Opinion
No. 01-06-00183-CV.
Opinion issued November 30, 2006.
On Appeal from the 268th District Court, Fort Bend County, Texas, Trial Court No. 05-CV-144176.
Panel consists of Justices TAFT, KEYES, and HANKS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellees, John Todd and Suzanne Todd, sued appellant, Bill Heard Chevrolet, Ltd., for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices — Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA"), fraud, and breach of contract. Appellant filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court apparently denied, and a motion for reconsideration of its motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied appellant's motion for reconsideration, and appellant filed an interlocutory appeal, asking this Court to order the trial court to withdraw its orders denying the motion to compel arbitration and the motion for reconsideration of that ruling. We conclude that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") applies to this case. See 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1- 16 (West 2000 Supp. 2006). Therefore, we dismiss the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Tex. Bus. Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.41-854 (Vernon 2002 Supp. 2005).
Appellant also filed a petition for writ of mandamus, cause number 01-06-00324-CV, asking this Court to order the trial court to withdraw its orders denying the motion to compel arbitration and the motion for reconsideration. We have considered cause numbers 01-06-00183-CV and 01-06-00324-CV together, but we issue a separate memorandum opinion in each cause.
Jurisdiction
Appellees entered into a vehicle-purchase transaction with appellant. Appellees signed an arbitration agreement that provided,
The Customer acknowledges and agrees that the Vehicle, which the Customer has purchased or leased or offered to purchase or lease from [appellant], has traveled in interstate commerce and that as a result the Vehicle and all aspects of any offer, sale or lease transaction between [appellant] and the Customer regarding the Vehicle are involved in, affect, or have a direct impact upon interstate commerce.
The Customer and [appellant] therefore agree that all claims and demands, disputes, or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise between them concerning any aspect of any transaction between them, including any offer to purchase or lease, any purchase or lease, arrangements for financing or insurance of any kind, any extended warranty or service contract, the performance, condition or repair of the Vehicle, any negotiations between the Customer and [appellant] concerning the Vehicle, and any other aspect of any transaction between the Customer and [appellant] concerning the Vehicle shall be settled by binding arbitration conducted pursuant to the provisions of 9 U.S.C. 1, et. seq., and according to the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
It is the intention of the Customer and [appellant] to resolve by binding arbitration any and all disputes between them concerning the Vehicle and any transaction relating to the Vehicle.
(Emphasis in original.)
On appeal, neither of the parties disputes applicability of the FAA to the arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement provides that arbitration will be conducted "pursuant to the provisions of 9 [United States Code] 1, et. seq." See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277-81, 115 S. Ct. 834, 839-41 (1995). Title nine of the United State Code is the FAA. See id.; see also 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1- 16. Thus, the parties have agreed to arbitrate under the FAA. See In re Kellogg Brown Root, 80 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, orig. proceeding) (concluding that FAA applied because parties had agreed to arbitrate under FAA). Additionally, appellant and appellees expressly agreed in the arbitration agreement that the transaction involved interstate commerce. See Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 269-70, 272 (Tex. 1992) (stating that FAA applies when contract relates to interstate commerce); see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 2.
We conclude that the FAA applies to this case. Therefore, the order denying the motion to compel arbitration must be reviewed by mandamus. See In re Kepka, 178S.W.3d279, 286 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding). Conclusion We dismiss the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction.