Opinion
No.: 05C-05-246 ASB, No.: 05C-06-083-ASB, No.: 05C-07-124 ASB, No.: 05C-05-203 ASB, No.: 05C-07-248 ASB, No.: 05C-06-341 ASB, No.: 05C-06-057 ASB, No.: 05C-05-273 ASB, No.: 05C-06-216 ASB, No.: 05C-06-067 ASB, No.: 05C-05-242 ASB, No.: 05C-05-270 ASB, No.: 05C-05-302 ASB, No.: 05C-06-176 ASB, Nos. 05C-08-185 ASB, 05C-09-083 ASB, 05C-08-039 ASB, No.: 05C-08-049 ASB, No.: 05C-08-207 ASB, Nos. 05C-07-321 ASB, 05C-07-273 ASB, 05C-08-071 ASB, 05C-07-204 ASB, 05C-07-271 ASB, 05C-05-245 ASB, 05C-07-160 ASB, 05C-09-119 ASB, 05C-09-034 ASB, 05C-06-069 ASB, 05C-09-152 ASB, 05C-08-312 ASB, 05C-09-192 ASB, 05C-07-247 ASB, 05C-09-237 ASB, 05C-09-269 ASB, 05C-09-177 ASB.
Submitted: December 20, 2005.
Decided: March 13, 2006.
Upon Consideration of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based on Interest of Justice
OPINION
Goodyear Tire Rubber Company ("Goodyear") is an Ohio corporation with its principle place of business in Ohio. Jurisdiction in this action is based on the long-arm statute, 10 Del.C. § 3104.
The motion was initially presented by Volkswagen of America, Inc ("Volkswagen") and joined by Dana Corporation and Goodyear. Since the November 28, 2005 oral argument, Dana Corporation has filed for bankruptcy protection and Volkswagen of American, Inc. has withdrawn its motion as moot, due to settlement of the claims against it. Goodyear formally incorporated by reference the Volkswagen Motion to Dismiss in its brief Motion to Dismiss. The interested parties designated Volkswagen's counsel to present argument for all.
Goodyear has filed a motion to dismiss this action based on a provision in the long-arm statute, subsection (l), which requires the court to dismiss or stay an action if, in the interest of justice, the action should be heard in another forum. I conclude that the provision relied on is a codification of the due process protection of the United States Constitution which is implicated when a State seeks to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident, and does not provide a basis for dismissing the plaintiff's claim. The motion to dismiss on interests of justice is DENIED.
10 Del. C. § 3104 (l) In any cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, the court may provide for a stay or dismissal of action if the court finds, in the interest of justice, that the action should be heard in another forum. (emphasis supplied)
Discussion
The previously issued decision in this case provides the background of this litigation and will not be repeated here.
In Re: Asbestos Litigation, Del. Super., C.A. Nos. 05C-05-246, 05C-08-250, 05C-07-206, 05C-08-262, 05C-081-76, 05C-07-178, 05C-08-142, 05C-06-083, 05C-07-124, 05C-05-203, 05C-06-215, 05C-05-274, 05C-07-223, 05C0-8-248, 05C-07-248, 05C-08-249, 05C-06-341, 05C-06-057, 05C-05-273, 05C-06-029, 05C-08-162, 05C-06-216, 05C-08-061, 04C-09-122, 05C-09-122, 05C-09-214, 05C-08-220, 05C-07-109, 05C-08-260, 05C-06-067, 05C-053-29, 05C-05-242, 05C-05-270, 05C-08-261, 05C-08-218, 05C-05-302, 05C-05-341, 05C-05-272, 05C-05-272, 05C0-5-247, 05C-08-285, 05C-06-176, Slights, J. (Mar. 8, 2006) (Mem. Op.)
Section 3104 is a jurisdictional statute that was enacted to afford Delaware residents a means of redress against persons not subject to personal service in the State. The statute has been construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due process clause.
Harm on v. Eudaily, 407 A.2d 232, 236 (Del.Super. 1979).
LaNuova D B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Company, Inc., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986); Wilmington Supply Co. v. Worth Plumbing Heating, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D.Del. 1980).
The analytical process for determining the application of the statute proceeds in two steps. First, the court must determine whether the statute provides for jurisdiction over a defendant. That is not contested.
The following exchange occurred at oral argument:
JUDGE DEL PESCO: Well, I have a question. If I understand your argument, you're agreeing that the clients you represent, the nonresidents, are subject to service and jurisdiction under 3104, but you say that that escape hatch, the last provision, applies here?
MR. WYNER: That's right, your Honor. 3104 (l) presumes that personal jurisdiction exists under the long-arm statute. In fact, it expressly says, "In a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section." In other words, when the cause of action is based on something that's properly within the long-arm jurisdiction, the Court may dismiss or stay in the interest of justice if it belongs somewhere else.
JUDGE DEL PESCO: So again, you agree that you're properly within those provision of the statute, the long-arm statute, you're just saying that (l) applies here to circumstances of the clients you mentioned?
Mr. WYNER: That's correct, your Honor.
Hearing Tr. 98: 1-21, Nov. 28, 2005.
Second, the court must determine whether exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the long-arm statute offends the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process requires that certain minimum contacts must exist between a State and a nonresident defendant before the State can exercise personal jurisdiction over it. If exercise of jurisdiction would overstep the bounds of State sovereignty or offend "`traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' . . . [citations omitted] . . . then the Due Process Clause forbids such exercise." Goodwill's contacts with Delaware "must rise to such a level that it should `reasonably anticipate'" being required to defend itself in the courts of this State. Goodwill does not argue a due process violation.
Moore v. Little Giant Industries, Inc., 513 F. Supp 1043, 1048 (D.Del. 1981).
LaNuova, 513 A.2d at 769 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
The factors argued by the defendant in support of its motion to dismiss are factors related to the plaintiff. Defendant notes that plaintiff has no ties to Delaware, that he has not been treated in Delaware, and that the tort in question did not occur in Delaware. Defendant also argues that litigating the claims here will be a burden on the court system and the citizens who may be called to serve as jurors. Those considerations were properly part of the forum non convenience analysis previously decided.
In Re: Asbestos Litigation, Del. Super., C.A. No. 05C-06-295, Slights, J. (Mar. 8, 2006) (Mem. Op.)
Defendant makes a novel argument, attempting to use the long-arm statute offensively, rather than defensively. I find that section 3104(l) merely codifies the due process limitations of the statute. As such, it is intended to protect a defendant, not to exclude a plaintiff.
The motion to dismiss on the grounds of interests of justice is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.