Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Super. Ct. No. J217211 Marsha Slough, Judge.
Christy C. Peterson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Sandra D. Baxter, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
M. Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, J.
Appellant J.D. (mother) contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a continuance of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing concerning her child, A.C. (the child). She also argues that the court erred in terminating the dependency. We disagree and affirm.
Counsel for the child filed a letter brief on June 6, 2008, joining in respondent’s arguments and urging us to affirm the court’s orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and the child’s father (father) were in a dating relationship when mother gave birth to the child. Father lived in the home with mother and the child until the child was two and one-half years old. Mother subsequently married Jo.D. Thereafter, a family court order granted custody to mother and visitation to father. On September 18, 2007, father called the police after he noticed a bruise on the child’s right thigh. Father asked the child what happened, and she said her stepfather had hit her. Father then noticed a bruise on her left thigh. He asked her again what happened, and she said “[Jo.D] pow pow.”
Father is not a party to this appeal.
The police interviewed father, who recalled that during August 2007 when he picked up the child for a visit, he noticed bruising on her right ear, which he photographed. Father asked the child’s babysitter what happened, and she said mother told her it was a spider bite. Father did not believe that explanation, so he asked the babysitter to ask mother again what happened. This time mother said the child “just woke[] up that way,” and the cause of the injury was unknown. During the interview, father further told the police that he had recently been contacted by mother’s sister and mother, who expressed their concern over the possibility that the child was being abused by Jo.D.
The police officer looked at the child’s injuries on her legs and asked her what happened. The child said “Jo[.D.] hit [her].” The officer observed the child’s right thigh, which had bruising “with what appeared to be three finger marks extending forward.” He also observed a four-inch long bruise on the child’s left thigh. The child used hand motions to show that she had been flicked on the ears, hit on top of her head, and slapped in the face.
The police summoned the San Bernardino County Department of Children’s Services (the department), and social worker Barry Munson responded. The child reported to Munson that she received the bruises on her legs from Jo.D., who hit her. Munson observed that the child’s right thigh had a visible hand print. The child also did a “finger flicking motion,” and pointed to her ear. In addition, the child hit herself in the head and said she was being hit by Jo.D.
On September 19, 2007, another social worker, Konnie Montoya, interviewed the child. The child repeated to Montoya that Jo.D. had hit her. Father showed Montoya pictures on his cell phone from August 2007, showing dark purple bruising on the child’s right ear, which Montoya opined was “usually consistent with a strong blow to the ear.” Father reported that the child had been acting fearful lately and would flinch if father made a sudden movement to hug her. Montoya and Munson questioned mother, who denied seeing bruises on the child. Montoya evaluated father’s home and found it to be suitable for placement of the child. Montoya placed the child in protective custody and detained her in father’s home.
On September 21, 2007, the department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of the child, alleging that she came within section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). The child was three years old at the time. The petition alleged that on or about September 19, 2007, the child sustained “hand-shaped bruising” on her legs, caused by her stepfather, Jo.D., striking her. The petition further alleged that mother knew or should have known the child was being abused but failed to protect her.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
At the detention hearing, the court detained the child and placed her in the temporary custody of father. At mother’s request, the matter was set for a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
Jurisdiction/Disposition Reports and Hearing
Social worker Stephanie Washington (hereafter, the social worker or social worker Washington) filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on October 16, 2007, and recommended that physical custody of the child be granted to father and the dependency be dismissed. During an interview with social workers on September 27, 2007, mother said that to her knowledge, Jo.D. only disciplined the child verbally. Social worker Washington then spoke with Jo.D., who said he disciplined the child verbally and by “spanking her on the hands.” Jo.D. denied ever seeing bruises on the child and stated his belief that father invented the allegations to avoid paying child support. During the interview, the social worker heard the child refer to a spanking as “pow, pow.” Father reported that the child told him Jo.D. had also spanked her while she was lying on the couch face down. Jo.D. denied that incident ever occurred, but confirmed that he and mother referred to spankings as “pow, pow.” Jo.D. and mother both maintained the belief that it was impossible for the child to have named Jo.D. as the culprit because she did not know Jo.D. by his first name.
The social worker further reported that mother, Jo.D., and father all had steady employment and housing, and appeared to be quite stable. The social worker remarked that the child received a substantial amount of emotional support from her paternal grandmother. In addition, the social worker reported that mother and father were no longer romantically involved, but appeared to have a very good relationship with one another. They each reported that the other usually took good care of the child. The social worker commented that the child was clearly very bonded and comfortable with both parents. However, the social worker questioned whether the child would be safe in the care of mother’s husband, Jo.D., noting that neither mother nor Jo.D. could provide an explanation as to how the child sustained the bruises described.
The social worker filed an addendum report on November 1, 2007, and attached seven pictures of the child’s injuries. Five of the pictures were taken by the police on September 19, 2007. The pictures showed the child’s bruises on her thighs, as well as the bruising on her ear. The social worker again noted that mother and Jo.D. denied ever seeing any bruises and could not provide an explanation as to how the child sustained any bruises. They believed the bruise on the child’s ear may have been the result of a spider bite. On October 9, 2007, the social worker showed the child the pictures and asked her how she got the injuries. The child hit herself on the thigh and said, “pow, pow” and said that Jo.D. “did the ‘pow pow’ to her.” Social worker Washington noted this was the fifth time the child had presented the same information to authorities: On September 18, 2007, the child reported it to father, the police, and social worker Munson; on September 19, 2007, she reported it to social worker Montoya; and on October 9, 2007, she reported it to social worker Washington. The social worker commented that the child had remained consistent in her report.
The social worker stated that it was the fourth time the child had reported the same information to authorities, when it was actually the fifth time.
The social worker filed another addendum report on December 19, 2007. She reported that she spoke with the child’s babysitter, Martha, regarding the child’s injuries. The babysitter said the only bruising she saw on the child was the bruise around her ear in August 2007. She inquired about it and was told the child had “gotten hurt on the side of the bed.” However, the previous referrals received by the department stated that the babysitter was told by mother that the child “just woke up that way,” and was later told that the bruise was suspected to be a spider bite. The babysitter further reported that on the day father reported the bruises on the child’s thighs to the police, she had cared for the child for only four hours that day before father picked the child up. The babysitter said she had no reason or opportunity to see bruising on the child since she did not dress or undress the child during that time.
In addition, the social worker reported that the child did not appear to exhibit any emotional distress about living with father, and noted the child was being well cared for by father. Father reported that the child spent a lot of time with her paternal grandmother and other extended family members because he went to school most afternoons and worked at night. The social worker stated there was no reason to question the quality of care the child was receiving.
The contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held on December 20, 2007. At the outset, mother’s counsel requested a continuance, informing the court that mother just gave her a packet of information about father that day. The court denied the request. Social worker Washington proceeded to testify. She testified that mother never entertained the idea that the bruising on the child’s ear could have been the result of physical abuse. The social worker recommended supervised visitation for mother, as opposed to joint custody, because of her concern about Jo.D. She did not feel that mother had demonstrated the ability to protect the child from Jo.D. Furthermore, the child had been very consistent in saying Jo.D. was the one who gave her the bruises. The social worker did not believe the child had been coached to blame Jo.D. for her injuries, in light of the child’s consistent and unwavering reports about him. The social worker further testified she had heard the child refer to her stepfather by his first name.
In addition, social worker Washington testified that father had an adequate support system to help him take care of the child, and that she had no reason to believe he could not support the child financially. She did not believe the child would be at risk in father’s care.
Mother also testified at the hearing. She said that she never knew father to use physical punishment on the child. Nonetheless, she believed father abused the child. She also testified that Jo.D. took care of the child alone, during her work hours, from 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. However, she never entertained the idea that it may have been Jo.D. who physically abused the child. Mother did not believe the child’s disclosure and felt that somebody told her to blame Jo.D. Mother also stated there was animosity between father and Jo.D., and that Jo.D. did not like the fact that “father [was] still around.”
Counsel for the department requested the court to dismiss the case with a family law order giving father full custody. Counsel for the child agreed with the request, stating that it was “pretty plain that this child [was] verbal enough to convey who injured her,” and that the child had been consistent in what she said.
The court agreed that it was clear the child had indicated to five separate people on five separate occasions that Jo.D. was the one who physically struck her. Based upon the evidence presented in the case, the court found the allegations in the petition to be true and thus found that the child came under the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b). The court determined that clear and convincing evidence showed the child should be removed from the physical custody of mother and that there was a substantial danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being if she remained in the home. The court dismissed the dependency and granted custody to father pursuant to a family law custody order. The court awarded joint legal custody to mother and father and physical custody to father. The court granted mother supervised visitation, and ordered Jo.D. to have no contact with the child. Finally, the court terminated jurisdiction over the child and stated that the family law custody order would continue unless and until modified by the superior court.
ANALYSIS
I. The Court Properly Denied Mother’s Request for a Continuance
Mother contends that the court abused its discretion in denying her counsel’s request to continue the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. We disagree.
A. Background
At the outset of the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on December 20, 2007, mother’s counsel stated she received a “packet of information” for the first time that day, which mother apparently had provided to the social worker a couple weeks earlier. Mother’s counsel stated that she looked at some of it and talked to mother about it, but in light of the fact that the packet seemed to present some new information of which she was unaware, mother’s counsel requested a continuance on mother’s behalf. Counsel for the department responded that she was troubled because mother went to the social worker’s office with a “stack of documents,” gave one packet to the social worker, “and suggested she was going to give it to her own attorney.” Counsel for the department stated it was “bothersome to have this hearing delayed by virtue of Mother not providing this.” The court indicated it was not inclined to grant a continuance and stated it did not know the content of the information in the packet which mother had apparently had for some time but for whatever reason did not provide to her attorney. Mother’s counsel then stated for the record that there were some photographs of father that “seem[ed] to put him in a compromising light,” and there were some e-mails “that also seem[ed] to do the same.” In addition, she stated there were a family court order, some reports, and financial data that did not appear to be significant. Mother’s counsel opined that the e-mails and photographs were “of some possible significance to this hearing” but she was not prepared to submit them into evidence because she had not received them earlier and did not know why they did not come to her. Mother had told her she thought the social worker was going to provide them, but the social worker said the exact opposite. The court said, “Okay. All right,” and proceeded with the hearing.
B. Standard of Review
“A continuance shall be granted only on a showing of good cause and shall not be granted if it is contrary to the minor’s best interests. [Citation.] In considering a request for a continuance, the court must ‘give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.’ [Citation.]” (In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 912.) Courts have interpreted the policy that continuances may be granted for good cause and only for the time shown to be necessary “to be an express discouragement of continuances. [Citation.]” (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 179.)
C. There Was No Abuse of Discretion
Mother’s counsel did not offer the court good cause for a continuance. The only reasons offered were that counsel had just received the packet that morning; she did not know why she had not received it before; the packet contained e-mails and photographs that “seem[ed] to put [father] in a compromising light” and were “of some possible significance” to the hearing; and she was not prepared to submit them into evidence. The court was well within its discretion to deny mother’s oral motion. There was no explanation given as to why mother had not provided the information to her attorney earlier. Mother gave the information packet to the social worker approximately two weeks prior to the hearing, and indicated she was going to give it to her attorney. However, she apparently never did until the day of the hearing. Furthermore, mother’s counsel reviewed the e-mails and photographs and discussed them with mother that morning. Even so, she could only contend that the e-mails and photographs “seemed” to put father in a compromising light and were only of “some possible significance.” Such assertions were tenuous at best, and there was no indication that a continuance would have made any difference. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel’s request for a continuance.
Mother now argues that she “likely” had every expectation the social worker would “share the information with the appropriate parties.” Mother further claims that while she could have provided the information to her attorney prior to the hearing, she “most likely was only able to speak with her attorney before the hearing, as is common in many dependency cases.” These contentions are speculative and unsupported by the record.
Mother also asserts that the requested continuance would have furthered the goals of serving the child’s best interests, preserving the family, providing a stable, permanent home in a timely manner, and having a dependency adjudication based upon “all material facts and circumstances.” She argues that she sought to provide information to the court that “may have impacted its findings regarding [the child’s] placement with her father.” Mother does not explain how a continuance would have actually furthered the stated goals. Moreover, if the information at issue really would have impacted the court’s decision regarding placement of the child with father, mother’s counsel should have submitted the information as evidence at the hearing for the court’s consideration.
In sum, the court properly denied the request for a continuance.
II. The Court Properly Granted Father Custody of the Child and Terminated Its Jurisdiction
Mother argues that the court’s disposition order must be reversed since the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating jurisdiction, rather than ordering continued supervision to ensure that the child would be provided for adequately. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“The juvenile court has broad discretion in crafting a disposition pursuant to a child’s best interest. Citation. A reviewing court will not disturb a juvenile court’s custody determination unless it ‘“exceeded the limits of legal discretion.”’ [Citation.]” (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179.)
B. There Was No Abuse of Discretion
Section 361.2, subdivision (a) “establishes the procedures a court must follow for placing a dependent child following removal from the custodial parent pursuant to section 361. [Citation.] Subdivision (a) of section 361.2 provides that when a court orders removal of a minor under section 361, the court ‘shall first determine’ whether there is a parent who wants to assume custody who was not residing with the minor at the time the events that brought the minor within the provisions of section 300 occurred. [Citation.] If that parent requests custody, the court ‘shall place’ the child with the parent unless ‘it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the minor.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1820-1821, fn. omitted.) If the court places the child with that parent, it may order that the parent become legal and physical custodian of the child and terminate jurisdiction. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).) “When deciding whether to terminate jurisdiction, the court must determine whether there is a need for continued supervision.” (In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451.)
The department’s reports clearly demonstrated the child was doing well in father’s care. Social worker Montoya reported that father had steady employment and stable housing. She also evaluated father’s home and found it to be suitable for placement of the child after the child was detained by the court. Moreover, mother even told the department that father usually took good care of the child. Social worker Washington observed that the child was clearly very bonded and comfortable with father, as well as mother. In her final report, social worker Washington stated the child did not exhibit any emotional distress about residing with father. She opined that the child had a good bond with both parents and was being well cared for by father. Father had a lot of family support with the child. The child spent a lot of time with her paternal grandmother and other family members because father went to school most afternoons and worked at night. Although mother did not like the fact that father allowed others to care for the child, father was appropriately making arrangements for the child’s care. (See In re V.F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) Social worker Washington concluded there were “no indicators . . . to question the quality of care the child [was] receiving.” In addition, she testified at the hearing that father had an adequate support system to help him take care of the child and that she had no reason to believe he could not support the child financially. She said she did not believe the child would be at risk in father’s care. Based on her observations, the social worker recommended terminating the court’s jurisdiction and granting physical custody to father. All this evidence amply supported the finding that continued supervision of the child was no longer necessary. Therefore, on the record before this court, it does not appear that the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating jurisdiction.
Mother claims the department could not confirm at trial whether father had adequate furnishings to care for the child or whether he had adequate income. Contrary to mother’s claim, social worker Washington testified that father did have furnishings, such as a crib and clothing, for the child. Moreover, the record shows that social worker Montoya evaluated father’s home and found it to be suitable for placement of the child.
Mother further contends there was evidence that father “may have injured” the child. However, there was no such evidence. There existed only mother’s unfounded belief that father was the one who abused the child. Mother then reiterates her previous argument regarding the potentially compromising photographs and e-mails concerning father, but now claims that she “tried to introduce evidence that may have impacted the court’s opinion regarding [f]ather’s ability to care for [the child].” However, the record does not reflect that she tried to introduce the evidence. Rather, it only shows that her counsel requested a continuance, which the court properly denied. (See ante, § I.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ, P.J., MILLER, J.