Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3754-13T2
03-30-2016
DANNY HENDLEY, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Danny Hendley, appellant pro se. Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicole E. Adams, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Hoffman and Leone. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Danny Hendley, appellant pro se. Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicole E. Adams, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Inmate Danny Hendley appeals from the December 3, 2014 final administrative decision of the Department of Corrections (DOC) which upheld the December 19, 2013 decision of the disciplinary hearing officer adjudicating him guilty for committing prohibited act *.004, fighting with another person. We affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts from the record. On December 16, 2013, Hendley got into a fight with another inmate over laundry at Talbot Hall, a residential community release program. Following an investigation, both inmates eventually admitted they had a fight in the bathroom and punched each other, with resulting injury to Hendley's eye. Based on the hearing officer's review of the evidence, including statements from numerous staff members documenting that both Hendley and the other inmate admitted to having a fight and punching each other, photographs indicating that Hendley had received injuries consistent with the fight, and the fact that Hendley pled guilty, the hearing officer adjudicated him guilty of the charge. Hendley was sanctioned with fifteen days detention, with credit for time served.
Hendley did not originally file an administrative appeal, but instead appealed to this court. After the DOC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we remanded the matter and Hendley filed an administrative appeal. On December 3, 2014, Assistant Superintendent Kenya Collins upheld the decision and sanctions. This appeal followed.
II.
Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited. Decisions of administrative agencies carry a strong presumption of reasonableness. City of Newark v. Natural Res. Council, 82 N.J. 530, 539, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983, 101 S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980). We reverse a decision only when it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or unsupported by substantial credible evidence. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); accord In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996).
An adjudication of guilt of an infraction must be supported by substantial evidence. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas, 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The substantial evidence standard permits an agency to apply its expertise where the evidence supports more than one conclusion. "Where there is substantial evidence in the record to support more than one regulatory conclusion, it is the agency's choice which governs." In re Vineland Chem. Co., 243 N.J. Super. 285, 307 (App. Div.) (citation and internal quotations omitted), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 323 (1990). We do not substitute our judgment for the fact-finding of an administrative agency if it is supported by the record. Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587 (2001).
Prisoners are entitled to certain limited protections prior to being subjected to disciplinary sanctions. However, prison disciplinary proceedings do not require the same due process protections as in criminal courts. Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 523-24 (1975). Prisoners facing disciplinary charges have a waivable right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 529; Jones v. Dep't of Corrs., 359 N.J. Super. 70, 75 (App. Div. 2003).
On appeal, appellant asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel substitute, claiming that he was unaware that he could raise a claim of self-defense. We need not consider the claim of self-defense as it was not presented during the course of the administrative appeal under review. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973); see also Hill v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 342 N.J. Super. 273, 293 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 338 (2002) (applying Nieder to prison cases). Regardless, the claim of self-defense clearly lacks substantive merit. The day after the fight, Hendley told the supervisor of Talbot Hall that he and the other inmate got into an argument over laundry, and that Hendley called the other inmate an "asshole." Hendley also admitted to the supervisor, in the presence of three other staff members, that he followed the other inmate into the bathroom to continue the argument, and the fight ensued. In order to prove a claim of self-defense, an inmate must present evidence establishing each of the following conditions:
1. The inmate was not the initial aggressor;
2. The inmate did not provoke the attacker;
3. The use of force was not by mutual agreement;
4. The use of force was used to defend against personal harm, not to defend property or honor;
5. The inmate had no reasonable opportunity or alternative to avoid the use of force, such as, by retreat or alerting correctional facility staff; and
6. Whether the force used by the inmate to respond to the attacker was reasonably necessary for self-defense and did not exceed the amount of force used against the inmate.
[N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(f)].
Clearly, the record refutes Hendley's self-defense claim based upon his own statements. In particular, Hendley had a reasonable opportunity and alternative to avoid the use of force, but instead chose to follow the other inmate into the bathroom.
Thus, even assuming that an inmate can claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel substitute, the record fails to provide any support for such a claim here. Moreover, the record also fails to provide any support for Hendley's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel substitute. Hendley was provided with due process because he was offered the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense, but declined.
The record contains substantial evidence that supports the guilty finding of prohibited act *.004. Further, we are satisfied the DOC afforded Hendley all due process to which he was entitled. Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the final agency decision.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION