Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:03 CV 2135 (CFD).
March 23, 2007
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Christopher Henderson brought this action in the Connecticut Superior Court against his former employer, United Parcel Service ("UPS") alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60, et seq., and the Connecticut's Workers' Compensation Act ("CWCA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-290a. UPS removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff Christopher Henderson died in June 2004; his father, Albert Henderson, now pursues this action as the administrator of Christopher Henderson's estate. Pending before the Court is UPS's motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, that motion is granted.
Christopher Henderson and his estate will be referred to as "Henderson."
I. Background
The following information is taken from the parties' Local Rule 56(a)(1) and (2) statements of undisputed facts. It is undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
Henderson was employed by UPS as a package sorter. He worked specifically in a "small sort" position. According to the UPS job description, that position required Henderson to bend, stoop, stand, walk and pivot, lift, lower, push, pull, manipulate, and carry containers weighing up to seventy pounds. Individual packages sent to the "small sort" weigh less than ten pounds.
UPS is an international package delivery service. It is comprised of three separate entities that are incorporated in Delaware, New York, and Ohio. Each entity has its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia.
On or about March 23, 1995, Henderson suffered a work related injury to his neck and shoulder. According to the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between Henderson's union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Union") and UPS, employees who have temporary restrictions could work under UPS's Temporary Alternative Work ("TAW") program, which allowed injured employees to work in temporary assignments for up to thirty days. Henderson worked in a temporary position from March 28 to March 31, 1995, when he returned to full duty.
After returning to full duty, Henderson continued to experience pain from his injury, and was given medical restrictions by his doctor. Henderson received benefits for the duration of those periods through UPS's workers' compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual. In the following years, Henderson missed work for extended periods because of the injury, including most of June and July 2001.
On July 26, 2001, Henderson's physician, Dr. Andrew Yuan, released him to return to work. Dr. Yuan stated that "it would be in Christopher['s] best interest due to his work related injury to remain in small sort position to prevent against his work-related injury." On September 29, 2001, Dr. Yuan restricted Henderson's lifting to five to ten pounds, ordered that he minimize bending, and prohibited him from raising any weight above shoulder level. Because of these restrictions, UPS did not allow Henderson to return to work in a small sort position until he was medically cleared to do so.
Henderson disagrees that his medical restriction prevented him from working in a small sort position, but he seems to concede that UPS did not allow him to return to work on the basis of Dr. Yuan's restrictions.
UPS did not terminate Henderson's employment. Henderson died, however, in June 2004 before returning to work.
In January 2002, Henderson filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO") which asserted that UPS discriminated against him because of his physical disability, in violation of CFEPA and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. On September 17, 2003, the CHRO dismissed Henderson's complaint on the merits, determining that he presented no reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred under the statutes. This action followed, in which Henderson's estate seeks monetary relief for discrimination under CFEPA and CWCA.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
In a summary judgment motion, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); White v. ABCO Engineering Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000). The burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists rests upon the moving party. Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994)). Once the moving party has met its burden, in order to defeat the motion the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
In assessing the record, the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255;Graham, 230 F.3d at 38. "This remedy that precludes a trial is properly granted only when no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party." Carlton, 202 F.3d at 134. "When reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standards, could differ in their responses to the question" raised on the basis of the evidence presented, the question must be left to the jury. Sologub v. City of New York, 202 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2000).
III. Discussion
A. CFEPA Disability Discrimination Claim
CFEPA prohibits employers from refusing "to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's . . . physical disability." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(1). A plaintiff bringing a disability discrimination suit under CFEPA must establish a prima facie case by showing "(1) he [was] in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination."Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Auth. of the City of Bridgeport, 900 A.2d 498, 508 (Conn. 2006). Here, summary judgment for UPS is appropriate because Henderson failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was qualified for a small sort position at UPS.
Connecticut courts consistently look to federal discrimination law for guidance in determining liability under CFEPA. Id. at 508 n. 11. Under federal law, an individual is qualified for a job if he can perform its essential functions. Shannon v. New York City Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2003). A job's "essential functions" are "the fundamental duties of the position in question, but not functions that are merely marginal." Peters v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No. 3:04cv1066, 2006 WL 2331077, at *8 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2006) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations defining the terms of the ADA)). The employer's judgment that a job function is essential is evidence that the particular job function is, in fact, essential. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(I). Courts must give "considerable deference to an employer's judgment regarding what functions are essential for service in a particular position."Shannon, 332 F.3d at 100.
UPS argues that the ability to lift and carry packages weighing up to seventy pounds is an essential function of the small sort job. UPS presented evidence that its job description for small sort work requires that workers are able to "continuously lift/lower, push/pull, manipulate and carry containers weighing up to 70 pounds." Henderson concedes that small sort workers must sort packages into bags and take the bags to conveyer belts for further processing and delivery. It is also undisputed that Henderson was medically restricted from lifting more than five to ten pounds at a time, and that his doctor prohibited him from raising any weight above shoulder level and ordered him to minimize bending. However, Henderson contends that lifting, manipulating, and carrying containers weighing up to seventy pounds is not an essential function of the small sort job because small sort workers' actual duties often vary, and workers are not always required to lift up to seventy pounds at a time.
The Court concludes that the ability to carry containers weighing up to seventy pounds is an essential function of a small sort worker at UPS. "Employers formulate jobs to fit the needs of their enterprises . . . [and] the essential character of a particular job qualification is therefore a matter of judgment and opinion." Id. at 102-03. UPS cannot predict the weight of its customers' packages, and they are often bundled together. Because of this, even if a small sort worker may not frequently handle bags of packages weighing up to seventy pounds, UPS may still require its workers to be able to do so to ensure that UPS's workers can meet the company's varying daily needs. Additionally, although a court should consider the amount of time a worker actually spends performing a particular duty in assessing whether that task is an essential element of a job, this factor is not determinative. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Although Henderson contends that lifting up to seventy pounds is not an essential function of a small sort worker, he provided no evidence to support his position or contradict UPS's evidence. Since Henderson could not complete the essential functions of a small sort worker, he is not qualified for that position, and his prima facie case of discrimination fails.
In support of its contention that small sort workers must be able to lift up to seventy pounds, UPS submitted its job description of a small sort worker, which specifies that workers must be able to do this, and an affidavit from Victor Birch, UPS's District Risk Manager. Birch stated that while individual small sort packages weigh less than ten pounds, a small sort worker is required to sort the packages into groups and carry them to conveyor belts in bundles weighing an average of forty to sixty pounds. Affidavit of Victor Birch, August 24, 2005, ¶¶ 6-8. Henderson produced no evidence contradicting UPS's assertion that the ability to lift up to seventy pounds is an essential function of a small sort worker. Although Henderson asserts that he could have completed the small sort job if he had been permitted to bring groups of packages weighing ten pounds or less to the conveyer belts, this argument is irrelevant to whether the ability to lift seventy pounds is one of the job's essential functions.
Henderson alternatively argues that he would have been qualified for the small sort job if UPS had made reasonable accommodations for him. This argument is also unavailing, because CFEPA likely does not currently require employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees. Levy v. Comm'n on Human Rights Opportunities, 671 A.2d 349, 355 (Conn. 1996) (noting that CFEPA, unlike federal law, only recognizes disability discrimination claims under disparate treatment and adverse impact theories, not for failure to make reasonable accommodations); see Beason v. United Tech. Corp., 337 F.3d 271, 279-82 (2d Cir. 2003) (narrowly construing available causes of action under CFEPA because the Connecticut legislature passed CFEPA after the ADA's enaction, indicating that differences between the two statutes were planned and intentional).
The Court notes that the question of whether CFEPA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees is unsettled. While the Supreme Court of Connecticut indicated in 1996 that reasonable accommodation may not be required, see Levy v. Comm'n on Human Rights Opportunities, 671 A.2d 349, 355 (Conn. 1996), other lower Connecticut courts have since inferred such a duty under CFEPA. See Curry v. Allen S. Goodman, Inc., No. CV020817767S, 2004 WL 3048590, at *7 (Conn.Super.Ct. Nov. 18, 2004); Trimachi v. Conn. Workers' Comp. Comm., No. CV 970403037, 2000 WL 872451 (Conn.Super.Ct. 2000);see also Gomez v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 81, 88 n. 4 (D. Conn. 2006) (noting this problem); Hill v. Pfizer, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 352, 364 (D. Conn. 2003) (same).
Even assuming that Connecticut law does require employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees, however, Henderson's claim still fails as a matter of law because he presented no evidence that he would have been qualified for a small sort job with reasonable accommodation. Henderson bears the burden of proposing a reasonable accommodation by UPS that would have enabled him to complete the essential functions of a small sort worker. Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 642 (2d Cir. 1991). Henderson, however, contends only that he should have been permitted to sort and carry packages in bundles weighing less than ten pounds, instead of in bundles weighing up to seventy pounds. This suggestion is insufficient because it would exempt Henderson from one of the essential functions of a small sort worker: lifting up to seventy pounds. "[A]n employer is not required to accommodate an individual with a disability by eliminating essential functions from the job." Borkowsky v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2005);Gilbert, 949 F.2d at 642 ("`reasonable accommodation' does not mean eliminating any of the job's essential functions"). Absent evidence showing that UPS could have reasonably accommodated him without eliminating an essential element of the small sort job — and that with such a reasonable accommodation he would have been qualified for the job — Henderson's claim fails. Therefore, summary judgment for UPS on Henderson's CFEPA claim is appropriate.
Henderson makes this argument in his memorandum opposing summary judgment. However, Henderson's only evidence that concerns reasonable accommodation is his father's affidavit and vague references to workplace accommodations in Dr. Yuan's notes to UPS. Henderson's father's affidavit states that UPS failed to make reasonable accommodations for Henderson, but his father had no personal knowledge of any efforts by UPS (or lack thereof) to accommodate his son. Amended Affidavit of Albert Henderson, January 4, 2006, at ¶¶ 20-22. The affidavit also does not identify any specific type of reasonable accommodation that UPS failed to make, other than allowing Henderson to avoid lifting more than ten pounds at a time. Similarly, Dr. Yuan's notes to UPS state that Henderson cannot lift more than ten pounds and that UPS should assign him to a position that accommodates these restrictions, but he does not make any specific recommendations as to how UPS should accommodate Henderson. The absence of a proposed accommodation from Dr. Yuan is especially telling as the record indicates that he previously worked for UPS.
B. CWCA Discrimination Claim
Connecticut law prohibits employers from discriminating against any employee because the employee exercised his workers' compensation rights under CWCA. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-290a. Discrimination claims brought under § 31-290a follow the U.S. Supreme Court's framework for all discrimination claims established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, 578 A.2d 1054, 1060 (Conn. 1990). This means that Henderson bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by "present[ing] evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Henderson's claim fails because no reasonable jury could find that he satisfied this requirement.
Henderson presented no evidence that gives rise to the inference that UPS discriminated against him because he received workers' compensation in 1995. It is undisputed that Henderson sustained a workplace injury in 1995 and received workers' compensation for his resulting lost wages. It is also undisputed, however, that Henderson returned to work at UPS for several years after receiving compensation under CWCA for his 1995 injury. In 2001, UPS prohibited Henderson from working in a small sort position only after receiving a note from Henderson's doctor barring him from completing tasks required of small sort workers. Henderson asserts that UPS's refusal to accommodate him so that he could work in a small sort position with limited duties is evidence that UPS discriminated against him for exercising his rights under CWCA. As explained above, however, UPS's actions did not constitute illegal discrimination, and Henderson provides no other causal link connecting UPS's refusal to accommodate him in 2001 with his worker's compensation claim in 1995. Henderson also points to a sign posted in his supervisor's office in 2001 stating, in part, "injuries are an attitude and are not tolerated" as evidence that UPS discriminated against him, but he provides no evidence that this statement was directed toward him and no explanation of the sign's relationship to the worker's compensation he received six years earlier. Because Henderson presented no evidence supporting the inference that UPS discriminated against him in violation of § 31-290a, his claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, UPS's motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.
IV. Conclusion
The defendants' motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 29] is GRANTED. Judgment is entered for the defendants, and the clerk is ordered to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
This action having come on for consideration of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment before the Honorable Christopher F. Droney, United States District Judge and,
The court having considered the full record of the case including applicable principles of law, and having filed a Ruling, granting the motion, it is therefore,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that judgment be and is hereby entered in favor of the defendant dismissing the case.