Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced CountySuper. Ct. No. J1924, Thomas S. Burr, Judge.
Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, John G. McLean and Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Harris, J., and Wiseman, J.
Following a jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations that appellant Allison M., a minor, born in February 1994, committed petty theft (Pen. Code, § 488), second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) and misdemeanor battery (§ 242). The court declared the burglary to be a misdemeanor. Following the subsequent disposition hearing, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court and placed her on probation for a period not to exceed six months.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, appellant contends (1) the court erred in failing to find, pursuant to section 26, that appellant understood the wrongfulness of her conduct when she committed the acts underlying her adjudications of petty theft and second degree burglary, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support appellant’s adjudication of second degree burglary. We will affirm.
Because appellant’s contentions on appeal relate only to her adjudications of burglary and petty theft, we limit our factual summary to those offenses.
Petty Theft
Susan Padilla testified to the following. She is the manager of a department store. On September 4, 2006 (September 4), at approximately 3:30 p.m., she stepped outside the store, where merchandise was being displayed for sale, and saw appellant and another girl holding a backpack, inside of which was a pair of shoes belonging to the store. When the girls saw Padilla, they “started running ….” At that point, Padilla directed another store employee to go out the back door and try to intercept and catch the girls. The employee complied, and “brought [the girls] in [the store].” Padilla called the police.
Tomas Jimenez testified to the following. At approximately 3:30 p.m. on September 4, he was working as a sales associate at the store, when Padilla directed him to “run out the back” because two girls were running off with a pair of shoes. Jimenez opened the back door, and saw appellant and another girl “[come] to a stop” and “drop[] a backpack to the ground.” Inside the backpack was a pair of shoes belonging to the store. Jimenez “proceeded to talk to [the girls] and bring them back in [the store].”
City of Merced Police Officer Brian Rodriguez testified to the following. On September 4, he went to the store to investigate a report of a theft. At the store he spoke with appellant, who admitted stealing a pair of shoes from the front of the store. Appellant stated she did not have any money with her, and she stole the shoes because she wanted them.
Burglary
Maisee Xiong testified she was working at Claire’s, a store in Merced that sold jewelry and personal accessories, when, at approximately 1:30 p.m. on October 28, 2006, appellant and another girl entered the store. Appellant went to the front of the store, picked up a bracelet from a display rack, walked to the back of the store, removed the bracelet from the “card” to which it was attached, threw the card on the floor and, as Xiong observed by means of a security mirror while standing about five feet away, placed the bracelet in her pocket.
Except as otherwise indicated, the remainder of our factual statement is taken from Xiong’s testimony.
Appellant then walked to the “middle” of the store, where she spoke briefly with her companion. Appellant then “picked out the necklace,” walked to the back of the store and put the necklace in her pocket. At that point, Xiong “handed [the two girls] baskets” but “they didn’t use the baskets.” Instead, the two girls walked out of the store. Xiong followed, stopped them and asked appellant to return the merchandise she had taken. Appellant handed Xiong two bracelets and a necklace.
Appellant stated she did not have any other merchandise, but Xiong “[thought] she might have more merchandise on her” because Xiong had “see[n] the earrings, too,” but did not see appellant remove the card from the earrings. When a police officer arrived, Xiong told the officer appellant “had more merchandise on her.”
City of Merced Police Officer Krista Stokes testified that at approximately 1:30 p.m. on October 28, she went to Claire’s, where she made contact with appellant and another girl. Appellant stated “she went into the store, saw the items, she wanted them so she put them in her pocket and took them.” Each girl stated she had no money with her.
The remainder of our factual statement is taken from Officer Stokes’s testimony.
Officer Stokes asked appellant if she had any other merchandise that she had taken. Appellant said she did not. The Officer then conducted a pat search of appellant and felt “something hard” in appellant’s bra. Officer Stokes asked appellant what it was, and appellant stated it was her bra. Officer Stokes then had appellant “pull her shirt down a little bit,” at which point the officer “could see in plain view” a pair of earrings.
An assistant manager stated the earrings belonged to Claire’s.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Burglary Adjudication
“Every person who enters any… building …with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary ….” (§ 459.) “The defendant’s intent to commit the crime must exist at the time of entering the building.” (People v. Gbadebo-Soda (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 160, 166.) Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion she formed the intent to steal before she entered the jewelry store, and therefore her adjudication of second degree burglary cannot stand. We disagree.
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a juvenile court finding that a minor has committed a criminal offense, the reviewing court is bound by the same principles as to sufficiency and the substantiality of the evidence which govern the review of criminal convictions generally. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) Those principles include the following:
In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the appellate court must determine “ ‘whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.) In making this determination, “[the appellate court] must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
“‘By definition, ‘substantial evidence’ requires evidence and not mere speculation.’” (People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 1002, quoting People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21.) “Evidence which merely raises a strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is not sufficient to support a conviction.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
“The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) “Although it is the duty of the [trier of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [trier of fact], not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.”’” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.)
Here, evidence was adduced that appellant had no money in her possession when she entered the store. This evidence, coupled with the evidence of appellant’s attempted theft, supports the inference that appellant formed the intent to steal before she entered the store. Moreover, this inference is strengthened by the evidence that appellant had committed theft in the recent past, specifically, less than two months before at the department store. The court was not obligated to draw the conclusion that appellant entered the store intending to merely look at items she could not then buy, or accept appellant’s statement to Officer Stokes that it was not until appellant saw the items she attempted to steal, after entering the store, that she decided to steal those items. These factors established only that “the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled” with a finding contrary to the judgment. (People v. Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 933.) Appellant’s burglary adjudication was supported by substantial evidence.
Section 26Section 26 provides that “[a]ll persons are capable of committing crimes” except, inter alia, “[c]hildren under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.” (Pen. Code, § 26, par. One.) Thus, “Penal Code section 26 articulates a presumption that a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime. [Citation.] To defeat the presumption, the People must show by ‘clear proof’ that at the time the minor committed the charged act, he or she knew of its wrongfulness.” (In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 231-232, fn. omitted.) “‘[C]lear proof’ is defined as “a burden of persuasion akin to clear and convincing evidence . . . .” (Id. at p. 232.)
Appellant contends her adjudications of burglary and petty theft cannot stand because “it does not appear from the record the juvenile court ever made a finding of capacity under Penal Code section 26.”
To the extent appellant’s argument is that the court erred in failing to make an express finding, that argument fails because the statute contains no express finding requirement. Rather, it is well-established that “we must affirm an implied finding that the juvenile understood the wrongfulness of his conduct if the implied finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298, italics added.) And any challenge to the court’s implied finding that appellant understood the wrongfulness of her conduct also fails.
“In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial evidence [citation] including the minor’s age, experience and understanding, as well as the circumstances of the offense including its method of commission and concealment [citation].” (In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) “[T]here is a rational basis for inferring that if a person flees immediately after a crime to avoid detection, he may do so because he believes himself to be guilty ….” (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1244.) “Moreover, a minor’s ‘age is a basic and important consideration [citation], and, as recognized by the common law, it is only reasonable to expect that generally the older a child gets and the closer [he] approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that [he] appreciates the wrongfulness of [his] acts.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378.)
As to the department store theft, at the time of that offense, appellant was less than five months shy of her 13th birthday, and the evidence supported the inference that she attempted to flee when the store manager saw that appellant had placed store property in the backpack she and her friend were carrying. These factors constitute substantial evidence appellant understood the wrongfulness of her act.
As to the burglary, appellant was almost two months older than at the time of the department store theft, and again, there was evidence of concealment. Specifically, it was reasonably inferable from the evidence of appellant’s conduct in the store that she was attempting to conceal her actions, and there was evidence that while in police custody, she lied when she stated she did not have store property in her possession.
On this record, we conclude appellant’s adjudications of theft and second degree burglary did not run afoul of section 26.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.