Opinion
23A-CR-650
08-28-2023
Jonathan Ray Heffley, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Justin R. Wall Wall Legal Services Huntington, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Caroline G. Templeton Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Huntington Superior Court The Honorable Jennifer E. Newton, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 35D01-2112-F2-383
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Justin R. Wall Wall Legal Services Huntington, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Caroline G. Templeton Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BAILEY, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] Jonathan Ray Heffley appeals following his convictions for Dealing in Methamphetamine, as a Level 2 felony; Unlawful Possession of a Syringe, as a Level 6 felony; Possession of a Narcotic, as a Level 6 felony; and Dealing Marijuana, as a Level 6 felony; as well as his adjudication as a Habitual Offender; for which he received an aggregate sentence of forty years. We affirm.
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e)(1).
I.C. § 16-42-19-18(a)-(b).
I.C. § 35-48-4-6(a).
I.C. § 35-48-4-10(a)(2), (c)(1)(A).
I.C. § 35-50-2-8.
Issues
[¶2] Heffley presents two issues for review:
I. Whether fundamental error occurred when the trial court admitted evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop; and
II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] During the late evening of December 24, 2021, Officer Jordan Corral was conducting stationary surveillance of vehicles arriving in the town of Huntington. Officer Corral observed Heffley, who was wearing sunglasses, drive past while appearing to reach between his legs and under the driver's seat. When Heffley passed the patrol vehicle, he immediately hit his brakes -although he had not been speeding - and changed from the far-right lane to the far-left lane. Officer Corral decided to follow the vehicle and run the license plate. He learned that the vehicle was registered to a woman in Michigan.
[¶4] After a few miles, Heffley exited U.S. Highway 24 onto Old U.S. 24 toward Broadway Street. Heffley's vehicle "straddled" the center line for about 200 feet, before making a "really sharp" turn and traveling south in the northbound lane for approximately 100 to 150 feet. (Tr. Vol. II, pgs. 32-33.) Officer Corral then initiated a traffic stop.
[¶5] When he approached Heffley's vehicle, Officer Corral could smell marijuana. He mentioned the odor, and Heffley initially claimed that there were "no illegal items in the vehicle." (Id. at 35.) Officer Corral called for backup and stated to Heffley that the vehicle would be searched. Heffley then admitted to having marijuana on his person and asked if he could retrieve it and hand it over. Officer Corral denied that request and asked that Heffley exit the vehicle. Officer Clayton Baker arrived and began a search of the vehicle; Officer Corral handcuffed Heffley and conducted a patdown search for weapons. During the patdown, Officer Corral discovered no weapon but detected a large non-anatomical bulge on Heffley's thigh. Because Heffley was unarmed and claimed that marijuana was secreted inside his underwear, he was permitted to retrieve a baggie from inside his clothing.
[¶6] As Officer Baker continued the search, Heffley leaned against the front bumper of the police vehicle. He complained that the lights were very bright but declined to turn away from them at Officer Corral's suggestion. Officer Corral then closely observed Heffley's posture. Heffley appeared to be pressing his midsection into the vehicle "almost like trying to hold something inside of his pants." (Id. at 184.) Officer Corral shook the waistband of Heffley's pants and a baggie containing a white crystal substance fell out. Heffley indicated that there was more, and the officer continued shaking the waistband, whereupon multiple syringes and a glass smoking device fell out.
[¶7] Ultimately, the search of Heffley's person and vehicle yielded 20.20 grams of marijuana, 12.29 grams of methamphetamine, 0.13 grams of fentanyl, scales, baggies, $400 of cash in small bills, syringes, and smoking devices. When interviewed, Heffley admitted to involvement in marijuana and methamphetamine sales.
[¶8] On December 27, 2021, the State charged Heffley with Dealing in Methamphetamine; Possession of Methamphetamine, as a Level 3 felony;Unlawful Possession of a Syringe; Possession of a Narcotic; Dealing in Marijuana; Possession of Marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor; and Possession of Paraphernalia, as a Class A misdemeanor. Heffley filed a pretrial motion to suppress, contending that all evidence against him had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights because the alleged traffic infractions had not been videotaped. At the conclusion of a hearing, the trial court rejected Heffley's argument that undocumented infractions "don't even exist." (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 61.) The trial court reasoned that an officer's observations are sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion and denied Heffley's motion to suppress.
I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (d)(2).
I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a)(1), (b)(1).
I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1). This charge was dismissed prior to trial, upon the State's request.
[¶9] On December 1, 2022, Heffley's jury trial commenced. The jury found Heffley guilty of all charges and found him to be a habitual offender. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court declined to enter judgment of conviction on the Possession of Methamphetamine and Possession of Marijuana counts. At the sentencing hearing conducted on March 20, 2023, Heffley was sentenced to forty years for Dealing in Methamphetamine, enhanced by fifteen years because of his status as a habitual offender. He received concurrent sentences of two years each for Unlawful Possession of a Syringe and Possession of a Narcotic. He received a concurrent one-year sentence for Dealing in Marijuana, entered as a Class A misdemeanor conviction. Heffley now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Admission of Evidence
[¶10] At trial, Heffley did not object to the admission of evidence challenged in his pretrial motion to suppress. And when the illegal substances were admitted into evidence, defense counsel stated that he had "no objection." (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 198.) Heffley now argues that fundamental error occurred with the admission of any evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop and ensuing searches of his person and vehicle. According to Heffley, it is "apparent from the evidence" that there was "no reasonable suspicion to pull over" his vehicle.Appellant's Brief at 12.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part as follows: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A traffic stop based upon a suspected traffic infraction is considered a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and must be based upon an officer's reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot. Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258-59 (Ind. 2019).
A claim that has been waived by a defendant's failure to raise a contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court determines that a fundamental error occurred. See, e.g., Trice v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Ind. 2002); Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009). The fundamental error exception is "extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process." Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). The error claimed must either "make a fair trial impossible" or constitute "clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process." Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009). This exception is available only in "egregious circumstances." Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2003).Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010).
[¶11] In Brown, as here, the defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the fruits of a search, which was denied, and he then failed to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial. Our Indiana Supreme Court held that "a claimed error in admitting unlawfully seized evidence at trial is not preserved for appeal unless an objection was lodged at the time the evidence was offered" and "such a claim, without more, does not assert fundamental error." Id. at 205. The Court reasoned:
an error in ruling on a motion to exclude improperly seized evidence is not per se fundamental error. Indeed, because improperly seized evidence is frequently highly relevant, its admission ordinarily does not cause us to question guilt. That is the case here. The only basis for questioning Brown's conviction lies not in doubt as to whether Brown committed these crimes, but rather in a challenge to the integrity of the judicial process. We do not consider that admission of unlawfully seized evidence ipso facto requires reversal. Here, there is no claim of fabrication of evidence or willful malfeasance on the part of the investigating officers and no contention that the evidence is not what it appears to be. In short, the claimed error does not rise to the level of fundamental error.Id. at 207. The Court observed that Brown asserted only "that the evidence was the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure," and he had not otherwise contended that he did not receive a fair trial. Id. at 208. In those circumstances, the Court did not need to resolve the issue of whether a search was lawful "because it was not preserved and there was no fundamental error." Id.
[¶12] Like the appellant in Brown, Heffley alleges no claim that his trial was unfair independent of his claim of an unconstitutional search. And he does not claim that there was fabrication of evidence or willful malfeasance in his prosecution. Accordingly, we need not resolve the issue of whether the traffic stop initiated by Officer Corral was supported by reasonable suspicion.
[¶13] Nonetheless, we observe that Heffley's claim of an absence of reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle presupposes that an officer's observations are to be disregarded if not corroborated. Heffley "disputes that he crossed the double yellow line" and urges: "the Court should insist that the State produce videographic proof of the alleged event." Appellant's Brief at 17. But this is not the law. Rather, "[a]n officer's observation of a traffic infraction is a well-established basis for a traffic stop under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution." Quintanilla v. State, 146 N.E.3d 982, 985 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). And to the extent that he presents a separate argument that the traffic stop was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution, Heffley again disregards officer observations, contrary to law. At bottom, Heffley advocates for a change in the law but does not present a cognizable constitutional challenge under the Fourth Amendment or the Indiana Constitution.
Although Article 1, Section 11 contains language nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, we interpret that Section independently. See Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 2010). In cases involving Article 1, Section 11, the State must show that the challenged police action was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 2014).
Sentence
[¶14] Upon conviction of a Level 2 felony, Heffley was subject to a sentence of between ten and thirty years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. Upon his adjudication as a habitual offender, Heffley was subject to an enhancement of six to twenty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-8. He received a sentence of twenty-five years, enhanced by fifteen years. Upon conviction of a Level 6 felony, Heffley was subject to a sentence of between six months and two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). For each of his Level 6 felony convictions, Heffley received a concurrent sentence of two years. Upon conviction of a Class A misdemeanor, Heffley was subject to a sentence of not more than one year. I.C. § 35-50-3-2. He received a concurrent one-year sentence. In imposing this sentence, the trial court found Heffley's criminal history to be an aggravator plus, when he committed the instant offenses, he was out on bond in one county and serving a sentence on probation in another.
[¶15] Heffley maintains that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize independent appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing order. E.g., Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 613 (Ind. 2018). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Rule 7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007). We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record. Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 417 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied. It is the defendant's burden to "persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review." Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007).
[¶16] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment "should receive considerable deference." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to "leaven the outliers." Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on "our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case." Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). Deference to the trial court "prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character)." Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[¶17] As to the nature of the offenses, Heffley possessed, with intent to deal, 12.29 grams of methamphetamine, 2.29 grams more than necessary to elevate the offense to a Level 2 felony. He possessed fentanyl and a syringe. He also possessed, with intent to deal, 20.20 grams of marijuana. There is nothing particularly remarkable about the manner in which the dealing and possession offenses were committed. However, it is noteworthy that the convictions for Dealing in Methamphetamine and Dealing in Marijuana were Heffley's fourth and fifth convictions for dealing illegal substances.
[¶18] Nor does Heffley's character support sentence revision. He was twice adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. As an adult, he acquired five misdemeanor and five felony convictions. These included one prior conviction for Dealing in Cocaine and two prior convictions for Dealing in Methamphetamine. In addition, Heffley has had numerous other brushes with the criminal justice system. Ultimately, he was afforded many opportunities at rehabilitation, but these were unsuccessful. At the time that he committed the instant offenses, Heffley was on probation but had been accepted into a program called Inspiration Ministries, where he was due to report in late December of 2021. Yet during this probationary period, Heffley was arrested for possession of cocaine in Allen County and while on bond for this unlawful act, he committed the instant offenses. He is a parent to three young children but has failed to make a meaningful contribution to their financial support. Our review reveals no "substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character." Id.
[¶19] We cannot say that Heffley's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.
Conclusion
[¶20] Heffley has not demonstrated fundamental error. Nor has he persuaded us that his sentence is inappropriate.
[¶21] Affirmed.
Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.