Opinion
# 2015-018-625 Claim No. 125675 Motion No. M-86672
06-25-2015
ARTHUR HINES v. STATE OF NEW YORK
ARTHUR HINES Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability for his cause of action for excessive wrongful confinement for the period of time he was held in the SHU after the reversal of the disciplinary findings is hereby GRANTED. This motion is otherwise DENIED.
Case information
| UID: | 2015-018-625 |
| Claimant(s): | ARTHUR HINES |
| Claimant short name: | HINES |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 125675 |
| Motion number(s): | M-86672 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | DIANE L. FITZPATRICK |
| Claimant's attorney: | ARTHUR HINES Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | June 25, 2015 |
| City: | Syracuse |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant makes a motion seeking summary judgment on his claim for wrongful confinement. Defendant opposes the motion.
The claim alleges that Claimant was unlawfully confined for 76 days in the Special Housing Unit (SHU). It is alleged that on January 12, 2014, Claimant was placed in the SHU pending a Tier III Disciplinary Superintendent's Hearing. On January 13, 2014, Claimant was served with a copy of the misbehavior report. On January 17, 2014, the Tier III Superintendent's Hearing commenced and, after hearing from witnesses, the charges were sustained. Claimant alleges that the formal charges did not comply with section 251-3.1 (c) (4) of the governing regulations, in that the misbehavior report fails to specify the specific role each inmate played in the wrongdoing. Claimant asserts that he appealed the disciplinary findings and on March 24, 2014, the Director of Special Housing/Inmate Disciplinary Program administratively reversed and expunged the claimant's disciplinary record relating to this alleged misbehavior. On March 31, 2014, Claimant was released from confinement in the SHU. Claimant alleges in the claim that the entire 76 days that he spent in the SHU were not privileged.
Claimant now brings this motion arguing that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for his alleged 76 days of wrongful confinement. His argument is that since the misbehavior report did not comply with the regulations, specifically 7 NYCRR section 251-3.1 (c) (1) and (4), his confinement was not privileged. Defendant has opposed the motion with nothing more than the affidavit of the Assistant Attorney General.
On a summary judgment motion, the moving party has the burden to come forward with proof, in admissible form, to make out a prima facie case showing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). "Failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers." (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
A cause of action for wrongful confinement is a "species" of the tort of false imprisonment (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 407 [Ct Cl 1986]). It is Claimant's burden to show that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged." (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom.; Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). Action by a government official is considered privileged where it is performed "under color of law or regulation." (Gittens, 132 Misc 2d at 402). Defendant is also entitled to immunity for claims for money damages arising from disciplinary matters within a prison setting that involve discretionary determinations (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212 [1988]; see also McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194 [2009]).
The fact that disciplinary findings were ultimately reversed does not establish a cause of action for wrongful confinement, unless there is proof that Defendant failed to act in compliance with its own rules and regulations (see Arteaga,72 NY2d at 220-221; Gittens, 132 Misc 2d at 406). However, even if it is established that Defendant failed to follow its own rules and regulations, this does not automatically establish Defendant's liability. Rather, the failure to abide by its rules and regulations only serves to remove the protection of immunity, Claimant still bears the burden to establish his cause of action (Kemp v State of New York, UID No. 2014-010-092 [Ct Cl, Ruderman, J., Dec. 19, 2014]; Kilpatrick v State of New York, UID No. 2001-013-031 [Ct Cl, Patti, J., Dec. 2001]).
Moreover, Claimant must also show that he was prejudiced by the violation of the rules and regulations - that is, he suffered some actual injury due to the violation (Matter of Sarkisian Bros. v State Div. of Human Rights, 48, NY2d 816, 818 [1979]; Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064 [3d Dept 2015]; Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089 [3d Dept 2009]).
The regulation that Claimant asserts Defendant violated 7 NYCRR section 251-3.1 [c] [1] and [4], contains the requirements for a misbehavior report. Subsection [c] provides, "[t]he misbehavior report shall include the following: [1] a written specification of the particulars of the alleged incident of misbehavior involved; . . . [4] when more than one inmate was involved in an incident, the report should, to the extent practicable under the given circumstances, indicate the specific role played by each inmate. Where two or more incidents are involved, all of them may be incorporated into a single misbehavior report. However, each incident must be separately stated." (7 NYCRR § 251-3.1 [c] [1] and [4]).
The misbehavior report with which Claimant was served indicates the date, time, and location of the alleged infraction, and what behavioral rules or regulations he was charged with violating: section 104.11 Violent Conduct; 100.13 Fighting, and 104.13 Creating a Disturbance. The incident was described as: "On January 13, 2014 at approximately 12:30 am I (Sgt R. Jarvis) received confidential information about a fight that happened on January 12, 2014 at approximately 5:40 pm in the D-1 inmate bathroom. I have determined that based on the information received that inmate Hines was involved in a fight with inmate Smith, Jamie 06A1309 in the inmate bathroom on D-1 at 5:40 pm."
Claimant did not attach his objections to the misbehavior findings on appeal. Nor does the appeal determination specify why the disciplinary findings were being reversed. Claimant has failed to come forward with proof to support his burden on a motion for partial summary judgment establishing that the misbehavior report with which he was served failed to comply with 7 NYCRR section 251-3.1 [c] [1] and [4], and affected the outcome of the hearing. A misbehavior report sufficiently complies with the regulations if "it contains the date, time, and place of the offense, identifies the disciplinary rules alleged to have been violated and specifies the factual basis for the charges with enough particularity to enable the inmate to prepare a defense." (Matter of Witherspoon v Goord, 284 AD2d 681, 681 [3d Dept 2001]; see also Matter of Smith v Goord, 307 AD2d 564 [3d Dept 2003]). Here, the misbehavior report sets forth this basic information, and Claimant has not shown, by this motion, how any defect prevented him from preparing his defense or otherwise prejudiced him.
The second component of Claimant's claim is the purported failure to timely release him from the SHU after the reversal of the findings of misbehavior that supported the imposed punishment. Without some justification for this continued confinement, liability may be imposed for the violation of nondiscretionary, ministerial rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (see Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159 [3d Dept 2013]; Gittens, 132 Misc 2d at 406 ; Ruggiero v State of New York, UID No. 2010-015-187 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Nov. 1, 2010; Ramos v State of New York, UID No. 2000-029-017 [Ct Cl, Mignano, J., Sept. 8, 2000]). Here, Claimant has established that Defendant had a duty to release Claimant from the SHU upon the March 24, 2014, reversal of the disciplinary findings that authorized Claimant's confinement in the SHU. Claimant provides in his verified claim that he was not released from the SHU until March 31, 2014. Defendant has not provided any justification for Claimant's extended confinement in the SHU. Claimant has made a prima facie showing of ministerial neglect for his continued confinement in the SHU from March 25 through March 30, 2014. Defendant has failed to refute this. Accordingly, Claimant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability for his cause of action for excessive wrongful confinement for the period of time he was held in the SHU after the reversal of the disciplinary findings, from March 25 through March 30, 2014, is hereby GRANTED. This motion is otherwise DENIED.
A trial on the issue of Claimant's wrongful confinement claim for the period from January 12, 2014 through March 24, 2014, and on the issue of damages for the period from March 25 through March 30, 2014, will be scheduled as soon as practicable.
June 25, 2015
Syracuse, New York
DIANE L. FITZPATRICK
Judge of the Court of Claims
The Court has considered the following in deciding this motion:
1) Notice of Motion.
2) Unsigned, unsworn "affidavit" of Arthur Hines, in support, with exhibits attached thereto.
3) Claimant's "Supporting Memorandum of Law" sworn to March 27, 2015.
3) Affirmation of Ray A. Kyles, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General in opposition.