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Hood v. State

Court of Appeals of Indiana
Aug 1, 2023
No. 22A-CR-2148 (Ind. App. Aug. 1, 2023)

Opinion

22A-CR-2148

08-01-2023

Alontae Hood, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jessica R. Merino Wyatt, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kyle M. Hunter Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

Appeal from the LaPorte Superior Court The Honorable Jaime M. Oss, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 46D01-2008-MR-7

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jessica R. Merino Wyatt, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana

Kyle M. Hunter Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Foley, Judge

[¶1] Alontae Hood ("Hood") was convicted after a jury trial of murder. The trial court sentenced Hood to the advisory sentence of fifty-five years in the Indiana Department of Correction, fully executed. Hood appeals his sentence and raises two issues for our review, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider certain mitigating factors when it sentenced Hood; and
II. Whether Hood's fifty-five-year advisory sentence for murder is inappropriate based on the nature of the offense and Hood's character.

[¶2] Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and Hood's sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶3] On August 9, 2020, the Michigan City Police Department was dispatched to a residence regarding an unconscious female. Officer Wells arrived on the scene and spoke with Clarence Hood ("Grandfather"), who was sitting on the front porch. While speaking with Grandfather, Hood approached Officer Wells and informed him that the unconscious female was inside the house. Officer Wells entered the residence and observed a female, later identified as sixty-eight-year- old Doris Hull ("Hull"), lying on her back in the walkway between the living room and dining room.

Doris Hull was Hood's aunt and Grandfather's daughter.

[¶4] Hood told detectives that he traveled to Grandfather's home because "[his] grandaddy supposedly owed [him] some money" and "[he] may need to go to Chicago to see about [his] wife." Tr. Vol. 3 p. 67. Hood used to reside at Grandfather's home with his wife, Sunshine Hood ("Sunshine"), for a brief period until Hull moved in to help care for Grandfather.

[¶5] When Hood arrived at Grandfather's house around 11:00 p.m., Grandfather was asleep in his room; however, Hull was awake and in the kitchen. Hood knocked on the window near the back door, but Hull took some time to get to the back door because she used a wheelchair. Hood stated that Hull was "old . . . [and] kind of slow," so he used his spare key to unlock the back door. Id. at 77.

[¶6] Once Hood was inside, he asked Hull if he could use her cell phone to call Sunshine because "[he] thought that there were [dangerous] people trying to get [him] and Sunshine" and he needed to "see. . . if [Sunshine's] car stopped or if she was robbed or anything." Id. at 71, 80. After making nine outgoing phone calls to Sunshine, an argument ensued between Hood and Hull. Hood alleged that Hull became physically aggressive with him, and she grabbed the handle of a knife that was sitting on top of a pie box nearby. Hood stated that he hit Hull's wrists, and she dropped the knife. Hood alleged that Hull "ran" toward Grandfather's room to "get [the] pistol that he keeps in there." Id. at 73. Hood then stabbed Hull with a large knife that he always carried with him. Hood stabbed Hull's neck four times and slashed her neck once, severing her carotid artery. When Hull began screaming for Grandfather's help, Hood slashed Hull's throat, severing her trachea. Hood continued to stab Hull seven times in the chest and torso, including twice through the heart. Hull sustained significant defensive wounds to her hands, fingers, and arms. Grandfather was awakened by the screaming and "ruckus" and came out of his room to find Hull on the floor and Hood standing over her body. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 195-97. Hood then called 911, and when Emergency Medical Services arrived, Hull was pronounced deceased.

[¶7] Hood was subsequently transported to the Michigan City Police Department to be interviewed. During the interview, Hood admitted to killing Hull but asserted that he believed he was acting in self-defense. Hood further revealed that he suffered from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia and was not taking his prescribed medication.

[¶8] On August 10, 2020, the State of Indiana charged Hood with murder. Hood entered a plea of not guilty. The parties stipulated to two psychologist's reports finding that Hood was sane at the time of the crime and was competent to stand trial. The trial court found Hood competent to stand trial. Following a jury trial held from June 6 to June 8, 2022, Hood was found guilty of murder. On August 9, 2022, the trial court sentenced Hood to the advisory sentence of fifty-five years in the Indiana Department of Correction, fully executed. Hood now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mitigating Factors

[¶9] Hood argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him because it failed to consider several mitigating factors that were significant and supported by the record. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn from them. Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019).

A trial court may abuse its discretion in several ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons improper as a matter of law.
Anglemyerv. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007).

[¶10] Hood contends that the trial court should have considered the following mitigators: (1) the crime was caused by an unmedicated, serious mental health illness of paranoid schizophrenia; (2) he believed he was acting in self-defense; (3) he is remorseful; (4) he has a lifetime history of receiving Social Security Disability payments due to his diagnosis; and (5) he has an insubstantial criminal history.

[¶11] An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Davis v. State, 173 N.E.3d 700, 704 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (citing Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind. 2000)). The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Id.

However, because the trial court did not enter a sentencing statement our analysis of whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion must end. A trial court is not required to enter a sentencing statement when it enters the advisory sentence for a felony conviction. Ward v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1242, 1245 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), ; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-1.3 ("After a court has pronounced a sentence for a felony conviction, the court shall issue a statement of the court's reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes unless the court imposes the advisory sentence for the felony.") Here, Hood received the advisory sentence of fifty-five years for murder. Because the trial court did not enter a sentencing statement, we are neither required, nor able, to analyze whether certain mitigating factors were applied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Hood to the fifty-five-year advisory sentence.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[¶12] The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019). "[W]e generally defer to the trial court's decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate." Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Because we generally defer to the judgement of trial courts in sentencing matters, defendants must persuade us that their sentences are inappropriate. Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1044-45 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016).

[¶13] The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). An advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). As a starting point for appropriateness, an advisory sentence is unlikely to be inappropriate. Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 371 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013).

[¶14] Hood argues that the nature of the offense and his character are compelling reasons to modify his sentence from the advisory sentence of fifty-five years to forty-five years. We disagree.

[¶15] As to the nature of the offense, Hood acknowledges the seriousness of his conduct, but urges this court to consider that he was suffering from a psychotic episode, causing him to subjectively believe that he was acting in self-defense. However, we find that the brutality of this crime and the jury's rejection of Hood's self-defense claim eclipses these assertions. While we acknowledge that Hood's mental health is relevant, we do not believe that it outweighs the heinous nature of this crime. Hood stabbed Hull five times in the neck, seven times in the chest and torso, and slashed her throat, severing her trachea. This crime was particularly brutal and does not suggest that Hood exercised "restraint, regard, and lack of brutality." Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. Further, two psychologists determined that Hood was competent to stand trial and was not insane at the time of the murder. Moreover, Hood raised the selfdefense claim at trial-which the jury rejected, and we grant substantial deference to the verdict. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 348 (Ind. 2015).

[¶16] As to Hood's character, his primary contention is that this crime is not the result of unscrupulous character, rather, it is the result of him being in an unmedicated state. Hood argues that complications related to the COVID-19 pandemic prevented him from taking his medication and that, as a result, he suffered from delusions that led him to commit this crime.

Hood also reported that at the time of the offense he "discontinued his medication on advice of his doctor." Appellant's Br. p. 11. However, the record is devoid of any such instruction.

[¶17] Hood argues that but-for his unmedicated state-caused by the COVID-19 pandemic-he would not have committed this crime, but fails to support that argument with any evidence from the record. Accordingly, we find that this argument is not clearly supported by the record.

[¶18] Hood next contends that it is unlikely that he would unjustifiably kill another person if he is properly medicated. Again, Hood fails to provide any factual support for this conclusion. The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") contains an evaluation of Hood's risk to reoffend utilizing the Indiana Risk Assessment System, Community Supervision Tool ("IRAS-CST"). Hood's risk assessment score placed him in the "HIGH" risk category to reoffend. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 54. The PSI also indicated that while Hood was in jail awating trial, he had been placed in segregation due to fighting and had prior battery charges. Id. at 53. The record fails to support Hood's assertion that he is unlikley to reoffend.

[¶19] Hood makes a final, and related argument, that history of law-abiding behavior while medicated; participation in treatment; and cooperation with law enforcement represent "persistent examples of good character." Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. The record reflects that Hood has a criminal history in Illinois. Hood was arrested seven times in Illinois-two times as a juvenile and five times as an adult. A defendant's criminal history is relevant, and even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. 2021). Considering this evidence, we disagree with Hood's characterization that he has a history of law-abiding behavior while medicated. Further, we acknowledge that Hood has been amenable to therapy, has consistently taken his medication since being committed to the Department of Correction, and was cooperative with law enforcement officials. However, we do not find that these factors rise to the level of demonstrating "substanital virtuous traits or perisistent examples of good character." Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

We note that Hood's cooperation with law enforcement is consistent with his self-defense theory, which was rejected by the jury, and therefore is given little weight in our analysis.

[¶20] We, therefore, conclude that Hood has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

[¶21] Affirmed.

Altice, C.J., and May, J., concur.


Summaries of

Hood v. State

Court of Appeals of Indiana
Aug 1, 2023
No. 22A-CR-2148 (Ind. App. Aug. 1, 2023)
Case details for

Hood v. State

Case Details

Full title:Alontae Hood, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court:Court of Appeals of Indiana

Date published: Aug 1, 2023

Citations

No. 22A-CR-2148 (Ind. App. Aug. 1, 2023)