Opinion
No. 10-03-00311-CV
Opinion delivered and filed July 14, 2004.
Appeal from the 19th District Court, McLennan County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2002-1649-1.
Affirmed.
Nita C. Fanniny, Attorney at Law, Waco, TX, for appellant/relator.
Christy Barber, McLennan County Asst. District Attorney, Waco, TX, for appellee/respondent.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Tammy Gilmore to her three children after a bench trial. Tammy appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
Tammy was 18 years old when her first child was born. By the time of the removal, the oldest child was not yet six years old and was in kindergarten. The Department of Protective and Regulatory Services had had numerous referrals for neglect and abuse of the children; that the children were filthy, had dirty and inadequate clothing; that the house they lived in was filthy, with cat feces and urine in the children's beds, trash piled up in the house, broken glass in the driveway. Tammy eventually moved out of the home, leaving the children behind with their father who had previously physically abused Tammy. She told the Department that she moved because the house had no electricity. She moved in with Daryl Bowden, a registered sex offender. The children were removed when the oldest arrived at school with a swollen eye.
After removal, Tammy was dishonest with the Department about many things. Most significantly, she failed to tell them that she had a relationship, and continued that relationship, with a registered sex offender. She refused to break off that relationship even though she was told many times by her therapists, her caseworker, and the CASA worker that reunification would not be recommended as long as that relationship continued. Although three months before trial she wrote the trial judge a letter telling him that she would end her relationship and asking to have another chance with her children, within weeks she moved in again with Daryl and his mother.
IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE
In her first issue, Tammy contends that the trial court should not have considered Daryl's status as a registered sex offender in determining whether Tammy's parental rights should be terminated. To the extent that Issue Number One could be construed as a complaint about the admission of evidence, the complaint was not properly preserved. To complain on appeal about the improper admission of evidence, a party must object to that admission. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Tammy did not object at any time to the admission of this evidence. To the extent that Issue Number One could be considered a complaint about the weight of evidence, it is subsumed within the sufficiency issues discussed below. Tammy's first issue is overruled.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In her second and third issues, Tammy argues that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the two prongs of termination: that she committed a predicate act as alleged by the State and that it was in the children's best interest to terminate Tammy's parental rights.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D) (E) (Vernon 2002).
This Court has previously set out the standards for reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in termination cases. In the Interest of C.J.B., No. 10-03-00009-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4365 (Tex. App.-Waco May 12, 2004, no pet. h.). We follow those standards in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. After reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standards, although a finding only on one predicate act is necessary, we find that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Tammy committed both predicate acts as alleged. Tammy's second issue is overruled.
We have also previously set out the factors considered in determining the best interest of the children and use those factors in conjunction with the review of the legal and factual sufficiency of the best interest finding. Id. After reviewing the evidence using the appropriate standards, we find that there was both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of the children. Tammy's third issue is overruled.
We note that the attorney ad litem for the children fully participated in the proceedings and focused on issues relevant to the protection of the children as well as to the best interest of the children. It is the best interest of the child, not the parent, that is the relevant inquiry. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003).
Conclusion
Having overruled each of Tammy's issues, the trial court's judgment of termination is affirmed.