Opinion
No. 2-841 / 02-0508.
Filed February 28, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jackson County, David H. Sivright, Jr., Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from a declaratory judgment finding no easement across defendant's property. AFFIRMED.
David Hammer, Angela Simon, and Scott Nelson of Hammer, Simon Jensen, Dubuque, for appellants.
Michael Coyle of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, for appellees Brown.
Stephanie Hinz of Pickens, Barnes Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellees/cross-appellants Stipes.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal from a declaratory judgment finding no easement across defendants' property. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. In September 1969, Roy and Anna Cheney platted a subdivision on property they owned in Jackson County. They filed a Declaration of Restrictive Covenants, which provided in part:
6. The owners, however, by the adoption of these covenants and the conveyance of any lot or lots, give, grant and convey, to the grantees of any lot or lots, a perpetual right of way and easement over and across the boat ramp, to be used jointly and in common with the owners of lots in this subdivision, and other contemplated subdivisions by the owners hereof, or with the public in case the same may have been dedicated to the public.
7. These covenants shall run with the land and shall be binding on all of the parties hereto and their successors in interest, until 1994 at which time said covenants shall be automatically extended for successive periods of ten (10) years each, unless by a vote of the majority of the then owners of said lots, it is agreed to change said covenants in whole or in part.
The plat depicted a boat ramp adjacent to Lot C of the Cheney subdivision, but when the restrictive covenants and plat were filed, no boat ramp had been built in that location. Lot C contained a small harbor leading to the Mississippi River, and the Cheneys had planned to enlarge the harbor and locate a marina and boat docks on Lot C. Had this development occurred as planned, the platted boat ramp would have provided access to the water. However, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers later denied permission to enlarge the harbor, and a boat ramp was never built in the location designated on the plat. The platted boat ramp location is entirely landlocked and situated at least 125 feet from the harbor.
Genevieve Hay and her husband bought two lots within the Cheney subdivision in 1977. Ms. Hay testified that when they purchased the lots, Roy Cheney led her and her husband across Lot C to the harbor and told them that was where they could launch their boat. She described tracks left on Lot C by bulldozers and other heavy machinery that had been brought in to dredge the harbor.
Thereafter Ms. Hay and her family crossed Lot C to gain access to the water on foot. They did not, however, launch boats from any location on Lot C. Another resident of the subdivision may have once launched a flat-bottomed fishing boat into the harbor by sliding the boat down an embankment.
The restrictive covenants have never been amended to extend the originally referenced boat ramp easement across Lot C to the actual harbor.
In the 1990's, Lot C was divided into Lots 11 and 12 and sold to the Stipes and the Browns. When they purchased the lots, the buyers were not aware of any easement over their property for access to the harbor. After repeated problems with dumping on their property, the Stipes erected a fence to prevent dumping on their land. The Browns conducted an extensive clean up of Lot 12 and eventually built a house and lawn on their land.
The Hays filed suit against the Browns and the Stipes on April 13, 2000. In Count I of the petition they alleged they had acquired an easement over the Browns' and Stipes' property by necessity. In Count II, they sought damages under a nuisance theory for obstruction of the alleged easement. In Count III, they requested a declaratory judgment construing and establishing the rights of the respective parties to the land in question. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the easement by necessity claim. The court also granted defendant Browns' motion for directed verdict on the nuisance claim. The nuisance claim against defendant Stipes was tried to a jury and the declaratory judgment action was tried to the court in a trial beginning March 4, 2002.
The Hays have since settled their claim with the Stipes, and the Stipes do not take part in this appeal.
At the close of trial, the court issued its findings of fact, declaratory judgment, and order. In this ruling, the district court found that an express easement existed for the platted boat ramp, but that the easement had never been extended across the 125 feet between the platted boat ramp and the harbor. The court then determined that the express easement had terminated because the purpose for which it was created had ceased to exist.
The Hays appeal, alleging the district court erred by (1) finding the express easement had not been extended beyond the platted boat ramp and across Lot C to the harbor; (2) finding the express easement was terminated; and (3) granting the equivalent of adverse possession to the Browns by holding the express easement terminated.
II. Scope of Review. Appellants contend that we should review this case as if on appeal from a directed verdict. However, the claims appellants raise in this appeal arise from the declaratory judgment issued by the district court, not the directed verdict. Appellees urge us to review appellants' claims de novo because
the declaratory action was tried in equity. We agree. Our review of a declaratory judgment action depends upon whether the case was tried in equity or at law. Because this case was tried in equity, our review is de novo. Owens v. Brownlie, 610 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Iowa 2000).
III. Existence of an Express Easement. In its declaratory ruling, the district court first found an express easement had been granted, but the easement was limited to the area designated as the boat ramp on the plat filed in 1969. It found the language in the restrictive covenants, coupled with the plat, to be unambiguous. After a careful review of the record, we agree. The language in the restrictive covenants is clear, and clearly refers to the platted boat ramp. We do not find the evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the easement was extended beyond the original platted location. Certainly Mr. Cheney encouraged residents of the subdivision to come on to Lot C to visit the restaurant and harbor, but we find no evidence that he granted an extension of the original easement across Lot C for a boat ramp. We note that the original formal grant of easement was never formally amended to include an extension across Lot C. The evidence suggests only one boat was ever launched from Lot C into the harbor. When the Stipes and Browns acquired their lots, the property was overgrown with brush and trees, and had evidently been used as a dumping ground for quite some time. They testified, and submitted photos indicating, they had to clean up garbage ranging from old refrigerators to balls of barbed wire to hypodermic needles. We conclude, therefore, Cheney granted an express boat ramp easement only for the location designated on the 1969 plat.
IV. Termination of the Express Easement. The district court also concluded the express easement terminated because the purpose for which it was created ceased to exist. The Hays argue the district court's conclusion is erroneous because mere nonuse is not sufficient to terminate an easement. Iowa case law clearly supports the proposition that nonuse alone will not terminate an easement. See Krogh v. Clark, 213 N.W.2d 503, 505-506 (Iowa 1973). However, the district court's determination, and ours, is not based on the fact that the Hays did not use the platted boat ramp. Our finding is based on the fact that the platted area cannot be used as a boat ramp and never will be. The platted boat ramp is landlocked and cannot be used for the purpose for which it was created — launching boats into the water. A "grant of an easement for particular purposes having been made, the right thereto terminates as soon as the purposes for which granted cease to exist or are abandoned or are impossible." Chicago N.W. Ry. Co. v. Sioux City Stockyards Co., 176 Iowa 659, 668, 158 N.W.2d 769, 772 (Iowa 1916); 25 Am. Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 115, at 687 (1996). We find the express easement granted in the restrictive covenants terminated when the harbor was not extended, as planned, to meet the platted boat ramp.
V. Adverse Possession. The Hays' final argument is that the district court's declaratory ruling, in essence, granted the Browns valuable property by adverse possession. However, the boat ramp easement terminated as soon as it became impossible for the harbor to be extended to the platted boat ramp. It was then that the purpose for which the easement was granted ceased to exist. This event occurred before either the Hays or the Browns owned property within Cheney's subdivision. Thus we conclude property belonging to the Hays was not granted to the Browns by adverse possession. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.