Opinion
04-21-00303-CV
01-19-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF A.N.L., G.R.L., P.M.L., R.A.J., A.A.J., L.C.R., J.E.R., C.J.R., Children
From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019-PA-01830 Honorable Linda A. Rodriguez, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena Chapa, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
AFFIRMED
Appellant Mom appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to A.A.J., L.C.R., J.E.R., and C.J.R.[i] Mom argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that terminating Mom's parental rights was in the children's best interests. For the reasons given below, we affirm the trial court's order.
Background
This appeal reviews the outcome of a CPS case that began in 2018 after Mom was reported for medical neglect.[ii] The medical neglect complaint stemmed from Mom's refusal to take her fifteen-year-old daughter, A.N.L., to the hospital after A.N.L. called her from school to say she was experiencing suicidal ideations.
Over the course of Mom's CPS case, Mom did not comply with her service plan. She tested positive for methamphetamines. She gave birth to two children who tested positive for drugs. She did not maintain a stable home, and she was not consistently employed. At one point, Mom told her caseworker that she would press charges for harassment if CPS did not leave her alone. When Mom's children were removed from Mom's home due to concerns of drug use and Mom's inability to keep the children safe, Mom enabled her three oldest children to run away from their placements. Mom's CPS-monitored visits with her children were chaotic and required security. One of the children refused to participate in the visits. Mom's caseworker did not believe Mom demonstrated the ability to adequately care for her children. The Department recommended termination of Mom's rights as to five of her children with possessory rights as to the three oldest. The children's attorney ad litem recommended termination of Mom's rights as to only four of the children.
The trial court followed the ad litem's recommendation, terminating Mom's parental rights to the four youngest children, A.A.J., L.C.R., J.E.R., and C.J.R. The trial court found that terminating these parental rights was in the children's best interests. Mom appeals.
Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Best Interests
Mom argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that terminating her parental rights to four of her children was in their best interests. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2).
The Family Code statutory factors and the Holley factors for the best interest of a child are well known. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371 (Tex. 1976). Applying the applicable standards of review and statutory and common law best interest factors, we examine the evidence pertaining to the best interests of the children.[iii]
Statutory Factors for Best Interest of the Child. The Texas legislature codified certain factors courts are to use in determining the best interest of a child:
(1) the child's age and physical and mental vulnerabilities;
(2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements;
(3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child;
(4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department;
(5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child's home;
(6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child's parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child's home;
(7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home;
(8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home;
(9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified;
(10) the willingness and ability of the child's family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency's close supervision;
(11) the willingness and ability of the child's family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time;
(12) whether the child's family demonstrates adequate parenting skills; . . . and
(13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child.Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b); see In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018) (recognizing statutory factors).
Holley Factors. The Supreme Court of Texas identified several nonexclusive factors to determine the best interest of a child:
(A) the desires of the child;
(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (footnotes omitted); accord In re E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex. 2012) (reciting the Holley factors).
A. Evidence of Mom's Course of Conduct
Mom's caseworker testified that, in 2018, Mom's CPS service plan required her to engage in individual counseling, to take her children to counseling, to complete parenting classes, and to submit to drug testing. However, she did not comply with the service plan. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(10), (11), (12)(B), (12)(F); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (D), (E)). When a new caseworker was assigned in 2019, the caseworker required the help of an investigator to find Mom. When the investigator and caseworker found Mom, the caseworker discovered that Mom was both overwhelmed by her children and hostile toward CPS intervention. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(10), (11), (12)(B), (12)(F); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (D), (E)). After talking with the caseworker, Mom agreed to reengage with services. But after the caseworker resubmitted referrals for Mom's services, Mom did not comply with the service plan. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(10), (11), (12)(B), (12)(F); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (D), (E)).
First, Mom did not successfully follow through with her counseling requirement. She was unsuccessfully discharged by two counselors for missed appointments, and she was not in compliance with a third therapist at the time of trial. The caseworker testified that Mom had been diagnosed with depression. During Mom's testimony, Mom denied her depression diagnosis. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(6), (10), (11), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (D), (E)).
Mom also failed to complete her required drug tests. In total, she missed ten tests. Of the tests Mom submitted to, she continued to show drug-positive results. Despite these drug-positive results, Mom denied any illicit drug use. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1), (3), (8), (11), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (D), (G), (H)). Rather than admit to illicit drug use, Mom insisted that these drug-positive results were false positives. However, when Mom's caseworker attempted to rule out false positives, Mom did not submit to any additional testing. Notwithstanding Mom's failure to submit to additional testing, Mom's caseworker testified that a CPS expert confirmed Mom's prescription medications would not cause false positive drug test results. Furthermore, when Mom gave birth to C.J.R., he was admitted to the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit due to his symptoms of withdrawal. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1), (3), (8); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (H)).
After C.J.R. was born, and as Mom's case progressed, all of Mom's children attended CPS-monitored visits with Mom. Mom's caseworker noted that the children would scream, fight, and sometimes becomes aggressive with CPS staff at these visits. CPS had to keep security on standby, and CPS lost some monitors due to the aggressive behavior. Mom's caseworker stated that Mom would not redirect the aggressive behavior. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (H)). The caseworker recalled that security escorted some of the children and Mom out because of their screaming arguments. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1), (7), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (D)). Mom's son, L.C.R., who was nine years old at the time of trial, expressed that he did not want to participate in the visits at all. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1), (7); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (A), (B), (C), (D)).
Mom's last caseworker, who was also assigned in 2019, testified that Mom was required to take parenting and domestic violence classes as part of her service plan. She testified that Mom did not complete these services. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(7), (10), (11), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (D), (E)). As a result, Mom's caseworker believed that Mom had not learned how to better protect her children from family violence.
At one point during Mom's case, the trial record shows that her boyfriend gave G.R.L. drugs to sell at school. His arrest led to CPS' discovery of his criminal drug history and past sexual abuse allegations against him. These past allegations were concerning to CPS, in part, because two of Mom's daughters were in counseling for past sexual abuse. Even so, Mom did not make the necessary changes to remove him from her home. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(8), (10), (11), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (D)). This was the point at which Mom's children were removed from her custody.
After removal, according to the trial record, Mom's three oldest children all ran away from their placements at separate times to see Mom. CPS was concerned that Mom was encouraging the children to run away, though Mom denied that she had done so. G.R.L. was one of Mom's children to run away from her placement home. On one occasion, G.R.L. was on runaway status for three months before she was located at an apartment that belonged to an old friend of Mom's who was a registered sex offender. Mom denied knowing that G.R.L. was there, though police found Mom at the same address. Mom admitted that G.R.L. had been in contact with her at the time. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factor (H)).
Mom testified that she wanted all her children returned to her. However, at the time of trial, she had no home. She testified that she was in the process of getting a home. She testified that she was living on her savings of $10,000. But Mom also testified that she had no income at the time of trial. She acknowledged she had not been actively employed in over a year. Mom explained that if the children were returned to her care, she would require them to live with her mother until Mom was able to provide housing. She preferred CPS not to be involved at all. She stated that her mother did not need CPS assistance or resources to help care for the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(10), (11), (12)(D); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (D), (E), (G), (H)).
B. Evidence on Children's Placements
At the time of trial, three of Mom's children lived with her mother: A.N.L., who was seventeen years old at the time of trial, P.M.L., who was fifteen, and A.A.J., who was twelve.
According to Mom's caseworker, A.N.L. had previously been placed at children's shelters, and she had run away from those placements. Notably, the children's shelters provided A.N.L. access to counseling services, which she needed and did not consistently have prior to removal from Mom's custody. After A.N.L.'s removal from Mom's custody, CPS had to spend time working toward placement with the grandmother, since the grandmother was not licensed, and she was allowing Mom to have unauthorized contact with the children. But A.N.L.'s later placement with her grandmother was important for her, since A.N.L. expressed no interest in being adopted by anyone, and the grandmother was a relative who could provide stability and ongoing engagement with counseling services before A.N.L. turned eighteen. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(6); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (A), (B), (F), (G)).
Mom's caseworker testified that P.M.L.'s current placement with his grandmother was also recent. He was previously placed with his maternal aunt, and he ran away from that placement to find Mom. But when P.M.L. was with Mom prior to his removal from her custody, he was not attending school, and he was failing classes. With his grandmother, P.M.L. is engaging with a new counselor. The grandmother has an approved home study and provides a stable environment for P.M.L. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(12)(D); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G)).
The children's attorney ad litem noted that A.A.J. lived with her grandmother prior to Mom's CPS case. A.A.J. told Mom's caseworker that her grandmother basically raised her, and she wanted to remain there. The Department anticipated that A.A.J.'s grandmother would adopt her. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (A), (B), (D), (G)).
Mom's caseworker testified that R.A.J., who was thirteen at the time of trial, was placed at the Boysville children's shelter after it became clear that placement with the grandmother was not appropriate for her. However, Mom's caseworker noted that R.A.J. had potential adoptive placements available to her. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(1), (12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (E), (F)).
G.R.L., who was sixteen years old at the time of trial, was first placed in children's shelters. She ran away from those placements and was later placed with a friend of Mom's. Mom's friend has an approved home study and provides a stable environment for G.R.L. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(12)(D); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (D), (F), (G)).
J.E.R., who was two years old at the time of trial, and L.C.R. were both placed with an acquaintance of Mom. The acquaintance was originally a potential paternal grandmother of L.C.R. Her status as a relative was ruled out through paternity testing, but she remained a viable placement for the two boys and planned to adopt them. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(12)(D); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (D), (F), (G)).
C.J.R., who was nineteen months old, was placed with his maternal cousin at birth. She and her husband fostered C.J.R. and planned to adopt him. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b)(12)(D); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors (B), (D), (F), (G)).
C. Ad Litem's Recommendations
The children's attorney ad litem recommended Mom's parental rights be terminated as to the four youngest children in this case, A.A.J., L.C.R., J.E.R., and C.J.R. In support of termination, the attorney ad litem highlighted concerns about Mom's drug use, poor mental health, inability to protect her children, and lack of follow through with parenting classes and individual counseling. He pointed to Mom's inability to secure a regular income and stable housing for her children. The attorney ad litem noted that the younger children would be best served by adoption in their current placements; he recommended termination of Mom's rights, in part, with the goal of making it possible for the children's placement parents to adopt them.
Based on the older children's wishes, the attorney ad litem asked the trial court to grant Mom possessory rights to A.N.L, P.M.L., G.R.L., and R.A.J., which it did.
D. Legally, Factually Sufficient Evidence
Having reviewed the evidence, we conclude the trial court could have "reasonably form[ed] a firm belief or conviction" that it was in the children's best interests for Mom's parental rights to A.A.J., L.C.R., J.E.R., and C.J.R. to be terminated. See In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005); In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25). The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's best interest of the child findings. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). Mom has not shown otherwise.
We overrule Mom's complaint.
Conclusion
Evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mom's parental rights to four of her children is in their best interests. We affirm the trial court's order.
[i] To protect the minors' identities, we refer to Mom and the children using aliases. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. Mom is the only appellant. We focus our recitation of the facts on those pertaining to Mom and the children as they relate to the trial court's best interest findings. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2).
[ii] Mom's caseworker testified that Mom's CPS history began in 2009 and included removals that did not result in termination of Mom's parental rights.
[iii] The State has argued that we should not apply Holley factors, citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). However, In re C.H. only states that the Holley factors are not exhaustive. We apply the Holley factors here as a guide. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976).