Opinion
Case No. 1:19-cv-00116 (Erie)
04-02-2020
EARL E. HOLT, JR., Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS ECF NO. 19 I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 3) be dismissed, with prejudice. II. Report
A. Introduction and Procedural History
Plaintiff Earl E. Holt, Jr., (Holt) initiated this action with the filing of a Complaint, pro se, on June 14, 2019. ECF No. 3. He alleged that the Defendants—The Pennsylvania State Police and Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro—violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by requiring him to register on the Commonwealth's SORNA/Megan's Law sex offender registry. Id. at p. 3. The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Holt's Complaint on October 31, 2019. ECF No. 19. Holt's response in opposition was to have been filed on or before December 6, 2019. See ECF No. 21. Holt did not file a response by that date.
On March 2, 2020, this Court ordered Holt to either show cause for his failure to file a response or to file such a response on or before March 16, 2020. ECF No. 24. To date, Holt has not filed a response or requested an extension of time to do so. III. Discussion and Analysis
A. Standards of Review — Motions to Dismiss
Two standards of review are of particular importance in this case. The first concerns motions to dismiss. Defendants' motion is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.").
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
B. Motions to Dismiss in Pro Se Cases
While the foregoing principles and requirements apply to all federal court complaints, pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se complaint to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read "with a measure of tolerance"); Smith v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Freeman v. Deft of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991).
C. The Claims against the Pennsylvania State Police Should be Dismissed.
Holt's Complaint first brings claims against the Pennsylvania State Police (State Police). ECF No. 3, ¶ IV (C)(1)-(2). Holt claims that:
The Pennsylvania State Police classified Mr. Holt as a lifetime registrant pursuant to SORNA/Megan's Law IV, violating Mr. Holt's Fifth (5th) and Fourteenth (14) amendment right to due process by way of the "irrebuttable presumption doctrine." By the P.S.P. classifying Mr. Holt as 'lifetime' denies (sic) Mr. Holt his right to equal protection of the law violating his Fourteenth (14th) amendment right as at the time of classification (2009) Mr. Holt was similarly situated to individuals that 'lifetime' cannot be applied to.Id. Holt's complaint also attempt to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the State Police:
By the Pennsylvania State Police classifying Mr. Holt as a 'lifetime' (or registrant in general) they violate Mr. Holt's Eighth (8th) amendment right to be free from "Cruel and Unusual" punishment as S.O.R.N.A. is akin to public shaming (also violating Mr. Holt's 'Right to Protection of Reputation and Honor" guaranteed by the Pennsylvania constitution Art. 1 § 1.ECF No. 3-1, p. 1. These claims must be dismissed because the State Police is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court that seek monetary damages. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984); A. W. v. Jersey City Public Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). The Commonwealth has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for lawsuits filed in federal court. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521-22. Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to entities that are arms of the state. See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment covers "department or agencies of the state having no existence apart from the state"). As an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania State Police is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Mitchell v. Miller, 884 F. Supp. 2d 334, 365-66 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Williams v. Pennsylvania State Police—Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement, 108 F.Supp.2d 460, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). Accordingly, Holt cannot maintain his claims against the State Police.
Furthermore, because Holt brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they must be dismissed because the State Police is not a "person" within the meaning of that statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The State Police is an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and as such, it is not a "person" amenable to suit under § 1983. Masi v. Pa. State Police, 2019 WL 6009366, *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2019) (citations omitted).
D. Claims against Attorney General Shapiro Should be Dismissed.
Holt has also sued Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro. ECF No. 3-1, p. 1. His Complaint against the Attorney General is as follows:
The Attorney General, Josh Shapiro is equally responsible for these violations as he is the individual the (sic) places the Pennsylvania State Police in charge of the sexual offender registry. The Attorney General is also responsible as he is the individual that oversees the passage of the laws that allow the Pennsylvania State Police to violate Mr. Holt's rights.Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. The Attorney General has moved to dismiss this claim, arguing a lack of personal involvement. ECF No. 20, p. 4. The Court agrees that this claims also should be dismissed.
Holt's Complaint does not reference a particular constitutional amendment or statute he claims the Attorney General has violated. His claims against the State Police reference the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the Court will construe the Complaint to raise such claims against the Attorney General, in his official capacity, as well. Specifically, Holt's claims are that the Attorney General (1) put the State Police "in charge" of the sex offender registry, and (2) that he is responsible for overseeing "the passage of laws" regarding the State Police and laws relating to sex offenders. Both claims fail to state a claim under any constitutional provision.
First, Pennsylvania statutes define the role of the State Police for purposes of the Commonwealth's sex offender registry—the Attorney General did not (nor can he) put them "in charge." See 42 Pa. C. S. §§ 9799.10-9799.74. The Attorney General, therefore, has no authority to define the role of the State Police. Id. As to the second claim, under the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the Attorney General does not "oversee" the passage of any laws; that is the province of the General Assembly. See Pa. Const. art. III, § 1. Thus, the Attorney General's Motion to Dismiss should be granted and these claims dismissed.
The claims against the Attorney General should also be dismissed because he is immune from suit. It is well-settled that "the Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting within their official capacities." Calipo v. Wolf, 2019 WL 6879570. *9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2019( citing O'Donnell v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 790 F.Supp.2d 289, 305 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)). Because the Attorney General is a "state official" sued in his official capacity, he shares in the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity." Johnson v. Wenerowicz, 440 Fed. Appx. 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011). Consequently, the Attorney General is also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Holt's claims.
E. Amendment of the Complaint
The Third Circuit has consistently held that "if a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3rd Cir.2008). Here, allowing Holt to amend his Complaint would be futile. Both Defendants are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity and under this set of circumstances, amendment would be clearly futile. See Van Tassel v. Piccione, 2014 WL 1884212, * 8 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2014) (citation omitted) (noting the futility of amendment where the defendants are largely entitled to immunity). III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants (ECF No. 19) be GRANTED, and that the claims against them be dismissed with prejudice, as any attempt to amend the Complaint would be futile. IV. Notice to Parties
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.
Entered this 2nd day of April, 2020.
/s/_________
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge