Opinion
PM-31-21
03-11-2021
Monica A. Duffy, Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department, Albany, for Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department. Clyde & Co., New York City (Aaron Lawson of counsel), for respondent.
(Attorney Registration No. 5155452.) Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Colangelo, JJ.
Monica A. Duffy, Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department, Albany, for Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department.
Clyde & Co., New York City (Aaron Lawson of counsel), for respondent.
Per Curiam.
Respondent was admitted to practice by this Court in 2013 and is not admitted to practice in any other jurisdiction. She currently resides in London, England, where she is employed by an international law firm. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law by May 2019 order of this Court for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice arising from her noncompliance with the attorney registration requirements of Judiciary Law § 468-a and Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR) § 118.1 beginning in 2015 (Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468 , 172 AD3d 1706, 1735 [2019]; see Judiciary Law § 468-a [5]; Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 8.4 [d]). Upon curing her registration delinquency in September 2020, respondent, by application marked returnable on March 1, 2021, now applies for her reinstatement. The Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department (hereinafter AGC) opposes respondent's motion based solely upon her failure to provide the required proof of her passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (hereinafter MPRE); nevertheless, AGC takes no position with respect to respondent's request for a waiver of the MPRE requirement.
Finding no open claims, the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection advises that it does not oppose respondent's reinstatement application. --------
We initially note that respondent has satisfied the procedural requirements for an attorney seeking reinstatement to the practice of law from a suspension of more than six months (see Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-a [Nenninger], 180 AD3d 1317, 1318 [2020]) by, among other things, submitting a sworn affidavit in the proper form set forth in appendix C to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) part 1240 (see Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.16 [b]). As for the threshold documentation required to be submitted in support of her application, as noted above, respondent has requested a waiver of the MPRE requirement applicable to all attorneys seeking reinstatement from suspensions of more than six months (see Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.16 [a]; see e.g. Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-a [D'Alessandro], 169 AD3d 1349 [2019]). As we have noted previously, a reinstatement applicant must demonstrate "good cause" in order to be granted a waiver, which standard may be satisfied by providing assurances "that additional MPRE testing would be unnecessary under the circumstances" (Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-a [Alimanova], 156 AD3d 1223, 1224 [2017]).
Our review of the documentation provided by respondent in support of her application convinces us that a waiver of the MPRE requirement is appropriate in this instance (see Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-a [Sauer], 178 AD3d 1191, 1193 [2019]). Respondent has provided proof that, among other things, upon learning of her suspension, she immediately ceased the practice of law and took steps to cure her delinquency and seek reinstatement. Notably, respondent has an otherwise blemish-free disciplinary history and she has submitted documentation establishing her completion of numerous credit hours of continuing legal education devoted to legal ethics. Under these circumstances, we agree that it is not necessary for respondent to undergo further MPRE testing, and we therefore grant her request for a waiver.
As for the remainder of respondent's application, we find that her submission establishes by clear and convincing evidence that she has satisfied the three-part test applicable to all attorneys seeking reinstatement from disciplinary suspension (see Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-a [Alimanova], 175 AD3d 1767, 1768 [2019]). Respondent has sufficiently demonstrated her compliance with the order of suspension. As to her character and fitness, respondent's application materials raise no cause for concern, inasmuch as she reports no criminal record and she further attests that she has not been the subject of any adverse disciplinary action or governmental investigation since her suspension (see Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] part 1240, appendix C, ¶¶ 14, 30, 31). We additionally conclude that respondent's reinstatement would be in the public interest. Giving due consideration to the fact that respondent's misconduct does not raise any concerns regarding a possible detriment to the public, as well as her otherwise spotless disciplinary history, we find that no detriment would inure to the public from respondent's reinstatement (see Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-a [Giordano], 186 AD3d 1827, 1829 [2020]; Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468-a [Serbinowski], 164 AD3d 1049, 1051 [2018]). We accordingly grant respondent's motion and reinstate her to the practice of law in New York, effective immediately.
Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Colangelo, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that respondent's motion is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent is reinstated as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York.