Opinion
No.: 8:18-cv-02548-TMC-JDA
02-22-2019
Alexander Louis Hunsberger, Plaintiff, v. Donald Myers; Ervin Maye; Frank Young; Alton Eargle, Jr.; Rick Hubbard; Randy B. Duran; Roger Lowe, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment and a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendants in this civil action. [Docs. 20; 21.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case.
Plaintiff brought this action on August 7, 2018, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1.] Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights. [Id.] On November 26, 2018, Defendants Randy B. Duran and Roger Lowe (the "Sheriff's Department Defendants") filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 20.] On the same day, Defendants Alton Eargle, Jr., Rick Hubbard, Ervin Maye, Donald Myers, and Frank Young (the "Prosecutor Defendants") filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Doc. 21.] On November 28, 2018, this Court issued an Order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and of the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motions. [Doc. 22.] On January 31, 2019, Plaintiff's response in opposition to both motions was docketed. [Doc. 29.] On February 5, 2019, the Prosecutor Defendants filed a reply. [Doc. 31.] Both motions are now ripe for review.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). In this case, construing the filing date in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this action was filed on August 7, 2018. [Doc. 1 at 8 (Complaint signature dated August 7, 2018).]
The Sheriff's Department Defendants, at the time of the events in question, were both employed by the Edgefield County Sheriff's Department. [Doc. 1 at 2.]
The Prosecutor Defendants are all employees or former employees of the Eleventh Circuit Solicitor's Office. [Doc. 21 at 1.] In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See S.C. CONST Art. V, § 24; S.C. Code § 1-7-310.
BACKGROUND
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from the Complaint. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff is a state prisoner incarcerated at Coffee Correctional Facility in Nicholls, Georgia. [Doc. 1 at 1.] In 2002, he was arrested for the murder of Samuel J. Sturrup and held without bond. [Id. at 2, 4-5.] Plaintiff alleges that his arrest was based in part on Defendant Duran's statement made under oath that "to the best of his knowledge Charlene A. Thatcher made a statement stating that she [had] seen the Plaintiff force Mr. Sturrup in[to] the trunk of his car and then later in a wooded area Ms. Thatcher [had] seen the Plaintiff shoot Mr. Sturrup" and "that William Harris [had] made the exact same statement as Ms. Thatcher." [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff alleges that not only was Duran's statement false but that "Cpt. Roger Lowe who supervised the investigation conducted by Lt. Duran, allowed Lt. Duran to present the false evidence under a judicial oath without correcting" him. [Id.]
Although Plaintiff was arrested in 2002, his trial was not held until 2012. [Id. at 2-4.] During the years between his arrest and trial Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce his rights to a speedy trial and for reconsideration of his denial of bond, which the court denied based on Assistant Solicitor Maye's representation to the court "that upon Solicitor Donald Myers['] instructions the State ha[d] yet to decide if they will seek the Death Penalty on the Plaintiff." [Id. at 2-5.]
Following his trial, a jury found Plaintiff guilty of Sturrup's murder. [Id. at 2-4.] Plaintiff appealed his conviction on the basis that his right to a speedy trial was violated. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, State v. Hunsberger, No. 2014-UP-381, 2014 WL 5772563 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2014), but the Supreme Court of South Carolina subsequently granted certiorari and reversed Plaintiff's conviction in a 3-2 decision, State v. Hunsberger, 794 S.E.2d 368 (S.C. 2016); id. at 377-82 (Toal, J., dissenting).
These decisions thoroughly describe the facts relating to the speedy trial issue.
In the present action, Plaintiff seeks money damages for the violation of his constitutional rights. He claims that Duran's presentation of false evidence, which Love knowingly allowed, "directly contributed to the prosecution and subsequent conviction of the Plaintiff" and violated his right to due process under the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. [Id. at 2, 4.] He alleges that Defendants Myers, Mayes, and Young used "the Death Penalty as a tactic to ensure that the Plaintiff was denied bond, fast and speedy trial, and Due Process," thereby prolonging his confinement and allowing him to be wrongfully convicted, and violating his right to a speedy trial and to not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. [Id. 2-3, 5.] And, Plaintiff alleges that, after his conviction was reversed, Defendants Assistant Solicitors Hubbard and Eargle violated Plaintiff's right to due process by "refus[ing] to perform their duties to remove the conviction and sentence both written and digitally." [Id. at 3, 6.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant "deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States" and (2) that the defendant "deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the "state action" requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, "the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual" may at times be treated "as if a State has caused it to be performed." Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, "state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'" Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation "caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible" and that "the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to "begin[ ] by identifying 'the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'" Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Judgment on the Pleadings Standard
Rule 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial. . . . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Where a Rule 12(b)(6) defense is raised by a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion under Rule 12(c) is reviewed under the same standards as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Rodriguez v. Finan, No. 2:15-cv-2317-BHH, 2016 WL 1258314, at *7 n.2 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2016) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999); Burbach Broad. Co. of Delaware v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) ("[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.").
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)—the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
DISCUSSION
The Prosecutor Defendants and the Sheriff's Department Defendants argue, for several reasons, that their motions should be granted. The Court agrees.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity for Official-Capacity Claims
As employees of the State of South Carolina, Defendants are all entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to any claims for money damages asserted against them in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina, or its officials in their official capacities, by a citizen of South Carolina or a citizen of another state. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). As noted in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.9 (1984), a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. The State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in a federal court. The South Carolina Tort Claims Act, section 15-78-20(e) of the South Carolina Code of Laws, expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the state of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. See McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (S.C. 1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities"), superseded by statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-100(b), as recognized in Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 633 S.E.2d 143 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 ("[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment."). Accordingly, because Plaintiff's claims are for money damages only, all Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the claims alleged against them in their official capacities.
Prosecutorial Immunity for the Prosecutor Defendants
The Prosecutor Defendants contend that they are entitled, as a matter of law, to prosecutorial immunity against Plaintiff's claims. [Doc. 21-1 at 4-9.] The Court agrees.
Prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings, such as criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pre-trial motions hearings. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 470-71 (4th Cir. 2000). Any actions taken by a solicitor in preparing a criminal charge and prosecuting the case against Plaintiff are part of the judicial process; therefore, the solicitor has absolute immunity from suit. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (explaining absolute immunity is "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability"); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 340-43 (2009). In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, have absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of proceedings that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 430. This absolute immunity from suit applies when prosecutors exercise their prosecutorial discretion, such as making the determination to go forward with indictment. See Springmen v. Williams, 122 F.3d 211, 212-13 (4th Cir. 1997).
Here, all of the conduct on which Plaintiff bases his claims against the Prosecutor Defendants were actions these Defendants took in prosecuting a criminal case against Plaintiff. Because this alleged conduct is intricately related to the judicial process and to the prosecution of the State's case against Plaintiff, the Prosecutor Defendants have absolute immunity from this suit and their motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted. See Dowdle v. Skinner, No. 6:12-cv-3253-DCN, 2013 WL 5771199, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 24, 2013); Rodgers v. Riddle, No. 6:09-cv-1446-PMD, 2009 WL 1953188, at *3 (D.S.C. July 7, 2009); see also Pressley v. McMaster, No. 3:14-cv-04025-JMC, 2015 WL 5178505, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2015) ("Representing the state's interest in criminal appeals or otherwise defending the validity of a conviction or sentence on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings is 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,' and thus constitutes an immune function.").
Because the Court concludes that the Prosecutor Defendants are entitled to prosecutorial immunity, the Court declines to address their alternative arguments.
Failure to State a Claim Against the Sheriff's Office Defendants
Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted as against the Sheriff's Office Defendants. His § 1983 claim against them is based on Duran's allegedly false statement to a judge under oath that led to Plaintiff's arrest and on Lowe's failure to correct Duran's statement. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Plaintiff contends that the alleged conduct caused a denial of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the South Carolina Constitution. However, § 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution or false arrest are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment "are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment"); Curtis v. Devlin, No. 1:04-cv-409, 2005 WL 940571, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2005) (explaining that § 1983 actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment).
"[T]he Fourth Circuit recognizes two distinct causes of action under § 1983 for violations of an individual's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure." Ellison v. Proffit, No. 4:16-cv-00847-BHH-KDW, 2017 WL 598511, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2017) (citing Brooks v. Winston Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1996)), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 588734 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2017). Because the Complaint here fails to satisfactorily allege either one, the Sheriff's Office Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the claim against them.
The Sheriff's Department Defendants do not specifically raise this ground in support of their summary judgment motion. However, the Court notes that 28 U.S.C. §1915, the in forma pauperis statute, authorizes the Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because the Court concludes, for the reasons discussed, that the Complaint fails to state a claim as to the Sheriff's Department Defendants, the Court declines to address the arguments these Defendants raise in support of their summary judgment motion.
"The first [cause of action is one] for false or unlawful arrest or arrest in the absence of legal process." Id. (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007)). Such a claim can succeed "only when no arrest warrant has been obtained." Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Brooks, 85 F.3d at 181-82 (determining that when the arresting official makes the arrest with a facially valid warrant, it is not false arrest). Because Plaintiff does not allege that he was arrested without a warrant, he does not state a cause of action of this type.
Allegations that officers arrested a suspect pursuant to a warrant they obtained by making intentional misrepresentations in applying for the warrant fall within the second type of Fourth Amendment cause of action. E.g., Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 555-56 (4th Cir. 2017). That "cause of action lies when there is a violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures because he or she is subjected to a 'malicious prosecution' or an abuse of judicial process." Ellison, 2017 WL 598511, at *3. This cause of action is not a malicious prosecution claim per se, but rather "'a claim founded on a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates the elements of the analogous common law tort of malicious prosecution—specifically, the requirement that the prior proceeding terminate favorably to the plaintiff.'" Snider v. Lee, 584 F.3d 193, 199 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000)); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). For the favorable termination element to be satisfied, the criminal proceedings of which the plaintiff complains must have been "terminated 'for reasons indicative of the innocence' of the criminal defendant (the civil plaintiff)." Ellison, 2017 WL 598511, at *3.
Here, Plaintiff cannot establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action because he has not alleged that his conviction was terminated for reasons indicating his innocence. Cf. Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 650-54 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on § 1983 malicious prosecution claim because plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to show that dismissal under New Mexico's Speedy Trial Act of the charges against him indicated his innocence of the charged crime). And in fact, his conviction was not terminated for such reasons. In reversing Plaintiff's conviction on speedy-trial grounds, the Supreme Court of South Carolina did not suggest that Plaintiff was actually innocent of the charge or that any evidence affirmatively indicated that he was. Hunsberger, 794 S.E.2d 368. In light of Plaintiff's failure to properly allege a violation under either of the two types of Fourth Amendment causes of action, the Court concludes that the Sheriff's Department Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the claim against them.
Plaintiff also conclusorily alleges that the challenged actions of the Sheriff's Department Defendants violated "the State of South Carolina's Constitution." [Doc. 1 at 4.] He does not identify which provision he alleges these Defendants violated. The Court recommends that summary judgment be granted on this claim as well.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' motions for summary judgment [Doc. 20] and for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. 21] both be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge February 22, 2019 Greenville, South Carolina