Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sup. Ct. No. JD212927
MORRISON, J.
V.H. (appellant), the mother of A.G. (the minor), appeals from juvenile court orders entered after a post-permanency planning review hearing that continued the minor as a dependent child and granted appellant supervised visitation with the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.3, subd. (d)(4), 395; undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court committed reversible error, when in the absence of appellant’s counsel, it made a visitation order more restrictive, thereby violating appellant’s right to counsel and denying her due process. Agreeing with that contention, we shall reverse and remand for a new review hearing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dependency proceedings began in this case in 1999. The juvenile court appointed counsel to represent appellant. Thereafter, the court ordered the minor placed into long-term foster care.
According to the reporter’s transcript, appellant’s counsel’s last appearance for appellant was at an April 24, 2002 review hearing. However, a social worker’s report filed March 29, 2007, continued to list counsel’s name as appellant’s attorney. Inexplicably, although appellant was notified of the April 10, 2007 review hearing that is the subject of this appeal, her counsel was not.
Neither appellant nor her counsel appeared at the April 10, 2007 hearing. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) recommended the juvenile court grant appellant regular visits with the minor and give DHHS discretion to determine whether those visits should be supervised. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court decided to grant appellant visits with the minor on a supervised basis.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends “[t]he action of the juvenile court on April 10, 2007, in proceeding in the absence of [appellant], counsel for [appellant] or a waiver of the right to be represented by counsel, to make more restrictive visitation orders deprived [appellant] of the right to counsel and constituted a deprivation of the right of due process of law.”
DHHS has filed a letter with this court reaffirming its position on the visitation issue and submitting the matter on appellant’s opening brief and the record in the this case.
We agree with appellant’s claim. Section 317, subdivisions (a) and (b), when construed together, provide that if a parent is unable to afford counsel and wants to be represented, the juvenile court must appoint counsel. Here, presumably those conditions were satisfied, as the record reflects appellant was represented throughout the proceedings. Thereafter, unless the parent no longer wants representation, or some other “cause” is shown, counsel must continue to represent the parent (§ 317, subd. (d).) (In re Ebony W. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1643; Janet O. v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1064, 1065; In re Andrew S. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 541.)
In this case, the record does not reflect any indication by appellant that she no longer wished to be represented by counsel, nor have the parties provided us with evidence that the juvenile court had discharged appellant’s counsel at some stage of the dependency proceedings. Moreover, the record does not reflect that the court appointed substitute counsel. Accordingly, we conclude that by proceeding with a review hearing in the absence of counsel for appellant or any explanation for appellant’s and counsel’s absence, the court violated appellant’s right to counsel. We further hold it is reasonably probable the error prejudiced appellant, as she was unable to present argument on the issue of visitation. (In re Ronald R. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1195.)
DISPOSITION
The April 10, 2007 orders of the juvenile court made at the review hearing are reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to the juvenile court to conduct a new review hearing, after providing appellant and her counsel with proper notice or appointing new counsel to represent appellant.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P.J., ROBIE, J.