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Henry v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Mar 30, 2005
No. 05-03-00590-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 30, 2005)

Opinion

No. 05-03-00590-CR

Opinion issued March 30, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.

On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-48113-R.

Affirmed.

Before Justices FRANCIS, LANG-MIERS, and MALONEY.


OPINION


The jury found Aaron Henry guilty of possession of cocaine and assessed an eight year sentence. In one point of error, appellant complains the trial court did not conduct a proper hearing on appellant's Batson challenge. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

Background

Before the trial court seated the jury, appellant objected that the State used six of its ten peremptory strikes against African-Americans. The trial court then turned to the State's attorney, who responded that appellant had not made a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The trial court agreed and ruled that four of the State's strikes were "self-evident" and required that the State explain only two of its strikes.

The Batson Hearing

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to explain its strikes of jurors 10, 21, 26, and 28. Specifically, appellant contends that this Court can not determine whether the State struck these jurors for race-neutral reasons without a proper record. The State responds that the trial court "did not clearly err" in sustaining the State's objection that appellant did not make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. It also maintains appellant did not object to the trial court's ruling on the complained-of strikes. However, it also argues that if this Court should hold the trial court erred, we should not reverse, but remand this cause for a retrospective hearing.

1. Standard of Review

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Applying this highly deferential review, we will overrule the trial court's ruling only if it is clearly erroneous. See Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 630 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).

2. Applicable Law

Excluding a prospective juror because of race violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 563 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). In reviewing Batson challenges, we first examine whether appellant made a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94. A prima facie case requires that appellant show a minimum quantity of evidence supporting a rational inference that purposeful racial discrimination occurred. See Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 955 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Merely reciting the struck-juror's race does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Stanley v. State, 887 S.W.2d 885, 891 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Rather, appellant must show he is member of an identifiable race and offer relevant evidence that tends to demonstrate the State purposefully excluded the complained-of jurors because of their race. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261(a) (Vernon 1989); Rousseau v. State, 824 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (op. on remand). Removal of every prospective juror of the same race establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d 187, 193 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Removal of a high rate of prospective jurors of the same race may also constitute a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Linscomb. v. State, 829 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). But, the burden of persuasion remains with the appellant. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.261. If appellant makes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the State to offer a race-neutral explanation. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. It is only after appellant has established a prima facie case that the State must come forth with a neutral explanation for striking prospective jurors. The trial court must then decide on whether the State struck the jurors for racial reasons. See id. at 98.

3. Application of Law to the Facts

Appellant challenged the State's peremptorily striking of jurors numbered 10, 21, 28, 30, (35)-all African Americans. The State responded that it also struck juror umber 26, another African American. The trial court then found, and it is uncontradicted, that all challenged juror strikes were African American. Next, the trial court called on the State's attorney, who replied that (1) four African Americans were on the jury and (2) appellant did not make a prima facie showing that it used any of its strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The trial court agreed "as applies to 10, 21, 26, and 28" because it heard "plenty of reasons it is valid to make a strike ignoring any ethnicity issues," but asked for the State's reasons for striking jurors numbered 30 and 35. On appeal, appellant does not challenge the trial court's denying the Batson challenge to jurors numbered 30 and 35. We agree that the trial court did not require the State to give racially neutral reasons for striking the four complained-of jurors. And, neither appellant nor the State directs us to any place in the record where the complained-of jurors were questioned and gave "plenty of reasons" beyond ethnicity for striking. We also agree that merely stating that the appellant as well as the four complained-of jurors were African-American, without more, does not establish a prima facie case. However, because the record contains neither the juror cards nor the attorneys' or the trial court's notes, we are unable to determine from the record the race of any jurors other than those addressed in the Batson hearing. Additionally, neither brief cites us to any place in the record where the complained-of struck jurors were questioned. The question before this Court is whether the trial court's recited but unexplained observations qualify as race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes. The court of criminal appeals has recognized that statements in the record are "especially well suited to the Batson hearing because the counsel (and the judge) naturally will be the best-placed observers of the venire members." Yarborough v. State, 947 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). The Yarborough court also held that unobjected-to, undisputed observations are valid proof to support an appellant's prima facie case. See id. Here, the record clearly shows that neither appellant nor the State disputed or objected to the trial court's statement of its observations of the challenged juror strikes. Therefore, we conclude that a trial court's unchallenged, unobjected-to conclusions, although not the best record, are sufficient to show the State's peremptory challenges were not racially motivated. Cf. id. We overrule appellant's sole point of error.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.


Summaries of

Henry v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Mar 30, 2005
No. 05-03-00590-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 30, 2005)
Case details for

Henry v. State

Case Details

Full title:AARON HENRY, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Mar 30, 2005

Citations

No. 05-03-00590-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 30, 2005)