On March 17, 2021, Jeffrey D. Hill (“Plaintiff”) initiated the above-captioned case. The document submitted as his Complaint appears to contain two separate pleadings. Both pleadings involve events that occurred in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s.

The first pleading is a three-page unsigned document titled “Racketeering- Civil Rights Complaint.” (Doc. 1). Plaintiff attached approximately twelve documents titled “judicial notice” to that Complaint. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 1-76). To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief under RICO or for civil rights violations, his claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are barred by the Eleventh Amendment (Sovereign Immunity).

The second pleading bears a new caption. It is a signed three-page document titled “Writ Quo Warranto // Prohibition // Error.” (Doc. 1-1, pp. 77-79). Plaintiff attached approximately sixteen documents titled “judicial notice” to the Writ Quo Warranto. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 80-190). Plaintiff has attached supporting exhibits to some of the “judicial notice” documents. Plaintiff's request for a Writ Quo Warranto, however, fails for lack of standing because there is no private right of action (a federal Quo Warranto action must be brought by the Attorney General).

In 2011, the Court imposed an injunctive sanction limiting Plaintiff's ability to file civil cases in this Court. Order, Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591 (M.D. Pa. Feb 26, 2011), ECF No. 18 (requiring that Plaintiff “receive certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.”). However, in 2015, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the enforceability of that sanction. Mandate of USCA, Hill v. Umpstead, No. 4:15-CV-587 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2016), ECF No. 9-2 (noting that “the District Court's pre-filing injunction - which ‘sanction[ed] Hill by requiring him to receive certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle district of Pennsylvania' - fails to comport with our direction that it ‘impose more tailored sanctions against him.'”). To the extent that the 2011 sanction is still enforceable, I DECLINE to certify this action for filing because there is no plausible claim alleged. However, even if the sanction is unenforceable, this case should alternatively be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted).

II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Plaintiff's Litigation History in the Middle District of Pennsylvania

It appears that Plaintiff initiated his first civil action in this Court in 1988. All cases were filed pro se and Plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. By September 1996, Plaintiff had filed approximately 42 separate actions in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Hill v. Gates, 940 F.Supp. 108, 109 (M.D. Pa. 1996). On September 3, 1996, United States District Judge James McClure issued an Order directing Plaintiff to show cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed. Id. In that Order, the court “indicated that it would consider as an appropriate sanction the issuance of an order rendering Hill subject to the same restrictions with respect to litigation under § 1915 as are applied for prisoners.” Id. On September 18, 1996, Judge McClure imposed a series of restrictions (explained in 51 paragraphs at the conclusion of his order) to Plaintiff's ability to file cases in this district, including (but not limited to):

(1) requiring Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $5.00 and to deposit $5.00 per month until the full filing fee was paid in each civil action filed (failure to pay, and keep making payments would result in dismissal), id at 113-114; and

(2) barring Plaintiff from bringing any further civil actions if he has “on 3 or more occasions after the date of [the September 18, 1996 order], brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed pursuant to this order on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id. at 114.

In April 2008, Plaintiff ran afoul of the 1996 sanction by filing his third frivolous lawsuit. On April 4, 2008, Judge McClure issued an order that states as follows:

4. Pursuant to our September 18, 1996 order in M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 96-1572 and our authority to impose sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed based on his filing at least three civil actions in the courts of the United States since the date of that order that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. Alternatively, the complaint is dismissed on the merits under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim.

5. Plaintiff is ordered not to bring any civil action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. We warn plaintiff that a failure to comply with this court order may result in contempt proceedings being brought against plaintiff.

Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591, 2008 WL 936927 at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2008).

Plaintiff appealed Judge McClure's April 2008 Order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 22, 2009, the Third Circuit affirmed Judge McClure's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint, but vacated the imposition of sanction. Hill v. Carpenter, 323 Fed.Appx. 167, 168 (3d Cir. 2009). In doing so the Circuit explained:

The District Court clearly was within its discretion to impose sanctions against Hill, as his filings in this case contained wholly inappropriate language and showed a complete lack of respect for the Court and the judicial process. Moreover, the instant case is but one of many non-meritorious actions Hill has filed over the years, and it is not the first instance in which Hill has used disrespectful and abusive

language. Nonetheless, there is no indication that the Court gave Hill adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before imposing sanctions. See Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993) (“If the circumstances warrant the imposition of an injunction [restricting a litigant's ability to file future law suits], the District Court must give notice to the litigant to show cause why the proposed injunctive relief should not issue.”); see also In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[The litigant] should have been provided with an opportunity to oppose the court's order [enjoining him from filing future cases] before it was instituted.”) The imposed sanctions, which bar Hill from ever bringing another lawsuit in the district, were also overly broad. See In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1989) (“There simply is no support in the law for permitting an injunction prohibiting a litigant from ever filing a document in federal court.”); see also Brow, 994 F.2d at 1038 (“[T]he scope of the injunctive order must be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case before the District Court.”). Thus, we must vacate the Court's injunction barring Hill from bringing any future civil suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

In lieu of the vacated injunction, we recommend that the District Court-after providing notice and an opportunity to respond-consider adopting an order requiring Hill to obtain certification from a United States Magistrate Judge before bringing any future action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Such an approach has been endorsed by Courts of Appeals, see, e.g., Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 186-94 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding an injunction preventing an abusive litigant from filing claims in any federal district court, bankruptcy court, or agency without court permission); Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is permissible to require one who has abused the legal process to make a showing that a tendered lawsuit is not frivolous or vexatious before permitting it to be filed.”); In re Packer Ave. Assoc., 884 F.2d at 748 (requiring a litigant to obtain leave of the district court before filing any action relating to a particular bankruptcy case); Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[D]istrict courts in this circuit may issue an injunction to require litigants to obtain the approval of the court before filing further complaints.”), and it would prevent Hill from pursuing frivolous actions without denying him access to the courts.

In addition, it may be appropriate to impose contempt sanctions against Hill for his blatant violation of the order prohibiting him “from filing any document which is replete with offensive, derogatory material.” Order at 10, Hill v. Gates, 940 F.Supp. 108 (M.D. Pa. 1996). Hill's complaint and appellate filings are brimming with vile and outrageous remarks that demean the judiciary and warrant a strong rebuke.

Id. at 171-172.

In December of 2010, Plaintiff's case was reassigned to United States District Judge Yvette Kane. On January 6, 2011, Judge Kane issued an order directing Plaintiff to show cause why sanctions (in the form of requiring Plaintiff to obtain certification from a Magistrate Judge before filing any new civil case) should not be imposed. Order to Show Cause, Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2011), ECF No. 16. On January 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed a response. Response, Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 17. On February 16, 2011, Judge Kane issued an order imposing a sanction that Plaintiff be “required to obtain certification from a United States Magistrate Judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.” Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591, 2011 WL 676810 at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb 16, 2011). In doing so, Judge Kane explained:

On January 6, 2011, pursuant to the recommendation of the Third Circuit, the Court issued an order on Hill to show cause why he should not be required to obtain certification from a United States Magistrate Judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 16 at 4-5); see also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990) ([D]istrict courts in this

circuit may issue an injunction to require litigants to obtain the approval of the court before filing further complaints.”). On January 19, 2011, Hill filed a twenty-one page document, with exhibits, entitled “Response to ‘Judge' Kane's 1-6-11 Rule to Show Cause.” (Doc. No. 17). Although this document is docketed as a response, it is wholly unresponsive to the Court's January 6, 2011 Order, contains vitriolic and unwarranted language, and continues the long pattern of abusive posturing by Hill.

The Court has provided Hill with notice “to show cause why injunctive relief should not issue.” Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987). In this notice, the Court informed Hill that he faced potential sanctions in the form of having to obtain certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 16 at 4-5). Hill has failed to adequately respond to this notice. Therefore, pursuant to the recommendation of the Third Circuit, the Court will sanction Hill by requiring him to receive certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Id. at 1-2.

Since that sanction was imposed Plaintiff filed five new cases in the Middle District of Pennsylvania in which he requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

In one such case, filed on March 24, 2015, Plaintiff alleged, in large part, “a conspiracy between municipal officials that resulted in his prosecution and incarceration for 5 ½ years on sundry ‘trumped-up' criminal charges, all of which occurred decades ago.” Report & Recommendation, Hill v. Umpstead, No. 415-CV-587 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2015), ECF No. 3. The complaint also concerned a dispute between Plaintiff and the “borough officials related to snow removal over the recent winter months.” Id. On March 27, 2015, United States Magistrate Judge

Karoline Mehalchick issued a report explaining that Plaintiff's claims related his criminal convictions (which occurred more than a decade before the complaint was filed) were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and Plaintiff's claims related to the snow removal were insufficient to support a plausible RICO or civil rights claim. Id. Judge Mehalchick declined to certify Plaintiff's complaint for filing because it was “legally and factually frivolous” and recommended that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to the February 2011 sanction order. Id. On June 25, 2015, United States District Judge Matthew W. Brann adopted Judge Mehalchick's recommendation and dismissed Plaintiff's case. Order, Hill v. Umpstead, No. 4:15-CV-587 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2015), ECF No. 6. Plaintiff appealed. On February 2, 2016, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit because the claims alleged had no merit. However, in doing so, the Circuit remarked:

District Courts in this Circuit may issue an injunction to require litigants who have engaged in abusive, groundless, and vexatious litigation to obtain approval of the court before filing further complaints. See Chipps v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Middle Dist. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989). We have recognized, however, that a pre-filing injunction is an extreme remedy which must be “narrowly tailored and sparingly used.” Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1989)). “Narrowly tailored” means fitting the language of the injunction to the particular circumstances of the case. Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, we have approved of an order “directing that the litigant not file any section 1983 claims without leave of court and that in seeking leave of court, the litigant certify (1) that the claims he wishes to present are new

claims never before raised and disposed of on the merits by any federal courts, (2) that he believes the facts alleged in his complaint to be true, and (3) that he knows of no reason to believe his claims are foreclosed by controlling law.” Abdul-Akbar, 901 F.2d at 333. Here, the District Court's pre-filing injunction - which “sanction[ed] Hill by requiring him to receive certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania” - fails to comport with our direction that it “impose more tailored sanctions against him.” Hill, 323 Fed.Appx. at 172. Despite this failure, however, the District Court properly dismissed Hill's complaint because, for the reasons provided below, his claims lack merit.

Mandate of USCA, Hill v. Umpstead, No. 4:15-CV-587 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2016), ECF No. 9-2.

Most recently, Plaintiff filed a case concerning a 2004 tax assessment. Hill v. Lycoming County Government, No. 4:21-CV-2397 (M.D. Pa.). On December 23, 2020, I issued a Report recommending that Plaintiff's complaint in that case not be certified, or in the alternative that it be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at ECF No. 7. Plaintiff did not file objections to that Report & Recommendation, and it was adopted. The case was then referred back to me to impose a sanction. On March 24, 2021, I issued a Report recommending that Plaintiff be enjoined from filing any further lawsuits specifically about the 2004 Lycoming County tax assessment without counsel or without paying the full civil filing fee. Id. at ECF No. 13. Plaintiff appealed both Reports & Recommendations. Those appeals are still pending.

B. Plaintiff's Complaints & Exhibits in This Case

1. Plaintiff's Racketeering & Civil Rights Complaint Plaintiff's Complaint in this case consists of a three-page unsigned document bearing the title “Racketeering-Civil Rights Complaint.” (Doc. 1). The Complaint names one Defendant: the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:

- Everything that manifested itself as authoritarian lawlessness criminality, corruption, cover-up, and cowardice was revealed on Friday 3-13-87 in the sworn testimony of Muncy police proxy / provocateur during Raymond Spencer Secrist found on p. 77-81 of Lycoming County #86-11, 095 (see attached) who recruited his burglar/car thief/armed robbery drinking and drugging buddies, all from 36 South Main Street, Muncy looking for get out of jail free cards from the Muncy cops and Pa State Police as well as the local magistrate C. Roger McRae who employed Muncy Police Sgt. James T. McGee's wife Deborah.

- I was arrested for assaults which Secrist's drinking and drugging buddies reported on behalf of the corrupt Muncy cops and falsely accused of assaulting them so I could be falsely arrested. The Muncy Post Office phony pistol-whipping was so pathetically dishonest that the feds refused to prosecute it-FBI agent Lewis Glodek told me “There's no case here.” The matter was not allowed by law into court pursuant to the incontrovertible physical fact rule of evidence and the infantile perjury that was the basis of the trumped-up, politically-motivated case filed in retaliation for my public criticism of the corrupt Muncy cops that jeopardized their crooked careers and exposed Sutton to criminal liability for theft of public funds for a private driveway built by the borough at his residence at no expense to him.

⁎ The Muncy cops are not allowed by law to put out contracts on private citizens and hire criminals to carry out hits by assaulting and repeatedly perjuring themselves about the assaults with the blessings of the magistrates, prosecutors, and “judges” as well as the public defenders, conflict staff lawyers, and private lawyers who acted to cover up the corruption behind it all. The Pa Superior court Hbg and the Pa Supreme court-MD as well as the U.S. District Court-MD Pa circled their wagons to protect the trial “judges” hatchet jobs. Perjury-violations of oaths.

⁎ “Judge” Gates STOLE & DESTROYED numerous public records/court files in my cases and bragged about it in open court stating for the record to the chagrin and disgust of the sheriff's deputies acting as his security detail that he was corrupt and there was nothing I could do about it-Gates burned the court files in my cases so there would be no appellate court review and therefore no more reversals and remands for new trials etc. I never had an appeal of Lycoming County #86-10, 266 (2nd Wollet-Osokow railroading) despite my TIMEY oral, written, and PCRA requests and 35 years of litigation which is currently destroyed by Lycoming County Common Pleas “judge” Marc Levecchio in my 7-7-20 Writ of Quo Warranto (An appeal is an ABSOLUTE right- Amendment 6-US Constitution; Article 5, Section 9 - Pa Constitution) (SEE Henry Mitchell's 10-22-96 brief about “judicial” misconduct in Lycoming Co. #86-10, 266 + the elimination of the Collateral Consequences Doctrine with the “in custody” requirement of the PCRA)

- The systemic deliberate legal malpractice and “judicial” corruption, criminality, cover up, and cowardice is nothing less than prohibitive racketeering criminal activity perpetrated to cover up the political nature of the series of trumped-up criminal charges filed against me, many of which resulted in acquittals when I represented myself and was alleged to be incompetent to stand trial.

- Judicial Notices with ATTACHED Exhibits follow.

[NOTE: Asst DA Kenneth Osokow's 2-19-87 perjury that Secrist wasn't working for the Muncy cops which “judge”

Wollet ordered him to correct after I caused a commotion and we had a private conversation in his chambers is an Implied Admission/Consciousness of Guilt on Osokow's part about the Muncy police criminality and corruption underlying all the prosecutions of me.

(Doc. 1, pp. 1-3) (grammatical and typographical errors in original).

The twelve documents titled “judicial notice” include allegations that various Lycoming County officials including Judges, Police, Prosecutors, Public Defenders, and members of the Muncy Borough Council in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s all knew each other and were corrupt. Plaintiff also alleges that these individuals conspired to have Plaintiff assaulted, and charged and convicted of several crimes in the mid to late 1980s in retaliation for Plaintiff's public criticism of that corruption. Plaintiff also alleges that many of the same individuals interfered with Plaintiff's ability to appeal or overturn those convictions

The exhibits attached to the twelve “judicial notice” documents include: transcripts from unidentified state court proceedings (Doc. 1-1, pp. 6-9, 27-28, 45-49); newspaper articles (Doc. 1-1, pp. 35-36, 38-39, 42-44, 51); letters from the Muncy Borough Council (Doc. 1-1, pp. 66-67); a motion for a new trial filed in state court criminal proceedings (Doc. 1-1, pp. 69-71); a 1986 lab report from the Muncy Borough Police Department (Doc. 1-1, p. 72); excerpts from the Pennsylvania Constitution (Doc. 1-1, pp. 73-74); an April 2003 order from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denying Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1-1, p. 75); and a 1991 order from the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas enjoining the Clerk of Court from accepting for filing any complaint or other papers from Plaintiff (Doc. 1-1, p. 76).

2. Plaintiff's Writ of Quo Warranto

Pages 77-79 of Plaintiff's exhibits are a document entitled “Writ of Quo Warranto // Prohibition // Error.” (Doc. 1-1, pp. 77-79). Like his Complaint, Plaintiff names the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as the Respondent in this document. Id. In this “Writ Quo Warranto, ” Plaintiff writes:

BY WHAT LEGAL (CONSTITUTIONAL) AUTHORITY DO YOU JUSTIFY THE FOLLOWING:

(1) Systemic Deliberate Legal Malpractice, especially that of court-appointed conflict staff lawyer James R. Protasio who deliberately discarded my Lycoming County #86-10, 266 appeal rights and was convicted by a jury on 12-10-92 for it in Lycoming County #89-01504.

(2) Systemic Judicial/Criminal Obstruction and Oppression of the return of my appeal rights for Lycoming County #86-10, 266 starting with my oral and written requests for an appeal immediately following my sentencing in 1987 by “judge” Robert Wollet and including my TIMELY-FILED 7-21-89 Post-Conviction HEARING Act Petition.

(3) The THEFT and DESTRUCTION of The Lycoming County # 86-10, 266 court file/public record (among many) by Lebanon County senior visiting “judge” G. Thomas Gates who openly bragged in court and put it on record that he was corrupt and there was nothing I could do about it. (He burned the files in my cases so there could be no appellate review and therefore no more new trials or reversals and remands in my cases. He hated pro se litigants-see Hill v. Thorne, 635 A.2d 186-191 (Pa. Super. 1993) (also see Comm v. Hill, 566 A.2d 252-253 (Pa. 1989), 631 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1993) with Hill v.

Thorne, 635 A.2d 186-191 (Pa. Super. 1993) at 189-190 new trial ordered by Pa Supreme Court - MD on 11-17-89 NEVER RETURNED BECAUSE IT WAS NEVER ALLOWED BY LAW INTO COURT PURSUANT TO INCONTROVERTIBLE PHYSICAL FACT RULE OF EVIDENCE and the fact that it was a Brett Feese fairly tale that Wollet and Osckow made stick with infantile, irrefutable, undeniable perjury.) see Henry Mitchell's 10-22-96 Brief; see Suzanne's 5-8-95 identification memo.

(4) The Lycoming County Kangaroo Kourt is a RACKETEERING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE.

(5) A “contingent of state police observes” sent down to the 2-20-86 preliminary hearing of Lycoming County #86-10, 167 by district attorney Brett O. Feese beat up my public defender Walter A. Steinbacher, stole my tape recording of the 2-20-86 preliminary hearing, and laughed at Steinbacher while he gave the magistrate livid hell for sending the blatantly perjurious charges to court and doubling my posted bail without justification so I could be imprisoned pre-trial. (Steinbacker should have gone back to the courthouse and filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus demanding production of that stolen tape of the 2-20-86 preliminary hearing, me, all in attendance, but he didn't!) see Friday 2-21-86 Williamsport Sun-Gazette, p. 15 “Edgy Police Ruch to Seize Innocent Paper Bag.”)

(6) The Post-Conviction HEARING Act Petition of mine dated 7-21-89 entitles me to an appeal since it was TIMELY-FILED.

(7) Any “in custody” requirement made by any court's pronouncement is clearly in conflict with Article I, Sections I and II-Pa Constitution (REPUTATION is a CONSTITUTIONALLY-PROTECTED RIGHT and REPUTATION SURVIVES YOUR DEATH!!)

(8) “judicial” CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT (OBSTRUCTION & OPRESSION) can't be justification for mootness excuse.

(9)The collateral consequences Doctrine has been nullified by “judicial” CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT (OBSTRUCTION & OPPRESSION)

(11) This case is classic CRIMINAL JUST U.S. // Rule of Force & Fraud // Rule of Lawyers, and it is Republican dirty politics at its most obvious with a total absence of The Rule of Law and the Constitutions of Pa and the US.

EXPLAIN YOURSELVES and YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION!!

Id.

The sixteen documents titled “judicial notice” include allegations that various Lycoming County officials including Judges, Police, Prosecutors, Public Defenders, and members of the Muncy Borough Council in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s all knew each other and were corrupt. Plaintiff also alleges that these individuals conspired to have Plaintiff assaulted, and charged and convicted of several crimes in the mid to late 1980s in retaliation for Plaintiff's public criticism of that corruption. Plaintiff also alleges that many of the same individuals interfered with Plaintiff's ability to appeal or overturn those convictions

The exhibits attached to the sixteen “judicial notice” documents include: images of Raymond Secrist (Doc. 1-1, p. 83, 96, 168); excerpts from state court transcripts (Doc. 1-1, pp. 86-90, 94-95, 97-99, 125-126, 132-133, 135, 169-173, 177-180, 188-190); a political cartoon criticizing the Pennsylvania court system (Doc. 1-1, p. 100); Briefs, Opinions, Orders and Judgments from some of Plaintiff's state court cases (Doc. 1-1, pp. 108-112, 115-119, 121, 137-145, 150-152, 154, 157-164); letters exchanged between prothonotary offices related to records from Plaintiff's previous cases (Doc. 1-1, pp. 113-114); newspaper articles (Doc. 1-1, pp. 120, 131, 153); and affidavits by Hal Stirling, Joseph Hilner, Kimberly Wright, and Anna Goble (Doc. 1-1, p. 183-186).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Specifically, the Court is obliged to review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -

(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same standard that is used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed the evolving standards governing pleading practice in the federal courts, stating that “pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Id. at 211. It also “has to ‘show' such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.

To test the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must conduct the following three-step inquiry:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.

Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and ‘“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well- pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are enough to raise the Plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Is Immune From the RICO and Civil Rights Claims Asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff has named only one Defendant in this case-the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Under the Eleventh Amendment, states-like the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania-are immune from suit brought in federal court by both their own citizens and citizens of other States. Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 2016). “[T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693, n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Therefore, unless Congress has ‘specifically abrogated' the states' sovereign immunity or a state has unequivocally consented to suit in federal court, we lack jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases.”); but see Lombardo v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has not been entirely consistent in the view that the Eleventh Amendment restricts subject matter jurisdiction”).

Eleventh Amendment protection is not absolute. A state's sovereign immunity may be relinquished through (1) waiver by a state's consent to suit against it in federal court and (2) the abrogation of such immunity by an act of Congress. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit in federal court. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8521(b) (“Noting contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States); 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310 (“the Commonwealth . . . shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and remain immune from suit. . . .”); See also Slavish v. City of Wilkes-Barre, No. 3:17-CV-1468, 2018 WL 5289500 at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 2018) (“Although the Commonwealth has expressly waived its sovereign immunity from suit in state court in nine specific areas, it has not waived its immunity from being sued in federal court for any reason.”).

Plaintiff's civil rights claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's RICO claim is brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Congress has not abrogated States' immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Phillips v. James, No. 13-1196, 2014 WL 1652914, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2014) (“Congress has not expressly abrogated Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity from civil rights suits for damages or RICO claims.”).

Therefore, Plaintiff's civil rights and RICO claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

B. Plaintiff Does not Have Standing to Bring A Federal Quo Warranto Action

The second pleading filed in this case appears to be a federal quo warranto action. As explained in Cizek v. Davis:

Historically, the federal quo warranto action has been available only in connection with proceedings over an individual's right to hold an office or position. See, e.g., Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 502 (1933); Newman v. Frizell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915); Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 1982). Moreover, “[i]t appears from case law that in federal court, the writ may be sought only by the United States, and not by private individuals.” Allah v. Robinson, 2007 WL 2220258, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 31, 2007) (citing Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. at 502 (1933)); see also Bhambra v. County of Nev., 2010 WL 3258836 (E.D. Cal. 2010); United States v. Machado, 306 F.Supp. 995, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 1969). In addition, a quo warranto action, like an injunction, is addressed to preventing a continued exercise of authority unlawfully asserted, not to a correction of what already has been done under it or to a vindication of private rights. See Sundance Land Corp. v. Community First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 840 F.2d 653, 665 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. at 502)).

Cizek v. Davis, No. 4:10-0185, 2010 WL 5437286, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2010), report and recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 5441969 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2010); Wilkes v. North Carolina, No. 1:19-CV-699, 2019 WL 7039631 at *4 (M.D. N.C. Nov. 19, 2019); Wright v. Magill, No. 18-1815, 2019 WL 440554 at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2019)

Plaintiff is a private individual, therefore he has no standing to bring a federal quo warranto action. Furthermore, Plaintiff appears to be seeking to correct actions that were taken in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s, not to prevent a continued exercise of authority unlawfully asserted. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff brings the instant action as a federal writ quo warranto, he does not have standing to bring this claim.

C. Leave to Amend

If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). In this case, the only Defendant named is immune from the RICO and Civil Rights claims asserted. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a federal petition for Writ Quo Warranto. Accordingly, granting further leave to amend would be futile.

V. RECOMMENDATION

To the extent the sanction imposed by the February 2011 Order is enforceable, I DECLINE to certify Plaintiff's Complaint. However, it is RECOMMENDED in the alternative that:

(1) Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) be GRANTED;

(2) Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim, and that leave to amend be DENIED; and

(3) Plaintiff's Motion for hearing transcripts (Doc. 3) should be DENIED as MOOT.

NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the

Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Hill v. PA

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Hill v. PA

Hill v. PA

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Hill v. PA

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Hill v. PA

Hill v. PA

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