Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Lake County Super. Ct. No. JV320013
Siggins, J.
This is our fifth review of these dependency proceedings. Mother and maternal grandmother (Grandmother) of dependent minors Athena and Israel appeal from a juvenile court order reinstating the termination of parental rights following our conditional reversal for violations of the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) notice requirements. Grandmother and Mother contend the juvenile court erred when it found notices to tribes provided by the Lake County Department of Social Services (the Department) following our remand complied with ICWA. Mother additionally contends the removal of her guardian ad litem was prejudicial error. We affirm the termination of parental rights.
BACKGROUND
The long history of this dependency is discussed in our previous opinions and we incorporate those discussions herein by reference. (See In re Athena H. (Jan. 22, 2007, A109735, A112506, A111434, A112930, A115422 [nonpub. opn.] review den. May 16, 2007, S150622 (Athena I); In re Athena H. (June 27, 2007, A114477 [nonpub. opn.] (Athena II); In re Athena H. (Sept. 7, 2007, A116610 [nonpub. opn.] (Athena III); In re Athena H. (Aug. 5, 2008, A119022 [nonpub. opn.] (Athena IV).) The facts specifically relevant to this appeal concern (1) the Department’s efforts to comply with ICWA’s notice provisions following our conditional reversal of prior juvenile court orders; and (2) the removal of Mother’s guardian ad litem at the final ICWA review hearing. Accordingly, our discussion will focus on those issues.
ICWA Notices
In Athena I, issued January 22, 2007,we found the Department’s ICWA notice procedures to be seriously deficient and therefore conditionally reversed orders terminating parental rights to require ICWA compliance. In Athena II, we found that a second round of ICWA notices filed by the Department on May 4, 2006, were also defective in various significant respects.
After our remand in Athena II, on October 12, 2007, the Department filed a 14-page “ICWA Compliance Report,” with attachments totaling over 500 pages that reflect its efforts to comply with ICWA notice requirements after the conditional reversal ordered in Athena I. According to the report, the Department issued three separate sets of ICWA notices to tribes,filed on February 23, 2007, July 3, 2007, and August 2, 2007. The February 2007 notices provided the previously omitted names of Athena’s and Israel’s alleged fathers, a family tree created by the Department, and copies of genealogical charts and a letter discussing Indian heritage that were provided by maternal grandfather (Grandfather). The Department determined that several of Grandfather’s relatives were of Native American heritage. Social workers contacted each possibly relevant tribe by telephone to obtain current addresses and designated recipients for notice, and mailed the notices according to that information.
In July 2007 the Department re-sent the same notices to the addresses and tribal designees listed in the August 2006 Federal Register and added Mother and Grandmother to the recipient list. Later that month, after the Department reviewed the return receipts for those notices, it re-sent notices to some dozen tribes for which tribal information was missing or incorrect.
On August 2, 2007, the Department filed its final set of ICWA notices, with additional attachments, to the relevant 26 tribes. These notices included Mother’s birthplace and a copy of the original dependency petition, Israel’s birth certificate, family trees created by the Department and the genealogical information provided by Mother and Grandmother. The Department’s compliance report chronicles what appears to have been a concerted and extensive effort by the Department from February 2007 until October 5, 2007, to fulfill its notice obligations under ICWA. These efforts included re-interviewing Grandmother and Grandfather, creating family trees for each of them using the information obtained from those interviews and other sources, telephoning the pertinent tribes to confirm the name and address of their appropriate contacts, reviewing return receipts from tribes and resending notices to tribes whose return receipts included missing or incorrect information; department-wide training on ICWA notice procedures; and the use of a designated social service worker to follow up with those tribes whose responses were outstanding.
The compliance report included a “Table of Tribes” that showed the tribe’s address and designee for service listed in the Federal Register for each of the 26 noticed tribes; a summary of the Department’s efforts to collect status eligibility from the tribes through phone calls, faxes and letters; the tribes’ responses; proofs of service; and receipts of certified mail and domestic return receipts.
The time for the tribes to respond to the Department’s final set of ICWA notices had expired when the Department filed its report on October 12, 2007. Four tribes, the Pueblos of Isleta, San Juan, Tesuque, and Zuni, had not responded on behalf of one or both of the children. Based on the responses received from the other tribes and the expiration of the period for the tribes to respond, the Department concluded the children were not members or eligible for membership in any of the noticed tribes and recommended that the trial court find ICWA does not apply.
On October 15, 2007, the Department told the court it had discovered an additional problem with several of the ICWA notices that required it to renotice three tribes. It asked that the ICWA compliance hearing be continued for 60 days. After much discussion, the court declined to delay the hearing beyond the scheduled October 22, 2007, date. Mother was still institutionalized at Patton State Hospital. The juvenile court conditionally appointed her previous guardian ad litem, Ms. Ocean, to explore whether a guardian ad litem should be reappointed.
County counsel explained to the court that “the problem with the three tribes is that the Department did not send it registered mail which requires the person who’s identified in the federal register to actually be the person who signs the receipt. So the Department does not have a signed receipt from those tribes. And then the other way to kind of verify the receipt if it went by certified mail is if the tribe actually responds. And these three tribes have not responded. We’ve received, I think, responses from all other tribes.”
On October 19, 2007, the Department filed an addendum to its report. The addendum indicated that the three remaining tribes had responded to the August 2, 2007, notices, and that each reported the minors were not members or eligible for enrollment.
At the October 22, 2007, hearing, the children’s new attorney was not present. The court and counsel for the Department discussed the role of a guardian ad litem with Mother, and she, her attorney and Ms. Ocean all agreed to the appointment. The court reappointed Ocean as guardian ad litem and set the ICWA compliance review and other matters for October 29, 2007.
On October 29, 2007, the court continued the ICWA compliance review once more until December 10, 2007, so the children’s new attorney could meet with her clients and review the file. Mother made a statement to the court. She said, “I just want to say, your Honor, I want to apologize for all the grief I’ve brought upon my children and everybody involved. I’m very remorseful for what I’ve done. [¶] I’ve been in the hospital for three years and I’ve made quite an improvement. I’m getting ready to come home now. My doctor and my social worker see my improvement, and they feel that I’m capable of taking care of my children. [¶] I appreciate everything that [the foster mother] has done for my children, but I feel that being with their biological family is the best, and I feel reunification with me is the best.”
The Department filed an updated report on November 30, 2007. Mother’s criminal attorney reported to the Department that she had been found not guilty by reason of insanity in her criminal case. The report also included information from Mother’s social worker at Patton State Hospital. The social worker was then preparing a report that would recommend Mother be transferred to community outpatient treatment.
The matter reconvened on December 10, 2007, before a visiting judge. Both Mother’s attorney and guardian ad litem Ocean requested that Ocean be relieved of her obligations. The Department concurred in the request but recommended that the court hold an evidentiary hearing on the propriety of dismissing the guardian ad litem.
The court then inquired of all counsel whether they believed there were any remaining ICWA issues. Grandmother’s attorney said he had reviewed the notices and “I don’t see where it’s deficient,” but observed that his client “might disagree with my opinion.” Grandmother told the court that (1) although her grandmother was from the Seminole Nation, the Department had failed to list her last name on the ICWA notices; and (2) the notices did not indicate that Athena had been a patient at the Lakeport Indian health clinic. In light of the complex history of the case and the volume of ICWA material in the file, the visiting judge declined to rule on the ICWA issues. The case was continued until December 17, 2007. The court directed Grandmother and her attorney to provide the Department with a complete list of her objections to the ICWA notice.
The hearing reconvened on December 17, 2007, before Judge Lechowick. Mother no longer wanted a guardian ad litem. Her attorney said she was doing “great” and was on the right medication, but that her guardian ad litem should not be terminated until the end of the hearing.
Mother testified that she had been recommended for release from the hospital. She anticipated she would be released as soon as there was an available bed at an outpatient facility in Mendocino, where she would probably spend six months. She said that she was catatonic and mute when this case began, but now that she was on medication she could think clearly. Mother explained she was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and is a recovering alcoholic, but she functions normally with medication and has been stable for over three years. She understood that the main purpose of the hearing was to determine the sufficiency of the ICWA notices, and that if the court found them sufficient it could terminate her parental rights. She said she wanted to remain in her children’s lives and felt she was capable of making her own decisions about them.
The guardian ad litem expressed her opinion that Mother was able to understand the proceedings, assist her attorney and make decisions in her own best interests. Despite some concern that she might be subject to undue influence from Grandmother, Ms. Ocean did not believe Mother any longer needed a guardian ad litem.
The juvenile court noted it shared the same concern and observed that at the previous hearing Grandmother “was essentially shaking her head no in terms of the guardian reappointment, trying to convey messages to the mother.”
The court relieved Ms. Ocean as guardian ad litem, but directed her to assist Mother through the remainder of the hearing. The court explained, “[Mother] does appear lucid and responsive. And while the Court may have concerns about her actual status in the system and how far she has progressed, it does appear that she’s capable of acting without a guardian ad litem in helping making her decisions in this matter. [¶] I still would ask, though, Attorney Ocean to remain for at least the remainder of today’s proceeding just in case there’s any need for intervention. But at this stage I feel—the Court feels it can proceed. [¶] In agreement with the mother’s request that the guardian ad litem be relieved, I just simply ask and the record should reflect that Attorney Ocean will be named, at least through today’s proceedings, as an observer and she’s still sitting next to the mother.”
Grandmother and her attorney repeated her objections that the ICWA notices failed to state that the children were treated at an Indian health clinic and that her grandmother’s name, Amelia C. did not appear in the notices, although it was reflected on the family tree attached to the notices. The Department reminded the court that Grandmother had been admonished to provide a written list of objections to the notices. The Department’s counsel said, “I just want to implore her again, if she has some other objection. I know that she has [,] I repeatedly spoke[] with her appellate lawyer to scrutinize everything possible, so I just want to make sure I’m not asking about attorney-client privileged information. But if she has any reason or notice or knowledge of some deficiency other than what she said right now in terms of there being an allegation of Athena being a patient of Tribal Health and not being set forth in the notice, that we ask that she provide that to us now.” In response, Grandmother testified she gave the Department her grandmother’s name and told them she was Seminole Indian “[a] couple of years ago.” She raised no other objections to the notices, either in writing or orally.
Grandmother also testified her grandmother was of Knacki as well as Seminole heritage.
Department employee Sheila Rockwell, who supervised the ICWA notice efforts for Athena and Israel, testified the Department expended approximately 150 hours attempting to perfect the ICWA notice. She also testified that Tribal Health Services in Lake County provides services to non-Indian as well as Indian clients.
Counsel for Grandmother and Mother submitted on the ICWA issue. Asked by the court whether she felt there were remaining issues to be addressed, Ms. Ocean said there were none. Mother submitted a letter asking that the children be placed with her mother.
The court found the Department had complied with ICWA notice requirements and concluded that ICWA does not apply to the minors. It further concluded the Department complied with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to finalize the children’s permanent placement; found the permanent plan of adoption appropriate; reordered adoption as the permanent plan; and reinstated the previously ordered termination of parental rights. Grandmother and Mother filed timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. ICWA Notices
In Athena I we held the Department’s initial ICWA notices were fatally inadequate. We conditionally reversed the termination of parental rights and ordered the Department to comply with ICWA’s notice provisions. Grandmother now raises a host of challenges to the adequacy of the Department’s post remand efforts to comply with ICWA. She asserts that (1) the new notices omitted known information that the children had been treated at Indian tribal health facilities; (2) the notices did not adequately show that Grandmother’s Seminole claimed heritage derived from her paternal grandmother; (3) the notices for Athena might have been sent without or with incomplete attachments; (4) the notices omitted telephone numbers for the court and noticed parties; (5) the notices omitted the name of a non-Indian maternal great-grandfather; (6) the notices sent to the Pueblo of Acoma tribe were addressed to a Melissa Gordan rather than Melissa Gordon, who was the tribe’s designated agent for service; (7) the return receipts and responsive letters from the Pueblo of Acoma were signed by someone other than Gordon; and (8) the tribes were not notified of the December 17, 2007, hearing date. All but the first two of these claims were waived by Grandmother’s failure to raise them in the juvenile court.
Although the minors did not appeal from the order reinstituting the termination of parental rights, their appellate counsel argues many of the same points on appeal, including the omission of information concerning Seminole heritage and treatment of the minors at an Indian health clinic. The minors concede that notice to the Pueblo of Acoma satisfied ICWA and that any challenge to the omission of Grandfather’s father’s name was forfeited.
II. Forfeiture
It is clear from the procedural history in this case that Grandmother had numerous opportunities to challenge the adequacy of the ICWA process following our remands in Athena I and Athena II. Even after the hearing to consider ICWA compliance was continued several times, she was ordered at the December 10, 2007, hearing—almost two months after the Department filed its ICWA compliance report and four months after the final notices were filed—to provide all her possible objections to the court and the Department. She did not do so, either in writing, as directed, or at the final ICWA compliance hearing held on December 17. Now, on appeal, she asserts multiple new challenges to the adequacy of the August 2007 notices. It is too late.
We are not the first court to reject an attempt to draw out dependency proceedings through serial challenges to ICWA notices. In In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, our colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District considered whether issues concerning the adequacy of ICWA notices are forfeited when parties fail to raise them in the juvenile court during remanded proceedings following a conditional reversal for ICWA noncompliance. The court held there can be a forfeiture for failure to object in such cases. It recognized that appellate courts should exercise their discretion to excuse forfeiture “rarely and with special care” (id. at p. 804), and noted the careful balancing in juvenile dependency proceedings of the interests of Indian children and tribes against the children’s significant interest in permanency and stability. (Id. at p. 798.)
The X.V. court observed that the children had been in multiple placements in the dependency system for nearly three and a half years. The extended length of the dependency in that case led to the court’s observation that delay resulting from the notice process can undermine the integrity of the proceedings, the policies in ICWA and the interests of the children. It said, “We are mindful that the ICWA is to be construed broadly [citation], but we are unwilling to further prolong the proceedings for another round of ICWA notices, to which the parents may again object on appeal. As a matter of respect for the children involved and the judicial system, as well as common sense, it is incumbent on parents on remand to assist the Agency in ensuring proper notice is given. Here, for instance, the inadequacies in the notices . . . could easily have been rectified at the juvenile court given a timely objection. Moreover, Congress’s intent to not cause unnecessary delay in dependency proceedings is evidenced by the provision allowing a hearing on the termination of parental rights within a relatively short time, 10 days, after the BIA or tribe receives ICWA notice. [Citation.] We do not believe Congress anticipated or intended to require successive or serial appeals challenging ICWA notices for the first time on appeal. As the Agency notes, ‘[a]t some point, the rules of error preservation must apply or parents will be able to repeatedly delay permanence for children through numerous belated ICWA notice appeals and writs.’ ” (In re X.V., supra, 132 Cal.App.4that pp. 804-805.)
The X.V. court concluded that forfeiture principles should apply to preclude a second appeal, “as further delay harms the paramount interests of dependent children in permanence and stability. The purposes of the ICWA are indeed commendable, but we do not believe Congress envisioned or intended successive or serial appeals on ICWA notice issues when, given a proper objection, they could easily be resolved during proceedings on remand for the specific purpose of determining whether proper notice was given.” (In re X.V., supra, 132 Cal.App.4that p. 798.) We agree.
A different division of the Fourth Appellate District more recently “wholeheartedly embrace[d] the holding and reasoning of X.V.” in a similar dependency case. (In re Amber F. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1156.) There, in a remand following a conditional reversal for ICWA noncompliance, the parent failed to object at the final notice review hearing. As in X.V., the appellate court distinguished the situation from a first appeal raising ICWA notice error, where parental inaction does not normally forfeit a right to notice that belongs to the tribes. (Amber F., supra, at p. 1155.) “Balancing Amber’s interest in permanency and stability against the tribes’ rights under ICWA requires a different result in this case. The case was remanded for the sole purpose of correcting defective ICWA notice, and [the mother] had multiple opportunities to examine the notice documents. Had she brought the errors she now asserts to the juvenile court’s attention, it could have dealt with them appropriately. She did not. At this juncture, allowing [her] to raise these issues on appeal for the first time opens the door to gamesmanship, a practice that is particularly reprehensible in the juvenile dependency arena.” (Id. at p. 1156; see also In re N.M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 253, 269 [following Amber F. and In re X.V.])
In this case, Grandmother has also had ample time, notice and opportunity to raise all of her complaints to the juvenile court, where they could have been most expeditiously addressed. Moreover, the de minimus and speculative nature of some of her new objections—e.g., a misspelled name, the omission from the notices of the court’s phone number, the lack of a birth certificate for Athena, even though Grandmother cannot identify any missing information it would have supplied or possible prejudice that could have resulted from its omission—smacks unavoidably of seeking delay for its own sake.
We are aware of one appellate court that recently declined to follow Amber F. and In re X.V. (In re Alice M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1195-1197.) Alice M. distinguished those cases, but Alice M. is distinguishable from this one. In Alice M., the appeal presented only the first challenge to the ICWA notice. (Id. at p. 1196.) Alice M. found it significant that the alleged deficiencies at issue in X.V. were related to information provided by or within the purview of the appellant, while the alleged notice deficiencies in Alice M. “were solely the result of the Department’s actions and within the Department’s control.” (In re Alice M., supra, at pp. 1196-1197.) But whether the deficiencies were caused by the appellant or the department, the appellant presumably could have identified the problems and raised them in the juvenile court instead of waiting until the appeal. We perceive no reason why the original source of the error, whether the parent, the department, or the tribe, should excuse a parent’s failure to bring the error to the attention of the juvenile court in the course of a conditional remand for ICWA compliance.
Finally, we disagree with Alice M’s rejection of Amber F.’sunderlying rationale. (In re Alice M., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.) The Department clearly, even if belatedly, expended considerable time and resources to remedy the earlier inadequacies in ICWA compliance. Far from giving the Department a “free pass in complying with ICWA,” (ibid), application of basic forfeiture principles in this case will require Grandmother and her attorney to identify problems she perceives in the ICWA notices at, not long after, the final ICWA compliance hearing in juvenile court. For these reasons, we think Amber F., not Alice M., strikes the better balance between the competing goals of appropriate notification for the tribes and stability and permanence for the children. Both interests deserve more than lip service.
Grandmother alternatively protests that if we deem her new complaints to have been forfeited, the forfeiture should be excused due to ineffective representation by her counsel. Mother, also, asserts her counsel was ineffective because she submitted without objection to the ICWA notice. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a party must show both that an attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and a reasonable probability that a more favorable result otherwise would have been reached. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1668.) Neither Mother nor Grandmother has done so. It is undisputed that responses were received from every one of the 26 noticed tribes indicating that the minors were neither tribal members nor eligible for enrollment. Grandmother has failed to demonstrate any way in which the allegedly deficient notices might have so altered the information available to the tribes that there would have been a different result. For example, as to the allegedly missing attachments to Athena’s notices, it is not at all clear from the record that they were not sent; and, in any event, the same information was undisputedly sent at the same time to the same tribes as attachments to Israel’s notices. Grandmother’s other complaints, i.e., a barely misspelled name of a tribal agent for service (Gordan instead of Gordon); telephone numbers not supplied; the omission of irrelevant information concerning a non-Indian great-grandfather; the lack of a notice of hearing to tribes after they had already responded that the children were not members or eligible for enrollment—could have made no explicable difference to the outcome.
Mother makes the somewhat more novel argument that she was prejudiced by her counsel’s failure to object because objection might have delayed the dependency proceedings until her eventual release from Patton State Hospital, when she could have petitioned for a modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. We obviously do not condone raising objections for the purpose of delaying a dependency proceeding. Nor, like Grandmother, has Mother shown that any objections would have produced a different result. Moreover, she has not demonstrated any possibility that a petition for modification, presumably to return the children to her own or her mother’s custody, would ever be granted. Such a development seems, at best, highly unlikely.
Finally, Grandmother’s contention that forfeiture principles should not be applied because an “objection would likely have been futile” is also unpersuasive. Her argument is based on our conclusions of judicial error in previous proceedings in this case. But the question now is whether the record shows the juvenile court would have ignored a meritorious objection raised at the December 2007 ICWA compliance hearings. There is nothing to show that it would have done so, and the fact that we have previously found error in this case does not relieve Grandmother or her counsel of their diligence to raise objections in a timely manner.
We conclude that Grandmother and Mother forfeited all but the two challenges to the renewed ICWA notices raised at the August 2007 compliance hearings. Accordingly, we will consider the juvenile court’s rulings on the two points Grandmother and her counsel did preserve through timely objections: the omission of information that the children received treatment at an Indian health clinic and information pertaining to the children’s maternal great-great-grandmother.
III. Treatment at an Indian Health Clinic
The Notice of Involuntary Child Custody Proceedings for an Indian Child form (JV-135) asks, as one of several “optional questions [that] may be helpful in tracing the ancestry of any person alleging Indian descent” (italics added), whether the minors or family members have received treatment at an Indian health clinic. The checked box in this case indicated “unknown” rather than “yes” even though it has long been known that the children were patients at an Indian health clinic (see Athena II). When this error was raised at the December 17, 2007, hearing, the court asked whether the omission was material in light of the fact that “it’s always been acknowledged these children have some Indian blood of some amount.” We agree with the court’s conclusion that this omission was immaterial in the circumstances and did not require yet another round of notices.
Grandmother argues it was reversible error for the Department to withhold information that might have helped the tribes investigate whether the children are Indian. But she fails to show any way in which this information might have furthered the tribes’ investigations and none is apparent, when we consider that (1) the notices otherwise disclosed that the children were alleged to be of Indian heritage; and (2) the Lake County Indian Health Clinic does not restrict its services to Native Americans.
The minors’ appellate counsel takes a similar tack, but argues that California Rules of Court require this information be provided. We disagree. Rule 5.481 requires the responsible agency to make further inquiry if it knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is or may be involved in a dependency proceeding. (Rule 5.481(a)(4).) The provision cited by the minors’ counsel merely lists as one circumstance “that may provide reason to know the child is an Indian child,” the fact that the child “has received services or benefits . . . that are available to Indians from tribes or the federal government, such as . . . Indian Health Service . . . .” (Rules 5.481(a)(5), 5.481(a)(5)(C).) Contrary to counsel’s argument, the rule does not mandate that this information be included in the notice sent to tribes. Although the answer to the question on the form was wrong, we will not again delay these proceedings to require the Department to fix an error that could not conceivably have affected the tribes’ investigations or responses to the notices.
IV. Seminole Lineage
Next, both Grandmother and counsel for the minors contend the notices did not describe the children’s possible Seminole heritage through their great-great grandmother Amelia C. with sufficient clarity to allow the noticed tribes to meaningfully evaluate their lineage. We disagree. Notice under the ICWA must contain enough information to allow tribes to conduct a meaningful evaluation of whether the minor is an Indian child. (See In re Louis S. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 622, 631; In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 175.) But the law does not require a description of potential lineage with unassailable perfection. Here, the JV-135 forms for both children reported that Grandmother and her father Norman C., the children’s maternal great-grandfather, alleged Seminole heritage, and stated that additional information was attached. The attached family tree identified only one of Norman’s forebearers: his mother, Amelia C. Any tribe interested in the children’s possible Seminole heritage was therefore able to investigate both Norman and Amelia, Amelia’s only identified ancestor. Although the Department could have gone one step further and explicitly identified Amelia as Seminole Indian, it is inconceivable that its failure to do so deprived any tribe of information needed to meaningfully evaluate the children’s heritage.
The JV-135 form does not specifically ask for information about generations beyond the great-grandparents.
The minors’ appellate attorney and Grandmother complain that the notices dated August 2, 2007, and filed with the court omitted several attachments to Athena’s JV-135 form, including the family tree. However, the copy of that notice filed with the Department’s ICWA compliance report includes the family tree. We will not presume on this record that these documents were omitted from the notices sent to the tribes. In any event, because there is no dispute that the family tree was attached to the notices sent for Israel at the same time as the notices for Athena, the relevant information was undoubtedly available to the noticed tribes.
In summary, we hold that Grandmother and the minors’ counsel forfeited any objections to the ICWA notices not raised in the juvenile court and that the two objections they preserved for appeal lack merit. Moreover, any failure of counsel to raise objections to the ICWA notice procedure was not prejudicial.
V. Guardian Ad Litem
Mother and the minors’ appellate counsel (but not Grandmother) assert that the juvenile court erred when it relieved Mother’s guardian ad litem at the hearing on December 17, 2007. As we observed in Athena I, there appears to be no authority addressing the due process requirements attached to the removal of a guardian ad litem. (Compare In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901 [due process considerations when appointing guardian ad litem; held, error is not structural]; In re Joann E. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 347, 356-357.) Although in Athena I, we determined the court and counsel paid inadequate heed to the guardian ad litem issues, we concluded that the potential error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We reach the same conclusion here. As in Athena I, when the court relieved the guardian ad litem it also ordered that she continue to assist Mother throughout the remainder of the hearing “in case there’s any need for intervention.” Accordingly, had Ms. Ocean seen any reason to intervene at any point during the hearing, she could and presumably would have done so. She did not. We cannot conceive that either her actions at the hearing or the result would have been any different if the court had maintained her official guardian ad litem status until the end of the hearing. If there was an error associated with Ms. Ocean’s removal as guardian ad litem, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The order reinstating the termination of parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P.J., Pollak, J.