Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC367208, Gregory W. Alarcon, Judge.
Thomas Hawkins III, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Leech & Associates and D. Wayne Leech for Defendant and Respondent City of Glendora.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, David S. Chaney, Chief Assistant Attorney General, James S. Schiavenza, Assistant Attorney General, Marsha S. Miller and Christina Bull Arndt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent State of California.
FLIER, J.
This is the third action filed in pro. per. by appellant Thomas Hawkins III. All three actions arise from a criminal, misdemeanor trial in which appellant was convicted on June 28, 2004, of the unlawful obstruction of a peace officer and of preventing and dissuading a witness from reporting charges. Like the previous two actions, this action is also predicated on the rulings of the trial court in that case. This third action has been brought against the Cities of Glendora and West Covina and the State of California. The trial court sustained the demurrers of all three defendants without leave to amend. We affirm the resulting judgment.
Glendora is involved to the extent of the arrest, but appellant does not predicate his claim on the arrest. We granted appellant’s motion to dismiss West Covina from this appeal on December 11, 2007.
THE UNDERLYING EVENT
We accept as true for the purposes of this appeal the factual allegations of the complaint. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 903, p. 363.) According to the rambling and disjointed allegations of the complaint, the event that precipitated the charges against appellant was when Armando Baeza called the police and complained that appellant had “written” on his truck, which was parked outside a Vons market in West Covina. This led to appellant’s arrest by the Glendora Police Department. Apparently, appellant was arrested near the Vons market at a liquor store, which is located in Glendora.
We note the style of the complaint only because it makes it more difficult to assess what theory appellant is pursuing on this case. As noted in the following text, the previous complaints in the first two actions are somewhat easier to understand.
The arrest led to the filing of a criminal complaint charging unlawful obstruction of a peace officer and preventing or dissuading a witness from reporting charges. The matter was called for a trial before Judge Robin M. Sloan. It appears that Baeza testified in this nonjury trial and that he made statements during his testimony that were inconsistent with his earlier statements to the police at the scene of the arrest.
The gravamen of the matter, as far this case is concerned, in appellant’s own words is that “[i]f you go to that location [the scene of the arrest] and go by what Armando Baeza testified on the witness stand you would see this case [the criminal case against appellant] was the stupidest case ever to be put in front of a Los Angeles Superior Court judge and for a judge to continue a criminal trial proceeding after the allege [sic] victim admits he had lied to the police officer and made a false 911 call should be barred from the bench.”
It is clear that appellant’s action is predicated on rulings that were made, or rulings that appellant claims should have been but were not made, by Judge Sloan during appellant’s criminal trial. It is fundamental, however, that a judge has absolute immunity from liability for acts (or omissions) committed as a judicial officer. (See cases and authorities collected in 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 166, pp. 285-287.)
As noted, appellant was convicted of both counts, placed on summary probation for three years and ordered to pay two fines totaling $120.
PREVIOUS ACTIONS FILED BY APPELLANT
On July 26, 2004, appellant filed an action against the Glendora Police Department, Judge Sloan, and Baeza. The complaint in this action, which is contained in the clerk’s transcript, is more lucid and detailed than the complaint in the instant action. It is quite clear from this complaint that the action filed on July 26, 2004, is identical to the case before us. Demurrers by Judge Sloan and the Glendora Police Department were sustained without leave to amend. Respondent State of California informs us that appellant tried unsuccessfully to add the Superior Court to this action and that this action was “eventually dismissed in its entirety.” The orders sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend appear in the clerk’s transcript; the final dismissal of the case is not documented.
The complaint in the action filed on July 26, 2004, alleges that Baeza committed perjury several times during appellant’s criminal trial, that Judge Sloan did nothing about this and that the “real reason” that appellant was arrested was because appellant threatened to sue the police officer and Baeza over the false complaint that Baeza had made. The complaint in this prior action also alleges that appellant lost his job as a property manager in a storage facility as a result of the criminal prosecution.
On October 5, 2005, well after Judge Sloan’s and Glendora’s demurrers had been sustained in the first action, appellant filed his second action in which he named only the Los Angeles Superior Court as a defendant. This action is again identical to the instant case. The complaint in the second action alleges that Baeza admitted in appellant’s criminal trial that the writing on his truck had been put there before appellant could have gotten to the truck and that all Judge Sloan did about this was to “scream at the guy and told the guy to get out of her court room.”
The demurrer to the complaint filed in the second action was sustained without leave to amend. The order granting the demurrer stated that the action was barred by judicial immunity and that, to the extent it stated a cause of action for malicious prosecution, appellant had not shown that he had prevailed in the underlying case. The order also stated that if the complaint alleged a tort, appellant had failed to file a tort claim under the Government Code. The order cited authorities for all of the foregoing propositions.
Division Four of this court affirmed the order sustaining the demurrer to the second action in an opinion filed on December 20, 2006, in case No. B188905. The sole issue raised in that appeal was that the defendant in that action allegedly had failed to appear when the demurrer was heard. Division Four rejected this claim on the facts and did not address the substantive points recited in the superior court’s order sustaining the demurrer to the second action.
The complaint in the instant case was filed on March 2, 2007.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s sole contention advanced in his opening brief is that, following the hearing of the demurrers on May 29, 2007, there was another hearing that took place on May 30, 2007, of which appellant did not have notice.
We have before us the notice continuing the hearing on the demurrers to May 29, 2007. Appellant admits that he was present during this hearing, which concluded with the court taking the matter under submission. The minute order sustaining the demurrers was entered in May 30, 2007; this order, which is two single-spaced pages long, carefully explains the doctrine of judicial immunity. Putting the most charitable construction on appellant’s contention, he does not understand that the entry of the minute order by the court on May 30, 2007, does not constitute a “hearing.” For appellant’s benefit, we affirm that the hearing took place on May 29, 2007, and not on May 30, 2007; there was no hearing on the latter date.
In his reply brief, appellant raises again his complaints about Judge Sloan, which he raised previously in his first and second actions. Points raised in the reply brief that were not raised in the opening brief will not be considered by the appellate court. (Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3.)
While we decline to address the issues raised for the first time in the reply brief, we note that at no time, including the present, did appellant have a cause of action against Judge Sloan that arose out of appellant’s criminal trial over which she presided. As we have already pointed out, judges have absolute immunity from liability for acts committed as judicial officers. This has been explained to appellant at least three times by three different superior court judges and now again by this court.
It goes without saying that appellant has absolutely no claim or claims against the Cities of West Covina and Glendora that arise out of the incident with Baeza and appellant’s criminal trial.
Our review of appellant’s filings, including the briefs filed in this appeal, prompts us to note that, even if initially appellant may have believed in good faith that he had a cause of action against Judge Sloan, it must be quite clear to him now that he never had such a cause of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: COOPER, P. J., EGERTON, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.