Opinion
No. 411, 2000
Decided: March 6, 2002
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County Cr.A. No. IK99-11-0375, 0376 and IK99-12-0227 Cr. A. ID No. 9911005395
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
WILLIAM J. HAWKINS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 411, 2000 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: February 21, 2002 Decided: March 6, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and BERGER, Justices.
JOSEPH T. WALSH, Justice:
ORDER
This 6th day of March 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and oral argument, it appears to the Court that:
(1) This is an appeal from Superior Court following a jury verdict finding appellant/defendant-below, William J. Hawkins ("Hawkins"), guilty of second degree assault (as a lesser included offense of first degree assault), second degree unlawful imprisonment, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. The Superior Court sentenced Hawkins as an habitual offender, for both the assault conviction and the weapon conviction, to an aggregate term of 30 years incarceration. This is Hawkins' direct appeal.
(2) On November 5, 1999, Hawkins was arrested for beating his then-roommate, Lilliana Mayfield, with a crowbar during an argument. Ms. Mayfield also alleged that after the assault, Hawkins blocked the door and refused to let her leave the garage in which they were living. When Ms. Mayfield was finally able to escape, she went to the hospital and learned that two of her ribs were fractured. The following day, Ms. Mayfield's left lung collapsed as a result of her injuries.
Hawkins was indicted on one count of first degree assault, one count of second degree unlawful imprisonment, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. Although trial was initially scheduled for March 20, 2000, the State requested a continuance because it had been unable to secure the appearance of Lilliana Mayfield. Ms. Mayfield was homeless at the time, and locating her proved difficult. After Ms. Mayfield again failed to appear on March 21, 2000, the trial court rescheduled the matter for March 27, 2000, at which time the trial proceeded as scheduled.
(3) At trial, during its case-in-chief, the State called Lawrence Demby, an alleged eyewitness to the crime. Demby proved to be a problematic witness because of his inconsistent prior statements. At one point, Demby even claimed not to have been present at all. (Ms. Mayfield consistently testified that Demby was, in fact, present in the garage at the time of the assault.) Once on the witness stand, Demby testified that, although he had originally told both defense counsel and the State that Ms. Mayfield was the aggressor in the altercation, he did so only because Hawkins had pressured him to lie. Following this direct testimony and cross-examination by the defense, the State asked Demby on redirect whether defense counsel had told him that he planned to call him as a witness. Defense counsel objected and the court restricted any further questioning by the State in this area but gave no curative instruction.
(4) Hawkins argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to introduce other bad acts (i.e. pressuring Demby to commit perjury) in its case-in-chief without performing the analysis mandated by Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). This argument is without merit. Demby's testimony concerning Hawkins' post-crime conduct did not amount to inadmissible propensity evidence. Instead, the evidence was elicited to show consciousness of guilt. In McKinney v. State, 466 A.2d 356, 359 (Del. 1983), we held that any conduct undertaken by a defendant after the commission of a crime that tends to show consciousness of guilt is relevant and admissible under D.R.E. 401.
(5) Hawkins also contends that the State's question to Demby about whether defense counsel had intended to call him as a witness implicated Hawkins' fifth amendment privilege and that the trial court erred by not taking any curative action following this comment. The State's questioning of Demby was not a comment on Hawkins' later election not to testify, however, but was proper follow-up questioning concerning the alleged attempt by Hawkins to procure false testimony from Demby.
The question of whether the defense had, at any time, intended to call Demby as a witness was relevant to this inquiry. In this context, therefore, the State's question was not improper and the Superior Court acted within its discretion in permitting it.
(6) Hawkins' contention that the Superior Court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss following the State's two continuance requests is also meritless.
We have long held that the Superior Court has broad discretion concerning trial management issues, and, in particular, the consideration of motions to dismiss for unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 48(b). State v. Fischer, 285 A.2d 417 (Del. 1971); State v. McElroy, 561 A.2d 154 (Del. 1989). There was no abuse of that discretion here.
(7) Hawkins' final challenge is that the Superior Court erred when it applied Delaware's Habitual Offender Statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214 to enhance his sentences for both second degree assault and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. Hawkins had previously been convicted of three qualifying felonies, making the assault and weapon convictions his fourth and subsequent felony convictions. In Reeder v. State, we noted that, because each separate conviction requires a separate sentence, the State has the discretion to seek habitual offender status for each count or none. 783 A.2d 124 (Del. 2001) (holding that "where the State initiates the habitual offender process, the court is limited to granting only the result sought by the State"), citing Kirby v. State, 708 A.2d 631 (Del. 1998). Section 4214 is clear that, following a third felony conviction, a defendant must be sentenced as an habitual offender on each subsequent felony conviction. Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in sentencing Hawkins as an habitual offender for each of his present felony convictions.
11 Del. C. § 4214 states in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony . . . and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is declared to be an habitual criminal, and the court in which such 4th or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may in its discretion, impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment upon the person so convicted. Notwithstanding any provision of this title to the contrary, any person sentenced pursuant to this section shall receive a minimum sentence which shall not be less than the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this title for the 4th or subsequent felony which forms the basis of the State's petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal except that this minimum provision shall apply only when the 4th or subsequent felony is a Title 11 violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title. . . .
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be, and the same hereby is,
AFFIRMED.