Opinion
C.A. No. 07M-03-049 MMJ.
Submitted: February 4, 2008.
Decided: February 14, 2008.
On Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment. DENIED.
Michael W. Modica, Esquire, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Petitioner.
Robert O'Neill, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for the State.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
On January 18, 2007, the New Castle County Police seized a 2001 Honda pursuant to 16 Del. C. § 4784(a)(4). The vehicle was used during the commission of a drug-related crime. On March 15, 2007, Gary Tyler petitioned the State for return of the Honda pursuant to the innocent owner defense. On October 9, 2007, Tyler filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The State filed a response on December 13, 2007. Oral argument was held on February 4, 2008.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tyler claims he gave his son, Jesse Tyler, permission to use the Honda to travel between his home in New Castle County and Delaware State University. While in possession of the Honda, Jesse was arrested for drug-related charges. The police seized the vehicle according to 16 Del. C. § 4784(a)(4).
Tyler states he purchased the Honda with his own resources. The Honda is titled in his name and his wife's name. Tyler claims he did not have actual or constructive knowledge that his son, Jesse, was involved in illegal drug activity. Tyler claims he is an innocent owner and entitled to the return of the vehicle or fair market value of the vehicle.
Innocent Owner Defense
Pursuant to 16 Del. C. 4784(a)(4)(b), a vehicle used in the commission of a drug-related crime is subject to forfeiture except:
(b) No vehicle is subject to forfeiture under this section by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent.
The Court must determine whether: (1) the claimant is the "owner" of the vehicle; and (2) the claimant was without knowledge of the illegal activity.
The possession of bare title is insufficient to establish ownership. The claimant must demonstrate an ownership interest with the attendant characteristics of dominion and control. The Court will consider various factors to determine if the claimant has dominion and control including: (i) the claimant's use and possession of the vehicle; (ii) whether claimant can adequately describe the characteristics of the vehicle; and (iii) whether claimants can demonstrate they purchased the vehicle with their own funds. The Court is likely to find the claimant is an owner, if the Claimant can demonstrate that claimant purchased the vehicle.
See United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, 647 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 867.
Mercedes Benz, 644 A.2d 423, 431-32 (Del.Super. 1992).
See Mercedes Benz, 644 A.2d 423, 431-32 (Del.Super. 1992); $280,505 Dollars, 655 F.Supp. 1487, 1495 (S.D. Fla. 1986); One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 538 A.2d 71, 75 (Pa.Super. 1988); One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, 563 F.Supp. 470, 475 (D.C. Pa. 1983); United States v. One 1980 Blazer Automible, 572 F.Supp. 994, 997 (D.C.N.Y. 1983).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
This Court will grant summary judgment only when no material issues of fact exist. The moving party bears the burden of establishing the non-existence of material issues of fact. Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of material issues of fact. Where the moving party produces an affidavit or other evidence sufficient under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 in support of its motion and the burden shifts, then the non-moving party may not rest on its own pleadings, but must provide evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If the non-moving party cannot make a sufficient showing of the existence of an essential element of the case, summary judgment must be granted.A court deciding a summary judgment motion must identify disputed factual issues whose resolution is necessary to decide the case, but the court must not decide those issues. The court must evaluate the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment will not be granted under circumstances where the record reasonably indicates that a material fact is in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of law to the circumstances.
H Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99 (Del. 1992)H.
Id.
HEbersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del. 1962)H.
ANALYSIS
Jesse Tyler was interviewed by the police. Jesse admitted he used the Honda to deliver Marijuana. Jesse stated he regularly used the Honda to make deliveries and pick-ups in New York and Philadelphia. However, the State has no evidence tending to show Jesse's father had actual or constructive knowledge that the Honda was being used for illegal drug activity. It appears from the record, that the State's sole dispute is with the ownership of the vehicle.On January 18, 2007, during an interview conducted by the police, Jesse Tyler stated that he owned and paid for the Honda. Jesse claimed his parents' names were on the title because he could not obtain a car loan. Jesse signed the Notification of Forfeiture form claiming that he was the owner of the property. On October 5, 2007, Jesse recanted this statement in an affidavit. Jesse stated that the car was owned by his father, and that he originally denied ownership so that his father would not become involved. Gary Tyler maintains that he purchased the Honda.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact exists as to who paid for the Honda.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the ownership of the Honda. THEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.