Opinion
J-S16001-15 No. 1590 MDA 2014
05-08-2015
IN RE: ADOPTION OF Q.R.T., A MINOR APPEAL OF: K.R.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered August 19, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Orphans' Court Division, at No(s): 67 - 2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.
K.R. (Father) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County, entered August 19, 2014, that terminated his parental rights to his daughter, Q.T. (Child). We affirm.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Child's natural mother in a separate proceeding. Mother did not appeal that termination.
The record supports the following recitation of the facts of this case. Child was removed originally from the care and custody of her mother on June 23, 2012, when Northumberland County Children and Youth Services (CYS) received a General Protective Services referral that Child had been hospitalized for injuries suffered when her mother, who was intoxicated at the time, dropped her on a concrete surface. Father was living in New Jersey when this incident happened, and, when contacted by CYS, told the agency he would return to Pennsylvania the next day. He never did. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent on July 10, 2012. She has remained in the care and legal custody of CYS ever since.
CYS filed its petition to terminate Father's parental rights on December 13, 2013. The trial court held hearings on that petition on May 19, 2014, and August 1, 2014.
Child's initial goal was to reunite with Father. Father's family service plan (FSP) goals were to obtain employment; maintain stable housing; prove his ability to support Child financially; complete anger management classes; and participate in drug and alcohol services until he was successfully discharged.
Father was incarcerated September 11, 2013, and, at the time of the hearing on the termination of his parental rights, Father did not know when he would be available as a permanent and stable resource for Child. He speculated that it might be some time in 2017. As of the hearing in this matter, Father had not provided CYS, or the trial court, any proof that he had completed, or even started, any of the tasks in his FSP.
Father had several visits with Child while incarcerated, but none between August 2013 and May 2014 because he did not bother to complete the necessary prison paperwork to permit the visits. The visits that occurred did not go well. Child cried uncontrollably, often got sick from the experience, exhibited no awareness of who Father was, and there was no evidence of any bond with him. Father has offered no financial or emotional support for Child and has had made no effort to contact Child's foster parents through the agency.
Child has resided with and formed a strong bond with her pre-adoptive foster family, with whom she has resided since August 2013.
The trial court entered its decree terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8), and changing Child's goal to adoption on August 19, 2014. Father timely appealed.
Our standard of review is as follows.
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence presented as well as the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court's order only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge's decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.In re L.M ., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could support an opposite result.In re M.G ., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court's inferences and deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court's sustainable findings.
We note our standard of review of a change of goal:
When we review a trial court's order to change the placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard is abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine that the court's judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or that the court's action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record.In the Interest of S.G ., 922 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W ., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
Requests to have a natural parent's parental rights terminated are governed by Section 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
. . .
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(b).
A party seeking termination of a parent's rights bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by "clear and convincing evidence," a standard that requires evidence that is "so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re T.F ., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). Further,
[a] parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.In the Interest of K.Z.S ., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), the person or agency seeking termination must demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence that, for a period of at least six months prior to the filing of the petition, the parent's conduct demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed to perform parental duties. See In Re Adoption of M.E.P ., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held:
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent's explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M ., II , 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1988). Further,
the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.In re N.M.B ., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
The Adoption Act provides that a trial court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. However, this Court has held that the trial court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S ., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008).
In regard to incarcerated persons, our Supreme Court has stated:
[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court's conclusion that grounds for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that [sic] the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.In re Adoption of S.P ., 616 Pa. 309, 328-329, 47 A.3d 817, 828, 830-831 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
. . .
[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of providing "essential parental care, control or subsistence" and the length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly relevant to whether "the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent," sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). If a court finds grounds for termination under subsection (a)(2), a court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child, considering the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child pursuant to § 2511(b). In this regard, trial courts must carefully review the individual circumstances for every child to determine, inter alia, how a parent's incarceration will factor into an assessment of the child's best interest.
The Supreme Court cited its decision in In re: Adoption of McCray , 331 A.2d 652, 655 (1975), for the proposition that termination may be appropriate for an incarcerated parent who has failed to perform his parental duties for a six-month period of time. See 47 A.3d at 828.
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Our examination of the record reveals that the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights under subections 2511(a)(1) and (b), and to change Child's goal to adoption is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion.
We have read the orphan courts' opinion in this matter and we are satisfied that it is thorough and complete. Accordingly, we affirm the order on the basis of the thoughtful, concise, and well-written opinion of the Honorable Anthony J. Rosini, that we adopt as our own.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/8/2015
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