Opinion
C098490
06-07-2024
ISAIAH HINOJOSA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 23CV00699
Duarte, J.
The Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) sets forth the procedures and requirements that must be satisfied before a lawsuit may be brought against a public entity for personal injuries. The statute precludes a suit for damages against a public entity unless a timely written claim has been presented to the entity. (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 734, 738.) In this appeal, Isaiah Hinojosa challenges the order denying his petition under section 946.6, in which he sought relief from the denial of his application to present a late claim against the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and the County of Butte (County) for damages arising out of a car accident on a public roadway when he was 18 years old. Hinojosa argues the trial court erred in concluding that the tolling provision in section 911.4 did not apply because he was an adult rather than a minor. As we will explain, we agree with Hinojosa. Under section 911.4, subdivision (c)(1), the time within which to file a late claim against a public entity is tolled if the adult claimant is mentally incapacitated and does not have a guardian or conservator to act on their behalf. Because the trial court did not reach the merits of the section 946.6 petition, including whether Hinojosa demonstrated that he was mentally incapacitated following the accident, we will reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Shortly after 11:00 a.m. on June 19, 2021, Hinojosa was involved in a single-car accident near Chico, on Durham Pentz Road in an unincorporated area of Butte County. Hinojosa was driving approximately 55 miles per hour when he drifted off the road and lost control of his Ford Explorer, which rolled over. Hinojosa, who was not wearing a seatbelt, was ejected from the Explorer and suffered serious injuries, including multiple fractures and a severe traumatic brain injury. Hinojosa was unconscious at the scene and was in a coma for about a month thereafter. At the time of the accident, Hinojosa was 18 years old.
More than 18 months later, in early January 2023, Hinojosa filed an application to present a late claim against Caltrans and the County for damages arising out of a dangerous condition of public property--Durham Pentz Road. By letter, the County denied Hinojosa's application in late January 2023 and the Department of General Services (DGS) (on behalf of Caltrans) did the same in early February 2023. In its denial letter, DGS explained that it had no jurisdiction to consider Hinojosa's claim because it was presented "more than one year beyond the date the damages accrued."
DGS serves as the business manager for the State of California.
In March 2023, Hinojosa filed a petition in the trial court for an order permitting a late claim against Caltrans and the County. In other words, Hinojosa sought relief from the claim presentation requirements (e.g., submitting a timely written claim). The petition alleged that Hinojosa was incapacitated following the accident due to "severe and debilitating personal injuries," and that Hinojosa "had absolutely no idea" of any potential liability on the part of Caltrans or the County until late November 2022 when his mother (Tracy Geary) consulted an attorney. As grounds for relief, Hinojosa argued that he should be excused from the claim presentation requirements because he was "incapacitated after the accident and [did] not have a guardian and/or conservator appointed," and because "there was a reasonable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and/or excusable neglect, to which [Caltrans and the County] have suffered no prejudice." Hinojosa argued his lawsuit "should be able to proceed because he had no idea that [Caltrans or the County] had any role in causing the accident . . . and had no idea about [their] potential liability until after retaining . . . [c]ounsel" in late November 2022. In arguing that his petition was timely, Hinojosa relied on the tolling provision set forth in section 911.4, subdivision (c)(1).
With his petition, Hinojosa submitted various documents, including the highway patrol traffic crash report, a September 2021 neurological evaluation report (which provided a detailed description of his injuries and medical condition), and a declaration from Geary.
The neurological evaluation report indicated (among other things) that Hinojosa was "non-vocal," "slow in processing," had poor neck control and eye contact, was emotionally "flat" in response to questions, did not know the "season, date, day of the week, or the month," was suffering from "posttraumatic amnesia," and could not "carry out a two-step command." As relevant here, the report stated that Hinojosa was diagnosed with: (1) "[s]evere traumatic brain injury with concurrent severe anoxic event (CPR 15 minute)"; and (2) "TBI anoxia with severe functional limitations in ADLs [(i.e., activities of daily living)], cognition, mobility, bladder and bowel incontinence, and dysphagia." In addition to the neurological evaluation report, Hinojosa also submitted the related "Pre-Admission Evaluation Report," which discussed the reasons why he needed "specialized, unique diagnostic and therapeutic neurorehabilitation services." This report indicated that Hinojosa required 24-hour assistance for mobility, self-care, and basic activities of daily living (e.g., eating, dressing, bathing), and that he was suffering from: (1) "[c]ognitive and linguistic deficits including the inability to vocalize coupled with limited and inconsistent head nods to answer egocentric yes/no questions significantly impacts his ability to communicate needs and wants, requiring ongoing support and skilled therapy intervention to increase his ability to interact with others and to help direct ongoing care"; and (2) "[i]mpaired cognitive abilities, including limited awareness, orientation, attention, recent and remote memory impede his independence, mandating the need for skilled intervention to improve his awareness to manage pain issues and maintain health and wellbeing."
The County filed an opposition and lodged objections to the evidence submitted by Hinojosa. The County argued that Hinojosa's petition should be denied because he failed to present admissible evidence (e.g., a declaration from a physician) showing he was incapacitated, and that his failure to comply with the claim presentation requirements was not excused due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Caltrans did not file an opposition.
In reply, Hinojosa reiterated the arguments he made in his petition. In support of his contention that his application to submit a late claim was timely due to mental incapacitation, Hinojosa provided a second declaration from Geary and a declaration from his treating physician, Victoria Ota, M.D. According to Geary, as a result of injuries from the accident, Hinojosa needed "24-hour supervision" and "extensive assistance with daily living activities." Geary explained that Hinojosa had "extreme aphasia" (loss of ability to understand or express language) and limited mobility (e.g., he could not walk without support and assistance). Geary further explained that Hinojosa was confused, disoriented (e.g., he repeatedly asked the same question), and often unaware of his surroundings and physical limitations. Dr. Ota opined that Hinojosa had been mentally incapacitated since the date of the accident due to the severe and debilitating injuries he suffered (e.g., severe brain injury). According to Dr. Ota, Hinojosa's incapacity was "permanent and a recovery [was] not expected." Dr. Ota explained that Hinojosa's "cognitive and mental impairments" required "24-hour supervision and assistance and care with daily living activities."
In early April 2023, the same superior court judge who was presiding over the Government Claims Act litigation appointed Geary as the guardian ad litem for Hinojosa in the related civil action he had filed against Ford Motor Company and others.
" '[A] guardian ad litem represents the interests of a person in legal proceedings who lacks capacity to represent himself or herself in those proceedings.'" (A.F. v. Jeffrey F. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 737, 747.)
In mid-April 2023, the County objected to the evidence Hinojosa submitted with his reply brief, arguing that Hinojosa had failed to show good cause for his failure to include the evidence with his petition.
In late April 2023, after a hearing wherein counsel for Caltrans stated that Caltrans "support[ed]" the County's arguments, the trial court issued an order denying Hinojosa's petition for relief from the claims presentation requirements. The court concluded Hinojosa had failed to show that his application to present a late claim against Caltrans and the County was made "pursuant to Government Code § 911.4." (Italics omitted.) The court explained that, while Hinojosa relied on the statute's tolling provision (§ 911.4, subd. (c)) to show his application was timely (i.e., filed within the one-year period), the tolling provision was inapplicable because he was not a minor at the time of the accident. The court went on to conclude that Kagy v. Napa State Hospital (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1 and Favorite v. County of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 835, cited by Hinojosa at the hearing, were distinguishable because they both involved a minor. The court added that Hinojosa had failed to cite any other authority demonstrating he was entitled to the relief he requested. The court did not rule on any of the evidentiary objections lodged by the County.
The trial court's order incorrectly states that Hinojosa was 20 years old at the time of the accident. The record reflects, and the parties agree, that Hinojosa was 18 years old. This error is immaterial to the resolution of Hinojosa's appeal.
Hinojosa timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Hinojosa argues the trial court erred in concluding that section 911.4's tolling provision did not apply because he was an adult rather than a minor. As we next explain, we agree.
I
Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The Government Claims Act (Act) was enacted in 1963 to provide a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts. (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803.) The Act authorizes limited governmental tort liability for injuries suffered as a result of the acts or omissions of public entities or their employees. (§§ 815.2, 815.6.) However, a prerequisite to such liability is compliance with the claims procedure of the Act. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 454; DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 989-990.) Generally, before a complaint for money or damages may be filed against a public entity on a cause of action relating to personal injuries, the plaintiff must present a written claim for damages to the public entity, and the claim must be denied or deemed rejected. (§ 945.4.) The failure to timely present a prelawsuit claim bars an action against the public entity. (City of Stockton v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 734.) For purposes of the Act, a "public entity" includes a county and a public agency. (§ 811.2.) Here, there is no dispute that Caltrans and the County are public entities within the meaning of the Act.
Under the Act, before a person can sue a public entity for damages based on a cause of action for personal injuries, he or she must first present a claim to the entity within six months of the date the cause of action accrued. (§ 911.2, subd. (a); Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 906.) The claim presentation requirement serves several purposes: (1) it "affords the [public] entity an opportunity to promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus minimizing the risk of similar harm to others"; (2) it "permits the public entity to investigate while tangible evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can be located"; and (3) it "permits early assessment by the public entity, allows its governing board to settle meritorious disputes without incurring the added cost of litigation, and gives it time to engage in appropriate budgetary planning." (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 213, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Rubenstein, at p. 914; see City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 455 [the purpose of the Act is "to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation"].) "The intent of the . . . Act is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs against governmental entities. Rather, the intent of the [A]ct is to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances." (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776.)
If the claim is not timely presented, an application to the public entity for leave to present a late claim may be made "within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action" and must "state the reason for the delay in presenting the claim." (§ 911.4, subds. (a), (b); Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 906.) " 'Accrual of the cause of action for purposes of [the Act] is the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants.'" (Rubenstein, at p. 906.) The filing of a late-claim application within one year after the accrual of a cause of action is a" 'jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief petition.'" (Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare Dist. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391, 405.) In calculating the one-year period to file a late-claim application, the Act provides: "The time during which the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss as a minor shall be counted, but the time during which he or she is mentally incapacitated and does not have a guardian or conservator of his or her person shall not be counted." (§ 911.4, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, unless the one-year period is tolled under section 911.4, subdivision (c), "the public entity is 'powerless to grant relief' if an application for leave to file a late claim was presented after the one-year deadline." (Coble v. Ventura County Health Care Agency (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 417, 421.)
Section 911.6 provides that a public entity must grant an application for leave to present a late claim in certain specified circumstances, including when (1) "[t]he failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect and the public entity was not prejudiced in its defense of the claim by the failure to present the claim within the time specified in Section 911.2" (i.e., the six-month claim presentation period); and (2) "[t]he person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in Section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that disability failed to present a claim during that time." (§ 911.6, subd. (b)(1), (4).)
If the application to the public entity for leave to present a late claim is denied, the claimant may petition the superior court for relief from the claim presentation requirements. (§ 946.6, subd. (a).) Relief must be granted if the court finds the application was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action, and one of the statutorily enumerated conditions justifying the failure to present a timely claim is satisfied. (§§ 946.6, subd. (c), 911.4, subd. (b).) Two of those conditions are at issue here: (1) "[t]he failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the [claim presentation] requirements of Section 945.4" (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(1)); and (2) "[t]he person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in Section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that disability failed to present a claim during that time" (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(4)).
In deciding a petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements, a trial court considers "the petition, any affidavits in support of or in opposition to the petition, and any additional evidence received at the hearing on the petition." (§ 946.6, subd. (e).) The claimant bears the burden of establishing one of the statutory grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. (See Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 431; Rojes v. Riverside General Hospital (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1162, overruled on another ground in Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1607.)
The standard for relief on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is the same as required for relief from a default judgment. To obtain relief from an untimely filing, the claimant must establish the required elements of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) by a preponderance of the evidence. (Viles v. State (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 29; Department of Water &Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.)" 'Excusable neglect has been defined as neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.' [Citation.] It 'is not shown by the mere failure to discover a fact until it is too late; the party seeking relief must establish that in the exercise of reasonable diligence, he failed to discover it.'" (Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1382-1383.) "Similarly, when mistake is claimed, '[t]he party seeking relief based on a claim of mistake must establish he [or she] was diligent in investigating and pursuing the claim ....' [Citation.] Under this standard,' "[f]ailure to discover the alleged basis of the cause of action in time is . . . not a compelling showing in the absence of reasonable diligence exercised for the purpose of discovering the facts."' [Citation.] Further, 'the mere ignorance of the time limitation for filing against a public entity is not a sufficient ground for allowing a late claim.'" (N.G. v. County of San Diego (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 63, 74.) Once a claimant makes a showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, the burden shifts to the public agency to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the delay. Such prejudice is often the determinative factor in whether relief should be granted. (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 275, 279; Department of Water &Power v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297; Powell v. City of Long Beach (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 105, 109-110.)
Incapacity is a justification for relief from the claim presentation requirements only if the claimant's physical or mental incapacity is the reason for the untimely filing. The incapacity must be so great that it prevents the claimant from filing a claim or from authorizing another person to file a claim on the claimant's behalf. (Draper v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 52 Cal.3d 502, 507-509.) Failure to file a claim as a result of an injury that does not completely incapacitate a person may nonetheless constitute excusable neglect in certain exceptional circumstances. (See Barragan v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1385-1386 [late filing accepted based on excusable neglect where claimant, who had been rendered quadriplegic from a car accident, was completely occupied with recovery during six-month filing period]; N.G. v. County of San Diego, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 75 [excusable neglect based on a serious injury requires exceptional showing that physical or mental disability reasonably prevented compliance with claim presentation requirements].)
We review the trial court's denial of a petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements under section 946.6 for abuse of discretion. (Ebersol v. Cowan, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 435; Lincoln Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1079, 1089.) "Abuse of discretion is shown where uncontradicted evidence or affidavits of the petitioner establish adequate cause for relief." (Ebersol, at p. 435.) "Section 946.6 is a remedial statute intended 'to provide relief from technical rules that otherwise provide a trap for the unwary claimant.' [Citations.] As such, it is construed in favor of relief whenever possible." (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Comm. College Dist., supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 275.) "In light of the policy considerations underlying section 946.6, a trial court decision denying relief will be scrutinized more carefully than an order granting relief." (Id. at p. 276.)
We independently review a trial court's decision on questions of law, such as construction of a statute and whether a claim is barred by a statute of limitations. (Lincoln Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1090.)
II
Analysis
Here, it is not disputed that Hinojosa's personal injury causes of action against Caltrans and the County accrued on the June 19, 2021--the date of the accident. Hinojosa, however, did not present a claim to either entity within the six-month period of section 911.2 (i.e., within six months from the accident). Nor did he apply for leave to present a late claim with either entity within the one-year period of section 911.4. Instead, after his mother (Geary) consulted an attorney in November 2022, Hinojosa filed a late-claim application with Caltrans and the County in January 2023, more than 18 months after the accident. Following the denial of his late-claim application, Hinojosa timely filed the section 946.6 petition at issue here. In support of his petition, Hinojosa asserted that he was entitled to relief from the claim presentation requirements under section 946.6, subdivision (c)(4) because he was mentally incapacitated during the entire statutory period for the presentation of the claim. Hinojosa alternatively argued that he was entitled to relief from the claims presentation requirements under section 946.6, subdivision (c)(1) because his failure to timely present a claim was due to a mistake and/or excusable neglect. In making these arguments, Hinojosa relied on the tolling provision set forth in section 911.4, subdivision (c)(1) to establish that his late-claim application was timely. In denying the petition, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the tolling provision did not apply because the provision "requires that the claimant be a minor." This was error.
As previously indicated, the tolling provision at issue here provides that, in computing the one-year period for presenting a late-claim application to a public entity, "[t]he time during which the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss as a minor shall be counted, but the time during which he or she is mentally incapacitated and does not have a guardian or conservator of his or her person shall not be counted." (§ 911.4, subd. (c)(1).) Our Supreme Court has explained that, although the language of this provision could be clearer, it is properly interpreted as applying to mentally incapacitated adults who lack a guardian or conservator. (Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1020, 1025 (Hernandez).) In other words, section 911.4 permits tolling of the late-claim filing period during the time in which an adult is mentally incapacitated and does not have a guardian or conservator to act on their behalf. (See ibid.)
We recognize that section 911.4's tolling provision has been modified since Hernandez was decided. (Compare Stats. 1999, ch. 620, § 1 with Stats. 2003, ch. 847, § 2.) However, the modifications were minor, stylistic changes. The former version of the provision is substantively identical to the current version. It stated: "In computing the one-year period under this subdivision, time during which the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss is a minor shall be counted, but the time during which he [or she] is mentally incapacitated and does not have a guardian or a conservator of his or her person shall not be counted." (See Hernandez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1024, italics added.)
In Hernandez, which involved an untimely claim filed on behalf of a minor suffering from profound mental retardation and severe physical handicaps allegedly caused by negligent medical care in connection with the minor's birth, our Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether the minor, who had a parent capable of acting on his behalf, was entitled to invoke the tolling provision of section 911.4, subdivision (c)(1) by virtue of the minor's mental incapacitation. (Hernandez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1022-1023.) In concluding that the minor was not entitled to do so, the high court held that, "unlike a mentally incapacitated adult who lacks a guardian, a mentally incapacitated minor must generally file a late-claim application no later than one year after the accrual of his cause of action." (Id. at p. 1027.) In so holding, the court explained: "With respect to minors, the statute makes clear that the normal late-claim time periods shall not be tolled; with respect to mentally incapacitated persons who lack a guardian or conservator, the time limitations shall be tolled.... [W]henever a child is injured it is invariably the child's parents or guardian rather than the child who files a claim for recovery; since a parent or guardian is equally capable of filing a claim whether or not the injured child is mentally incapacitated ...." (Id. at p. 1025.) The court further explained: "By explicitly providing that the 'time during which the person who sustained the alleged injury . . . is a minor shall be counted' . . . for purposes of the late-claim filing period, the Legislature has clearly indicated that it did not intend to authorize the filing of a claim on behalf of a child many years after the accrual of his cause of action. [Citation.] With respect to such an injured child, the Legislature evidently concluded that it was reasonable to expect that a late-claim application would be filed on his behalf by a parent or another adult responsible for the child's care within one year of the accrual of his cause of action. [¶] At the same time, the Legislature concluded that a similar assumption could not be made with respect to a mentally incapacitated adult who lacks a guardian or conservator to act on his behalf. As to this class of claimants, the Legislature determined that the tolling of a late-claim filing period was warranted-even if it resulted in a substantial delay in the filing of claims-so as not to deny such claimants a meaningful opportunity to obtain redress for their injuries." (Id. at p. 1025.)
Since Hernandez was decided, appellate courts have held that, in certain circumstances, the tolling provision contained in section 911.4 applies to mentally incapacitated persons (including minors) who have a conservator. In Kagy v. Napa State Hospital, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1, the appellate court held that the one-year period within which to present a late claim was tolled because the public guardian appointed to serve as conservator for the mentally incapacitated minor lacked the authority to file suit on behalf of the minor and therefore could not adequately represent the minor's interests. (Id. at pp. 6-7.) Similarly, in Favorite v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 835, the appellate court held that the one-year period was tolled where the conservator appointed for the incapacitated claimant was incapable of acting on the claimant's behalf because the claimant could not communicate with the conservator regarding the nature and extent of her injuries. (Id. at pp. 840-841.) Thus, tolling has been allowed under section 911.4 where the claimant did not have a representative who was authorized to represent their interests or where the representative was incapable of doing so. In short, the cases that have dealt with this tolling provision indicate that its purpose is to ensure that the claimant is properly represented by one authorized to act on their behalf. (See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1314-1316 [discussing cases, including Hernandez, Kagy, and Favorite, and concluding that the tolling provision applied because the appointed independent counsel assigned by the juvenile court to act on the behalf of the minor claimants was not the equivalent of a parent or guardian ad litem for purposes of the tolling provision].) Here, the record reflects that Hinojosa was an adult at the time of the accident and was not represented by a person authorized to act on his behalf at any point prior to the filing of the section 946.6 petition for relief from the claims presentation requirements.
This purpose is confirmed by the 2003 amendments to section 911.4, which added subdivision (c)(3). (Stats. 2003, ch. 847, § 2.) That provision provides: "The time shall not be counted during which a minor is adjudged to be a dependent child of the juvenile court under the Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law[,] . . . if the minor is without a guardian ad litem or conservator for purposes of filing civil actions." (§ 911.4, subd. (c)(3).)
Under the circumstances presented, we conclude reversal is warranted. The trial court erred as a matter of law by interpreting section 911.4 incorrectly, as only permitting tolling of the one-year period within which to present a late claim against a public entity if the claimant is a minor. Such an interpretation is contrary to the express language of the statute and the case law interpreting it. Because the court rejected Hinojosa's section 946.6 petition on this procedural ground and did not reach the merits of the issues raised therein (e.g., whether the one-year period to present a late claim was tolled due to mental incapacity), we remand for further proceedings. The court had the authority to grant the relief requested by Hinojosa, but did not do so based on its incorrect determination that section 911.4's tolling provision did not apply as a matter of law. The court did not decide whether the evidence submitted by Hinojosa was sufficient to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief from the claims presentation requirements under section 946.6, subdivision (c). This is a matter for the trial court to determine in the first instance.
Appellate counsel for Hinojosa, who also represented him in the trial court, provides no explanation for why counsel did not direct that court's attention to Hernandez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1020, which would have been a prudent course of action.
On remand, the trial court shall rehear the section 946.6 petition, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by Hinojosa and any other evidence the court allows the parties to present. We express no opinion on how the trial court should rule on the petition or the evidentiary objections lodged by the County. However, in ruling on the petition, the trial court should be mindful of the rule that remedial statutes (including the one at issue here) are to be liberally construed in favor of those persons within their purview.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Hinojosa's petition for relief from the claims presentation requirements under section 946.6 is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Hinojosa shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
We concur: Earl, P. J., Krause, J.