Opinion
CIV-18-479-F
07-13-2018
JEFFREY A. HOLDEN, Plaintiff, v. HECTOR RIOS, JR., et. al. Defendants.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se, has sued Hector Rios, Jr., the Warden of the Lawton Correctional Facility ("LCF"), where Plaintiff is currently confined, and the GEO Group Private Prisons ("GEO Group"). The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having reviewed the sufficiency of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a), (b), the undersigned recommends the action be dismissed.
I. Background
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 14, 2018. See Doc. No. 1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges several claims based primarily on his contention that LCF is not providing drug addiction treatment. In his first claims, Plaintiff purports to assert claims based on LCF's violation of Oklahoma Department of Corrections ("ODOC") policy related to mental health/substance abuse treatment, as well as LCF's failure to meet standards set forth by the American Corrections Association ("ACA") pertaining to the same. Doc. No. 1 ("Comp.") at 4; Doc. No. 12 at 3-4. In his next claim, Plaintiff purports to assert a state constitutional claim "in regards to the courts." Comp. at 4.
On June 29, 2018, following the initial review of Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b), the undersigned issued an Order setting forth the deficiencies in the same, as well as the applicable standards to each of his claims as construed. Doc. No. 11. The undersigned also provided Plaintiff the opportunity to file an Amended Complaint in order to present claims that might survive the screening process. Id.
Rather than file an Amended Complaint, however, Plaintiff filed a document in which he criticized the previous Order as "irresponsible" and "insulting" and directed the Court to simply read his Complaint again as "this Magistrate either did not even read the original filing or is in some way directly affected by the outcome of these proceedings, whether it is a shareholder position in private prison companies or does not want to render a verdict in favor of inmates being provided with drug treatment in accordance with all medical norms." Doc. No. 12 at 3. Aside from the fact that allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended pleading is not reconcilable with a nefarious intent to dismiss his case, because Plaintiff refused to submit an Amended Complaint, the initial deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint remain.
II. Screening of Prisoner Complaints
A federal district court must review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). After conducting an initial review, a court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it presenting claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b).
In conducting this review, the reviewing court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Although a pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), "[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to frame a 'complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief." Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The allegations in a complaint must present "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Further, a claim is frivolous "where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact" or is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff identifies his first claim as "The Right to receive treatment for mental illness as outlined by the DOC OP's 140100 & ACA standards under healthcare." Comp. at 4. As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that violations of ODOC policy, state law, and/or agency accreditation guidelines are not a valid basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Jones v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Section 1983 does not . . . provide a basis for redressing violations of state law, but only for those violations of federal law done under color of state law." (emphasis in original)). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's claims are based upon violation of ODOC policy and/or American Corrections Association guidelines or requirements, they must be dismissed.
In his most recent filing, Plaintiff clarified that "ACA" references the American Corrections Association. Doc. No. 12 at 3. According to Plaintiff, the American Corrections Association "gives accreditation to prisons and has a set of standards that must be met." Id. at 3-4. It is those standards, i.e. "policies and guidelines", see id. at 4, in addition to ODOC policy, upon which Plaintiff's claim is based.
Similarly, on page two of Plaintiff's Complaint, he describes this case as arising from "the systemic denial of treatment to the offenders in this state's department of corrections [that] is in direct violation of the constitution of the United States and the state of Oklahoma, the American Medical Association, American Psychological Association, Center for Disease Control, and multitudes of others related in this field [that] have declared years ago that addiction is a disease that must be met with treatment for mental and[] physical health well being." Comp. at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff references GEO Group's contractual responsibilities to provide health care, including mental health and drug treatment, indicating they are not meeting the same. Id. at 3. As noted, only violations of federal law present a viable basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Jones, 854 F.2d at 1209. Thus, any claim Plaintiff intended to assert based on violations of state law, GEO Group's contractual obligations, or policies and guidelines from the various groups and agencies referenced above must also be dismissed.
Plaintiff next asserts Defendants have violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide drug addiction treatment while he has been incarcerated for the past thirteen years. Comp. at 4. Constitutionally required medical treatment has been held to include drug addiction therapy in certain circumstances. Fiallo v. Batista, 666 F.2d 729, 731 (1st Cir. 1981); Doe v. Goord, 04 CV 0570 GBD AJP, 2004 WL 2829876, at *13 n.29 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2004); Waldo v. Goord, 97-CV-1385, 1998 WL 713809, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1998). Presuming, without deciding, that denial of such treatment may trigger constitutional protections in this case, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim fails.
The undersigned notes documents Plaintiff submitted with his response to the Court's previous Order to amend indicate that he did not arrive at LCF until February 26, 2018. Doc. No. 12-3.
In support of this claim, Plaintiff implies LCF and/or GEO Group simply do not provide drug addiction treatment and/or that inmates in said facilities will never have access to the same. However, Plaintiff's supporting documentation indicates this is inaccurate. Instead, under the applicable substance abuse program policy, an inmate may participate in drug addiction treatment when he has a certain minimum amount of time remaining on their sentence. Doc. No. 12-3; Doc. No. 12-7. For example, on February 28, 2018, the Administrative Review Authority responded to one of Plaintiff's grievances explaining, "You are currently assessed with substance abuse; however, . . . [t]o transfer to a substance abuse program you must meet the requirements of minimum eligibility with fewer than 2000 days remaining or minimum eligible with balance suspended upon completion to transfer. As of the end of February 2018, you have 5895 days remaining. You do not meet the requirements to transfer to a Substance Abuse program." Doc. No. 12-3. Thus, based on the documentation Plaintiff submitted in support of his claims, it is clear that a substance abuse treatment program exists, however, Plaintiff simply does not yet meet the requirements to participate.
At most, Plaintiff may allege a delay in providing him with treatment for his drug addiction. However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts from which to infer that Defendants' inaction in delaying his receipt of substance abuse treatment has resulted in substantial harm. See Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (delay in providing medical care requires showing of substantial harm in order to state Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs). "'[T]he substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.'" Al-Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff alleges only that the delay in substance abuse treatment has resulted in mental anguish, stress, anxiety, hopelessness, depression, and "continual highs and lows of hope for relief to never come to fruition." Comp. at 2, 3. These allegations fall far short of satisfying the Eighth Amendment's requirements for substantial harm resulting from a delay in receiving medical treatment. See Al-Turki, 762 F.3d at 1193; Garrett, 254 F.3d at 950. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim and this claim should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Finally, in his last claim, Plaintiff purports to assert a state constitutional claim "in regards to the courts." Comp. at 4. As noted, violation of state law is not a valid basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Jones, 854 F.2d at1209. Generally, the Court recognizes a federal First Amendment constitutional claim, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based upon a right of access to courts whenever a litigant contends that a defendant has interfered with his ability to seek redress from the court system. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). The Supreme Court has held that, in order to state a claim for denial of access to courts, a party must identify all of the following in the complaint: 1) a non-frivolous, underlying claim: 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit. Id.
Here, Plaintiff states only that because of his right to access the courts, this matter is properly brought before this Court. However, if a defendant has not interfered with Plaintiff's ability to litigate the claims he is attempting to assert herein, no cause of action lies related to his right of access to the courts. See id. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted with respect a claim under the First Amendment for right of access to the courts.
In his most recent filing, Plaintiff indicates that his claim of right of access to the courts was intended as a request to construe this action "as a habeas should it be the proper vehicle to move this action through the courts, or any other vehicle required." Doc. No. 12 at 4. There are two types of habeas actions, brought under either 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and neither are appropriate actions in which to assert Plaintiff's attempted claims herein. --------
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended that Plaintiff's federal claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff intended to assert any state law claims, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the same.
Plaintiff is advised of the right to file an objection to this Supplemental Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by August 2nd , 2018, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Supplemental Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.").
This Supplemental Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not specifically addressed herein is denied.
Dated this 13th day of July, 2018.
/s/_________
GARY M. PURCELL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE