Opinion
No. 486 C.D. 2011
02-14-2012
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH
This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 7, 2012, when Judge Pellegrini became President Judge.
Alonzo Hodges (Petitioner) petitions, pro se, for review of the March 7, 2011, decision of the Office of Open Records (OOR) denying his appeal pursuant to the Right to Know Law (RTKL). In doing so, the OOR affirmed the Department of Corrections' (Department) denial of Petitioner's request for information concerning the Department's health care facilities.
Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§67.101-67.3104.
On January 24, 2010, Petitioner, an inmate at State Correctional Institution at Fayette, filed a RTKL request with the Department, seeking "the designation of the health care facilities of the Department of Corrections, and its classification level." (Certified Record (C.R.) Item 1.) By letter dated February 1, 2001, (C.R. Item 2), the Department informed Petitioner that his request was denied pursuant to section 703 of the RTKL, which states in relevant part that a "written request should identify or describe the records sought with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to ascertain which records are being requested...." 65 P.S. §67.703. Petitioner filed an appeal to the OOR, alleging that the Department operates licensed health care facilities. Petitioner cited statutes and regulations which, he asserted, required the Department to designate a classification level and obtain a license for any health care facility under the Department's control. (C.R. Item 3.)
In support of the Department's denial of Petitioner's request, the Department submitted the declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, of Kathy Montag, who is employed by the Department as a Correctional Health Care Administrator. Montag stated that her current position includes supervision of all contracts for the provision of health care services to inmates and that, as a result, she possesses an overall knowledge of the Department's inmate health care system. Addressing Petitioner's RTKL request, Montag explained that the Department provides health care to inmates in various contexts and sites, such as infirmaries, professional offices, and cells of certain inmates, and that she could not determine what specific records Petitioner referred to with the terms "health care facilities," "designation," and "classification." Finally, Montag clarified that the Department does not operate any hospitals or conduct surgery in its State Correctional Institutions. (C.R. Item 5, Exhibit A.)
Based on its review of Petitioner's request, the OOR concluded that it was unable to ascertain what records Petitioner was seeking. In a final determination issued and mailed March 7, 2011, the OOR explained as follows:
While the Department affirms that it provides health care to inmates in a variety of locations, including at infirmaries, at
prison cells or in other offices, it is unclear whether the Requester seeks information regarding any or all of these locations. Instead, on appeal, Requester argues that [the Health Care Facilities Act], mandates that the [Department] must obtain a license to operate a health care facility" and that the Department operates health care facilities as defined by Section 448.802 of the Health Care Facilities Act. Even with this statutory definition offered during the appeal, it remains unclear as to what records are sought by the Request. Accordingly, the OOR finds that the Request did not comply with 65 P.S. §67.703.(C.R. Item 6.)
Act of July 19, 1979, P.L. 130, as amended, 35 P.S. §§448.101-448.904(b).
On appeal, Petitioner argues that his request was not broad and unlimited and that the meaning of the terms "health care facilities," "designation," and "classification level" was clear in context of the request. (Petitioner's brief, Statement of Questions Involved.) In his Petition for Review, Petitioner asserts that the Department should have understood his use of the term "health care facilities" to mean the "the medical area where the infirmary is located and where inmates go for medical services." (Petition for Review, ¶5.) Petitioner again argues that the Health Care Facilities Act and relevant regulations require the Department to obtain a license in order to provide medical services at Department facilities and, therefore, the information he requests is readily identifiable.
In reviewing a final determination of the OOR, this Court independently reviews the OOR's orders and may substitute its own findings of fact for those of the agency. Office of the Budget v. Office of Open Records, 11 A.3d 618, 620 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). In addition, the RTKL does not prohibit this Court from considering evidence that was not presented to the OOR. Id. Indeed, in reviewing a decision of the OOR, this Court is entitled to the broadest scope of review, while mindful to proceed in a manner most consistent with justice, fairness and expeditious resolution. Id.
Petitioner apparently bases this belief on a nurse's comment to the effect that SCI Somerset has a surgical facility that could bring in the equipment necessary to conduct a sleep study. (Petitioner's brief at 3, 10.) --------
In response, the Department contends that the OOR properly dismissed Petitioner's appeal from the Department's denial of his RTKL request for lack of specificity. The Department also requests that we dismiss Petitioner's appeal as moot. In support of its request, the Department references a subsequent RTKL request Petitioner filed with the Department on March 14, 2011, clarifying that the records he sought were license applications and licenses to operate the infirmaries in state correctional institutions issued to the Department by the Department of Health. The OOR ultimately determined that such records do not exist, and this Court affirmed that decision on appeal. Hodges v. Department of Corrections, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1032 C.D. 2011, filed February 13, 2012).
The Department argues that our disposition on appeal from the denial of Petitioner's subsequent request renders the present appeal moot, and we agree. An issue can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due to an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an intervening change in the applicable law. Consumer Education and Protective Association v. Public Utility Commission, 847 A.2d 789, 794 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004); In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002). Here, in light of the final determination that the specific records Petitioner requests do not exist, any order that we would enter would be meaningless, rendering the instant appeal moot.
Generally, a court will not consider moot questions. In re Gross, 382 A.2d 116 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978). Exceptions to this principle are made in rare instances where the case involves issues important to the public interest, the conduct complained of is capable of repetition yet the likely to evade appellate review, or a party will suffer some detriment without the court's decision. Musheno v. Department of Public Welfare, 829 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). We conclude that none of those exceptions apply in this instance.
Accordingly, we dismiss Petitioner's appeal as moot.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of February, 2012, the appeal of Alonzo Hodges in the above-captioned matter is dismissed as moot.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge