.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P.J., NICHOLSON, J.