Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV118745
ROBIE, J.
The juvenile court found true the allegation that the minor, Anthony F., committed robbery and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in doing so. On appeal, the minor contends the court denied his motion to dismiss on a legally incorrect ground -- that the force necessary for robbery need not be motivated by an intent to steal. As we explain, this contention rests on a statement by the juvenile court taken out of context. Based on the court’s ruling in its entirety, we will conclude the court’s denial of the minor’s motion to dismiss was proper and will therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2007, Moses Sanchez was walking on 21st Avenue listening to his iPod. Sanchez noticed a group of about five people, including the minor, walking toward him on the opposite side of the street and looked at the group for one or two seconds. Believing something was going to happen with the group, Sanchez put his iPod away and took his cell phone out to call his sister or a friend. Before Sanchez could place the call, he turned around and saw the group close behind him. Sanchez looked at the minor for two to three seconds, including at his eyes for less than a second. The minor then struck Sanchez on the left side of his head, causing Sanchez to lose consciousness.
Michael Hill saw the minor strike Sanchez in the head three or four more times. After Sanchez fell unconscious, the minor picked up Sanchez’s cell phone. After witnessing the attack, Hill called the police and followed the minor as he walked away from the scene. Hill continued to follow the minor for 10 to 15 minutes until he jumped over a fence into a backyard. The minor left Sanchez’s cell phone in the backyard.
Five days after the incident, Officer Evan Kanenaga of the Sacramento Police Department saw the minor and recognized him from an arrest bulletin identifying him as a suspect in a robbery. He summoned the minor to his patrol car and read the minor his Miranda rights, and the minor agreed to talk about the incident. The minor told the officer he saw Sanchez holding what he thought was an iPod and he thought of taking the iPod so he could sell it. The minor then told Officer Kanenaga that as he walked closer to Sanchez, Sanchez gave him a look he did not like, and he “just snapped,” punched Sanchez twice in the face, then took the item Sanchez had in his hand when he fell, which turned out to be a cell phone. The minor told Officer Kanenaga that as he was running away, he realized the item he had taken was not the iPod, so he got rid of it. He then showed Officer Kanenaga where he left the cell phone, and it was recovered.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694].
After the People presented all of their witnesses, the minor moved to dismiss the robbery allegation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1. The minor asserted that in a robbery, the “intent to take property must have been formed before or during the time he or she used force or fear” and that “[i]f the [minor] did not form this required intent until after using force or fear, then he did not commit robbery.” The minor argued that although he contemplated taking the iPod, the “look” Sanchez gave him was what provoked the physical attack, therefore there was no robbery.
The People argued it was unreasonable to believe that the minor formed the intent to steal the iPod, abandoned that intent, beat Sanchez because of a look, then decided to take his cell phone.
The court stated that the issue was whether the minor “had an intent to steal before the property was forceably [sic] taken” and for robbery to occur, “[t]he force has to further the taking, but it doesn’t have to be the motivating force for it.” Later, the court also stated, “Whatever motivates the force is not the issue.” The court ultimately denied the minor’s motion to dismiss, however, based on the conclusion that there were “no circumstances here that could lead a court to a reasonable inference that [the minor] actually formed the affirmative intent to abandon the intent to steal” and that there was “clear evidence that he continued to hold th[e] intent [to steal the iPod] throughout the course of events here thinking he had accomplished his goal of stealing the iPod in the end.”
DISCUSSION
The minor argues the juvenile court misapplied the law of robbery to the facts of this case when it stated, “[w]hatever motivates the force is not the issue.” As the minor points out, “the intent to steal . . . must motivate the force in order for the offense to be a robbery.” (See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34; People v. Reeves (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 52-53.) He asserts that because the juvenile court here acknowledged that he “snapped” when Sanchez looked at him and therefore his “act of force against Sanchez was not motivated by an intent to steal,” the court’s finding that the minor committed robbery must be reversed.
While the minor is correct that the force must be motivated by the intent to steal for there to be a robbery, the minor is mistaken in asserting that the juvenile court committed a legal error requiring reversal when it stated “[w]hatever motivates the force is not the issue” because he takes that statement out of the context of the court’s entire ruling. When the juvenile court’s entire ruling is examined, it appears the court was trying to explain why it did not matter whether the minor struck Sanchez because of the “look” he thought Sanchez gave him as long as he also had the intent to steal from Sanchez at the time of the attack. Indeed, consistent with the rule that the force must be motivated by the intent to steal, the court ultimately explained that robbery occurs if, “when the defendant used force and fear to take property he intended to deprive the owner of it permanently.” The court then correctly applied that principle to the facts of this case, as follows: “The minor formed that intent. There is no evidence that he changed his mind and decided not to steal and that is an important distinction. He has formed the intent to steal. The fact that he gets upset and decides to add force to it does not mean that he has abandoned the intent to steal. There are no circumstances here that could lead a court to a reasonable inference that he has actually formed the affirmative intent to abandon the intent to steal. He still holds that . . . . [¶] The circumstantial evidence of him still holding that is the fact that he immediately reaches down and picks up an electric device and leaves. Clearly he was not reevaluating the matter at that point, newly evaluating what [do I] have here. . . . It’s only after that he said as he was running away that he realizes he doesn’t have the iPod. So his intent to steal that iPod was clear evidence that he continued to hold that intent throughout the course of events here thinking he had accomplished his goal of stealing the iPod in the end. [¶] Therefore, the robbery aspect of it is proved at this point beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of the elements.”
Despite some initial language suggesting a misunderstanding of the law, the juvenile court’s decision can ultimately be understood as a proper application of the correct legal principle posited by the minor, “that the act must be motivated by the intent.” Accordingly, we find no error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MORRISON, Acting P.J., HULL, J.