Opinion
J-S49003-15 J-S49004-15 No. 339 MDA 2015 No. 365 MDA 2015
09-01-2015
IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.F.C., A MINOR APPEAL OF: J.C., JR., FATHER IN THE INTEREST OF: C.C., A MINOR APPEAL OF: J.C., JR., FATHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 21, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2014-0086
Appeal from the Order Entered January 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000151-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and OLSON, J. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:
J.C., Jr. ("Father"), appeals, in the case docketed at 339 MDA 2015, from the decree entered on January 21, 2015, by the Court of Common Pleas of York County, involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his son, C.F.C., born in June of 2013. Father has also filed a second appeal, in the case docketed at 365 MDA 2015, from the court's January 22, 2015 order changing the goal for C.F.C. to adoption. Because these appeals are interrelated, we consolidate them herein. After careful review, we affirm both the January 21, 2015 decree terminating Father's parental rights, as well as the January 22, 2015 order changing the goal for C.F.C. to adoption.
While the initials "C.F.C." are used in place of the minor's name in 339 MDA 2015, and the initials "C.C." are used in place of the minor's name in 365 MDA 2015, both cases involve the same child. We will use the initials C.F.C. herein.
C.F.C.'s mother, F.F.R.C. ("Mother"), executed a consent to the adoption of C.F.C. on April 24, 2014, which the trial court confirmed in the January 21, 2015 decree terminating Father's parental rights. Therefore, she is not a party to this appeal. --------
We note that Father was permitted by order of this Court to file one brief to address both of his appeals. In that brief, Father presents the following issue for our review:
Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in applying the test contained in In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (P[a.] 2012)[,] in terminating the parental rights of Father when he had utilized all available resources to maintain his relationship with his child during his incarceration, and his incarceration will conclude in a time frame that would allow him to parent his child[?]Father's Brief at 5.
In the argument portion of his brief, Father focuses on challenging the court's termination of his parental rights, rather than the court's order changing the goal for C.F.C. to adoption. Thus, we review Father's appeal according to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial courtS.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827.
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id .; In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id .; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America , Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely , 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio , 539 Pa. 161, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of theIn re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511; other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence the validity of the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). This Court must agree with only one subsection of 2511(a), in addition to section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
In this case, the trial court concluded that the petitioning party, the York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families, provided clear and convincing evidence that Father's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as section 2511(b). Those provisions provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b).
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
With respect to section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite analysis as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, "Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child." In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 63.In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Here, Father, who is incarcerated, primarily contends that the trial court erred by focusing its decision to terminate his parental rights solely on the length of his remaining incarceration, rather than considering all the facts of the case. However, our review of the January 21, 2015 opinion by the Honorable Todd R. Platts of the Court of Common Pleas of York County convinces us that Judge Platts did, in fact, consider all of the relevant circumstances of Father's case, and did not terminate Father's parental rights based solely on the length of his remaining incarceration. Additionally, based on our examination of the certified record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that Judge Platts' thorough, well-reasoned opinion properly addresses the grounds for terminating Father's parental rights and changing the goal for C.F.C. to adoption. Accordingly, we adopt Judge Platts' opinion as our own and affirm both the January 21, 2015 decree terminating Father's parental rights, as well as the January 22, 2015 order changing the goal for C.F.C. to adoption.
Decree and Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/1/2015
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