Opinion
Case No. 20000317-CA.
Filed November 2, 2000. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Seventh District Juvenile, Monticello Department, The Honorable Mary L. Manley.
Rosalie Reilly, Monticello, for Appellant.
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, and Craig C. Halls, Monticello, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
When reviewing a juvenile court's decision for sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider all the facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the juvenile court's determination. See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,¶ 12, 985 P.2d 911. We reverse only when the decision is "against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
The evidence, primarily from the victim, S.C, was sufficient to support B.K.'s conviction. S.C. testified that B.K. pulled at her swimming suit many times and ultimately digitally penetrated her vagina. S.C.'s testimony was bolstered by her mother and sister who said that she reported the incident shortly after it happened. Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that S.C. was upset with B.K. prior to the incident or had a motive to make up the story. B.K. denied any penetration, and said that any inappropriate contact with S.C. was inadvertent. However, the trial court found S.C. to be more credible, and we must defer to the trial court's assessment of the evidence and witness credibility. See In re R.A.F., 863 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (stating "trial court is in a better position to observe factors bearing on credibility"); see also Promax Dev. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (stating it is "trial court's role to assess witness credibility, given its advantaged position to observe testimony first hand, and normally, we will not second guess the trial court's findings in this regard"). Having determined that S.C.'s testimony was credible, the juvenile court "could properly draw the inference that defendant had the intent to arouse or gratify his own sexual desire." State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah Ct.App. 1997).
Because B.K. has not demonstrated that he preserved the issues of whether it is constitutional to require a juvenile to pay a filing fee and to post a bond on appeal, or whether any exceptions apply, we cannot consider these issues. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) ("`Issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal.' This rule applies to all claims, including constitutional questions, unless the petitioner demonstrates that `plain error' occurred or `exceptional circumstances' exist") (quoting State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)).
B.K.'s conviction is affirmed.
Russell W. Bench, Judge, James Z. Davis, Judge, William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge.