Opinion
A-13544 7121
07-17-2024
LAURA CRISTINE HINZ, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Claire F. DeWitte, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Sharon Illsley, Judge Trial Court No. 3KN-19-00340 CR.
Claire F. DeWitte, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TERRELL, JUDGE
Laura Cristine Hinz was convicted, following a jury trial, of fourth-degree assault, fifth-degree criminal mischief, and violating conditions of release after she got into a drunken argument with her former boyfriend, broke several of his possessions, and attempted to bite a state trooper who arrested her. Hinz raises two claims of error on appeal.
AS 11.41.230(a)(3), AS 11.46.486(a)(2), and AS 11.56.757(a), respectively.
First, she argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury that it must accept the parties' stipulation to three of the five elements of the violating conditions of release charge. According to Hinz, such an instruction removes the stipulated elements from the jury's consideration and is effectively a waiver of the right to a jury trial on those elements. Hinz further contends that the district court was required to conduct a personal colloquy with Hinz to determine if her waiver of the right to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary, and that the failure to conduct such a personal colloquy was structural error. For the reasons explained in this decision, we reject this claim of error.
Second, Hinz argues that the district court's instruction to the jury on the jury's duty to deliberate on the domestic violence aggravating factor was unduly coercive. Because we conclude that the instruction was not unduly coercive, we affirm the jury's finding of the domestic violence aggravating factor.
Underlying facts and proceedings
Alaska State Troopers were dispatched to the home of Michael Stinnett after receiving a report of a domestic disturbance. Hinz, Stinnett's former girlfriend, was staying with him, and the two had an argument. Hinz was intoxicated and broke several objects in the house during the course of the argument. She also hit Stinnett over the head with a picture frame. At the time of this incident, Hinz had an open court case, for which she had been released on bail. Among her conditions of release was the requirement that she not consume alcohol.
The troopers took Hinz into custody and transported her to the hospital for a medical evaluation due to the fact that she appeared highly intoxicated. At the hospital, Hinz was yelling profanities and screaming. As the troopers were escorting Hinz from the hospital, she attempted to bite one of the troopers who was leading her to the patrol vehicle.
For this conduct, Hinz was charged with two counts of fourth-degree assault (for hitting Stinnett with the picture frame and attempting to bite one of the troopers), one count of fifth-degree criminal mischief (for breaking Stinnett's property), one count of disorderly conduct (for creating a hazardous condition at the hospital), and one count of violating her conditions of release (for consuming alcohol). The jury found Hinz not guilty of fourth-degree assault (for hitting Stinnett with the picture frame) and disorderly conduct. She was found guilty of the other fourth-degree assault count (for attempting to bite the trooper), criminal mischief, and violating her conditions of release.
After the verdict, the jury was asked to deliberate on the question of whether Hinz and Stinnett were "household members," and thus whether the criminal mischief conviction should be considered a crime of domestic violence. The jury ultimately returned a verdict that the criminal mischief conviction had been proved a crime of domestic violence beyond a reasonable doubt.
This appeal followed.
Why we conclude that the district court was not required to obtain a personal jury waiver from Hinz before instructing the jury that it should treat stipulated elements as proven
Prior to trial, the district court asked the defense if it wanted a stipulation regarding the violating conditions of release charge to avoid the jury hearing the facts of Hinz's other pending case. The defense attorney indicated that Hinz was willing to stipulate that she was "on conditions, and one of those conditions was no alcohol."
The parties ultimately agreed to instruct the jury that in order to prove that Hinz committed the crime of violating her conditions of release:
[T]he state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) the defendant was charged with a crime;
(2) the defendant was released on bail or on her own recognizance;
(3) the defendant was ordered by a judicial officer, as a condition of release, to not consume alcohol;
(4) the defendant knowingly consumed alcohol; and
(5) the defendant recklessly disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the conduct was prohibited by the order.
The parties also agreed to the following instruction regarding the stipulation:
The parties may not disagree that certain facts are true. In this situation, instead of presenting evidence, the parties will present a stipulation, which is an agreed statement of facts. You must accept stipulated facts as true.
As to Count III in this case, violation of condition of release, the parties have stipulated to elements (1), (2) and (3). The parties have also stipulated that the defendant was aware of the condition of release that precluded the consumption of alcohol.
With this stipulation, the state is only required to prove elements (4) and (5) of the crime of violating condition of release beyond a reasonable doubt.
You are cautioned that you are not to consider the stipulated fact that the defendant was charged with a crime in another case to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that she has a tendency to commit crimes. The stipulation as to element (1) may only be used by you to establish element (1) of the violation of condition of release charge.
In closing argument, the State argued:
[T]he defendant is charged with violating the conditions of release . . . for consuming alcohol. Now, the defense has stipulated to the first three elements, so there was a crime she was charged with, she was released from
custody, and as a condition for that release she was ordered not to consume alcohol. They have also stipulated that she was aware of those conditions.
So there's two things you must find on this charge: first, that she consumed alcohol - and she admitted to consuming alcohol; second, that she . . . recklessly disregarded the risk that consuming alcohol was prohibited by the court order that prohibited her from consuming alcohol. So [I] ask that you find her guilty of violating conditions of release.
The defense attorney did not mention the stipulation or the violating conditions of release charge in closing argument.
On appeal, Hinz argues that her conviction for violating conditions of release should be reversed because the district court instructed the jury that the State only had to prove the elements that had not been stipulated to by the parties. According to Hinz, the instruction removed the stipulated elements from the jury's consideration and therefore required Hinz to personally waive her right to a jury trial on those elements. Hinz further argues that the failure to obtain a personal waiver of her right to a jury trial was structural error, requiring reversal of her conviction without any showing of prejudice.
We recently addressed similar arguments in Hank v. State. Hank was charged with third-degree weapons misconduct (felon in possession), which required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Hank knowingly possessed a firearm capable of being concealed on his person; (2) Hank had previously been convicted of a felony; and (3) Hank was aware of or recklessly disregarded the fact that he had been convicted of a felony. To avoid the jury hearing the details of his prior conviction, Hank stipulated to facts that established the second and third elements of the crime and only contested the first element. The jury was instructed that it "must" accept the stipulated facts as true, and the State told the jurors during closing arguments that they did not have to deliberate on the elements that were covered by the stipulation because those elements were "already proven beyond reasonable doubt" through the stipulation.
Hank v. State, __ P.3d __, 2024 WL 2873257 (Alaska App. June 7, 2024).
Id. at *2; see also AS 11.61.200(a)(1).
After he was convicted, Hank appealed, arguing that the jury instruction mandating acceptance of the stipulated facts in his case amounted to a waiver of his right to a jury trial. He asserted that the court's failure to obtain his personal consent to waiving his jury right on the second and third elements amounted to structural error - that is, error that requires reversal regardless of whether he actually disagreed with his attorney's decision to stipulate, or whether that decision caused him prejudice.
Hank, 2024 WL 2873257, at *2.
In Hank, we concluded that, when a defense attorney agrees to stipulate to facts that establish an element or elements of a crime in the presence of the defendant, the court may accept the stipulation without first obtaining the defendant's on-the-record waiver as long as the stipulation does not effectively amount to a guilty plea and there is no indication in the record that the defendant disagrees with the decision to stipulate.
Id. at *8.
In this case, Hinz's attorney agreed to the stipulation that Hinz was charged with a crime and on conditions of release prohibiting her from drinking alcohol in the presence of the jury. Hinz did not object. And the stipulation still allowed the attorney to argue to the jury that Hinz was not guilty because the State had failed to prove other elements of the crime. We therefore reject Hinz's argument on appeal that the district court was required to obtain her personal consent to the stipulation.
Why we conclude that the district court did not unduly coerce the jury to reach a verdict when responding to a jury note stating that the jury did not agree on whether the criminal conviction was a crime of domestic violence
After the jury found Hinz guilty of fifth-degree criminal mischief, it was asked to determine whether the criminal mischief conviction was a crime of domestic violence, as that term is defined under Alaska law. After a period of deliberation, the jury sent the court a note stating that four of the six jurors would find that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Hinz and Stinnett were household members and therefore that it was a crime of domestic violence, while two jurors would find that they were not household members and therefore that it was not a crime of domestic violence. The note also stated, "Hung - Impass[e] as 2 feel bad for defendant."
In response to the note, the State asked the court to instruct the jury to continue to deliberate and "that they need to follow the law and not rely on feelings of what they do and don't want to find against the defendant, because they're required to follow the law." Hinz requested that the court declare a mistrial on the domestic violence question. The court instructed the jury to continue its deliberations, but excused the jury for the weekend because it was past court hours. When the court was explaining why the jury needed to return to deliberate further, the court stated:
I recognize this is difficult. You've already given a lot of time. But essentially, verdicts have to be based on the law and the facts, and I understand that this is a difficult question for some jurors, perhaps. But you need to give it a little more time, and perhaps when you're fresh you'll be able to do that.
Prior to the jury returning to deliberations, Hinz filed a motion to dismiss the allegation that the criminal mischief conviction was a crime of domestic violence or, alternatively, to declare a mistrial on the issue. Hinz argued that the above remark was unduly coercive to the minority jurors who had indicated that they would find it was not a domestic violence crime. When the trial resumed, the court took the motion "under advisement." The judge also reread a jury instruction that had been read prior to deliberating on Hinz's guilt, which stated:
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement if that can be done without violence to individual judgment.
Each juror must decide the case for himself or herself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with the other jurors.
In the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to re-examine his or her own views and to change his or her opinion if convinced it is erroneous.
A jury should not surrender an honest belief as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of the other jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
After further deliberation, the jury returned a verdict that the criminal mischief conviction had been proved a crime of domestic violence beyond a reasonable doubt. And the court denied Hinz's motion for dismissal or a mistrial.
On appeal, Hinz again argues that she was entitled to a mistrial on the domestic violence aggravating factor because the court's remarks unduly coerced the minority jurors to join the majority position and find that the criminal mischief conviction was a crime of domestic violence.
Hinz relies on the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Fields v. State. In Fields, the supreme court concluded that so-called "Allen charges" - jury instructions "emphasizing the duty of the minority jurors to reconsider their views without a like admonition to the majority" - are "so inherently fraught with coercive tendencies that [their] use cannot be justified." The court also concluded that the trial court's admonishment to the jury that it had to deliberate until it reached a unanimous verdict was especially coercive and improper. The court instead endorsed an instruction similar to the one the district court reread prior to the jury resuming deliberations here.
Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 835-43 (Alaska 1971).
Id. at 836; see also Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896).
Fields, 487 P.2d at 836-39.
Id. at 842-43.
Hinz does not contend that the final instruction the jury received before resuming deliberations was improper, nor does she argue that it was improper for the court to instruct the jury that "verdicts have to be based on the law and the facts." But she argues that the court's remark that it "[understood] that this [was] a difficult question for some jurors, perhaps" improperly singled out the two jurors who were apparently in the minority and implied that only they should reconsider their positions.
We do not believe that this admonition was of the same coercive character as the express admonition that minority jurors should reconsider their positions, or the instruction in Fields that the jury had to deliberate until it reached a verdict. On its face, the jury was simply told that it had a duty to base its verdict on the law and facts and that doing so can be difficult. And to the extent that the remark was improper because of its surrounding context, we are confident that any impropriety was ultimately cured by the instruction the jury heard immediately before returning to deliberate. We therefore reject Hinz's challenge to the court's response to the jury's note stating that it could not reach a verdict on the domestic violence aggravating factor.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.