Opinion
C. A. PC-2021-07558
08-29-2024
HIGHLANDER CHARTER SCHOOL Appellant, v. EAST PROVIDENCE SCHOOL DISTRICT; CRANSTON SCHOOL DISTRICT; and RHODE ISLAND COUNCIL ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION Appellees.
For Appellant: Matthew R. Plain, Esq. Steven G. Vanden Eykel, Esq. For Appellee: Benjamin M. Scungio, Esq. Lori A. Miller, Esq. Amanda R. Cascione, Esq. Paul V. Sullivan, Esq.
For Appellant: Matthew R. Plain, Esq. Steven G. Vanden Eykel, Esq.
For Appellee: Benjamin M. Scungio, Esq. Lori A. Miller, Esq. Amanda R. Cascione, Esq. Paul V. Sullivan, Esq.
DECISION
M. DARIGAN, J.
Before this Court is Highlander Charter School's (Highlander) Complaint requesting judicial review of a November 2021 decision by the Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education (Council). See Compl; see also Highlander's Mem. in Supp. of Appeal (Highlander's Appeal). Highlander petitioned the Rhode Island Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education (Commissioner) requesting that the General Treasurer withhold state aid to East Providence School District. Highlander similarly petitioned the Commissioner regarding Cranston School District. The Commissioner considered and denied Highlander's petitions. The Council affirmed the Commissioner's denial. Highlander then timely appealed to this Court seeking reversal of the Council's decision. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15.
In May 2021, the Commissioner consolidated the two matters: Highlander Charter School v. East Providence School District, RIDE No. 21-009A with Highlander Charter School v. Cranston School District, RIDE No. 20-018A. See Records Submittal #9: Motion to Consolidate; Records Submittal #6: Consolidated Decision and Order (Commissioner's Decision) at 14.
I
Facts and Travel
Highlander is an independent charter school, as approved by the Rhode Island Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education (Board of Regents) and established pursuant to the Charter Public School Act of Rhode Island (Charter School Act), codified as G.L. 1956 chapters 77, 77.1, 77.2, 77.3, and 77.4 of title 16. See Commissioner's Decision at 4; see also G.L. 1956 § 16-77-1. Highlander has operated since 2000. See Commissioner's Decision at 4.
The Board of Regents is the predecessor to the Council, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 16-60-1(c).
The Council submitted fifteen documents as part of the original Record in this matter. This Court will refer to the submissions by the number in which they are referenced on the cover page of the Record. See Records Submittal.
In 2012, the Board of Regents approved Highlander's request to amend its charter and expand its school size from kindergarten through eighth grade with an enrollment of 324 students to pre-kindergarten (pre-K) through twelfth grade with an enrollment of 499 students. See Compl., Ex. A. Highlander is the only charter school in Rhode Island that offers a pre-K program. See Commissioner's Decision at 4. Highlander's pre-K program "provides educational services to children between the ages of two (2) years eight (8) months and six (6) years of age[.]" Id.
Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 16-7.2-5, the "Fair Funding Formula Act" (FFF Act), a charter school is funded, in part, by the school districts in which the charter school's students reside. Specifically, the FFF Act states that:
"[l]ocal district payments to charter public schools . . . for each district's students enrolled in these schools shall be made on a quarterly basis . . . . Failure of the community to make the local-district payment for its student(s) enrolled in a charter public
school . . . may result in the withholding of state education aid pursuant to § 16-7-31." Section 16-7.2-5(d) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Highlander sends quarterly invoices to the districts in which its students reside-in this matter, East Providence School District (East Providence) and Cranston School District (Cranston) (collectively, the Districts). See Commissioner's Decision at 4-6.
In August 2020, Highlander sent an invoice to East Providence "for the payment of its first quarter per pupil share with respect to eighteen (18) East Providence resident-students enrolled at Highlander." Id. at 4. East Providence remitted partial payment, deducting $2,031.75 for the one resident-student enrolled in Highlander's pre-K program. See id. at 5. Withholding partial payment of Highlander's invoices for pre-K students continued for the remaining three quarters of the 2020-2021 school year, resulting in a total amount in dispute of $8,127. See id. East Providence explained that "it does not pay for preschool students." (Districts' Opp'n 2.)
In January 2021, Highlander sent a third-quarter invoice to Cranston. See Commissioner's Decision at 5. Cranston, too, withheld payment for six of its resident-students who were enrolled in Highlander's pre-K program, in the amount of $12,415.50. Id. at 6. In the fourth quarter, Cranston withheld $10,346.25 from its payment for five pre-K resident-students then enrolled at Highlander. Id. Following Highlander's fourth quarter invoice, the total amount in dispute regarding Cranston was $22,761.75. Id.
Presumably, since Highlander first initiated these proceedings, additional invoices have issued to East Providence and Cranston, with amounts pertaining to pre-K students withheld. It is therefore likely that the amounts in controversy have increased due to the passage of time.
The Districts acknowledge that they previously paid for their pre-K resident-students enrolled at Highlander. (Districts' Opp'n 3-4.) However, East Providence explains that it "inadvertently paid for a [pre-K] student enrolled at Highlander during the 2019-2020 school year because Highlander['s] invoices [did] not provide the students in order by grade. Consequently, an [East Providence] clerk missed the fact that the tuition request was for a [pre-K student]." Id. at 2. The Districts claim that prior payment was "a product of a ministerial error due to Highlander's opaque billing practices." Id. at 5.
The Districts additionally asserted that, since "[Highlander's] invoices [did] not provide the students in order by grade, [it made] it easy for a clerk to miss a [pre-K] tuition request for payment. Additionally, there [was] no mechanism for [the Districts] to know in advance which children from their district enrolled at [Highlander], unless the child has an IEP." (Records Submittal #3: Districts' Appellate Resp. at 8.)
When East Providence failed to pay Highlander for its pre-K resident-students for the 2020-2021 school year, Highlander petitioned the Commissioner to withhold state education aid to East Providence pursuant to the FFF Act and G.L. 1956 § 16-7-31. See Records Submittal #15: Highlander's Request for Withholding. Section 16-7-31 states:
"If any community shall fail to maintain local appropriation or fail to appropriate or otherwise make available to the school committee the minimum sums provided in this chapter, . . . the commissioner of elementary and secondary education may notify the general treasurer of the amount of any deficiency. The general treasurer, on being so informed in writing of the amount of the deficiency by the commissioner, shall withhold state funds otherwise due during the subsequent state fiscal year to the community for its general uses and purposes in an amount equal to the deficiency." Section 16-7-31 (emphases added).
For failing to pay "for each district's students enrolled" at Highlander pursuant to the FFF Act, Highlander requested that the Commissioner "notify the General Treasurer to withhold state aid from East Providence." See Highlander's Request for Withholding. Highlander contended that East Providence "refus[ed] to reimburse Highlander" for a "statutorily-mandated portion of the cost of services provided by Highlander to a resident of East Providence who attended Highlander's [pre-K] program[.]" (Commissioner's Decision at 2.) Highlander made a similar request as to Cranston, for its failure to pay for the Cranston resident-students attending Highlander's pre-K program for the 2020-2021 school year. See id.
1
Commissioner's Decision and Order
The Commissioner had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 16-39-1. See Commissioner's Decision at 2. In consideration of Highlander's petitions, the Commissioner held a hearing on June 4, 2021. See Records Submittal #7: Commissioner Hr'g Tr., June 4, 2021. On July 15, 2021, the Commissioner issued her Consolidated Decision and Order wherein she denied Highlander's petitions. See Commissioner's Decision.
Section 16-39-1 states:
"Parties having any matter of dispute between them arising under any law relating to schools or education may appeal to the commissioner of elementary and secondary education who, after notice to the parties interested of the time and place of hearing, shall examine and decide the appeal without cost to the parties involved."
The Commissioner found that "there was neither clear statutory language requiring such reimbursement [for pre-K students] nor persuasive evidence that the General Assembly intended to significantly expand the financial responsibility of local school districts by mandating payments to charter schools for programs which the districts were not legally obligated to provide." Id. at 1. In concluding that the FFF Act lacked specific direction as to payment for pre-K students, the Commissioner opined that the FFF Act's requirement that the Districts pay Highlander "for each district's students enrolled" at Highlander "is only 'clear and unambiguous' if read in a vacuum, without reference to certain other provisions of the Charter School Act or the state's compulsory school law[.]" Id. at 6, 10.
In support, the Commissioner asserted that the FFF Act must be read in pari materia with G.L. 1956 chapter 19 of title 16 (Compulsory Attendance Law). Id. at 10-11. Section 16-19-1 states:
In pari materia "stands for the simple proposition that 'statutes on the same subject . . . are, when enacted by the same jurisdiction, to be read in relation to each other.'" Such v. State, 950 A.2d 1150, 1156 (R.I. 2008) (internal quotation omitted).
"(a) Every child who has completed, or will have completed, six (6) years of life on or before September 1 of any school year, or is enrolled in kindergarten, and has not completed eighteen (18) years of life, shall regularly attend some public day school during all the days and hours that the public schools are in session in the city or town in which the child resides." Section 16-19-1(a).
The Commissioner observed that "the [FFF] Act does make clear that a local school district's obligation to reimburse charter schools under §§ 16-7.2-5(d) [the FFF Act] and 16-77.1-2(e) is limited to 'each district's students enrolled.'" (Commissioner's Decision at 12) (internal quotation omitted). With the term "students" being undefined, however, the Commissioner concluded that "even though [pre-K] students are counted as part of a local district's average daily membership under the funding formula, it nonetheless is logical to assume that these statutory references to a district's students refer exclusively to resident children subject to the state's compulsory attendance law." Id. at 12-13. Thus, the Commissioner determined that "students" in the FFF Act's reference to payment required for "each district's students enrolled" means only those students subject to the Compulsory Attendance Law-i.e., children aged six to eighteen-not students who are younger than six years.
Section 16-77.1-2(e) states, in pertinent part, "Local district payments to charter public schools for each district's students enrolled in the charter public school shall also be made quarterly as designated in subsection (d) . . . ." Section 16-77.1-2(e) (emphasis added). See also footnote 9.
The Commissioner additionally considered policy implications should school districts be required to pay charter schools for pre-K students. She noted that school districts are not legally required to provide pre-K programs. Id. at 11. And although Highlander is specifically authorized to offer pre-K, the Charter School Act provides that "funding [pursuant to this chapter] shall be neither a financial incentive nor a financial disincentive to the establishment of an independent charter school." Id. at 13; see also G.L. 1956 § 16-77.3-5(a). The Commissioner determined that, "under Highlander's interpretation of the [FFF] Act," "charters would be provided with a financial incentive not available to local school districts in violation of the [Charter School] Act." (Commissioner's Decision at 13.)
The Commissioner additionally addressed whether the "Legislature intended to link the list of permissible charter school programs under § 16-77-6.1(b) [(which included pre-K)] with the financial obligations of a local school district under §§ 16-7.2-5(d) and 16-77.1-2(c)." (Commissioner's Decision at 13.) Highlander asserted that the Commissioner's reliance on G.L. 1956 §§ 16-77.1-2 and 16-77.3-5 was in error because § 16-7.2-9 suspended § 16-77.1-2, effective July 1, 2011. See Highlander's Appellate Br. 9; see also § 16-7.2-9. Therefore, Highlander claimed that "the Commissioner interpreted laws that are not only inconsistent, but that also no longer carry the force of law." (Highlander's Appellate Br. 7.) The Council, however, confirmed that, despite § 16-77.1-2's suspension, the language "each district's students enrolled" is also found in the FFF Act, which is not suspended. (Council Decision at 3 (citing § 16-7.2-5(d)).) The Court finds that this issue has been adequately addressed by the Council. Furthermore, this issue is tangential to the heart of the instant matter and need not be further addressed by this Court.
In conclusion, the Commissioner reasoned that, "[i]f the General Assembly had intended to so significantly expand the financial responsibility of local school districts [to require payment for pre-K resident-students], it would have done so expressly." Id. at 13.
2
Proceedings Before the Council
On August 20, 2021, Highlander appealed the Commissioner's decision to the Council. See Records Submittal #4: Highlander Appellate Brief; Submittal #5: Notice of Appeal. In brief summary, Highlander asserted the following: "Highlander is permitted, as a matter of law, to operate Pre-K and enroll Pre-K students"; "[the Districts] are unambiguously required to make payment for their resident students enrolled in Highlander on a quarterly basis"; and "[the Districts'] funding obligations related to their respective resident-students enrolled at Highlander are governed exclusively by the Fair Funding Formula[.]" (Highlander's Appellate Br. 8).
In response, the Districts argued that "[t]he Commissioner correctly denied [Highlander's] demand" because Highlander "relie[d] on their statutory ability to create [pre-K] . . . not on any statutory or regulatory authority requiring a district's payment for such programs." (Records Submittal #3: Districts' Response 9). The Districts further contended that "[t]here is simply no authority compelling [them] to pay [Highlander] for children attending [Highlander's] [pre-K] program." Id. Moreover, they asserted that "[t]he creation of the obligation to pay . . . creates an impermissible financial incentive for charter schools and . . . creates an inequity among children selected for the statewide [Highlander] program[.]" Id. at 10.
On November 16, 2021, the Council released its decision affirming the Commissioner. See Records Submittal #1: Council's Decision. The Council's review was limited "to a determination regarding whether the decision of the Commissioner [was] patently arbitrary, discriminatory, or unfair." Id. at 2. (internal quotation omitted). The Council explained that "funding from local districts is provided to charter schools for 'each district's students enrolled'"; however, "[t]here is no definition of 'students' provided" in the FFF Act. Id. at 4. The Council observed that "[t]he Commissioner looked to the compulsory attendance statutes and read the statutes in pari materia." Id. Thus, the Council concluded that the Commissioner's "interpretation does not rise to the standard of review that allows the Council to overturn the Decision." Id.
In sum, the Council determined that the Commissioner's decision in reliance on the Compulsory Attendance Law's definition of "students" was not "patently arbitrary, discriminatory, or unfair." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
3
Appeal to the Superior Court
On December 16, 2021, Highlander filed its Complaint with this Court seeking judicial review of the Council's decision. See Compl. Thereafter, on May 30, 2023, Highlander filed a Memorandum in Support of its Appeal. See Highlander's Appeal. On August 11 and 15, 2023, Appellees, the Districts and the Council (collectively, Appellees), submitted their respective briefs in opposition. See Districts' Opp'n; see also Council's Opp'n. Highlander filed a Reply on August 25, 2023. See Highlander's Reply. This Court heard oral arguments in this matter on April 26, 2024. Highlander submitted a post-hearing supplemental brief on June 20, 2024. See Highlander's Suppl. Mem. The Districts submitted a response on June 28, 2024. See Districts' Reply.
Highlander amended its brief to correctly identify exhibits on June 28, 2024. See Docket.
II
Standard of Review
When reviewing administrative agency decisions, the Superior Court "sits as an appellate court with a limited scope of review." Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Berry, 620 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1993). The Court's review of an agency decision is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, as codified in § 42-35-15. Iselin v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1048 (R.I. 2008); see also Arnold v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training Board of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I. 2003). Section 42-35-15(g) provides that:
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
"(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
"(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
"(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
"(4) Affected by other error of law;
"(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
"(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Section 42-35-15(g).
The Court conducts a "de novo review of determinations of law made by an agency." Arnold, 822 A.2d at 167. Questions of law include statutory interpretation questions. See Town of Warren v. Bristol Warren Regional School District, 159 A.3d 1029, 1039 (R.I. 2017) (Bristol Warren RSD). Thus, the Court "reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo." Id.
Accordingly, as the matter before this Court is one of statutory interpretation and construction, the Court will conduct a de novo review.
III
Analysis
A
Parties' Arguments
Highlander claims that the FFF Act is clear and unambiguous, thus arguing that this Court should interpret it literally. See Highlander's Appeal 10-11. Highlander insists that the Compulsory Attendance Law does not govern the Districts' funding obligations. Id. at 13. In support, Highlander directs this Court to the "plain language" of the FFF Act and emphasizes that "there is no provision [in the FFF Act] that limits a local school district's payment obligation only to students subject to the compulsory attendance law." Id. at 14.
The Districts assert that the Commissioner was "required . . . to determine the appropriate and logical definition of student" since the FFF Act does not define "student." (Districts' Opp'n 8.) They aver that the Commissioner's definition was appropriate because the FFF Act can be read in pari materia with the Compulsory Attendance Law, which "provides a clear definition of 'student.'" Id. at 11. They additionally contend that, pursuant to § 16-77.3-5, the General Assembly clearly intended "to place independent charter schools on an equal footing with school districts." Id. at 12-13. Thus, they claim that payment from the Districts for their respective resident-students attending pre-K would "provide[] Highlander with the opportunity to operate a state and locally funded program which neither the State nor a district can afford to provide universally[,]" thereby creating inequities between Highlander students and other students residing in the Districts. Id. at 14.
Section 16-77.3-5(a) provides:
"It is the intent of the general assembly that funding pursuant to this chapter shall be neither a financial incentive nor a financial disincentive to the establishment of an independent charter school. Funding for each independent charter school shall consist of state revenue and municipal or district revenue in the same proportions that funding is provided for other schools within the sending school district(s)." Section 16-77.3-5(a).
Highlander additionally argues that the definition of "charter public school" provides the controlling definition of "student" for purposes of the FFF Act. (Highlander's Appeal 15-16.) "Charter public schools" are defined in chapter 77 of title 16, which states: "[a] charter public school may include any grade up to grade twelve (12) or any configuration of those grades, including kindergarten and prekindergarten." Id. at 15; see also §§ 16-77-6.1. Thus, Highlander claims that the Districts must provide funding for the pre-K students because charter schools expressly may include pre-K students. See Highlander's Appeal 15-16. In other words, a charter school is authorized to provide pre-K instruction; necessarily then, the children enrolled in such instruction are "students." Highlander argues that the FFF Act should not be "tied to a fabricated definition of 'student' from the compulsory education laws." Id. at 16.
The Districts agree that § 16-77-6.1 allows charter schools to include pre-K; however, they take issue with the claim that the Districts must provide funding for pre-K students. (Districts' Opp'n 15.) They claim that "[a]ll students and prospective students of a charter school shall be deemed to be public school students having all the same rights under federal and Rhode Island law as students and prospective students at a non-chartered public school." Id. at 9 (emphasis added); see also § 16-77-3.1. They insist that the "having all the same rights" language affirms the Legislature's intent to exclude pre-K students from the definition of "student" in the FFF Act since pre-K students are not required to attend school. See Districts' Opp'n 9. Therefore, they argue that, if the statute were to include pre-K students, it would provide a "right" to the charter school students that is not afforded to public school students. See id.
Highlander responds by directing this Court to a May 1, 2023 Declaratory Order (Order) wherein the Commissioner stated:
This Order entered in the proceeding entitled "In re the May 1, 2023 Request for a Declaratory Order Concerning a Local School District's Obligation to Pay Charter and State Schools for Resident Students over Eighteen Years of Age and the Student Information to be Provided by Charter and State Schools when Billing the Sending District."
"[T]he enrollment policies of charter and state-operated schools are defined with reference to either a Council-approved charter or statute, and thus are not subject to a sending district's own enrollment policies or practices. To hold otherwise would potentially undercut a charter school's ability to 'operate independently' and to be 'vanguards' and 'laboratories,' and to 'increase the educational opportunities of educationally disadvantaged and at-risk pupils." (Highlander's Suppl. Mem., at 2, citing Order No. 23-001.)
In essence, Highlander asserts that the Commissioner recently rejected the Districts' "having all the same rights" argument by recognizing the unique role and function the Legislature assigned to charter schools: to innovate and enhance education opportunities. The Order confirms that Highlander's services are defined by its charter alone and do not need to mirror those provided by the Districts' enrollment policies and practices. See Highlander's Suppl. Mem. 2. In response, the Districts insist that the Order is irrelevant because they "do not argue that District policies preclude payment of tuition for pre-[K] persons attending Highlander"; rather, they argue that "state law does not require districts to pay tuition for pre-K children." (Districts' Reply 3.)
Appellee Council largely echoes the arguments made by the Districts. See Council's Opp'n. The Council insists that "discretion should be afforded [to] the Commissioner in interpreting [the FFF Act] . . . where it is unclear as to what is meant by 'its students enrolled.'" Id. at 5. The Council relies on the FFF Act's language, emphasizing that "there is no explicit requirement from the General Assembly for payment to a charter school for [pre-K] students by the sending district[.]" Id. at 7. In summary, the Council asserts that "the General Assembly could have mandated the sending district pay for [the pre-K students], but the General Assembly did not." Id. at 8.
B
"Students" is Unambiguous
The issue before this Court is squarely one of statutory interpretation. When faced with interpreting a statute, the first question for the Court to determine is "whether the statutory provision at issue is clear and unambiguous." Power Test Realty, Co. Limited Partnership v. Coit, 134 A.3d 1213, 1219 (R.I. 2016) (Power Test Realty). If the statute '"is clear and unambiguous [the Court is] bound to ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the statute and [its] inquiry is at an end."' Bristol Warren RSD, 159 A.3d at 1039 (quoting Town of Burrillville v. Pascoag Apartment Associates, LLC, 950 A.2d 435, 445 (R.I. 2008)).
In examining an unambiguous statute, "'there is no room for statutory construction and [the Court] must apply the statute as written.'" City of Pawtucket v. Rhode Island Department of Revenue, 313 A.3d 493, 499 (R.I. 2024) (quoting State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029, 1032 (R.I. 2005)). Our Supreme Court has noted that, "[t]he plain statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent." Santos, 870 A.2d at 1032; see also Wayne Distributing Company v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I. 1996) ("Where there is no ambiguity, we are not privileged to legislate, by inclusion, words which are not found in the statute."). Furthermore, "when a statute is clear and unambiguous, [the Court] [is] not required to give any deference to the agency's reading of the statute." Bristol Warren RSD, 159 A.3d at 1038 (internal citations omitted).
This Court first notes that the FFF Act is not ambiguous merely because Highlander, the Districts, and the Council disagree as to its proper interpretation. See Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc., 973 A.2d 553, 560 (R.I. 2009) ("the mere fact that parties differ as to the meaning of an agreement does not necessarily mean that the agreement is in fact ambiguous"); see also In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 505 (R.I. 2011) (noting that the Court only considers legislative intent if it "ascertain[s] an actual ambiguity in the statute, not one styled by skilled attorneys") (emphasis added). Neither does this Court find ambiguity in the fact that the FFF Act is silent as to a definition of "students." Silence does not signify ambiguity. See Unistrut Corporation v. State Department of Labor and Training, 922 A.2d 93, 99-100 (R.I. 2007) (holding that a statute was not ambiguous for merely lacking a definition; there, the agency adopted a dictionary definition of an undefined statutory term).
This Court must determine "whether the language has only one reasonable meaning when construed, not in a hypertechnical fashion, but in an ordinary, common sense manner." Textron, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 638 A.2d 537, 541 (R.I. 1994) (internal quotation omitted); see also State v. Fuller-Balletta, 996 A.2d 133, 140 (R.I. 2010) (internal quotation omitted) ("When the language of a statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, there is no room for statutory . . . extension[.]").
Common sense tells this Court that "students" is susceptible of only one meaning: those individuals who are enrolled in the school. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the FFF Act is clear and unambiguous. The Court is therefore tasked with reviewing the plain meaning of the FFF Act and determining what "students" means in the context of the FFF Act.
This Court finds Greene v. Rhode Island Executive Office of Health and Human Services, No. PC-2022-06016, 2023 WL 4148843, at *8 (R.I. Super. June 19, 2023), to be persuasive. In Greene, the Superior Court reviewed the phrase "family of the size involved" and concluded that it was not ambiguous and should be given its plain meaning. Id. at *7. The issue in Greene concerned the appellant's eligibility for Medicare benefits. Medicare "eligibility is based on the applicant's countable income and resources calculated by using the SSI [(Supplemental Security Income)] methodology." Id. at *4. "Countable income" is determined "by applying the SSI methodology for the applicable beneficiary status." Id. Accordingly, "a person's income and resources, applied to the SSI methodology, determine whether a person is [Medicare] eligible." Id. For example:
"[t]he SSI methodology for [Qualified Individuals] necessitates that some or all the income of a spouse who is ineligible for [Medicare]
but lives with the applicant must be 'deemed' to the applicant. The deeming of income from child to parent, however, is prohibited. Therefore, when determining a person's initial eligibility and countable income for [Medicare] purposes, income cannot be deemed from a child to a parent. The applicant's countable income is then compared to the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) applicable to the 'family of the size involved.'" Id. at *4-5 (internal citations omitted) (emphases added) (cleaned up).
"Deemed income" is defined as "income attributed to another person whether or not the income is actually available to the person to whom it is deemed." Greene v. Rhode Island Executive Office of Health and Human Services No. PC-2022-06016, 2023 WL 4148843, at *4, n.3 (R.I. Super. June 19, 2023).
The appellant in Greene was enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid benefits; he lived with both his wife and minor daughter. Id. at *1. The State of Rhode Island Office of Health and Human Services (OHHS) warned the appellant that his Medicare benefits would soon expire. Id. The appellant timely appealed. Id. OHHS asserted that the appellant was ineligible for Medicare because his beneficiary status as a Qualified Individual "is determined by the number of adults in the household, so in [the appellant's] case, he and his wife are a household of two, and only their income is countable." Id. The appellant, however, asserted that the SSI methodology should only be used "for determining which income streams count[,]" and that no laws "require a family member to be eligible for Medicare in order to be included . . . in his family[.]" Id. In other words, the appellant claimed that despite his daughter's ineligibility for Medicare, her existence as a family member should nevertheless be considered in determining "family of the size involved." See id. OHHS denied the appeal and the appellant sought review in the Superior Court. Id. at 2.
The appellant asserted that "family" in the phrase "family of the size involved" must be given its plain meaning. Id. at *3. He claimed that "[i]ncluding a minor child (who lives with the parents) within the term 'family' is self-evident." Id. As such, the appellant claimed that OHHS's decision was founded upon a "misinterpretation of the unambiguous language in the Medicaid Act[.]" Id.
The Medicaid Act, codified in United States Code chapter 7, subsection XIX of title 42, features the language "family of the size involved" and is the same language used in determining Medicare eligibility-specifically, for determining Medicare eligibility for Qualified Individuals. See Greene, 2023 WL 4148843, at *4-5.
On the other hand, OHHS claimed that the term "family" was vague when applied to a child and that its interpretation, as the agency, should be awarded deference. Id. at *4. The Superior Court sided with the appellant and reasoned that:
"'[f]amily' is defined as 'the basic unit in society traditionally consisting of two parents rearing their children' or 'a group of individuals living under one roof and usually under one head.' Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online edition). Undoubtedly, using any of these definitions, children must be included within the word 'family's' meaning . . . family 'does not mean whatever [state] officials want it to mean.'" Id. at *7 (internal quotation omitted).
Thus, the Superior Court concluded that children should be included in the word "family's" meaning and that the statute's plain meaning required the appellant's daughter to be calculated as a member of his family. Id. The court reversed OHHS's decision because OHHS's interpretation was "contrary to the plain meaning of the applicable statutes." Id. at *8.
In reviewing the FFF Act, this Court is satisfied that its plain meaning includes Highlander's pre-K students. There is no language to the contrary. Reference to "each district's students" is not limited by language in the Compulsory Attendance Law. As in Greene, 2023 WL 4148843, at *8, this Court finds that the term "students" has a common sense, dictionary meaning. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "student" as "scholar, learner"; "one who attends a school"; "one who studies[.]" Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online edition) (emphasis added). Accordingly, residents of East Providence and Cranston who attend Highlander's pre-K program undoubtedly are included in the FFF Act's language, "each district's students enrolled in these schools[.]" Section 16-7.2-5(d). This Court perceives no language in the FFF Act suggesting that the Compulsory Attendance Law provides a definition of student. Additionally, this Court is satisfied that, if the FFF Act intended to limit "students" to the age ranges described in the Compulsory Attendance Law, it would have expressly done so.
It appears that the Council's predecessor, the Board of Regents, reached a similar conclusion on the meaning of "students" in the FFF Act. In 2010, the Board of Regents analyzed § 16-77.1-2 (the predecessor to the FFF Act) to determine whether a school district was required to pay tuition to public charter schools for the number of resident-students attending the schools as of the "reference year." See Highlander's Suppl. Mem., Ex. 1: Board's Decision at 1. The Board of Regents reviewed the statutory language: "Local district payments to charter public schools for each district's students enrolled in the charter public school shall also be made quarterly . . . ." Id. at 2; see also § 16-77.1-2(e) (emphasis added). The Board of Regents found that "the participial phrase 'enrolled in the charter public school' modifies the word 'students,' plainly indicating that a local district's payments to a charter school are to be tied to the number of students from that district enrolled in the charter school." (Highlander's Suppl. Mem., Ex. 1 at 3 (emphasis added).) Thus, the Board of Regents understood the word "students" to mean those "enrolled in the charter public school." This Court understands that the Board of Regent's decision analyzed a since-suspended statute. Nevertheless, the FFF Act contains similar language: "students enrolled." This Court finds the Board of Regent's reasoning persuasive-that "enrolled" modifies "students," and therefore, the definition of "students" should not be limited by the Compulsory Attendance Law, but rather should include all those who are enrolled in the charter school.
Therefore, the Council's decision shall be reversed because it clearly erred in upholding the Commissioner's Decision which was contrary to the plain meaning of the FFF Act. This Court is mindful of the policy implications that may result from this decision. However, this Court attempts to apply the law as it is written. Any policy implications are for the General Assembly to address. See Powers v. Warwick Public Schools, 204 A.3d 1078, 1088 (R.I. 2019) (explaining that "[i]t is not the function of this Court to act as a super legislative body and rewrite or amend statutes already enacted by the General Assembly") (internal quotation omitted).
C
Ambiguous Statute
Notwithstanding the above conclusion, this Court notes that, even if it were to construe the FFF Act as ambiguous, the outcome would remain the same. When a statute is unclear or "susceptible of more than one meaning, [the Court] employ[s] [its] well-established maxims of statutory construction in an effort to glean the intent of the Legislature."' Bristol Warren RSD, 159 A.3d at 1039 (quoting Town of Burrillville, 950 A.2d at 445). To "ascertain the Legislature's intention behind an ambiguous statute[,] [the court considers] 'the entire statute, keeping in mind its nature, object, language, and arrangement.'" Arnold, 822 A.2d at 168 (quoting LaPlante v. Honda North America, Inc., 697 A.2d 625, 628 (R.I. 1997)). However, the Court's "ultimate interpretation of an ambiguous statute . . . is grounded in policy considerations and [the Court] will not apply a statute in a manner that will defeat its underlying purpose." Id. at 169.
The Court will give deference to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency that is charged with enforcing the statute only if "that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized." Gallison v. Bristol School Committee, 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I. 1985); see also Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 456-57 (R.I. 1993) ("Deference is accorded even when the agency's interpretation is not the only permissible interpretation that could be applied."). Our Supreme Court has made clear that the Court does not "owe any administrative agency's interpretation blind obeisance[.]" Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159, 168 (R.I. 2017). "[R]ather, 'the true measure of a court's willingness to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute depends . . . on the persuasiveness of the interpretation, given all the attendant circumstances."' Id. (quoting United States v. 29 Cartons of * * * An Article of Food, 987 F.2d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 1993)). "[R]egardless of ambiguities or deference due, this Court always has the final say in construing a statute." New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 506. This Court addresses the Legislature's intent and deference to the Council in turn below.
1
Legislative Intent
"The best evidence of [the General Assembly's] intent can be found in the plain language used in the statute." Martone v. Johnston School Committee, 824 A.2d 426, 431 (R.I. 2003). This Court "presume[s] that the General Assembly intended to attach significance to every word, sentence and provision of [the] statute." Retirement Board of Employees' Retirement System of State v. DiPrete, 845 A.2d 270, 279 (R.I. 2004); see also Rhode Island Department of Revenue, et al., 313 A.3d at 500 ("If the General Assembly desired to extend the definition of nonprofit hospital facility so as to include all properties used for the provision of medical care, we have no doubt that it could have done so; but the fact is that it did not do so."). Furthermore, "[i]t is presumed that the General Assembly knows the state of existing relevant law when it enacts or amends a statute." Id. at 287 (internal quotations omitted); see also Power Test Realty, 134 A.3d at 1220-21 (explaining that the Court presumes that when the General Assembly enacts a statute, it is "fully aware" of the existing statutes on the subject).
For example, in Rossi v. Employees' Retirement System, 895 A.2d 106 (R.I. 2006), the Supreme Court examined the Legislature's intent concerning an accidental disability statute and determined that the retirement board's (board) decision was contrary to the statute's intent. Rossi, 895 A.2d at 113-14. There, an applicant was injured at work in 1992. Id. at 107-08. She resumed work in 1999 but suffered from the gradual aggravation of the earlier injury and filed for an accidental disability pension in 2002, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 36-10-14. Id. at 108. In her application, the applicant failed to identify a specific incident that caused the aggravation. See id. at 109. Subsequently, the board's disability subcommittee denied her application and the board affirmed. See id. Thereafter, the Superior Court upheld the board's decision on appeal. Id.
The sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether a person who suffers a work-related injury and then aggravates the injury upon returning to work must identify a specific incident causing the aggravation in order to qualify for an accidental disability pension. The Court narrowed its focus to the language provided in § 36-10-14 and emphasized the presumption that the Legislature "attach[es] significance to every word, sentence and provision of a statute." Id. at 113 (citing DiPrete, 845 A.2d at 279). Section 36-10-14 states:
"provided that if the member was able to return to his or her employment and subsequently reinjures or aggravates the same injury, the application shall be made within the later of five (5) years of the alleged accident or three (3) years of the reinjury or aggravation." Section 36-10-14(b) (emphasis added).
The Court explained that the board's "interpretation of the statute would require a person claiming disability based on aggravation to meet the same standard as for the original, disabling accident." Rossi, 895 A.2d at 112. "[T]o interpret the law in that way would render the second clause of § 36-10-14(b) largely superfluous." Id. at 113. The Court went on, "requiring a person to identify a specific incident of aggravation would render the term 'aggravation' synonymous with 'reinjury.'" Id. Those "two terms[,]" the Court explained, "must have different meanings; otherwise the word 'aggravation' would be redundant." Id. The Court reviewed the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms "reinjury" and "aggravation." See id. It reasoned that "the Legislature intended these terms to describe two distinct circumstances under which a work-related injury may give rise to an entitlement to an accidental disability pension[.]" Id. As such, the board's decision requiring a "specific aggravating incident" was clearly wrong. Id. at 109, 113.
Here, this Court looks to § 16-7.2-1(b), the legislative findings underlying the FFF Act, which states:
"The intent of this chapter is to promote a school finance system in Rhode Island that is predicated on student need and taxpayer ability to pay. A new school funding system in the state should promote educational equity for all students and reduce the reliance on the property tax to fund public education. This legislation is intended to ensure educational opportunity to each pupil in each city or town on substantially equal terms. Adequate per pupil support will be provided through a combination of state school aid and local education property tax levies." Section 16-7.2-1(b) (emphases added).
This Court must presume that the Legislature meant every word. See DiPrete, 845 A.2d at 279. Accordingly, the language "all students" and "each pupil" suggests inclusion of all students, regardless of grade level. Furthermore, the language "substantially equal terms" emphasizes all students, regardless of grade level.
This Court also presumes that the Legislature meant every word of the Charter School Act. Therein, the Legislature explained that "[c]harter public schools are intended to be vanguards, laboratories, and an expression of the on-going and vital state interest in the improvement of education." Section 16-77-3.1(b). The Section continues: "[t]hese charter public schools shall be vehicles for research and development . . . . [i]t is the intent of the general assembly to create within the public school system vehicles for innovative learning opportunities to be utilized and evaluated in pilot projects." Id. Such purposes were provided by the Legislature for a reason. This Court shall not disturb the Charter School Act's intent to provide innovative educational opportunities without regard to grade level. Id. Moreover, charter schools in general, and Highlander specifically, are approved to educate pre-K students; therefore, the absence of language providing for different treatment for pre-K students evinces the Legislature's intent to include pre-K students in the FFF Act.
Importantly, the Legislature is aware that students can be of differing ages. In subsection (c) of the FFF Act, the Legislature specifically addressed "services for students age eighteen (18) to twenty-one (21) years old" and "pre-school screening and intervention[.]" Section 16-7.2-5(c). Such distinction shows this Court that the Legislature could distinguish students by age if it intended to do so. However, the Legislature made no distinctions based on age or grade level in the FFF Act.
Accordingly, this Court concludes that chapter 7.2 of title 16 intends to address all students, regardless of grade level. Thus, the Commissioner's interpretation that the FFF Act only applies to the students subject to the Compulsory Attendance Law is contrary to the Legislature's intent.
2
Deference to the Council
"The law in Rhode Island is well settled that an administrative agency will be accorded great deference in interpreting a statute whose administration and enforcement have been entrusted to the agency." Murray v. McWalters, 868 A.2d 659, 662 (R.I. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Here, it is uncontested that the Council is the appropriate agency. The Court may uphold an agency's interpretation that is reasonable, despite it conflicting with what the Court otherwise would have concluded. See Labor Ready Northeast, Inc. v. McConaghy, 849 A.2d 340, 346 (R.I. 2004) ("Thus, even though the reviewing justice disagreed with the agency's conclusion . . . [the justice] was not free to reverse that administrative decision because it was not clearly erroneous or unauthorized."). Deference is not required however when the Court finds that the agency's interpretation is "clearly erroneous or unauthorized." Gallison, 493 A.2d at 166; see also Bristol Warren RSD, 159 A.3d at 1038 ("considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer"; "deference is due to that agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous or unauthorized").
For example, in Power Test Realty, our Supreme Court upheld the agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms as reasonable. There, an ambiguous statutory provision of the Oil Pollution Control Act (OPCA) was at issue. See Power Test Realty, 134 A.3d at 1215-16, 1220-21. The OPCA defined "discharge" as "'any spilling leaking, pumping . . . leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment.'" Id. at 1220 (quoting § 46-12.5.1-1(9)) (emphases added). The dispute concerned "whether the phrase 'leaching . . . into the environment' [could] apply to passive conduct" by a landowner. Id. The plaintiff received a notice of violation for violating the OPCA because it was aware of the "presence of the petroleum product in the groundwater" of its properties. Id. at 1217. The plaintiff appealed to the Department of Environmental Management (DEM). Id. at 1218. A DEM hearing officer "interpreted the word 'leaching' within the definition of 'discharge' to carry a meaning of passiveness, so as to include contaminants moving within and throughout the soil." Id. at 1221. As a result, it affirmed and imposed an administrative penalty on the plaintiff. Id. at 1217-18.
Pertinently, the OPCA states that "no person shall discharge, cause to be discharged, or permit the discharge of oil into, or upon the waters or land of the state . . . ." Power Test Realty, Co. Limited Partnership v. Coit, 134 A.3d 1213, 1220 (R.I. 2016).
The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. Id. at 1218. The hearing justice reviewed Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "leaching." Id. at 1220. That definition did not require conduct by the landowner. Id. Therefore, the justice concluded that leaching could occur passively. Id. at 1221. Our Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court's determination that the "hearing officer's construction of the statute [was] sound[,]" and thus, not clearly erroneous. Id.; see also Labor Ready Northeast, 849 A.2d at 345-46 (the undefined term "'instrument' in the check-cashing statute" "was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation"; therefore, the agency's interpretation was "one of several extant definitions or interpretations of the undefined statutory term . . . and [was] reasonably applied . . . to this factual situation").
However, in Rossi, 895 A.2d at 113, our Supreme Court concluded that the agency's interpretation was clearly wrong. As explained above, the board denied Ms. Rossi's request for accidental disability pension because it concluded that she did not "identify a specific incident causing aggravation of the 1992 injury." Id. at 109. After reviewing legislative intent, our Supreme Court noted that the board's conclusion was owed deference, "provided that the agency's construction is neither clearly erroneous nor unauthorized." Id. at 113. The Court held that the board's interpretation was wrong and therefore was due no deference. Id.
As in Rossi, this Court concludes that the Council's decision was clearly wrong. The Council relied on the FFF Act's failure to define "students;" therefore, it held that the Commissioner's reading of the FFF Act in pari materia with the Compulsory Attendance Law was acceptable. (Council decision at 4.) As noted previously, in pari materia permits two or more statutes on the same subject to be "read in relation to each other." Such v. State, 950 A.2d at 1156. The Court "give[s] effect to the apparent object and purpose of the Legislature." Id. (internal citations omitted). The goal is that the statutes "will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general objective scope." Id. (internal citations omitted). "Courts routinely find that several acts treating the same subject, but having different objects [or purposes], are not in pari materia."
This Court notes that statutes need not contain references to each other in order to be read in pari materia. See Purcell v. Johnson, 297 A.3d 464, 470-71 (R.I. 2023).
Norman Singer, 2B Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51:3 (7th ed.).
This Court finds that it was a far reach for the Commissioner to apply the Compulsory Attendance Law in pari materia with the FFF Act. The FFF Act was enacted so that "[a]ll children . . . have access to an adequate and meaningful education regardless of their residence or economic means." Section 16-7.2-1(a)(a). The purpose of the FFF Act is to "ensure educational opportunity to each pupil in each city or town on substantially equal terms." Section 16-7.2-1(b). At least one other section of title 16-one whose purpose is more in line with that of the FFF Act: the Charter School Act-identifies the class of "students" in charter schools. It states: "[a] charter public school may include any grade up to grade twelve (12) or any configuration of those grades, including kindergarten and prekindergarten." Section 16-77-6.1(b) (emphases added). Chapter 77 of title 16's purpose "is to provide an alternative within the public education system by offering opportunities . . . to establish and maintain a high performing public school program according to the terms of a charter." Id. Further, "[t]he provisions of [chapter 77] are to be interpreted liberally to support the purposes set forth in this chapter and to advance a renewed commitment by the state to the mission, goals, and diversity of public education." Id. Such goals are broad and feature a commitment to educate all students, in the same sentiment that the FFF Act aims to encourage education "in each pupil." See § 16-7.2-1. As such, § 16-77-6.1(b) must be read in pari materia with the FFF Act because their purposes are in line. Under such a reading, the definition of "students" includes those in pre-K.
Instead, the Commissioner defined students based on the Compulsory Attendance Law. Of course, both the FFF Act and the Compulsory Attendance Law are part of title 16 on Education; however, harmonizing these two statutes is a difficult feat. The Compulsory Attendance Lawmandates that children of specific ages be required to attend a public day school. See § 16-19-1. With respect to their purposes alone, the statutes conflict: the FFF Act encourages schooling for all, yet the Compulsory Attendance Law limits schooling to certain grade levels. Moreover, the Compulsory Attendance Law was enacted before the FFF Act; therefore, the Legislature could have limited the FFF Act to the ages described in the Compulsory Attendance Law, had it intended for such a limitation.
General Laws 1956 chapter 19 of title 16 does not provide a stated purpose.
This Court is further guided by the dictionary definition of "students." See Power Test Realty, 134 A.3d at 1220. The Council failed to use the common sense understanding of the word "students." This situation differs from Labor Ready Northeast, 849 A.2d at 346, because, there, the ambiguous term "instrument" was susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations. Here, "students" has one reasonable definition, as set forth above. See Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online edition). Pre-K students would be included in such a definition because they attend the charter school.
Accordingly, it was clearly erroneous for the Council to approve the Commissioner's use of the Compulsory Attendance Law's age ranges to provide a definition for "students." Section 16-77-6.1(b) provides a plain definition of "students" and the Charter School Act's purpose is more closely aligned with the purpose of the FFF Act.
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court reverses the Council's decision because it is contrary to the plain meaning of the FFF Act and common sense meaning of "students." Further, even if the Court deemed the FFF Act ambiguous, the Court still would conclude that the Council's interpretation is contrary to legislative intent and not entitled to deference. This matter shall be remanded to the Council for further proceedings on Highlander's requests for withholding pursuant to §§ 16-7.2-5(d) and 16-7-31. Counsel for Highlander shall prepare an appropriate order for entry.