Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD224531
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
M.S. (appellant), the mother of A.S. (the minor), appeals in pro per from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that “the court should not have given . . . [the] Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services [(DHHS)] the absolute right to arbitrarily deny [her] the right to see [the minor] on a regular basis.” We shall affirm the judgment (order terminating parental rights).
Hereafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because the issue on appeal is limited, an extensive description of the dependency proceedings is not needed.
In June 2006, DHHS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the 12-day-old minor, alleging that appellant “has psychiatric/emotional problems,” and as a result, lacks “the cognitive ability to safely parent the [minor] without direct and constant supervision.” (§ 300, subd. (b).) The minor was ordered detained, and appellant was granted supervised visitation.
In November 2006, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a dependent of the court; granted appellant “regular visitation with the [minor]”; delegated DHHS the authority to “determine the time, place and manner of visitation”; and set the section 366.26 hearing.
In April 2007, the juvenile court found the minor would likely be adopted, terminated appellant’s parental rights, and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
Appellant challenges the juvenile court’s delegation of authority to DHHS to determine the time, place, and manner of visitation. According to appellant, the juvenile court erred by giving DHHS “the absolute right to arbitrarily deny [her] the right to see her son on a regular basis.” As we shall explain, appellant’s claim is not cognizable on appeal.
Section 366.26, subdivision (l), bars review of an order setting a section 366.26 hearing unless the parent has sought timely review by extraordinary writ. California Rules of Court, rule 5.600(b) further provides in pertinent part: “When the court orders a hearing under section 366.26, the court must advise orally all parties present . . . that if the party wishes to preserve any right to review on appeal of the order setting the hearing under section 366.26, the party is required to seek an extraordinary writ by filing a Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition and Request for Record (California Rules of Court, [r]ule 8.450) (form JV-820) . . . .” The petition for extraordinary writ must be filed within 10 days after the filing of any record in the reviewing court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.600(i).)
As previously mentioned, the delegation of authority that is the subject of this appeal occurred at the disposition hearing in November 2006. Appellant was present at the disposition hearing and was advised of the need to file a notice of intent to file a writ petition to preserve any right to review on appeal of the court’s order. Indeed, appellant timely filed such a notice. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.600(c).) She failed, however, to file a petition for extraordinary writ at any point thereafter (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.600(i)) or otherwise appeal from the disposition order. Accordingly, her challenge is not cognizable in this appeal. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(B); Joe B. v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 23, 26; Anthony D. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 149, 155-156; Suzanne J. v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 785, 787-788.)
To the extent appellant requests that this court “grant her more freedom in determining when she can visit with [the minor],” we note that her right to visitation was extinguished along with her parental rights. (§ 366.26.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order terminating parental rights) is affirmed.
We concur: RAYE , Acting P.J., BUTZ , J.