Opinion
(11046)
By statute [ 47a-7[a], 47a-8, 47a-4a), landlords are required to do whatever is necessary to keep dwelling units free of lead-based paint, the presence of such paint renders units unfit for human habitation and the receipt of rent is prohibited. The plaintiff East Hartford housing authority sought, by way of a summary process action, to recover possession of a certain apartment that had been leased to the defendants. During the pendency of the action, the presence of lead-based paint was discovered on the exterior of the apartment. The plaintiff took immediate action, and the problem was corrected within two weeks. Thereafter, the defendants raised several special defenses including two alleging that the presence of lead-based paint had obviated their obligation to pay rent. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the statutory scheme impliedly provides for a grace period in which to correct the problem or notice requirement before the right to withhold rent arises; there is no indication that the legislature intended anything other than what was expressed in the clear statutory language.
Argued January 7, 1993
Decision released May 18, 1993
Summary process action, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, Housing Session at Hartford, and tried to the court, Berger, J.; judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
John F. Sullivan, with whom, on the brief, was Ralph J. Alexander, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Pamela A. Mitchell, with whom was Nancy A. Hronek, for the appellees (defendants).
The plaintiff housing authority appeals from the judgment in favor of the defendants in this summary process action based on the defendants' failure to pay their April, 1988 rent. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) construed the plaintiff's duty under federal law to inspect for lead-based paint, and (2) applied General Statutes 47a-4a to the facts of this case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff is a municipal housing authority created pursuant to chapter 128 of the General Statutes.
The defendants, Eugene Olesen and Nancy McCormick-Olesen, were parties to the rental agreement.
In November, 1986, the plaintiff and the defendants entered into an automatically renewable month-to-month written lease for an apartment in East Hartford. The apartment is a federally subsidized public housing unit governed by applicable state law and 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437, and its implementing regulations in Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
As a result of the defendants' failure to make their April, 1988 rent payment, the plaintiff caused a notice to quit to be served on the defendants, ordering them to quit possession of the premises on or before April 25, 1988. When the defendants did not vacate the premises, the plaintiff commenced this summary process action. Subsequently, the East Hartford health department removed samples of peeling paint from the premises and forwarded them to the state department of health services laboratory where analysis revealed that the paint had a lead content in excess of that permitted by federal and state standards. The plaintiff took immediate action and the problem was corrected within two weeks.
The parties stipulated that the lead content of the paint exceeded the amount permitted by the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, chapter 63 of the Social Security Act. Because General Statutes 47a-8 has incorporated that standard, the lead content of the paint also exceeded that permitted by state law.
Thereafter, the defendants filed an amended answer that raised several special defenses including two alleging that the presence of the lead-based paint obviated their obligation to pay rent for April, 1988. The matter proceeded to trial and the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed.
The first of these two special defenses alleged a violation of General Statutes 47a-7(a)(2) and the second alleged violations of subsections (1) through (4). Because we find the first special defense to be dispositive of this appeal, we do not address the second.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the presence of paint with a lead content in excess of relevant federal and state standards bars the collection of rent even if the landlord is not aware of the problem at the time of nonpayment. The plaintiff first claims that the presence of lead-based paint should not act as a bar to the collection of rent because it fully observed the federal regulation in effect at the time, which required paint inspections only at unit turnover or as part of routine periodic unit inspections. See 24 C.F.R. § 965.704 (1988). The plaintiff maintains, therefore, that it was under no duty to inspect the premises for lead-based paint at the time of nonpayment. We note that although the trial court found the plaintiff to have such a duty, we decline to address this issue because it is irrelevant to the disposition of the appeal.
The outcome of this case is not governed by the frequency of inspection required by federal law. Rather, the outcome of the case is controlled by the clear mandate of state law. While the federal regulations set forth various components of a landlord's duty in lead-based paint abatement, they also expressly state that the landlord must comply with state and local law. "Nothing in this subpart [governing lead-based paint poisoning prevention] is intended to relieve a [public housing authority] of any responsibility for compliance with state or local laws, ordinances, codes or regulations governing lead-based paint testing or hazard abatement." 24 C.F.R. § 965.706 (1988); see 24 C.F.R. § 965.710 (1992); see also Connelly v. Housing Authority, 213 Conn. 354, 356 n. 2, 567 A.2d 1212 (1990) (federally subsidized housing is subject to applicable state law).
Our state law provides a broad range of statutes and regulations governing lead-based paint testing and abatement. Included in that body of law is the statutorily established affirmative duty of a landlord to do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition, including its being free of paint with an impermissible lead content. This duty has its provenance in General Statutes 47a-7(a), which imposes a number of responsibilities on the landlord including the mandate in subsection (2) that a landlord "make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition . . . ." The expansion of that duty to include lead-based paint abatement is unequivocally furnished by General Statutes 47a-8, which provides in relevant part that "[t]he presence of paint which does not conform to federal standards as required in accordance with the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, Chapter 63 of the Social Security Act, as amended. . . shall be construed to render such dwelling unit . . . unfit for human habitation and shall constitute a noncompliance with subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 47a-7." A violation of 47a-8, therefore, constitutes a per se violation of 47a-7(a)(2).
State statutes include General Statutes 8-219e (financial assistance for removal of lead-based paint), 17-585 (lead-based paint inspection of family day-care centers), 19a-111a through 19a-111d (lead poisoning prevention program), 21a-82 (use of nonconforming lead-based paint in tenements and municipally owned buildings prohibited), 21a-83 (restrictions on the packaging and sale of nonconforming lead-based paint), 21a-85 (penalties for failure to comply with 21a-82 and 21a-83), and 47a-8. The primary compilation of regulations is found at 19a-111-1 et seq. of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
To ensure that the landlord's duties are performed, General Statutes 47a-4a provides that "[a] rental agreement shall not permit the receipt of rent for any period during which the landlord has failed to comply with subsection (a) of section 47a-7." Generally, a tenant claiming the right to withhold rent must "show that the landlord's failure to comply with 47a-7(a) materially affects his safety . . . or has rendered the premises uninhabitable." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Visco v. Cody, 16 Conn. App. 444, 450, 547 A.2d 935 (1988). The legislature, however, in its enactment of 47a-8, has removed that burden from the tenant where lead-based paint is involved. The legislature has determined that the mere presence of lead-based paint shall be construed to render the dwelling unit uninhabitable and shall constitute noncompliance with 47a-7(a)(2). Consequently, there is nothing to forestall the triggering of the sanction imposed by 47a-4a.
In the present case, the parties agree that the lead content of the paint on the exterior of the apartment at the time of nonpayment of rent in April, 1988, exceeded the standard referenced in 47a-8. Accordingly, by virtue of the unambiguous language of the statutes, the plaintiff was not in compliance with 47a-7(a)(2) in April and, as a result, pursuant to 47a-4a, the receipt of rent for that month was prohibited.
Notwithstanding the plain language of the statutes, however, the plaintiff suggests that the statutory scheme impliedly provides for either a grace period in which to cure the problem or, at least, a notice requirement before the right to withhold rent arises. There is no indication that the legislature intended anything other than what it has expressed in the clear statutory language. In the absence of any ambiguity, we construe the intent of the legislature by what it said, not by what it may have meant to say. Furstein v. Hill, 218 Conn. 610, 622, 590 A.2d 939 (1991). We need look no further than the statutory language. Elections Review Committee of Eighth Utilities District v. Freedom of Information Commission, 219 Conn. 685, 692, 595 A.2d 313 (1991). Moreover, in light of the significant health hazards posed by lead-based paint, the result compelled by the language of these statutes is neither absurd nor irrational. See Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 712-13, 595 A.2d 297 (1991). Accordingly, we decline to impose a notice provision on this unambiguous statutory scheme.
The plaintiff does not argue that it had no notice that the presence of lead-based paint was not permitted on the premises. Nonconforming lead-based paint has been prohibited on rental dwelling units in this state for many years under General Statutes 47a-8. Section 47a-8 has its origins in General Statutes 47-24, enacted in 1958. It was first substantially revised by No. 194, 4, of the 1971 Public Acts, the act being entitled "An Act to Enforce the Elimination of Lead-based Paint in Housing Accommodations." By 1976, it had nearly assumed its present language which, ultimately, was provided by No. 79-571 of the 1979 Public Acts.
Furthermore, if the legislature intended to include a notice provision, it was capable of doing so. For example, General Statutes 47a-13, which was enacted as part of a public act that also significantly revised 47a-8, specifically established such a provision. In addressing the tenant's remedies when a landlord has failed to supply essential services, the statute provides in subsection (c) that the "[r]ights of the tenant under this section do not arise (1) until the tenant has given reasonable written or oral notice to the landlord or (2) if the condition was caused by the wilful or negligent act or omission of the tenant, a member of his family or other person on the premises with his consent." General Statutes 47a-13(c). No similar language accompanies 47a-8.
Public Acts 1976, No. 76-95, 13. Section 20 of the same act amended General Statutes 47a-8 by, inter alia, adding the language "and shall constitute a noncompliance with subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 47a-7."
Because it is presumed that the legislature acts with knowledge of existing statutes and intends to create one consistent body of law; Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 65, 566 A.2d 670 (1989); it is not our role to engraft the language of one statute onto another, particularly where, as here, the statutes are similar and were under consideration by the legislature at the same time. See Caron v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Commission, 222 Conn. 269, 277, 610 A.2d 584 (1992); Doe v. Manson, 183 Conn. 183, 187-88, 438 A.2d 859 (1981).