Opinion
No. HHD CV 08-5024043S
February 4, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #130
FACTS
The plaintiffs, Alice and Izeal Hollis, filed an amended complaint on October 21, 2009, in which they allege the following facts. On or about September 26, 2006, the plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident in which a vehicle operated by Michael Leibchen, a resident of Grobbottwar, Germany, suddenly and without warning collided with the plaintiffs' vehicle, resulting in various injuries to Alice Hollis. The defendants, Alamo Financing, LP, Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC, were the owner and lessor of the vehicle, and Vanguard Car Rental, Inc., the authorized principal surety to the owner of the vehicle operated by Leibchen. The Hartford Police Department responded to the accident and as a result of its investigation, Leibchen was determined to be the contributing factor and was issued an infraction ticket for failure to obey a traffic signal and operation of a motor vehicle by an unlicensed person over eighteen years of age. A police officer determined that Leibchen was unable to provide any documentation to verify that he possessed sufficient United States driving privileges, and that he could only provide a German identification card.
Plaintiff, Alice Hollis' Amended Complaint is based on negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle against Alamo Financing, LP, Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC, and Vanguard Car Rental, Inc. Identical claims are brought by Izeal Hollis for damages for loss of consortium. There are also several counts brought by Alice Hollis based on a theory of vicarious liability under General Statutes §§ 52-183 and 14-154a against Alamo Financing, LP and Vanguard Car Rental, Inc. Again, identical claims are brought by Izeal Hollis for damages for loss of consortium.
On April 16, 2010, the defendants filed for summary judgment on all counts on the ground that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On September 16, 2010, summary judgment was granted by this court as to those counts sounding in reckless entrustment against Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC, and those sounding in vicarious liability for recklessness against Alamo Financing, LP. The defendants filed a motion to reargue on October 5, 2010, which was granted on October 27, 2010.
DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). "However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury . . . the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard . . . of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kakadelis v. DeFabritis, 191 Conn. 276, 282, 464 A.2d 57 (1983). "Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). However, "The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neuhaus v. Decholnoky, 280 Conn. 190, 217, 905 A.2d 1135 (2006).
The defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on counts three, four, seven, eight, eleven and twelve, which claim negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, because the undisputed facts provide no evidence that the driver was incompetent at the time of the rental agreement. The defendants further argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on counts one, two, nine, ten, eleven and twelve, which claim vicarious liability based upon General Statutes §§ 52-183 and 14-154a, because such claims are preempted by federal law. The plaintiffs counter that sufficient evidence exists to show that the defendants knew or should have known that Leibchen had not demonstrated his competence to operate a motor vehicle in the United States and that the defendants failed to follow their own written leasing policy, which if adhered to, would have precluded the driver from obtaining a rental car. Further, the plaintiffs argue that federal law does not preempt their vicarious liability claims because such claims are brought alleging negligence, specifically, negligent entrustment on the part of the owner of the vehicle or an affiliate of the owner.
I. Federal Preemption
General Statutes § 14-154a(a) provides that "[a]ny person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner." General Statutes § 52-183 provides that "[i]n any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption."
General Statutes § 14-154a(b) provides that "[t]he provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to:
(1) Any person, with respect to the person's lease to another of a private passenger motor vehicle, if the total lease term is for one year or more and if, at the time damages are incurred, the leased vehicle is insured for bodily injury liability in amounts of not less than one hundred thousand dollars per person and three hundred thousand dollars per occurrence and the vehicle is not subject to subdivision (2) of this subsection. As used in this section, "private passenger motor vehicle" means a: (A) Private passenger type automobile; (B) station-wagon-type automobile; (C) camper-type motor vehicle; (D) truck-type motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than ten thousand pounds, registered as a passenger motor vehicle, as defined in section 14-1, or as a passenger and commercial motor vehicle, as defined in said section, .or used for farming purposes; or (E) a vehicle with a commercial registration, as defined in subdivision (12) of said section. Private passenger motor vehicle does not include a motorcycle or motor vehicle used as a public or livery conveyance.
(2) Any person, with respect to the person's lease to another of a truck, tractor trailer or tractor-trailer unit with a gross vehicle weight rating of ten thousand pounds or more if the total lease term is for one year or more, or the applicable contract term is one year or more, and if, at the time damages are incurred, the loss or claim is insured by any combination of coverage through an insurer, as defined in section 38a-363, in an amount of not less than two million dollars."
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claims sounding in vicarious liability, based on the above statutes, are preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 30106, also known as the Graves Amendment. The plaintiffs counter that their claims fall under the exemption of § 30106(a)(2) because they have put forth sufficient evidence to show that the defendants were independently negligent in entrusting a vehicle to an incompetent driver.
49 U.S.C. § 30106 provides in relevant part: "Rented or leased motor vehicle safety and responsibility
(a) In General-An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if —
(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)."
The constitutionality of the Graves Amendment has consistently been upheld throughout the country. Recently, our Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of the Graves Amendment, stating: "[W]e join the overwhelming majority of federal courts that have considered the question and concluded that the Amendment is constitutional." Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 23, 993 A.2d 955 (2010). The court went on to address the Graves Amendment in the context of preemption of General Statutes § 14-154a with respect to the rental car market. "[I]t has long been understood that the commerce power includes not only the ability to regulate interstate markets, but the ability to facilitate interstate commerce by removing intrastate burdens and obstructions to it . . . On this theory, the Graves Amendment protects the rental car market by deregulating it, eliminating state-imposed laws and lawsuits Congress reasonably believed to be a burden on an economic activity with substantial effects on commerce . . . Congress may foster and protect the entire market for rental cars because, in the aggregate, that market substantially affects interstate commerce. [As] long as the underlying economic activity the federal statute aims to protect is within the commerce power, we will not second guess [Congress'] decision that preemption is an appropriate means to achieve proper ends. Rather, Congress may choose any means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the suited end, even though they [involve] control of intrastate activities." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 24.
In the present case, the vicarious liability claims against the defendants based on § 14-154a appear to be preempted by the Graves Amendment. However, the plaintiffs argue that their particular claims are exempted from preemption by the savings clause in § 30106(a)(2), which makes the absence of negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner a condition precedent to the applicability of the statute. The plaintiffs contend that they have presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants were negligent in entrusting a vehicle to an incompetent operator and, therefore, statutory vicarious liability under § 14-154a is not preempted by the Graves Amendment in the present case. In order to determine whether the plaintiffs' claims are exempted from preemption by the Graves Amendment, the court must examine the validity of the negligent entrustment claims alleged against the defendants.
II. Negligent Entrustment
In their objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants had a duty to refrain from renting a vehicle to an incompetent driver, and that they breached this duty by failing to follow their own "driver's license policy" and "international driver's license policy" in that the defendants' employees, agents, and/or representatives failed to require that the lessee produce a valid driver's license and a valid international driver's permit (IDP). The defendants argue that the affidavit of Michael Leibchen, the lessee, confirms that he produced a valid German driver's license to a representative of the defendants at the time of the rental. He further attests that at the time of the rental in September 2006, there were no restrictions on his driving privileges. The defendants argue that this information is undisputed and that the plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that Leibchen was incompetent at the time of the rental, or that the defendants ought to have known of such alleged incompetence. The defendants claim that by inspecting Leibchen's facially valid German driver's license, they satisfied their duty of care with respect to the plaintiffs, and therefore, no cause of action for negligent entrustment lies. The defendants also claim that they have no duty to require a lessee with a valid German license to produce an international driver's permit.
Our Supreme Court recognized the tort of negligent entrustment over seventy-five years ago in Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 518, 165 A. 678 (1933). There, the court stated: "An automobile, while capable of doing great injury when not properly operated upon the highways, is not an intrinsically dangerous instrumentality to be classed with ferocious animals or high explosives . . . and liability cannot be imposed upon an owner merely because he entrusts it to another to drive upon the highways. It is, however, coming to be generally held that the owner may be liable for injury resulting from the operation of an automobile he loans to another, when he knows or ought reasonably to know that the one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it by reason of inexperience or other cause that the owner ought reasonably anticipate the likelihood that in its operation injury will be done to others." (Citation omitted.) Id. Accordingly, several Superior Court cases have implemented a test, holding that, "[l]iability can only be imposed if (1) there is actual or constructive knowledge that the person to whom the automobile is loaned is incompetent to operate the motor vehicle and (2) the injury resulted from that incompetence." Anastasia v. Mitsock, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 4012156 (December 12, 2006, Jones, J.) ( 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 496). See Griffin v. Larson, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV 02 0079364 (August 18, 2004, Lager, J.).
As of this date, there exists no Connecticut case law directly on point with respect to whether a rental agency, before leasing a car, must require production of an IDP in addition to a facially valid foreign license. There is however, case law regarding the legal duty of a rental car company.
"[T]he existence of a duty of care is an essential element of negligence . . . A duty to use care may arise from a contract, from a statute, or from circumstances under which a reasonable person, knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result from his act or failure to act." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 139-40, 2 A.3d 859 (2010).
"The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 286 Conn. 563, 593, 945 A.2d 388 (2008). "The ultimate test of the existence of the duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised . . . A simple conclusion that the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable, however, cannot by itself mandate a determination that a legal duty exists. Many harms are quite literally foreseeable, yet for pragmatic reasons, no recovery is allowed . . . A further inquiry must be made, for we recognize that duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection . . . The final step in the duty inquiry, then, is to make a determination of the fundamental policy of the law, as to whether the defendant's responsibility should extend to such results." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 407-08.
In Chapman v. Herren, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 07 5005067 (June 24, 2010, Cosgrove, J.) ( 50 Conn. L. Rptr. 228), the court was faced with the issue of whether a rental car company had a duty to investigate a renter's driving record where that renter has presented a valid driver's license. Basing its conclusion on General Statutes § 14-153, as well as decisions from a number of other jurisdictions, the court found that rental car companies have no legal duty to investigate renters' driving records. "Under [§ 14-153], a rental car company is not required to investigate a potential renter's driving record; rather, the rental car company must only assess the facial validity of a driver's license before renting to that driver. The legislature could have mandated that rental car companies run driving record reports if it intended that such a duty would exist . . . [L]egislation exists at both the federal and the state level regulating the rental car industry. This makes for a difficult arena for the court to impose a duty where there is silence in the statutory scheme." Id. The court also found that other jurisdictions that have considered the issue of the extent of a rental car company's duty came to a similar conclusion. "See Palacios v. Aris, Inc., [United States District Court, E.D. New York, Docket No. 08-CV-0746 (E.D.N.Y., March 11, 2010)] ("[A] rental company may be liable if it allows an unlicensed driver, or a driver without a valid license, to operate a vehicle. Although this obviously requires that rental car companies assess the facial validity of a driver's license before renting to that driver or otherwise allowing that driver to operate a vehicle, this duty does not require the company to investigate a renter's driving record where that renter has presented a valid driver's license") . . . Cousin v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 948 So.2d 1287, 1292 (Miss. 2007) (holding that Mississippi law "only places a burden on rental car companies to accept facially valid, unexpired driver's licenses"); Dortch v. Jack, [United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Docket No. 1:01CV289LG-RHW (S.D.Miss., July 1, 2005)] ("[I]n North Carolina . . . if a customer presents a valid driver's license, the rental company is under no duty to inquire further") . . ." Id.
General Statutes § 14-153 provides in relevant part: "Any person, firm or corporation which rents a motor vehicle without a driver for a period of thirty days or less shall inspect or cause to be inspected the motor vehicle operator's license of the person initially operating such motor vehicle, shall compare the signature on such license with that of the alleged licensee written in his presence . . ."
"In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).
In this case, the defendants have produced evidence, in the form of Leibchen's affidavit, that establishes that a valid German driver's license was produced when the rental agreement was made. As further evidence that Leibchen produced his driver's license at the time of the rental, the number on the photocopy of his license corresponds to the "driver license number" field on the rental documents produced by the plaintiffs as an attachment to their objection to the defendants' motion to strike, filed April 29, 2009. The plaintiffs maintain that the operator did not produce a license, but they do not present any counter-evidence to demonstrate the existence of a disputed factual issue.
The plaintiffs also argue that the defendants had a duty to require the operator to produce an international driver's permit, in addition to a facially valid German license, pursuant to their own corporate leasing policies as well as Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles regulations § 14-137-121.
Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles regulation § 14-137-121 provides in relevant part: "In accordance with the provisions of sections 14-39 and 14-40 of the Connecticut General Statutes, and subject to the exceptions stated therein, any nonresident sixteen (16) years of age or older, including any person who is admitted to the United States as a temporary visitor, may operate any registered motor vehicle on the highways of this state, provided that such nonresident is the holder of a motor vehicle operator's license issued by any state or territory of the United States, or by any country that is a member of a currently valid agreement entered into with the United States that provides for the reciprocal extension of driving privileges. Such motor vehicle operator's license shall be in the possession of such nonresident and must be current and valid according to its terms. If such motor vehicle operator's license is in any language besides English or Spanish, or if it has not been issued by a territory of Canada, it shall be accompanied by an English translation and certified under the form of an International Driving Permit, in accordance with Article 24 of the United Nations Convention on Road Traffic (1949), unless the validity of the license is readily ascertainable by law enforcement personnel without the benefit of such official translation."
While Department of Motor Vehicles regulation § 14-137-121 does indicate that an international driver's permit should accompany a foreign driver's license printed in any language besides English or Spanish, the language "unless the validity of the license is readily ascertainable by law enforcement personnel without the benefit of such official translation" indicates that the purpose of this requirement is to ensure that such a valid foreign license is recognizable to law enforcement. Additionally, a review of a number of states' Department of Motor Vehicle websites evidences a general consensus that an international driver's permit serves merely as a translation of an operator's driver's license, and it itself confers no driving privileges. See website of Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles ("The reason to have an IDP is to ensure that your foreign language license will be comprehensible and therefore acceptable to all officials who may ask to see your driver's license"); website of New York State Department of Motor Vehicles ("The DMV recommends that you get an International Driving Permit in your home country before you come to NYS. The International Driving Permit is recommended, but it is not required to operate a motor vehicle in NYS"); website of Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles ("Although some countries require a foreign motorist to possess an IDP, the United States has not done so. It is suggested, however, that he/she carry an IDP if the foreign license is not printed in the English language").
http://www.ct.gov/dmv/cwp/view.asp?a'805 q'244730, accessed January 3, 2011.
http://nysdmv.custhelp.com/cgi-bin/nysdmv.cfg/ php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid'15, accessed January 3, 2011.
http://www.mass.gov/rmv/forms/21317.pdf, accessed January 3, 2011.
In the present case, the plaintiffs have not presented any legal authority to support their argument that the duty of rental car companies should be extended to require operators, who present a facially valid foreign license, to also present an international driver's permit. Given the significant degree of regulation of the rental car industry at both the federal and state levels, it is not appropriate that this court should extend the duty of rental car companies to require anything more than an inspection of a facially valid driver's license. Here, there exists undisputed evidence that Leibchen presented the defendants with a valid German driver's license, which did confer driving privileges to him.
The court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the claim of negligent entrustment, and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Further, the plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that the defendants were independently negligent, and therefore, their claims sounding in vicarious liability pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-183 and 14-154a are preempted by federal law pursuant to the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted as to the remaining counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint.