R.A. (father) appeals from orders of the juvenile court sustaining a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code, § 300, subdivision (b), declaring his daughter, A.A. (the child), a dependent and removing her from his custody under section 361, subdivisions (a), (c)(1), (d), and (e)(1). Father contends the juvenile court (1) did not have sufficient evidence to find that the child’s injuries occurred while she was in his custody, and (2) did not articulate a sufficient basis for finding a substantial risk of physical harm to the child requiring her removal from father’s custody, and no evidence in the record would support such a finding under the clear and convincing evidence standard. Counsel for minors has joined the position of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (Department) urging affirmance of the juvenile court’s orders. We find no error, and we affirm.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 2006, the Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm) and (b) (failure to protect). The petition alleged under section 300, subdivision (a) that the child, born in January 2004, had, while in the care of her mother, A.Y., suffered “multiple injuries on different planes of her body including bruising on her buttocks, calf, inner knee, upper thigh, arm, and a laceration that were described as inflicted and worrisome to the forensic pediatrician . . . .” The petition alleged under section 300, subdivision (b), that mother had inappropriately disciplined the child with a belt, that the parents had neglected the child’s health and safety by engaging in repeated acts of domestic violence and by failing to seek prompt medical attention for injuries to the child, that both parents had histories of substance abuse, and that father had a serious criminal history.

Mother is not a party to this appeal.

The Department filed a detention report stating that the child had multiple injuries which could not be explained. She had previously suffered serious physical harm while in the care of her mother, including when she had stopped breathing at the age of four months after being left unattended on a bed. The parents had a history of making allegations against each other to Child Protective Services (CPS) and had failed to benefit from previous services. Each parent alleged the other parent had a history of substance abuse. The parents had engaged in acts of domestic violence in the child’s presence. Father had been arrested for serious felonies, including domestic violence against another spouse. Under family law court orders, the parents had joint legal and physical custody of the child.

The detention report stated that father had brought the child to the police station on October 26, 2006, and requested to make a report. The social worker met father at the police station on October 28. Father stated that when he had picked up the child from mother’s care on October 25, he had noticed bruises on various parts of her body and a bump and cut on the back of her head. Father had taken photographs of the injuries. The social worker observed the injuries. Father said he had not taken the child to a doctor because mother had not provided medical insurance information. Father said the child had told him her mother and step grandfather had hit her. Father played tape recordings for the social worker, in which the mother was heard talking about incidents involving the child, including the child’s becoming wedged between the mattress and the headboard as an infant, the child’s falling off a bed, mother’s failure to obtain medication for the child when the child had a fever, and the child’s infection after having her ears pierced. Father stated he had seen bruises and marks on the child in the past and had made reports to the police, CPS, and family law court, to no avail. Father said mother had falsely accused him of domestic violence in 2004, but the charges had been dismissed. Mother and father had previously had mutual restraining orders, but according to father, no current restraining order existed.

Mother told the social worker the child had sustained the bruises when the child had fallen on an escalator at Disneyland. Mother also told the social worker that father had once returned the child with a severe diaper rash after visitation, that father had been seen smoking while holding the child on his lap, and that the child had once been returned with an apparent cigarette burn on her hand; however, mother had not then taken the child to the doctor.

The child told the social worker that “Mommy” spanked her with a belt, and “Grandpa” also spanked her. CPS had had four prior referrals, one of which was evaluated out, one of which was found to be inconclusive, and two of which were determined to be unfounded.

A report of Dr. Horowitz, the physician who examined the child on October 30, 2006, was attached to the detention report. Dr. Horowitz concluded that linear bruises on the child’s thigh and buttocks resulted from an intentionally inflicted injury, and circular bruises on the child’s left leg “look[ed] like finger imprints and would imply grabbing her with excessive force.” Dr. Horowitz also concluded, “This child has been physically abused, possibly since infancy. Children left in the same environment are at risk of further injury, including death.”

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facie showing had been made and detained the child out of parents’ custody.

The Department filed a jurisdiction/disposition report in November 2006. With respect to the allegation of domestic violence in the child’s presence, father told the social worker that mother had been verbally and physically abusive to him and he had pushed mother during their arguments; however, father denied having been physically abusive to mother. Father denied drug or alcohol abuse, but he reported mother drank to the point of being out of control and had used “ecstasy” at a nightclub. Father reported he had been placed on probation for a conviction of terrorist threats based on an incident in which he had left a threatening message for his former girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend. Father denied other criminal charges. Mother denied the allegations concerning the injuries to the child and reported that the bruises had occurred when the child had fallen on the escalator at Disneyland. Mother denied using any type of physical or corporal punishment on the child. Mother reported father had verbally and emotionally abused her and admitted she had verbally abused him. Mother admitted she had not sought medical care for the child when she had been returned with an apparent cigarette burn because the condition did not seem to be serious enough to warrant a visit to the doctor. Mother denied drinking to the point of intoxication. Mother stated that father was addicted to methamphetamine. Both parents agreed to complete hair follicle testing. The maternal step grandfather reported that he had used methamphetamine with father in 2004 and stated that father continued to use the drug.

The child was adjusting to her foster placement, although she seemed to be sad, and she cried for her parents after visits and during telephone calls. The parents each visited the child twice per week. During the visits, mother prayed loudly and continuously over the child, and the child cried when mother did so.

The social worker recommended amending the petition to state that the child’s injuries had occurred while in the care of the parents because there was “insufficient evidence at this time to substantiate that the child’s injuries were caused by the mother since the family household compositions with the mother and the father [were] similar, in that, there is a ‘grandfather’ at both homes, and a ‘mommy’ at both homes also.” The social worker also recommended dismissing as unfounded the allegation that mother spanked the child with a belt.

The Department filed a case plan in November 2006 that provided, among other things, that the parents would complete a domestic violence program, complete a psychological evaluation and comply with the recommendations of the evaluation, participate in individual counseling, complete a parenting program, and submit to random drug testing.

The Department filed an addendum report in December 2006. Both parents had submitted hair follicle tests in November which were negative. Father had also tested negative for drugs in December. The child appeared to be happy and comfortable in her foster home. The social worker had received a telephone call from a relative who reported concerns about mother, including mother’s obsession with showing how bad father was and her hatred of father. The foster family agency social worker reported that parents were each visiting the child twice per week. During her visits, mother checked the child from head to toe for any marks or bruises and questioned the child about any bruises. During his visits, father had fun with the child and was, “for the most part,” appropriate.

In December 2006, mother filed a motion to strike minor’s statements from the detention and jurisdiction/disposition reports due to fraud and undue influence. The motion was supported by mother’s declaration and by exhibits, including copies of allegedly false accusations, police reports, and statements to social workers that father had made against mother. In January 2007, mother filed a motion to dismiss the case because the petition failed to state a claim under section 300. Like her previous motion, the motion was supported by mother’s declaration and by exhibits, including copies of allegedly false accusations, police reports, and statements to social workers that father had made against mother. The juvenile court denied both motions. Mother’s counsel later renewed both motions, and the juvenile court again denied them. Mother also moved for removal of the social worker for bias or, in the alternative, to strike the social worker’s reports because of bias. The juvenile court denied that motion as well.

The Department filed another addendum report in January 2007. The parents continued to have twice-weekly supervised visits with the child. The social worker reported that the parents “continue to display their bitterness for one another rather than focus on the issue as to the events that led to the removal of their daughter.” The social worker stated that “the concerns for the child have heightened since the initiation of this investigation based on the following:

“1) the countless counter-complaints made by the parents against one another;

“2) the uncertainties of what happened to the child;

“3) the tendency of the parents to report problems and/or file a complaint to law enforcement against one another first, rather than seek proper medical treatment and/or follow up for their child;

“4) [t]he lack of insight by the parents as to how detrimental their actions are to the emotional well being of their child and as to why CPS is involved with their family;

“5) an investigation with Jurupa Sheriff[‘s] Department has yet to be completed as to the ‘Cruelty to a Child’ offense and a disposition has yet to be determined;

“6) the parents seemed to have not benefited from the services previously provided to them by Family Law Court as evidenced in their inability to be cordial as parents and work together harmoniously for the sake of their daughter.”

The jurisdiction/disposition hearing was continued several times, and the Department filed an additional addendum report in March 2007. The social worker reported that mother had been participating in counseling and had completed seven domestic violence sessions, a program in shared custody, and 14 classes in parenting education. Father had tested negative for drug use in February 2007. The child had been placed with a paternal aunt and appeared to be comfortable in that home. The parents continued their twice-weekly visits with the child.

After further continuances of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the Department filed another addendum report in April 2007. Mother had completed a psychological evaluation and was continuing in individual counseling. The psychologist indicated that mother’s test results “‘were reflective of a confident and optimistic person who has a clear sense of purpose and convictions . . . she likely has very strong needs for attention and approval which may provoke some extreme behaviors on her part, which cause her to be overly attention-seeking and dramatic.’” The psychologist stated that mother’s prognosis was “‘quite favorable.’” Father stated he had been participating in individual therapy but had not provided the Department with a progress letter from his therapist. The court had referred the parents to mediation services, but in mediation, the parents were unable to agree on a visitation and custody agreement for the child. Father stated during the mediation proceedings that he would prefer to settle those issues in trial. Based on father’s response to the mediation services, the social worker stated that father had not yet benefited from the therapy process.

The social worker again noted both parents’ pattern of attempting to pass off blame on each other. The social worker observed that the extensive documentary evidence both parents had provided “portray[ed] the sequences and patterns of their long, drawn out ‘war’ against one another, with only limited focus [on] the welfare and safety of their child. This ‘war’ clearly poses a serious risk of emotional harm and damage to their three-year[-]old child.”

The Department filed another addendum report in May 2007. The child was then placed with her maternal grandmother. The social worker reported the child had disclosed that father had spent the night at the home of the paternal aunt, with whom the child had previously been placed. Such a stay violated the visitation guidelines. Father denied having stayed overnight at the aunt’s house. The maternal grandmother later reported that the child did not want to visit father and had cried and screamed and refused to visit him. In the social worker’s opinion, mother was making progress on her case plan and was focusing on the child’s needs rather than on mother’s issues with father, but father had “demonstrated that he is not able to communicate about the needs of his daughter without placing blame on others.”

Another addendum report was filed in July 2007. The report recommended placing the child with mother under family maintenance. The social worker reported that mother and the child had been having positive visits. Father had been visiting the child regularly and had telephone visits scheduled three times a week, although the child sometimes did not want to talk to him.

The Department filed an amended petition under section 300. The amended petition deleted the allegation of serious physical harm under section 300, subdivision (a), and the previous allegations under section 300, subdivision (b), and substituted a single new allegation under section 300, subdivision (b): “While in the custody of the parents, the child suffered multiple injuries on different planes of her body that were determined to be inflicted according to Dr. Horowitz.

Following the contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the amended petition true by a preponderance of the evidence and adjudged the child to be a dependent of the court. The court accepted the family maintenance plan for mother, ordered the child removed from father’s custody, and ordered frequent visitation and reunification services for father.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support the Jurisdictional Finding

The amended petition alleged, “While in the custody of the parents, the child suffered multiple injuries on different planes of her body that were determined to be inflicted according to Dr. Horowitz.” Father contends the juvenile court did not have sufficient evidence to find that the child’s injuries occurred while she was in his custody. Father also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of risk of future harm to the child.

1. Standard of Review

“‘The petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child who is the subject of a petition comes within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. . . . On review, this court will view the juvenile court record in the light most favorable to that court’s order. . . . We may not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence, but must decide only whether sufficient evidence supports the findings of the juvenile court. . . . Issues of fact and credibility are matters for the trial court alone; we may decide only “‘“whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.” . . . ’”’[Citation.]” (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.)

“[A]n appellate court may reject the testimony of a witness who was apparently believed by the trier of fact if that testimony is inherently improbable or impossible of belief.” (People v. Jackson (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 13, 21.) However, testimony is not inherently improbable unless what has been related or described could not have occurred; contradictions and inconsistencies alone do not necessarily render evidence inherently improbable or unreliable. (People v. Baldwin (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 396, 402.)

2. Analysis

In order to find true allegations under section 300, subdivision (b), the juvenile court must find three elements: “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)

a. Finding that the child’s injuries occurred while she was in parents’ care

Father argues there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that the child’s injuries occurred while she was in his care. Actually, the juvenile court found that the child’s injuries occurred while she was in parents’ care; it was never specifically determined when or how the child’s injuries had occurred.

On appeal, father asserts that the amended petition was based only on one incident of neglect — the injuries the child sustained from a fall on an escalator on October 24, 2006, when the child was in mother’s care. However, Dr. Horowitz concluded in her report that the injuries had been inflicted, not that they had resulted from the child’s fall. Thus, the premise for father’s argument is factually erroneous.

Father asserts that “[t]he injuries which are evident in the photographs which the social worker attached to the detention report . . . were clearly the result of that fall and mother’s attempts to grab the child while she was falling.” Father’s opinion of what the photographs show directly contradicts the opinion of the forensic evaluator, and we give no credence to father’s interpretation of the photographs.

Father repeatedly asserts, moreover, that the social worker had not followed up with Dr. Horowitz after mother explained the child had fallen on the escalator a day or two before the child was detained, and therefore the social worker conducted an insufficient investigation. The record makes clear, however, that Dr. Horowitz had been informed of mother’s explanation for the child’s injuries — Dr. Horowitz’s report explicitly states that mother had reported that the child had fallen on an escalator at Disneyland. Dr. Horowitz nonetheless concluded the child’s injuries had been inflicted, and Dr. Horowitz’s report was undisputed.

Father also argues the social worker’s conclusion that either father or mother could have caused the injuries was inherently improbable or impossible of belief because the social worker “was not an eyewitness nor had she attempted to establish with Dr. Horowitz that the injuries could not have been caused as explained by mother.” Again, father’s argument fails because it is clear that Dr. Horowitz was informed of the possible explanation for the child’s injuries but concluded, in her professional opinion, that the injuries appeared to have been inflicted, not accidental.

Father next contends that the child “never exhibited the kind of fear of a parent which would have been necessary, if the injuries had been inflicted by either of them.” However, father cites no authority, either in the record or in the law, to support his assertion that a child who has been abused will exhibit distress or fear of the abuser, and we reject his contention as unsupported. (See People v. Windham (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 881, 893, fn. 8.)

b. Finding of future risk of harm

Father further contends there was no evidence to support a finding of future risk of harm to the child. “An act or acts of abuse do not in themselves provide a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction. There must be some reason to believe the acts may continue in the future.” (In re Jennifer P. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 322, 326.) Thus, the juvenile court was required to consider whether the conditions alleged in the petition still existed at the time of the adjudication and the likelihood the acts alleged would recur in the absence of court intervention. “‘In determining whether the child is in present need of the juvenile court’s protection, the court may consider past events. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135, disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 749, fn. 6.)

Father states that during the nine months that passed between the detention and the jurisdiction hearing, he had consistently tested negative for drugs, completed coparenting classes, was participating in therapy, had consistently visited the child and had always been appropriate during the visits. Thus, he argues, the court had no basis for concluding that harm to the child would continue in the future.

Although father testified at the jurisdiction hearing he had been to counseling, he had never provided any substantiating documentation to the social worker. Moreover, father had completed the coparenting class and parenting without conflict program through family court in 2005 and 2006, before the detention. As the social worker observed in the May 2007 addendum report, the safety issues originally presented had “now been overshadowed by the developing concerns of emotional harm to the child by the parents due to their continuing conflict.” Although the court had referred parents to mediation at least three times, parents were unable to resolve issues of custody for their child. The social worker concluded, “The father has demonstrated that he is not able to communicate about the needs of his daughter without placing blame on others.” Moreover, in the July 2007 addendum report, the social worker stated, “Despite completing services that would assist in eliminating the need for the Department and the Court’s involvement, the parents evidently continue to struggle with co-parenting.”

Father did testify at the jurisdiction hearing that he had asked the social worker to contact his counselor, and his counselor had attempted to contact the social worker, but the social worker had failed to return the counselor’s calls.

In In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, on which father relies, the parents caught a family friend in the act of sexually molesting one of their one and one-half-year-old twin daughters. (Id. at p. 1391.) A dependency petition was filed on the basis that the parents had shown poor judgment in leaving the children in the care of the perpetrator, and the juvenile court found the allegation true. (Id. at pp. 1391-1392.) The mother appealed from the jurisdiction and disposition orders, and the appellate court reversed. (Id. at p. 1400.) The court explained that a previous single act of neglect was an insufficient basis for finding a substantial risk of harm, and there had to be “‘some reason beyond mere speculation’” to believe the harm would reoccur. (Id. at p. 1394, italics omitted.) The court observed that the parents could not have reasonably foreseen that a family friend who had seven of his own children would molest another child left in his care. Moreover, the parents had reported the incident to the police, and the mother had stated she would not leave her children in anyone else’s care. The court found insufficient evidence of a risk of future serious physical harm and reversed the juvenile court order. (Id. at p. 1395.)

Here, unlike in In re Savannah M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, the perpetrator was not identified, and father did not and could not demonstrate that the risk of harm had been eliminated from the child’s life. In a written report which was submitted into evidence through the Department’s detention report, Dr. Horowitz concluded that linear bruises on the child’s thigh and buttocks resulted from intentionally inflicted injury and that the child “has been physically abused, possibly since infancy. Children left in the same environment are at risk of further injury, including death.” Dr. Horowitz’s report and the social worker’s observations provide ample support for the juvenile court’s finding that a substantial risk of future harm existed to the child within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b).

B. Finding of Substantial Risk of Physical Harm to the Child Requiring Her Removal from Father’s Custody

Father contends the juvenile court did not have or articulate a sufficient basis for finding a substantial risk of physical harm to the child requiring her removal from father’s custody. He argues that because the record does not include the juvenile court’s statement of specific facts supporting the removal or any statement that the juvenile court applied the clear and convincing standard of proof for its dispositional order, the juvenile court committed reversible error.

1. Background

At the contested hearing on July 25, 2007, the juvenile court stated it had “sufficient evidence to make [section] 361 findings against father and mother.” The Department and the child’s attorney had requested that such findings not be made against mother because she had made significant progress in her case plan, and the juvenile court made findings against father only under section 361, subdivisions (a)(1), (c)(1), (d), and (e)(1). The juvenile court stated, “There is substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection or physical or emotional well[-]being of the child if the child were returned home; and there are no reasonable means by which the child’s physical health may be protected without removing the child from the parents’ custody.”

2. Standard of Review

Although the burden of proof at the dispositional phase (clear and convincing evidence) is substantially greater than the burden of proof for the jurisdictional findings (preponderance of the evidence), we apply the substantial evidence standard of review for both jurisdictional and dispositional findings. (See In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 529-530 (Henry V.).) In conducting our review of the dispositional findings, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order to determine whether substantial evidence exists “from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard. [Citation.] Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. [Citation.]” (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694-695.)

3. Analysis

When the juvenile court removes a child from the physical custody of a parent, the juvenile court must make a finding based on clear and convincing evidence of one of six listed circumstances, including that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The standard of clear and convincing evidence applies even when there is to be a transfer between a custodial parent and a noncustodial parent. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 548.) And the basis for the removal order must be tied to the identified harm from the sustained petition. (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 830.) However, “[t]he parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citations.]” (In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.)

a. The juvenile court was not required to articulate the standard of proof.

Father asserts the juvenile court was required to articulate on the record at the dispositional hearing both the standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence and the basis for removal, and the reviewing court cannot simply assume the juvenile court applied the correct standard. To support that argument, he cites In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618, 627. That case does not support father’s position; the issue before the court was the sufficiency of the evidence to support the dispositional finding.

In Henry V., however, the court stated that no evidence in the record indicated that either the juvenile court or the social services agency understood the necessity of making dispositional findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard. (Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 530.) The court observed that a box on the order form for determining the allegations of the petition true by clear and convincing evidence had been left blank. (Ibid.) The court further stated that when “the jurisdictional and dispositional phases were combined in a single hearing, we cannot be confident the lower standard of proof governing the jurisdictional findings was not transferred to the dispositional findings.” (Ibid.)

Here, however, we do not presume error from a silent record; rather, we presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the juvenile court applied the correct standard of proof in making dispositional findings. (Evid. Code, § 664; see also In re L.B. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1425.) We therefore reject father’s argument that the juvenile court erred by failing to articulate the standard of proof on the record.

b. The juvenile court was required to state the facts on which its dispositional order was based

Under section 361, subdivision (d), the juvenile court must “state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.” The Department impliedly concedes that the juvenile court erred in failing to make specific findings as to the basis for the dispositional order. However, any error in failing to make the required findings is harmless when “‘it is not reasonably probable such finding, if made, would have been in favor of continued parental custody.’ [Citations.]” (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1218.)

c. The error was harmless

In Henry V., a child suffered a physical injury; the injury was a one-time occurrence, and the cause of the injury was disputed. (Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 525-526, 529.) The appellate court held that the evidence was insufficient to support an order removing the child from the parents’ custody. (Id. at pp. 529-530.) Father relies on Henry V.; however, the Department argues that the juvenile court’s decision not to return the child to father’s custody “was supported by facts that the identity of the perpetrator was unknown, that the serious injuries to the minor occurred while in one of the parents’ custody and that [father] had not demonstrated any actions to alter the circumstances of the initial detention and removal.” We agree. Here, the child, as a toddler, had visible signs of an unexplained, inflicted injury. Before the detention, her time was divided between her parents, who were in constant battle and who continually charged each other with negligence. As in Henry V., the cause of the injury was disputed. Unlike in Henry V., however, this was not a one-time injury. The forensic evaluator stated her conclusion that “[t]his child has been physically abused, possibly since infancy. Children left in the same environment are at risk of further injury, including death.”

Moreover, although father stated he was participating in therapy, he failed to provide any documentation as to the type of therapy or the progress he was making, and the social worker concluded that father was not benefiting from his therapy because, despite multiple referrals to mediation, father preferred to have the court decide custody issues.

We conclude that the error in failing to articulate the facts underlying the dispositional order was harmless because it is not reasonably probable such finding, if made, would have been in favor of continued parental custody.

IV. DISPOSITION

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

We concur: RAMIREZ, P.J., GAUT, J.

In re A.A.

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In re A.A.

In re A.A.

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