Opinion
07 Civ. 3984 (SAS).
March 6, 2008
Plaintiff (Pro Se):, Nikkia Holmes o/b/o Brandon Holmes, New York, NY.
For Defendant:, Susan D. Baird, Assistant United States Attorney, New York, NY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Nikkia Holmes ("Holmes"), proceeding pro se, brings this action on behalf of her minor child Brandon Holmes ("Brandon"), pursuant to the Social Security Act (the "Act"). Holmes seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying her son's claim for supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits on the basis of disability. Holmes moved for judgment on the pleadings and the Commissioner cross-moved for the same relief. The evidence, which is contained in the transcript of the administrative record filed by the Commissioner as part of his answer, has been summarized by the Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") in his decision denying benefits. This decision became the Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals Council denied Holmes' request for review. This court has reviewed the evidence in its entirety and concludes that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. For this reason, the Commissioner's cross-motion is granted and Holmes' motion is denied.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
See Transcript of the Administrative Record ("Tr.") filed as part of the Commissioner's Answer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) at 12-22.
See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998)).
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Substantial Evidence Standard
When examining the ALJ's decision in a disability benefits case, "`[i]t is not our function to determine de novo whether [plaintiff] is disabled.'" The Commissioner's final decision in a disability benefits case must be affirmed if the "decision was `supported by substantial evidence.'" Courts have interpreted substantial evidence to consist of "`more than a mere scintilla.'" It means "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" "Where the Commissioner's decision rests on adequate findings supported by evidence having rational probative force, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner." "To determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn." However, if substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed, "even if there is also substantial evidence for the plaintiff's position." "`Reversal and entry of judgment for the claimant is appropriate only when the record provides persuasive proof of disability and a remand for further evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose.'"
Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1996)). Accord Halloran, 362 F.3d at 31.
Halloran, 362 F.3d at 31.
Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
Id.
Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002). Accord Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 1999).
Morillo v. Apfel, 150 F. Supp. 2d 540, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Pimentel v. Barnhart, No. 04 Civ. 3769, 2006 WL 2013015, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006) (quoting Cruz ex rel. Vega v. Barnhart, No. 04 Civ. 9794, 2005 WL 2010152, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2005).
B. Requirements for Eligibility
For a child to qualify for SSI benefits, the child must be disabled within the meaning of the Act. A child less than eighteen years of age is disabled under the Act if the child has "a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." To determine whether a child is disabled, the ALJ must engage in a three-part analysis. First, the ALJ must consider whether the child is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." If so, the child will not be awarded SSI benefits. Second, the ALJ must consider whether the child has "an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe." "A severe impairment is an impairment that is more than a slight abnormality." Third, if the child's impairment is severe, the must ALJ consider whether the impairment "meets, medically equals, or functionally equals the listings [in the Act]."
Id.
Id.
Leach ex rel. Murray v. Barnhart, No. 02 Civ. 3561, 2004 WL 99935, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.924-25).
20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). A list of impairments and relevant definitions can be found in Appendix 1 of Subpart P to 20 C.F.R. § 404.
With regard to functional equivalence, the third step of the analysis, the ALJ assesses the "limitations in functioning" caused by the child's impairment. If those limitations are the same as the functional limitations caused by a listed impairment, the ALJ will find that the child's impairment is functionally equivalent to a listed impairment, and the child will be found to be disabled within the meaning of Act.
See id.
An impairment will be found functionally equivalent to a listed impairment if it results in marked limitations in two of six domains of functioning or an extreme limitation in one domain. The six domains of functioning for minors are: "(i) [a]cquiring and using information; (ii) [a]ttending and completing tasks; (iii) [i]nteracting and relating with others; (iv) [m]oving about and manipulating objects; (v) [c]aring for yourself, and (vi) [h]ealth and physical well-being." A marked impairment is one that "interferes seriously with [a child's] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities." This "more than moderate but less than extreme" limitation may "limit only one activity," as long as the degree of limitation is such that it seriously interferes with the ability to function within that activity. An extreme impairment is one that "interferes very seriously with [the] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities."
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.926a(b)(1)(i-vi).
Id.
Id.
II. DISCUSSION
In denying benefits, the ALJ determined that Brandon was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The various experts that were consulted agreed that the only disability Brandon suffered from was a learning disability with a recent onset of behavioral problems. Therefore, while there is substantial evidence that Brandon had a marked limitation in acquiring and using information (domain one), there is no evidence to support a finding that Brandon suffered from a marked limitation in any of the other five domains. Thus, the requirement of a marked limitation in at least two of the six domains has not been satisfied. Brandon's disability is therefore not functionally equivalent to an impairment listed in the Act. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence and is hereby affirmed. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close these motions [documents 2 and 10 on the docket] and this case.
See Tr. at 22.
See id. at 15-18.
See id. at 17-22.
SO ORDERED.