Opinion
C24-1644 TSZ
12-16-2024
JEFFREY HILL, Plaintiff, v. SPIRIT HALLOWEEN SUPERSTORES LLC, et al. Defendants.
ORDER
Thomas S. Zilly, United States District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Jeffrey Hill's motion to remand, docket no. 11. Having reviewed all papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the motion, the Court enters the following order.
Plaintiff filed this putative class action in King County Superior Court alleging that Defendant Spirit Halloween Superstores LLC violated the pay transparency requirements of Washington's Equal Pay and Opportunities Act (“EPOA”), RCW 49.58, by failing to include wage and salary information in its job postings. Compl. at ¶ 10 (docket no. 1-1). Spirit Halloween removed the case to this Court, asserting that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Notice of Removal (docket no. 1). Plaintiff seeks remand, arguing that Spirit Halloween failed to show that Plaintiff suffered an injury or harm sufficient to establish Article III standing, that Spirit Halloween failed to establish CAFA jurisdiction, and that the state law issues are best adjudicated in state court. Mot. (docket no. 11 at 4-11).
In a putative class action case, Article III standing is “the threshold issue.” Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). If a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Without subject matter jurisdiction, the Court “need never reach the class action issue.” Lierboe, 350 F.3d at 1022.
Courts in this district have repeatedly found that plaintiffs who alleged statutory violations of the EPOA similar to or the same as those alleged by Plaintiff lacked Article III standing and, as a result, granted remand. In Perry v. Boeing Co., 2024 WL 4867023 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2024), the court held that wasted time and an inability to evaluate the pay offered by the defendant or compare the pay to the wages associated with other job opportunities do not constitute concrete injuries. Id. at *2 (citing cases in which the complaints contained allegations similar or identical to those in the complaint in this case and granting remand). Similarly, in Spencer v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 2024 WL 4834901 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2024), the court concluded that an allegation of lost time “has already been identified by this Court as insufficient to establish Article III standing” and that additional allegations made in the complaint, including a conclusory allegation that the plaintiff was qualified to perform the position for which he applied, are not sufficient to demonstrate Article III standing. Id. at *3; see also Kent v. HCL Tech. Ltd., 2024 WL 4825383, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2024) (also finding that claims regarding qualifications are not sufficient to allege a concrete and particularized injury).
The Court cannot ignore the weight of growing authority.The allegations of the complaint in this case are nearly identical to those found in Perry, Spencer, and Kent. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that his allegations fail to establish a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to give rise to Article III standing. Without standing, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and need not address Plaintiff's additional arguments in support of granting remand.
Spirit Halloween's argument that this Court has Article III standing based on recent rulings in Moquete v. GNC Holdings, LLC, 2024 WL 4553690 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2024), and Hein v. Crash Champions, LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193775 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 24, 2024), is unavailing. See Def.'s Response (docket no. 16). Moquete is distinguishable. The Moquete Court denied remand because plaintiff “applied for and obtained a position” with the defendant, thereby establishing injury in fact. Moquete, 2024 WL 4553690, at *2. In this case, Plaintiff did not allege a successful application with Spirit Halloween. In Hein, the plaintiff's motion to remand was actually granted. See Hein v. Crash Champions, LLC, 2024 WL 5039900, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 9, 2024).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS:
(1) Plaintiff's motion to remand, docket no. 11, is GRANTED.
(2) This matter is REMANDED to King County Superior Court effective fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order.
(3) The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.