Opinion
G039551
10-30-2008
SCOTT P. HOLCOMB, Cross-complainant and Appellant, v. OSO VALLEY GREENBELT ASSOCIATION et al., Cross-defendants and Respondents.
Scott P. Holcomb, in pro. per., for Cross-complainant and Appellant. Hart, King & Coldren, William R. Hart, James S. Morse and Rhonda H. Mehlman for Cross-defendants and Respondents.
Not to be Published
Scott P. Holcombs homeowners association, Oso Valley Greenbelt Association (Oso), sued him after he allegedly failed to maintain his property under Osos governing covenants (CC&Rs). Holcomb cross-complained against Oso and its property manager, Ginny Ledford, alleging invasion of privacy, intentional interference with contractual relations, and slander. Although Oso dismissed its complaint, Holcomb proceeded to trial on his cross-complaint. The jury found in Holcombs favor on the invasion of privacy claim against Oso, awarding him $244 as damages, but rejected his other causes of action against Ledford and Oso.
Holcomb contends the jury returned a fatally inconsistent verdict when it found Oso violated his privacy rights but exonerated Ledford, Osos agent. He also complains the damages awarded against Oso bore no relationship to the evidence and were inadequate as a matter of law. Holcomb challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jurys rejection of his claim for interference with economic relations, and argues the trial court should have sanctioned defense counsel for representing a suspended corporation. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Holcomb represented himself at trial. He testified in narrative form he served on the board of Oso — a 2,714-home association in Mission Viejo — in the 1990s. He became embroiled in several disputes with fellow board members and Osos management company, CC&R Association Management, Inc. (CCRAM).
According to the parties, CCRAMs corporate status became suspended at some point before trial. The court ultimately struck CCRAMs answer and entered judgment against it on the invasion of privacy cause of action. It is not party to this appeal.
In March 2000, a windstorm damaged the shake roof of Holcombs home. The roof had been damaged previously in 1993 and 1995 and State Farm, Holcombs insurer, issued checks to Holcomb to pay for repairs. Holcomb reported the new damage to his agent, Harvey Chavis, a few days after the March 2000 storm. Chavis took the information and promised to file a claim.
Holcomb testified Chavis neglected to file the claim until May 25. About a week later, State Farms inspector estimated the roof damage at $11,000. According to Holcomb, the inspector failed to account for damage to insulation, ducting, and electrical systems caused by rainwater intrusion. As a result, Holcomb lacked electricity in most rooms of his house, affecting his home computer business because he lacked power to run his servers.
He called State Farm repeatedly to complain. State Farm assigned Wilbur Senterfitt to take charge of the claim. Holcomb received a check for the roof damage and scheduled a roofer to begin repairs in early July. He informed State Farm the roof repairs would destroy evidence of other damage and it should inspect the roof beforehand if it had any concerns.
Holcombs relationship with Senterfitt grew acrimonious. Senterfitt arrived the evening before the scheduled repairs and gave Holcomb a document containing a reservation of rights. He asked Senterfitt "am I good to put my roof on tomorrow?" and Senterfitt replied "you can do anything you want," but informed him State Farm had stopped payment on the check because it had "some concerns about your earlier repairs." Senterfitt asked Holcomb for proof the repair work to his roof in 1993 and 1995 had been completed. Holcomb replied he did one of the jobs himself and for the other repair work he used a neighbors repairman, who covered Holcombs roof with plastic until the rain stopped. The repairs did not require permits. Holcomb attempted to demonstrate to Senterfitt the difference between the repaired areas and the new damage, and invited Senterfitt to ask his neighbors about the previous work on his roof.
Holcomb felt he had no choice but to suspend repairs until he resolved his dispute with State Farm. In early August, other State Farm inspectors examined the roof and electrical system. A few weeks later, Senterfitt informed him the inspectors found nothing wrong and believed Holcomb had never repaired the damage to the roof that occurred in 1993 and 1995.
Holcombs dispute with State Farm continued for several months. After questioning Holcomb under oath in November and December 2000, State Farm conducted several more inspections. Eventually, State Farm paid for the repairs, but the work was not completed until October or November 2001.
Holcombs business suffered because of State Farms delay in authorizing payment for repairing his roof. He borrowed at steep interest rates to pay bills and to start the roof work. He fell behind on his mortgage and other bills. Holcomb attributed a minor heart attack and other medical issues to the delay and stress of dealing with the claim. Hospital records reflected Holcomb suffered his heart or stress attack on October 22, 2001, while working on the roof. Holcombs accountant later testified, from information supplied by his client, that Holcomb suffered damages of over $800,000, including extra interest charges and loss of equity when the lender foreclosed on Holcombs home in March 2006.
Holcomb attended the 2004 board election. Afterward, Holcomb, Ledford, and others conversed in the parking lot. Someone accused Holcomb of violating Osos CC&Rs because he had not painted a front planter and had plastic on his roof. Holcomb explained State Farm was responsible because of the delay in processing his claim. Ledford mentioned she had spoken with State Farm representatives investigating Holcombs claims. This surprised Holcomb, who accused her of violating CC&Rs requiring a homeowners permission to disclose information from a homeowners file. He invited Ledford and other board members to inspect his house for violations.
In November 2004, Ledford and other board members inspected Holcombs house. The group complained about the condition of Holcombs roof. Holcomb accused the board of selectively enforcing the CC&Rs, and also claimed Ledfords conversation with State Farm had delayed his insurers payment for the repairs. Ledford at first denied talking to State Farm, but eventually admitted she spoke with "Wilbur." Holcomb explained Wilbur was State Farms Senterfitt. She admitted she told Senterfitt it appeared to her Holcomb had put the insurance money from the previous claims in his pocket rather than repair the roof, which seemed "like insurance fraud to her." Holcomb accused her of invading his privacy.
Holcomb learned through discovery Ledford told Senterfitt during an early August 2000 phone call that Holcomb was behind in his homeowners dues and had been cited for failing to maintain his property. Holcomb believed this information delayed the roof repairs and damaged his health and finances.
Holcomb admitted on cross-examination he had fallen behind on his mortgage months before the March 2000 storm. He also conceded his mortgage company refused to endorse State Farms check payable jointly to him and the company around July 11, 2000. At the time, he was eight months behind in mortgage payments. As of August 1, 2000, he also owed Oso $693.55 in association dues, which were assessed at $62.95 each quarter. Holcomb acknowledged State Farm inspectors raised questions about his claim before Senterfitts phone call to Ledford. Although he denied it at trial, he told State Farm investigators and testified at his examination under oath that he often put plastic camping tarps on his roof before March 2000 so they could dry off following camping trips.
The parties read portions of Senterfitts April 2007 deposition into the trial record. According to Senterfitts testimony, he worked in State Farms Special Investigative Unit (SIU), which initiated an investigation of Holcombs claim on July 3, 2000. Chavis told Senterfitt that Holcomb reported the loss on May 25, the same day the agent reported it to State Farm. Holcombs claim warranted closer review based on his failure to promptly report the damage and because photographs of the roof depicted damage similar to the damage Holcomb reported in his earlier claims.
Senterfitt asked Holcomb about the earlier roof repairs and Holcomb said he gave receipts and photographs concerning the repairs to Chavis. Senterfitt observed no new damage to the roof. Holcomb promised to check with the homeowners association to see if he could locate a form submitted to replace his roof. State Farm stopped payment on the check so it could complete its investigation.
On August 4, Senterfitt canvassed the neighborhood to determine whether neighbors had seen Holcombs previous repairs. No one could confirm the repairs. On August 7 or August 8, Senterfitt spoke by telephone with Ledford, who told him Holcomb owed quarterly association dues of $61.65 and was in arrears about $ 650, including related costs and fees. Oso had cited Holcomb for placing plastic on his roof, and other landscaping and paint violations. Ledford had observed plastic on Holcombs roof for the past three to five years. She said she would try to find violation notices. Ledfords information confirmed what neighbors had told Senterfitt about the plastic. Senterfitt denied Ledford had accused Holcomb of filing false claims.
On August 8, Ledford informed Senterfitt she was hesitant to provide him with copies of Osos violation notices to Holcomb because of privacy issues and said she would check with Osos attorneys to see if she could respond. In early November, Ledford stated she could not supply information about Holcomb without his authorization.
Ledford testified she spoke with Senterfitt because she thought it would help Holcomb obtain a new roof. She informed him Oso did not require an architectural application for roof repairs and therefore Oso did not have any records documenting whether Holcomb had repaired his roof before 2000. She informed Senterfitt of Osos quarterly dues, but did not tell him Holcomb was in arrears or that he owed Oso attorney fees. She told him fines had been assessed against Holcombs property for having plastic on his roof. The plastic had been there a long time "to the point it deteriorated into little tiny pieces like confetti, just sort of blowing everywhere, neighbors yards." Senterfitt already knew Holcomb covered his roof with plastic.
Senterfitt asked for a copy of violation notices, but Ledford told him she did not believe she could provide, but would check with Osos attorney to see if she could comply with his request. Oso had a policy of keeping information regarding homeowners private, although she did not recall anything in writing. Oso would disclose dues balances to escrow and title companies without express authorization, however. The attorney later told her she could not provide the information.
Ledford denied having a conversation with Holcomb at the 2004 board election, but did recall meeting at Holcombs house about six months later to discuss the condition of his property. Holcomb emerged from his house and yelled at her about contacting State Farm and reporting he had fraudulently filed a second claim for damage to his roof. She denied his charges, explaining she had no idea he had made a previous claim, and did not know the name of his insurer.
Oso filed an action against Holcomb in May 2002. Holcomb cross-complained against Oso, CCRAM, and Ledford in March 2006 for invasion of privacy, intentional inference with contractual relations, and slander. Oso dismissed its complaint in early 2007 and trial on the cross-complaint occurred in August 2007.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Holcomb and against Oso for invasion of privacy and awarded damages of $ 244. The jury rejected Holcombs claims against Oso for slander and intentional interference with contractual relations, and ruled in favor of Ledford as to all causes of action. The jury found defendants did not act with malice, oppression, or fraud. The court denied Holcombs motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial based on the sufficiency of the evidence and adequacy of the damages award.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Holcomb Is Not Entitled to a New Trial Based on His Claim of Inconsistent Verdicts
Holcomb contends he is entitled to a new trial because the jury returned irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts on his invasion of privacy claim. He asserts his privacy rights were invaded when Ledford disclosed private information about him to Senterfitt without authorization. Consequently, he contends the jury could not find Oso violated his privacy without also holding Ledford liable because a corporation can only act through its agents, and Osos liability was vicarious. He argues the verdict in favor of Ledford "demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding by the jury of the Courts instructions. If the jury misconstrued the instructions on vicarious liability, there can be no assurance that they did not misconstrue other instructions as well."
Whether verdicts are fatally inconsistent based upon the same set of facts is a legal question subject to de novo review. (See Morris v. McCauleys Quality Transmission Service (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 964, 970, 973; Campbell v. Zokelt (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 315.)
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the innocent principal or employer is liable for the torts of the agent or employee, committed while acting within the scope of employment. It is immaterial that the employee acts in excess of authority or contrary to instructions. (Civ. Code, § 2338; Rest.2d, Agency §§ 219, 243 et seq.; 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency and Employment, § 165, p. 208. (Witkin).) The modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 959.)
"The liability of an innocent, nonparticipating principal under the respondeat superior doctrine is based on the wrongful conduct of the agent; the principal cannot be liable unless the agent is liable. Hence, a judgment that holds the principal and exonerates the agent is `self-stultifying and must be reversed." (3 Witkin, supra, § 167, p. 211, and cases cited.) But the liability of the principal for torts of the agent or employee is not always based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. (3 Witkin, supra, § 163, p. 206.) The verdict is considered self-stultifying only where the principal or employer is innocent of wrongdoing and liability is based on respondeat superior. If an employee acts under the direction of the employer, the employer participates in the act, and the employers liability is based on its own fault. The same is true where the principal or employer is under a primary liability independent of the agents or employees acts. (3 Witkin, supra, § 168, p. 212, and cases cited.)
At Holcombs request, the trial court instructed the jury on two theories of invasion of privacy — false light, and violation of the state constitutional (as distinguished from the common law) right of privacy. We agree with Holcomb the jury must have determined Oso violated Holcombs privacy by communicating confidential information to State Farm. There was no substantial evidence supporting a false light claim. And there was no evidence or jury instructions supporting defendants theory Osos agents violated Holcombs physical privacy. Because Holcomb invited defendants to inspect his property, he lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude when the inspection occurred. (Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 232.)
The court instructed the jury a constitutional violation of the right to privacy occurred if the jury found Holcomb had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information in defendants custody, defendants invaded his privacy by disseminating by spoken word personal information, defendants conduct was a serious invasion of Holcombs privacy, Holcomb was harmed, and defendants conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (Former CACI No. 1806, revoked Dec. 2007; see Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35-40 [three elements of a cause of action for violation of the state constitutional right to privacy action are (1) specific, legally protected privacy interest (e.g., interest in precluding dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information), (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy, i.e., an objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms, and (3) an invasion of privacy sufficiently serious in nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right].)
To establish invasion of privacy on a false light theory, the jury was instructed it must find Holcomb proved (1) defendants publicized information or material that showed Holcomb in a false light; (2) the false light created by the publication would be highly offensive to a reasonable person in plaintiffs position; (3) there was clear and convincing evidence defendants knew the publication would create a false impression about Holcomb or acted with reckless disregard for the truth, or that defendants were negligent in determining the truth of the information or whether a false impression would be created by its publication; (4) Holcomb sustained harm to his property, business, profession, or occupation including money spent as a result of the statement(s); and (5) defendants conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs harm. In deciding whether defendants publicized the information or material, the jury was told it must determine whether it was made public either by communicating it to the public at large or to so many people that the information or material was substantially certain to become public knowledge. (CACI No. 1802.)
At one point during discussion of jury instructions, the court asked, "Well, I think it would be informational privacy, confidential information. I dont think youre alleging invasion of your physical privacy; right?" Holcomb responded, "Well, your honor, the physical privacy is, in fact, there because frankly it went to invasion of my house. [¶] . . . [¶] I mean all the contractors and all that."
Holcomb argues uncontradicted evidence demonstrates Ledfords liability. But jury instructions, proffered and approved by Holcomb, led the jury to believe Oso alone could be held liable based on Ledfords tortious conduct. One instruction provided Oso was "responsible for harm caused by the wrongful conduct of ITS agents while acting within the scope of their authority." (CACI No. 3700.) Another provided, "If you find that Ginny Ledford was acting within the scope of Her agency when the incident occurred, then Oso . . . is responsible for any harm caused by Ginny Ledfords actions." (See CACI No. 3703, italics added.) More importantly, the jury was not instructed that if it found Ledford violated Holcombs right to privacy while acting as Osos agent, it must hold Ledford responsible. (See CACI No. 3701.) It is Holcombs responsibility to propose complete and comprehensive instructions on his theory of the case. (Null v. City of Los Angeles (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1528, 1534.)
In sum, we discern no prejudice to Holcomb from the jurys split decision. Holcomb has not argued the jury instructions were erroneous. He has not argued the court erroneously admitted or excluded evidence. We are required to presume the judgment is correct and may not assume the jury misconstrued other instructions. Nothing suggests Holcomb has suffered any detriment from the jurys finding of nonliability as to Ledford. We find no basis to reverse for another trial.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Verdict on Intentional Interference with Contract
Holcomb challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jurys finding defendants did not intentionally interfere with his contractual relations. We note Holcomb did not assert a claim for negligent interference in the trial court, as his brief suggests.
The court instructed the jury Holcomb must prove defendants (1) knew of the contract; (2) intended to disrupt performance of the contract; (3) prevented performance or made performance more expensive or difficult, and (4) defendants conduct was a substantial factor in causing Holcomb harm. (CACI No. 2201; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126.)
Assuming Ledford knew of Holcombs contract with State Farm, Ledford testified she gave information to Senterfitt to assist Holcomb in getting his roof repaired. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude she had no intent or interest in disrupting performance or inducing State Farm to breach the insurance contract. Moreover, the claim had been assigned to State Farms SIU more than a month before Senterfitts conversation with Ledford, and the investigator provided compelling, independent reasons that justified the companys suspicions and led to the delay concerning the claim. Contrary to Holcombs assertion, there was no evidence "Senterfitt delayed processing Holcombs claim for months waiting for written corroboration" from Ledford or Oso. Consequently, the jury could have reasonably found defendants conduct did not prevent or hinder performance of the contract, and that it was not a substantial factor in causing Holcomb harm. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated Holcomb was in financial straits — without income and behind on his mortgage and association dues — long before Ledford spoke to Senterfitt. The jury reasonably could conclude defendants were not responsible for Holcombs "downward spiral that [led] to foreclosure on his home."
C. The Damage Award Is Not Inadequate as a Matter of Law
Holcomb argues the jurys award of $244 "is not only inadequate but peculiar" and is not "any readily identifiable fraction of the proof of damages presented at trial." He asserts "[t]he only evidence at trial demonstrated that [he] suffered in excess of $800,000 in damages as a result" of defendants conduct. We disagree.
An inadequate award of damages by a jury is erroneous and may be addressed, as it was here, in a motion for new trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 5; all statutory references are to this code unless noted.) A new trial should not be granted, however, "unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision." (Ibid.) The primary duty to scrutinize the jurys verdict rests with the trial court, which is necessarily more familiar with the evidence than the appellate court. (6 Witkin, supra, Torts, § 1740, p. 1276.) Consequently, a reviewing court does not ordinarily substitute its judgment for that of the jury and trial court. (Id., § 1747, p. 1282.) The amount of damages is a question of fact. (Pellegrini v. Weiss (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 515, 531.) On review, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the damage award. (Ibid.) In doing so, the reviewing court need not precisely recreate the jurys reasoning and will uphold a verdict if it is within the range of possibilities supported by the testimony. (Ibid.)
Holcombs damage claim rested primarily on his own credibility. His accountant testified concerning Holcombs financial losses, but conceded he based his conclusions on information Holcomb furnished. Holcomb offered little evidence establishing a causal connection between the violation of his privacy rights and his alleged damages, such as the foreclosure of his home. Simply put, the jury either did not believe Holcomb suffered the damage he claimed or concluded Osos conduct did not cause Holcombs financial problems or affect his health. The jury could reasonably conclude an award of $244, which approximated his association dues for a year, adequately compensated Holcomb for Osos revelation of private information to Holcombs insurance carrier. Substantial evidence supports the jurys rejection of Holcombs claim for damages in excess of this amount.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Impose Sanctions Against Counsel for Representing a Suspended Corporation
Holcomb argues the trial court should have sanctioned trial counsel for representing CCRAM when it knew CCRAMs corporate status had been suspended. It is undisputed counsel represented all three cross-defendants, including CCRAM. Just before trial, the court struck CCRAMs answer and entered a default against it. (See 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 89, p. 151 [suspended corporation may be sued, but it cannot sue or defend, and cannot appeal from an adverse decision].) We review the trial courts ruling on sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. (Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 167; 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Choong (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1277.)
Lee & Mellenger, and Richard Mellenger filed Osos original complaint for injunctive relief etc. against Holcomb in May 2002. Mellenger and the Law Offices of Marie Molnar, and Marie Molnar, represented all three cross-defendants, including CCRAM, in answering Holcombs cross-complaint in August 2006. Oso hired a new management company effective February 2007, and Hart, King & Coldren and James Morse substituted into the case. Oso dismissed its complaint against Holcomb as moot after Holcomb lost his home. Holcomb did not serve Mellenger or Molnar with the sanctions motion.
We conclude the trial court did not err when it denied Holcombs motion for sanctions. As the trial court noted, neither statute cited by Holcomb authorized sanctions. Section 128.5 does not apply to actions filed after December 31, 1994. (Olmstead v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 804, 812 (Olmstead ).) Likewise, section 2023 was repealed in 2004. Section 2023.010 et seq. governed discovery sanctions at the time of Holcombs motion. But Holcomb does not explain how the mere fact of representation amounted to a misuse of the discovery process. (§ 2023.010.) The notice of motion was not accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought (§ 2023.040) and Holcomb did not identify any reasonable expenses incurred by him as a result of counsels actions (§ 2023.030, subd. (a)).
Holcomb relies on Palm Valley Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Design MTC (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 553. Palm Valley upheld a sanctions order under sections 128.5 and 2023, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a law firm acted in bad faith by continuing to represent a corporation in litigation after the firm knew its client corporation had been suspended. (Palm Valley, at pp. 562-563.) The decision has no application here because the statutory authorization relied on in Palm Valley no longer exists. We also note there was no evidence trial counsel (Hart, King & Coldren and James Morse) concealed knowledge of CCRAMs suspended status. By the time the firm appeared in the case, Holcomb and the court were aware of CCRAMs suspension. As noted above, Holcomb did not serve prior counsel, Mellenger and Molnar, with his sanctions motion.
Finally, Holcomb concedes he mistakenly cited the wrong statutes in the trial court, but argues counsels actions warranted sanctions and sections 128.6 and 128.7 authorized an award. Section 128.6 is inoperative. (Olmstead, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 812.) Section 128.7 authorizes sanctions where a pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper is presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, or where claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are unwarranted by nonfrivolous legal arguments. But Holcomb did not comply with procedural requirements under section 128.7, which prohibit filing a sanctions motion unless the opponent is given 21 days to withdraw or correct the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial. (§ 128.7, subd. (c)(1).)
Also, section 128.7, subdivision (d), provides, "A sanction imposed for violation of subdivision (b) shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in paragraphs (1) and (2), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation."
Here, the court imposed a significant nonmonetary sanction when it struck CCRAMs answer and entered its default. The courts action eliminated any prejudice that might have ensued had CCRAM remained a party. Moreover, Holcombs failure to provide evidence of any expenses incurred as a result of counsels representation of CCRAM further supports the trial courts order. We therefore conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Holcombs motion seeking sanctions against counsel.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to their appellate costs.
WE CONCUR:
FYBEL, J.
IKOLA, J.