Opinion
Civil Action 23-1248
12-29-2023
JOSHUA MICHAEL HAVENS v. DEPUTY HARRINGTON, ET AL.
SECTION P
DAVID C. JOSEPH, JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kayla Dye McClusky, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Joshua Michael Havens, a pre-trial detainee at Morehouse Parish Jail proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this proceeding on approximately September 8, 2023, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names the following defendants: Morehouse Parish Jail, Corporal Harrington, Sergeant Williams, Corporal Armstrong, and Lieutenant Clacks. For reasons that follow, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.
Background
Plaintiff claims that on approximately July 15, 2023, Defendants Harrington, Williams, and Clacks falsified a protection order and then denied him access to his Smart Jail Mail account, citing the falsified protection order. [doc. # 1, p. 4]. The next day, Plaintiff contacted the individual subject to the protection order, and she “denied such order.” [doc. #s 11, p. 1; 1, p. 4]. After Plaintiff contacted the individual, Corporal Armstrong placed Plaintiff in lockdown for allegedly violating the protection order. Id. When Plaintiff returned from lockdown to general population, he “could no longer receive inmate mail” or “correspond with any persons via [his] active account.” Id. He could, however, receive legal mail. [doc. # 11, p. 2].
Plaintiff was transferred to Eastern Louisiana Mental Health on an unknown date. [doc. # 11, p. 1]. When he returned to Morehouse Parish Jail, he was able to access Smart Jail Mail using a different account number. Id. His new “account works” now. Id. at 2.
After he returned to the jail, Plaintiff again tried to contact the individual subject to the protection order, but her number was banned and he “received another verbal warning of a threat to be thrown into lockdown over the protective order.” [doc. # 11, p. 2]. To date, he is unable to contact the individual. Id.
Plaintiff seeks (1) compensation and (2) “inmates rights to receive copies of falsified documents of accounts and paperwork.” [doc. # 1, p. 5].
Law and Analysis
1. Preliminary Screening
Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his Complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), “‘prisoner' means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”
A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id.
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.
In making this determination, the court must assume that all of the plaintiff's factual allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.
“[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53 (5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner's civil rights complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).
“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a “[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).
2. Standing
Plaintiff seeks “inmates rights to receive copies of falsified documents of accounts and paperwork.” [doc. # 1, p. 5].
A. Relief on Behalf of Others
To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of other inmates, he lacks standing.
Persons claiming a deprivation of constitutional rights are required to show a deprivation of their personal rights, as opposed to the rights of others. Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1159 (5th Cir. 1986); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (“Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.”). In Resendez v. Texas, 440 Fed.Appx. 305, 306 (5th Cir. 2011), for example, the court held that “to the extent that [the plaintiff] seeks to raise issues regarding the illegal confinement of other prisoners . . ., he lacks standing to bring those claims.”); see Kennedy v. Dallas Police Dep't, 2007 WL 30260, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2007) (plaintiff may bring a Section 1983 action only for deprivations he suffered).
See also Gregory v. McKennon, 430 Fed.Appx. 306, 310 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff “would lack standing to seek § 1983 damages for violations of other prisoners' rights . . . .”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 1999), on reh'g en banc sub nom. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen making a determination of standing[,]” trial courts “are exhorted to consider . . . whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests of third parties.”).
In addition, Plaintiff may not function as counsel for other prisoners. See, e.g., Wade v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 2058446, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 14, 2009) (“[I]ndividuals who do not have a law license may not represent other parties even on a next friend basis.”). Parties can represent themselves or they can be represented by an attorney; a non-lawyer cannot represent them. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308-09 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewing authority)).
Here, the Court will consider only the alleged harm that Plaintiff suffered. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss any claims Plaintiff raises on behalf of other inmates.
B. Standing for Injunctive Relief
To the extent Plaintiff seeks “inmates rights to receive copies of falsified documents of accounts and paperwork” for himself only, he also lacks standing.
“A litigant seeking redress in federal court must show that he has standing to pursue his claims.” Adams v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 2022 WL 2829756, at *3 (5th Cir. July 20, 2022). “Litigants must also demonstrate standing with respect to the type of relief they seek.” Id.
“To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and likely to be redressed by the plaintiff's requested relief. Courts have divided this rule into three components: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Stringer v. Whitley, 942 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal footnotes omitted).
“Requests for injunctive and declaratory relief implicate the intersection of the redressability and injury-in-fact requirements. The redressability requirement limits the relief that a plaintiff may seek to that which is likely to remedy the plaintiff's alleged injuries.
Because injunctive and declaratory relief cannot conceivably remedy any past wrong, plaintiffs seeking injunctive and declaratory relief can satisfy the redressability requirement only by demonstrating a continuing injury or threatened future injury. That continuing or threatened future injury, like all injuries supporting Article III standing, must be an injury in fact. To be an injury in fact, a threatened future injury must be (1) potentially suffered by the plaintiff, not someone else; (2) concrete and particularized, not abstract; and (3) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. The purpose of the requirement that the injury be ‘imminent' is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes. For a threatened future injury to satisfy the imminence requirement, there must be at least a ‘substantial risk' that the injury will occur.” Id. (internal footnotes, quotation marks, and quoted sources omitted).
Here, the only continuing harm that Plaintiff suggests he endures is his inability to contact the subject of the alleged fraudulent protection order. [doc. # 11, p. 2]. However, granting Plaintiff “rights to receive copies of falsified documents of accounts and paperwork” is not substantially likely to redress this ongoing harm/injury. Obtaining copies of unspecified falsified documents (or even a copy of the alleged fraudulent protection order) is not substantially likely to restore Plaintiff's ability to contact the individual in question.
To “establish redressability, a plaintiff must show a ‘substantial likelihood' that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.” Denning v. Bond Pharmacy, Inc., 50 F.4th 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2022).
Instead of final relief, Plaintiff essentially seeks evidence-a copy of the fraudulent protection order-ostensibly to prove the protection order is fraudulent and in turn to prove defendants lack grounds to prevent him from contacting the individual. It is only speculative that enjoining defendants to provide copies of the document(s) will redress any ongoing harm. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992) (holding that a plaintiff must prove that “it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”). The proposed injunction would not give Plaintiff “legally enforceable protection from the” ongoing harm: the “issue would not be settled between” the parties.
See Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 893 (7th Cir. 2011) (“An injunction is not a final remedy if it would merely lay an evidentiary foundation for subsequent determinations of liability.”).
See U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937 (2011) (per curiam) (a judgment's “possible, indirect benefit in a future lawsuit” does not preserve standing); Teton Historic Aviation Found. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 785 F.3d 719, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[A] plaintiff does not have standing to sue when redress for its injury depends entirely on the occurrence of some other, future event made no more likely by its victory in court.”).
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief for lack of standing.
3. Limitation on Recovery Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
Apart from seeking the injunctive relief discussed above, Plaintiff seeks only compensation. [doc. # 1, p. 3].
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).” “[I]t is the nature of the relief sought, and not the underlying substantive violation, that controls: Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent physical injury.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005). “The ‘physical injury' required by § 1997e(e) ‘must be more than de minimus [sic], but need not be significant.'” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Here, Plaintiff claims that he was unable to access his Smart Jail Mail account, that he is unable to contact one individual, that he was placed in lockdown for an unknown length of time, and that he was threatened. Plaintiff does not present a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246. He seeks monetary compensation for, at best, only mental or emotional injuries he suffered while in custody. In addition, he does not allege that he suffered any other injuries or damages compensable by monetary relief.
Plaintiff may not recover compensation for mental or emotional injuries. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's request for compensatory relief. As Plaintiff does not seek any other cognizable relief for his claims, the Court should dismiss them.
Recommendation
For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Joshua Michael Havens' claims on behalf of other prisoners and his request for injunctive relief be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of standing and as frivolous.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's remaining claims and request for relief be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failing to state claims on which relief may be granted.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association , 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).