Opinion
Civil Action 9:22cv177
11-04-2022
JAMES WILLIAM HORNSBY v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Zack Hawthorn, United States Magistrate Judge
Petitioner James William Hornsby an inmate confined at the McConnell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, proceeding pro se, brings this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The above-styled action was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636 and the Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to the United States Magistrate Judge, for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case.
Discussion
Petitioner contests the validity of a prison disciplinary conviction he received on February 3, 2022 for possession of narcotics, Disciplinary Report #20220080572. As a result of the disciplinary conviction, petitioner claims he was assessed the following punishment: (1) a loss of 380 days' good conduct time; (2) 45 days' recreation restriction; and (3) 60 days' commissary restriction, cell restriction, and telephone restriction; (4) a reduction in time-earning classification from S-3 to L-1; (5) a reduction in custodial classification from G2 to G5; and (6) the assignment of a security precaution designator for five years. Petitioner complains he was denied due process because the evidence was insufficient to satisfy all elements of the offense of possession. Additionally, petitioner claims he was denied due process because the charging officer provided false testimony and he was denied exculpatory evidence.
Analysis
Denial of Due Process
Prisoners charged with rule violations are entitled to certain due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when the disciplinary action may result in a sanction that will impose upon a liberty interest. State-created liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause are generally limited to freedom from restraint imposing an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995).
In Sandin, the Court adopted a new and different methodology for determining whether a state has created a protected liberty interest to benefit prison inmates. Id. at 2297-2300. Rather than focusing on the presence or absence of mandatory statutory or regulatory language, [ See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).] the Supreme Court determined that the reviewing court should consider the nature of the challenged state action and whether it involved such a significant departure from normal prison conditions that the state might have conceivably created a liberty interest. Id. at 2299.
Protected “interests are generally limited to state-created regulations or statutes which affect the quantity of time rather than the quality of time served by a prisoner.” Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1997). In Texas, prisoners eligible for release on mandatory supervised release, may have a protected liberty interest in previously-earned good conduct time. See Kimbrell v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 2002); Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 956-58 (5th Cir. 2000). However, being placed in disciplinary confinement, losing commissary and property privileges for thirty days, and remaining at the same time earning class are not sanctions which impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2299. See also Madison, 104 F.3d at 768 (concluding that imposing thirty days of commissary and cell restrictions as punishment constitutes mere changes in the conditions of a prisoners confinement and do not implicate due process concerns); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995) (“the mere opportunity to earn good-time credits [does not] constitute a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the Due Process Clause.”), cert. denied, Luken v. Johnson, 116 S.Ct. 1690 (1996); Moody v. Baker, 857 F.2d 256, 257-58 (5th Cir.) (“An inmate has neither a protectible property nor liberty interest in his custody classification ....”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 985 (1988).
The due process that an inmate must receive in a disciplinary hearing is: (1) written notice of the charges against him at least twenty-four hours before the hearing, (2) a written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken, and (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense, unless these procedures would create a security risk in the particular case. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-80, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Henson v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 213 F.3d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 2000); Walker v. Navarro County Jail, 4 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1993).
Here, petitioner claims he was denied due process with respect to the challenged disciplinary conviction. However, petitioner admits he is not eligible for release on mandatory supervision because he was convicted of murder. As a result, due process concerns are not implicated and prison officials were not required to afford petitioner due process at the disciplinary hearing. The punishment imposed in this case did not affect the fact or duration of confinement. Accordingly, petitioner's due process claims do not present grounds warranting relief pursuant to federal habeas corpus review.
Recommendation
The above-styled petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed.
Objections
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of the Magistrate Judge's report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C).
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations contained within this report within fourteen days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from entitlement to de novo review by the district court of the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations and from appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court except on grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72.