Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 19-0548
06-23-2020
JUSTIN DWAYNE HILL, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
COUNSEL Justin Dwayne Hill, Phoenix Plaintiff/Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix Jennifer G. Lockerby, Joseph I. Vigil, Joseph Branco Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. LC2019-000003-001
The Honorable Daniel G. Martin, Judge
VACATED AND REMANDED
COUNSEL Justin Dwayne Hill, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
Jennifer G. Lockerby, Joseph I. Vigil, Joseph Branco
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined. MORSE, Judge:
¶1 Justin Hill appeals from the superior court's decision dismissing his special action and denying his motions to amend his complaint and strike the County's reply. For the following reasons, we vacate the superior court's order dismissing the special action and remand for further proceedings.
We likewise deny as moot Hill's motion for an extension in time to file the audio recording from the superior court. --------
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Hill is an inmate at the Maricopa County Jail. In September 2018, Hill submitted a public records request to Inmate Legal Services ("ILS") in which he sought information on numerous Maricopa County Sheriff's Office ("MCSO") detention officers. ILS is responsible for delivering inmate public records requests to the Legal Liaison Services ("LLS"), which then processes and responds to public records requests for the County. Although Hill properly submitted his request, ILS did not deliver Hill's request to LLS for processing. Both ILS and LLS are operated by the MCSO.
¶3 In January 2019, Hill filled a special action pursuant to A.R.S. § 39-121.02(A), in which he claimed his request had been effectively denied by the County's failure to "promptly respond." A.R.S. § 39-121.01(E). He also requested costs and damages for having to file a special action. Based on the information provided in Hill's special action, LLS investigated, determined that ILS had failed to transmit the request, and began processing it that same month. The County then filed a motion to dismiss under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(1), arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the County promptly responded under the circumstances. Hill responded that the County's error was the result of its own inattentiveness and thus was still a failure to promptly respond.
¶4 A few weeks later, LLS responded to and denied Hill's request. The County then filed a reply and argued the case was now moot. Hill moved to strike parts of the County's reply for raising new issues or arguments. The superior court denied the motion to strike but allowed Hill to file a sur-reply. In his sur-reply, Hill argued that his case was not moot because the County had denied his entire request.
¶5 Following oral argument, the superior court granted the County's motion to dismiss, but waived Hill's filing fees. Hill then moved to amend his complaint. The superior court denied the motion because it had already granted the County's motion to dismiss. Hill timely appeals and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶6 Hill contends that the superior court erred in dismissing his special action. We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 (2012). This court also reviews the promptness of a response to a public record request de novo but defers to the superior court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ariz. v. Ariz. Dep't of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 26, 29, ¶ 10 (App. 2020). Moreover, because Hill failed to provide a transcript of the proceedings below, we assume that the facts support the superior court's finding. See State ex rel. Brnovich v. Miller, 245 Ariz. 323, 325, ¶ 9 (App. 2018).
¶7 Hill filed his special action pursuant to A.R.S. § 39-121.02(A), which provides that "[a]ny person who has requested to examine or copy public records pursuant to this article, and who has been denied access to or the right to copy such records, may appeal the denial through a special action in the superior court[.]" (Emphasis added). Hill's complaint alleged the County denied his records request by its failure to "promptly respond." See A.R.S. § 39-121.01(E). The County countered that its response was prompt, Hill was not "denied access" to the records, and the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
¶8 For purposes of our public records laws, "prompt" means "'quick to act' or producing the requested records 'without delay.'" Phx. New Times, LLC v. Arpaio, 217 Ariz. 533, 538, ¶ 14 (App. 2008) (citation omitted). The agency bears the burden of showing that its response was prompt under the circumstances and facts of each case. Id. at 538-39, ¶ 15. Here, the County claims the four-month delay (121 days) in responding to Hill is excused by ILS's error in not sending the request to LLS. But in the County's own words, ILS is the first step in the process by which the MCSO handles public records requests. If we accepted the County's argument that ILS's neglect can excuse LLS's delay, we would effectively, "shield governmental entities from their statutory duties simply by virtue of their own disorganization." Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ariz., 248 Ariz. at 31, ¶ 18 (finding a five-month delay was a failure to promptly respond); see also Arpaio, 217 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 27 (holding that a 141-day delay due to inattentiveness was failure to promptly respond). Because the County offers only ILS's error as a justification for the four-month delay, it has not met its burden to show that the response was prompt under these facts and circumstances.
¶9 The County alternatively argues that their response during the litigation rendered Hill's special action moot because he had already obtained the relief sought. But Hill did not merely request a response, rather he sought production of the documents. The County issued a complete denial of Hill's request and, based on the plain language of the statute, the County's formal denial removed any dispute that Hill was "denied access" to the requested records. See A.R.S. § 39-121.02(A). Therefore, rather than providing grounds upon which to dismiss, the County's formal denial of Hill's request further solidified the statutory basis for Hill's special action.
¶10 As such, there was no proper basis for the court to dismiss Hill's special action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Instead, Hill met the statutory requirements to bring his special action and he was entitled to a hearing on the merits. Accordingly, we vacate the superior court's decision granting the County's motion to dismiss and remand for consideration on the merits of the denial of Hill's public records request. Because we are vacating and remanding, we need not address the denial of Hill's other motions and claims.
CONCLUSION
¶11 For the foregoing reasons we vacate the superior court's decision dismissing Hill's special action and remand for further proceedings.