Opinion
J-S14031-18 No. 3716 EDA 2017 No. 3717 EDA 2017
04-03-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.D.S. A/K/A S.S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: V.H., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: T.R.G. A/K/A T.G., A MINOR APPEAL OF: V.H., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 25, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000981-2017, CP-51-DP-0002024-2015, FID: 51-FN-001680-2015 Appeal from the Decree Entered October 25, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000982-2017, CP-51-DP-0002025-2015, FID: 51-FN-001680-2015 BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM, J. MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, V.H. ("Mother"), appeals from the decrees of the Family Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered October 25, 2017, that terminated her parental rights to and changed the permanency goal from reunification to adoption for her sons, T.R.G., born 2006, and S.D.S., born 2010 ("the Children"). We affirm the decrees on the basis of the trial court opinion.
In its opinion, entered December 7, 2017, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 12/7/17, at 2-15. Thus, we have no reason to restate them at length here.
For the convenience of the reader, we briefly note that, in May 2015, then-five-year-old S.D.S. was evaluated at St. Christopher's Hospital for Children; in July 2015, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS") received a general protective services ("GPS") report alleging that S.D.S. was nonverbal and unable to walk. The day after receiving the GPS report, DHS visited Mother's home, which had a strong odor of urine, was infested with flies, and had a kitchen floor with structural deficiencies and the possibility of collapse. DHS returned four days later and observed S.D.S. eating food from his lap and off a soiled couch. A social worker returned three days later, but Mother refused to allow the social worker to enter. The social worker tried again three days later and a day after that but still could not gain access. The social worker returned with police and removed the Children, and DHS obtained orders of protective custody for the Children that same day. S.D.S., who has DiGeorge Syndrome, was placed with Woods Services ("Woods"), an educational and residential center for children with special needs.
A birth defect that caused the poor development of several of S.D.S.'s bodily systems, including his immune system.
In October 2017, DHS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children. The trial court held a hearing on these petitions later that month.
Kwaima Sanders, a case manager with the community umbrella agency NorthEast Treatment Center ("NET") testified that DHS removed the Children from Mother's home, due to the home's deplorable condition and the Children's inadequate healthcare. Notes of Testimony (N. T.), 10/25/17, at 6-22, 29-32, 36-38, 49. She continued that NET had developed a single case plan ("SCP") for Mother, with the following aims: to attend parenting classes for children with special needs, to make home repairs identified as safety threats in order to ensure that the home is suitable for the Children, to attend visitation, to collaborate with professionals regarding planning and goals for the Children, and to comply with mental health treatment. She added that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mother continued to reside in the same home from which the Children had been removed, as she was unable to obtain housing from either the Philadelphia Housing Authority ("PHA") or Section 8 through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), and the house continued to be in poor condition, including having lead in the home, which Mother had failed to have removed, as she could not obtain funding for the repairs from a nonprofit. Sanders also testified that Mother had only attended visitation with S.D.S. twice in 2017, even though visitation was supposed to be weekly, and had missed more than half of her visitations with T.R.G. She further testified that the Children would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated and that it would be in their best interests to do so. She acknowledged that T.R.G., who was then ten-years-old, had lived with his paternal grandmother, M.G. ("Grandmother"), for almost two years at the time of the hearing.
Grandmother confirmed that T.R.G. had lived with her since December 2015 and that she has been his primary caregiver and seeks to adopt him. N.T. at 52, 58.
Casey Chavinka, a program specialist at Woods and S.D.S.'s special services manager, also testified. N. T. at 66-72. According to Chavinka, since being removed from Mother's custody and arriving at Woods in 2015, S.D.S. has learned to walk and to eat with utensils.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered decrees changing the permanency goal for the Children from reunification with Mother to adoption and terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). Mother's timely appeals followed in November 2017.
Mother timely filed her notices of appeal and statements of errors complained of on appeal in November 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court entered its opinion in December 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii).
Mother raises the following questions on appeal:
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights where such
determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence under the adoption act, 23 P[a].C.S.[] §2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8)?Mother's Brief at 4.
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it involuntarily terminated Mother's parental rights without giving primary consideration to the effect that the termination would have on . . . the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the children as required by the adoption act, 23 P[a].C.S.[] §2511(b)?
3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it terminated Mother's parental rights and changed the children's goals to adoption as substantial, sufficient, and credible evidence was presented at the time of trial which would have substantiated denying the Petition for Goal Change?
We consider Mother's arguments about the termination of her parental rights in light of our well-settled standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We will affirm if we agree with the trial court's decision as to any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and its decision as to § 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
Here, we affirm the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights under subsections 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
Further,
A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
As for Mother's challenge to the change of the Children's permanency goals to adoption, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set forth our standard of review in a dependency case, including a goal change, as follows:
The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court's inferences or conclusions of law. We review for abuse of discretion.In re J.M., 166 A.3d 408, 416 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 534 (Pa.Super. 2007), this Court stressed that the focus of dependency proceedings is upon the best interest of the children and that those considerations supersede all other concerns, "including the conduct and the rights of the parent." Again, in In the Interest of D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009), we explained, "In a change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court, and the parent's rights are secondary." Id. Likewise, this Court has held, "a child's life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting."
In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.Super. 2003)).In re L.T., 158 A.3d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2017).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that there is no merit to the issues that Mother has raised on appeal. The trial court opinion properly disposes of the questions presented. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 12/7/17, at 18-24 (finding that: (I) DHS had met its burden by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) -- in the form of Chavinka's testimony about S.D.S.'s improvement since his removal from Mother's custody and Sanders's testimony about the reasons for the Children's removal by DHS, Mother's SCP objectives, including safe housing and visitation, and Mother's failure to comply with her SCP aims -- thereby establishing that Mother failed and refused to perform parental duties, failed to address the conditions which brought the Children into placement, and lacks the capacity to provide care and control and a healthy, safe, and stable environment for the Children; (II) termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests and that DHS met its burden pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) by relying on the credible testimony of Grandmother and of Sanders that the Children would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated, that it would be in the Children's best interests to do so, and that T.R.G. had already lived with Grandmother since 2015; and (III) the change of the Children's permanency goal to adoption was proper, because Grandmother's and Sanders's testimony established that the Children have thrived and shown substantial improvement in their conditions by living in foster care, making the goal change in the best interests of the Children). Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights to the Children and the change of the permanency goal for the Children from reunification to adoption on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Mother's challenge to the change of the Children's permanency goal to adoption is controlled by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375. In challenging the goal change to adoption, Mother does not contend that the trial court failed to consider any of the factors enumerated in § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act regarding permanency planning, with the arguable exception of § 6351(f)(3), "The extent of progress made toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement." Mother's Brief at 18-19. In her argument about the goal change, Mother maintains that she has "worked to repair her home or alternatively secure other housing, in an attempt to remedy the situations that might have previously created a safety issue for the [C]hildren." Id. at 19. However, this claim is belied elsewhere in her brief, where she admits that she has not had the lead cleaned out of her home, is unable to obtain assistance from a nonprofit to fix the home, and was on waiting lists for housing from both PHA and HUD. Id. at 11 (citing N. T. at 15-16, 38).
Decrees affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/3/18
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