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Ifill v. State

New York State Court of Claims
Jan 22, 2015
# 2014-039-436 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Jan. 22, 2015)

Opinion

# 2014-039-436 Claim No. 117927

01-22-2015

SHAKA IFILL v. STATE OF NEW YORK

Leventhal & Klein, LLP By: Jason Leventhal, Esq. Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman Attorney General of the State of New York By: Thomas R. Monjeau Assistant Attorney General


Synopsis

Defendant found liable to claimant for 94 days of wrongful confinement beyond the maximum expiration date of his sentence due to defendant's failure to properly credit claimant with 176 days of parole jail time credit to which he was due after serving a concurrent sentence in a local jail.

Case information

UID:

2014-039-436

Claimant(s):

SHAKA IFILL

Claimant short name:

IFILL

Footnote (claimant name) :

Defendant(s):

STATE OF NEW YORK

Footnote (defendant name) :

Third-party claimant(s):

Third-party defendant(s):

Claim number(s):

117927

Motion number(s):

Cross-motion number(s):

Judge:

James H. Ferreira

Claimant's attorney:

Leventhal & Klein, LLP By: Jason Leventhal, Esq.

Defendant's attorney:

Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman Attorney General of the State of New York By: Thomas R. Monjeau Assistant Attorney General

Third-party defendant's attorney:

Signature date:

January 22, 2015

City:

Albany

Comments:

Official citation:

Appellate results:

See also (multicaptioned case)


Decision

On January 21, 2010, claimant Shaka Ifill (a/k/a Ciya Brown) filed this claim with the Clerk of the Court of Claims seeking to recover, inter alia, damages for an alleged wrongful confinement lasting 94 days from July 22, 2009 through October 23, 2009, while claimant was incarcerated at Marcy Correctional Facility (CF). A bifurcated trial on the issue of liability was conducted on January 10, 2013 at the New York State Court of Claims in Albany, New York. Following the trial on liability, this Court found that claimant established by a preponderance of the credible evidence his cause of action sounding in wrongful confinement against defendant for the period of time from July 22, 2009 through October 23, 2009 (see Ifill v State of New York, UID No. 2013-039-371 [Ct Cl, Ferreira, J., June 12, 2013]). A trial on the issue of damages was held on June 24, 2014. Claimant testified and offered documentary evidence in support of his claim. Defendant called no witnesses and offered no exhibits. The Court granted requests from both parties for extensions of time to submit post-trial memoranda, and said memoranda were received on October 17, 2014.

The Court received into evidence without objection the exhibits admitted into evidence during the liability trial (see claimant's exhibits 1 through 17), as well as three new exhibits (see claimant's exhibits 18 through 20).

The underlying facts are set forth in the Court's Decision on liability (see id.). Briefly stated, this claim involved the calculation by the New York State Department of Correctional Services (hereinafter DOCS) of the amount of Parole Jail Time Credit (hereinafter PJTC) due to claimant and the resulting calculation of claimant's maximum expiration date (hereinafter ME date). It was undisputed at trial that DOCS failed to credit claimant with the proper amount of PJTC owed to him and that claimant should have been released on July 21, 2009, but was not released until October 23, 2009. The Court concluded that claimant's confinement for the 94-day period following claimant's correct ME date of July 21, 2009 was not privileged and that defendant was therefore liable for the wrongful confinement of claimant for that period.

DOCS and the Department of Parole (hereinafter DOP) are now encompassed within the current Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (see L 2011, ch 62, pt C, subpt A, § 4, eff. March 31, 2011). Inasmuch as the events in the claim here occurred prior to that change, the Court will refer to the agencies by their former names.

In a written directive dated October 23, 2009, the Marcy CF Superintendent ordered that "[d]ue to additional Jail time credit for BROWN, Ciya, 02B2386, the Maximum Expiration has been adjusted to July 21, 2009. Therefore, [claimant] is herby [sic] discharged from Marcy Correctional Facility having completed the Maximum Expiration of his sentence" (claimant's exhibit 15).

At the damages trial, claimant, age 34, testified that he currently resides in Baltimore, Maryland. He is unmarried and has a six month old son. Claimant was born in Queens, New York on January 6, 1980. He testified that he is a high school graduate and attended one year of community college. Claimant acknowledged that he had various encounters with law enforcement between 2001 and 2009, including convictions for several misdemeanor crimes such as trespassing and possession of marijuana. He spent three to six months in a county jail in Binghamton when he was 18, and spent three years in state prison for attempted burglary in the second degree. He stated that the attempted burglary conviction involved taking property from a neighbor who had borrowed money from claimant but had not repaid him.

In later testimony, claimant stated that he earned his GED at Marcy CF because he did not have records reflecting that he had attended high school in Baltimore.

Claimant testified that he presently works five day a week for AGR Group, an energy marketing company based out of Baltimore. His compensation is commission-based and depends on sales. His work entails going door to door in residential neighborhoods offering energy services from various energy suppliers. He testified that, since his release from Marcy CF on October 23, 2009, he has not been convicted of any felonies, nor has he been arrested. He acknowledged that he has had two encounters with the law but neither resulted in a conviction; one involved a charge of disorderly conduct and the other involved a charge that was dropped after it became apparent he was mistaken for another individual. He testified that he has never filed a lawsuit other than the instant claim.

Claimant testified that he first realized his ME date was miscalculated in December 2008 after he was transferred from Rikers Island, a New York City facility, to State custody, and received his classification sheet, which did not reflect the time he spent incarcerated at Rikers. At first, he was not "upset [or] mad . . . it was like a shock, like I was scared, like what's going on . . . it really scared me cause I had things planned, I'm thinking that I'm coming out this time but then it's pushed back, . . . the paperwork's messed up, . . . I'm kind of scared." Claimant then described how he felt during the time he was incarcerated longer than he believed he should have been and was writing to facility officials about his incorrect release date. He stated: "I felt neglected, I felt like once you're here you do the crime you pay the time, no one cares, . . . I felt like there wasn't no hope." In describing what he meant when he said he felt neglected, he stated that he felt "ignored, isolated, shut off, like you don't have a voice."

Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the electronic audio recording of the trial.

Claimant testified that, after more time passed without any resolution, he started to feel that "no one was paying attention, so I started to give up . . . I just waved the white flag, I can't fight this . . . I don't care no more." Claimant testified that his longer-than-expected incarceration affected his behavior at Marcy CF, in that he acted out and disobeyed orders. Prior to such behavior, he followed the rules, showed respect, never fought with a correction officer and worked in the kitchen. He spent some time in segregated housing at the very beginning of his three-year sentence and at the end of his incarceration, during the time he was wrongfully confined. Claimant stated that, while he had participated in various facility programs during the majority of his prison sentence, during the period of time he maintained that he should not have been in prison, he refused to attend some programs related to adjusting to society after his release because he felt that he was being "ignored."

On September 8, 2009, he was charged with two Tier II violations, which claimant attributed to the mood he was in because he had not been released. He described himself at that time as being "lazy" and "mouthing off" because "of the simple fact I was not getting out . . . when I was supposed to get out." The charges resulted from an incident that occurred while he was working in the mess hall. After he and an inmate exchanged words, claimant threw a cleaning rag at the inmate and grabbed him. Correction officers separated them and claimant was placed in the special housing unit (SHU), where he stayed from September 8, 2009 through September 14, 2009 (see claimant's exhibit 18). While in SHU, he was allowed to leave to shower, but was not allowed to leave the cell for any other reason. Claimant was also fasting during this period of time for religious reasons. On his first day in SHU, he did not believe he was strong enough to get through his SHU confinement because he was fasting; he stated that he prayed, cried and felt embarrassed and upset about not being home. After moving from SHU to keeplock, his disciplinary penalties continued with a loss of recreation, program, phone and commissary privileges until October 8, 2009 (see id.). Although allowed to leave his cubicle to go to meals or to shower, claimant could not leave his cubicle without permission from an officer.

Claimant described the dorm he lived in before and after his SHU confinement as a sleeping area with dividers for about 50 inmates. There were also shower, television and cooking areas.

On September 30, 2009, during the time he was out of SHU but still in keeplock, he received a disciplinary infraction for not complying with the terms of the hearing disposition resulting from the September 8 incident (see claimant's exhibit 19). This infraction involved claimant leaving his cubicle without permission to heat up some food. After the disciplinary hearing for that charge, claimant received an additional 20 days of loss of recreation, which extended the loss of that privilege until October 29, 2009 (see id.). Claimant was also given a penalty of a four-day trash pick up assignment (see id.).

Claimant was released on October 23, 2009 (see claimant's exhibit 15). At the time of his release, he was "shocked" and "didn't know what was happening" as men in uniforms and suits entered his cubicle and escorted him out. He stated that he thought he was being placed back in SHU and had "[done] something really bad ... [or done] something again that was wrong." Claimant stated that he was told to "pack [his] stuff" and thought that he "was being moved to a different jail." When he realized he was being released, he was "happy" and "excited."

During cross-examination, claimant acknowledged that he had other disciplinary infractions that resulted in SHU and keeplock confinement beyond the incidents he raised during his direct examination. Claimant also repeated that he was in SHU for six days as a result of the September 8, 2009 incident and then returned to a dorm cubicle where he was held under keeplock for 24 days. He stated that he did not return to the mess hall dorm cubicle he had resided in prior to the incident in the mess hall, and commented that the mess hall dorm is "something special" for inmates with more privileges. During this period of time, he was housed in another dorm. While he acknowledged that he did not have a lot of visitors toward the end of his confinement, he stated that he still lost "certain freedoms" in keeplock.

Documents received into evidence indicate that claimant arrived at Marcy CF from Mohawk CF on February 5, 2009 (claimant's exhibit 20, Chronological Entry Sheet). At that time, claimant met with a counselor and refused to participate in an alcohol and substance abuse treatment program and aggression replacement therapy (an anger management program). Claimant just wanted to "max out" his time and again refused to participate in those programs in May and August 2009 (see id.). Claimant also acknowledged during cross-examination that he was in and out of DOCS custody and local correction facilities between 2005 and 2008 for a variety of different offenses. He repeated that he was restricted from all programs when he was in keeplock for the September 8, 2009 incident, including access to the prison library.

Claimant testified that, while incarcerated, he wrote notes and letters to several DOCS and DOP officials, including DOP headquarters and Marcy Facility Parole Officer Blair, stating that he believed his jail time had been improperly calculated and that his release date was incorrect ( see claimant's exhibit 1[a January 2009 affidavit seeking an application for review of his jail time]; see also claimant's exhibits 3, 5, 6, and 7). Claimant stated that he eventually obtained the sentence and commitment order arising from a guilty plea entered on July 24, 2008 to one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, to satisfy criminal charges pending in Richmond County, and provided that information to DOP officials on October 13, 2009 ( see claimant's exhibit 7).

The sentence and commitment order, which was executed on August 5, 2008, before the Honorable Alan J. Meyer of the Richmond County Criminal Court, sentenced claimant to a definite term of imprisonment of nine months to be served concurrently with claimant's term for violation of his PRS (see claimant's exhibit 7).

"As a general rule, the measure of damages for [wrongful] confinement is such a sum as will fairly and reasonably compensate the injured person for injuries caused by the defendant's wrongful act" (Hallenbeck v City of Albany, 99 AD2d 639, 640 [3d Dept 1984]; accord Sanabria v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d 988, 993 [Ct Cl 2010]). "Such damages may include noneconomic damages for mental anguish and economic damages for loss of earnings, as well as noneconomic damages for the loss of liberty during a period of unlawful confinement" (Sanabria v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d at 993 [internal citation omitted]). "The mental anguish suffered by an inmate while he is in prison encompasses his discomfort, fear, lack of privacy and degradation" (Baba-Ali v State of New York, 24 Misc 3d 576, 581-582 [Ct Cl 2009], affd in part, revd in part 76 AD3d 940 [2d Dept 2010]). The "[d]amages attributable to loss of liberty include damages for the loss of the fundamental right to be free, lost opportunities to engage in everyday activities while confined, and for the mental anguish that accompanies the loss of liberty" (Sanabria v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d at 993). "The inherently factual finding of [noneconomic damages] is generally 'left to a [factfinder's] common sense and judgment in light of its common knowledge and experience and with due regard to the evidence presented at trial, including the demeanor and testimony of all witnesses' " (id. quoting Murphy v Lewry, 235 AD2d 968, 969 [3d Dept 1997]). In assessing the amount of a damage award, "[i]t is proper for a court to look at other similar cases to determine what would be a reasonable award" (Jackson v State of New York, UID No. 2009-038-105 [Ct Cl, DeBow, J., Dec. 21, 2009]). Notably, there are few reported cases involving an award of damages arising from confinement in a State facility beyond an inmate's ME date (see e.g. Miller v State of New York, UID No. 2013-039-369 [Ct Cl, Ferreira, J., April 9, 2013], affd ___ AD3d ___, ___, 2015 NY Slip Op 00408 [3d Dept Jan. 15, 2015]; Sanabria v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d 988 [Ct Cl 2010]).

Here, claimant seeks damages for the loss of his liberty and the mental anguish that he suffered during the wrongful confinement. In his post-trial memorandum, claimant contends that any award of damages should be allocated based upon the varying degrees of confinement he endured during the 94 day period. Claimant asserts that the first 48 days of confinement warrant an award of $2,000 per day, and that the remaining 46 days of confinement, during which time he was in the SHU or keeplock, justify a greater award of $4,000 per day for the six days in SHU and $2,500 per day for the 40 days he was in keeplock (see claimant's post-trial memorandum of law at 1-4, and 9). The Court disagrees.

Claimant is not seeking any economic damages arising from the wrongful confinement (see claimant's post-trial memorandum of law at 5). In any event, it was claimant's burden to establish any lost earnings with "reasonable certainty" (Bielich v Winters, 95 AD2d 750, 751 [1st Dept 1983]), and the Court received no specific evidence establishing that claimant incurred any economic damages with respect to the 94 days that he was held at Marcy CF beyond his ME date. Thus, the Court makes no award for economic damages.

Certainly, there is no dispute that confinement beyond one's term of incarceration is a clear infringement on one's liberty interest and, as previously noted, can culminate in "damages for the loss of the fundamental right to be free, lost opportunities to engage in everyday activities while confined, and for the mental anguish that accompanies the loss of liberty" (Sanabria v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d at 994). Here, claimant suffered a loss of liberty, as he was confined for 94 days longer than he should have been. He was unable to participate in the every day activities that non-incarcerated individuals enjoy. He was away from family and friends and unable to travel and work. The Court has considered claimant's calm, candid and conversational demeanor at trial and found that claimant credibly conveyed the frustration and disappointment attendant to confinement beyond his ME date. Claimant testified that, once he believed he was being held beyond his release date, he felt "neglected" and without "hope." When pressed further, he stated that he felt "ignored, isolated, shut off [and without] a voice."

The Court, however, does not find persuasive claimant's contention that his non-economic damages should be greater for the period of time he was in SHU and under keeplock. Claimant offers no case - and the Court is not aware of any decision - to support this type of tiered damages allocation. While claimant was understandably and legitimately upset and annoyed by the time calculation error and the resulting delay in his release, the disciplinary incidents in September 2009 were attributable only to his own misconduct, and he must bear the responsibility and consequences for his actions.

Further, the decisions cited by claimant are, in large part, factually inapposite to the record before this Court (see Hallenbeck v City of Albany, 99 AD2d 639 [3d Dept 1984] [court reduces award of $25,000 to $10,000 in false arrest and confinement case where motorist arrested after traffic stop was detained for three hours]; Woodard v City of Albany, 81 AD2d 947 [3d Dept 1981] [court reduces damages award of $16,000 to $7,500 in false arrest and imprisonment case where plaintiff spent five hours in jail following altercation with an off-duty police officer]; Guion v Associated Dry Goods Corp. [Lord & Taylor Div.], 56 AD2d 798 [1st Dept 1977] [court upholds award of $10,000 in false arrest case where store patron was detained three hours]; see also Gardner v Federated Dept. Stores, 907 F2d 1348 [2d Cir 1990] [court reduces damages award of $150,000 to $50,000 in false imprisonment case where department store patron was imprisoned by store security personnel for several hours]).

This Court recently addressed the issue of damages in a case involving a person who was wrongfully held beyond his ME date (see Miller v State of New York, UID No. 2013-039-369 [Ct Cl, Ferreira, J., Apr. 9, 2013], affd ___ AD3d ___, ___ 2015 NY Slip Op 00408 [3d Dept Jan. 15, 2015]). In Miller, a 67 year old former inmate had returned from his residence in New Jersey to a criminal court in New York City for a sentencing hearing. Having already served an 18-month sentence for the crime that was the subject of the sentencing hearing, Mr. Miller believed that the hearing would be brief and that he would then be returning home to New Jersey. In fact, according to Mr. Miller, the sentencing judge informed him that after some administrative work was completed, he would be released that afternoon or the next day. Instead, he spent two weeks at Rikers Island and 23 more days in a State correctional facility before he was released. The Court awarded Mr. Miller damages in the amount of $35,000 as compensation for the noneconomic damages that he incurred during the period of his wrongful incarceration. The damages award was based on some particularly compelling and unique facts, specific to that case, including the unexpectedness of Mr. Miller's confinement in that he testified credibly that he thought his sentencing hearing would be brief and that he would be away from home for only a short time. Further, Mr. Miller's confinement was so sudden that he did not believe that his family or his attorney knew where he was and, during his 23 day confinement, he was unable to obtain information about why he was still being held and when he would be released. Finally, it bears mention that the State knew that Mr. Miller was being kept past his ME date within two days of his arrival in State custody but still detained him (see Miller v State of New York, 37 Misc 3d 1202[A] [Ct Cl 2012], affd ___ AD3d ___, ___ 2015 NY Slip Op 00408 [3d Dept Jan. 15, 2015]). The Court found Mr. Miller's powerful testimony compelling and persuasive; there is no question that his life was turned upside down by this unforeseen and traumatic experience.

Based on the record before it, the Court is not persuaded by claimant's testimony that claimant's unlawful 94-day confinement is comparable to the facts in Miller and requires a non-economic damages award commensurate with Miller and other cases cited by claimant. There was no credible evidence presented that claimant suffered any substantial physical or mental harm. While claimant testified to frustration, annoyance and anger caused by the extended incarceration, he proffered no evidence, expert or otherwise, of physical or mental health injury arising from the additional time in prison, and there was no indication he pursued any counseling or psychological assistance attributable to his wrongful confinement upon his release. Other than his embarrassment of not being able to fulfill his religious obligations during his time in SHU, there was scant evidence of "discomfort, fear, lack of privacy and degradation" (Baba-Ali v State of New York, 24 Misc 3d at 581-582). In addition, claimant's incarcerative history "as compared to a claimant who has never been incarcerated - is properly considered on the issue of claimed mental anguish" (Sanabria v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d at 994).

While claimant spoke of being scared when he first discovered the time calculation discrepancy, he never explained the basis of his fear nor elaborated on what he meant by that testimony.

Furthermore, unlike the situation in Miller, correction facility officials were responding to and communicating with claimant regarding the time calculation issue. Claimant had initially discovered the error in the computation of his sentence upon reviewing a classification sheet in December 2008 (see claimant's exhibit 8). In January 2009, claimant composed an affidavit requesting review of the computation of his jail time (see claimant's exhibit 1). This affidavit was received at the DOP Office of the Counsel on January 16, 2009 and at the DOP at Mohawk CF on February 2, 2009. After being transferred to Marcy CF in February 2009, claimant recalled speaking to the facility parole officer at Marcy about the time calculation error. The record shows that claimant and the facility parole officer communicated verbally and in writing on the time calculation issue (see claimant's exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Claimant was also promptly released upon discovery and rectification of the time calculation error (see claimant's exhibits 15 and 16).

Annexed to this affidavit was the court order for investigation and report from the New York City Department of Probation, dated July 24, 2008. This form indicated that claimant's sentencing date was August 5, 2008 and that a judicial sentence promise was made to claimant for "Nine (9) months jail conc. with Time Serving + FOP" (id.). It does not appear that claimant ever received a response to his affidavit.

Finally, the Court is not persuaded by defendant's argument that claimant did not act in an expeditious manner to mitigate his damages. "As a general rule, a party who claims to have suffered damage by the tort of another is bound to use reasonable and proper efforts to make the damage as small as practicable . . . and if an injured party allows the damages to be unnecessarily enhanced, the incurred loss justly falls upon him" (Novko v State of New York, 285 AD2d 696, 697 [3d Dept 2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, claimant testified that he discovered the calculation error in December 2008, submitted an affidavit to DOP officials seeking review of his jail time computation in mid-January 2009, and told a Marcy CF parole officer, on at least one occasion, about the time calculation error (see claimant's exhibit 1). Given claimant's actions, the Court finds no merit to this defense.

The Court also notes that the defense of failure to mitigate damages must be pleaded by the defendant if defendant intends to employ that defense, and defendant's answer contains no such defense (see Loomis v City of Binghamton, 43 AD2d 764 [3d Dept 1973], appeal dismissed 34 NY2d 537 [1973]; see also16 NY Prac, New York Law of Torts § 21:125 [2014]).
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As discussed earlier, there is a scarcity of cases comparable to the claim before this Court (see e.g., Sanabria v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d 988 [court awards $20,000 in noneconomic damages in wrongful confinement case where claimant was held 91 days beyond his release date because of incorrect release date calculation]). Upon consideration of the specific circumstances of this case, including the number of days that claimant was wrongfully confined and claimant's testimony and demeanor, the Court awards damages to claimant in the amount of $20,000.00. This damages award represents compensation to claimant for the noneconomic damages that he incurred during the period of his wrongful incarceration.

The amount awarded herein shall carry interest at the interest rate of 9% per year from the date of the determination of liability on June 12, 2013. In addition, to the extent claimant has paid a filing fee, it may be recovered pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11-a (2).

Any motions on which the Court may have previously reserved or which were not previously determined are hereby denied.

Let judgment be entered accordingly.

January 22, 2015

Albany, New York

James H. Ferreira

Judge of the Court of Claims


Summaries of

Ifill v. State

New York State Court of Claims
Jan 22, 2015
# 2014-039-436 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Jan. 22, 2015)
Case details for

Ifill v. State

Case Details

Full title:SHAKA IFILL v. STATE OF NEW YORK

Court:New York State Court of Claims

Date published: Jan 22, 2015

Citations

# 2014-039-436 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Jan. 22, 2015)