Opinion
No. 3:01-CV-0376-M
February 7, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an Order of Reference, dated July 16, 2001, this case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial management.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Defendants Ramona Mayer and Vincent Mayer, in a motion filed August 2, 2001, seek a more definite statement, dismissal for insufficient service of process, and such other relief to which they may be entitled. In their July 6, 2001 complaint which the District Court has construed as Plaintiffs' final complete complaint stating their best case, Plaintiffs allege as follows:
Ramona Mayer, at all times relevant hereto was a witness for the Federal Government against her parents, the former defendants, providing false information, filing false claims in the Bankruptcy Court, and as a civilian third party, who has conspired with a Federal Government agent such as the U.S. Attorney Paul E. Coggins, is therefore acting under color of law.
Vincent Mayer, at all times relevant hereto was a witness for the Federal Government against the former defendants, providing false information, filing false claims in the Bankruptcy Court, and as a civilian third party, who has conspired with a Federal Government agent such as the U.S. Attorney Paul E. Coggins, is therefore acting under color of law.
Despite the liberal interpretation afforded pro se plaintiffs, a plaintiff retains the burden of proof to show that federal jurisdiction has properly been invoked. See Hooks v. Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., 944 F. Supp. 503, 506 (N.D. Tex. 1996). An amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading. King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994).
Standard of Review
In addition to a more definite statement, the Mayers have requested the relief to which they may be entitled, which, in this case, is dismissal. A district court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). In considering dismissal, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). The court cannot look beyond the face of the pleadings. Baker, 75 F.3d at 196; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). Dismissal is warranted if a plaintiff has (1) been given the opportunity to amend her complaint, (2) made specific and detailed allegations constituting her best case, and (3) still fails to state a claim. See Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that dismissal is required if a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his case, but has failed); Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1985) (assuming that the specific allegations of the amended complaint constitute the plaintiffs' best case).
Analysis Plaintiffs' Conclusory Allegations of Conspiracy
Mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material facts, survive a motion to dismiss. Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1982), quoting Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1977). The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited. Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Nowhere in the text of the complaint do the plaintiffs describe how or when the Mayers met with Paul E. Coggins, where they met, or what agreement they reached with respect to harming Plaintiffs. Instead, Plaintiffs sets forth mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy. As such, the plaintiffs claims are subject to dismissal by the Court. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs have made only conclusory allegations of conspiracy against the Mayers, and the Mayers should be dismissed from this action.
The Absolute Immunity of Witnesses
Plaintiffs allege the Mayers violated their civil rights by appearing as witnesses against them in a criminal proceeding. Witnesses, including police officers, are shielded by absolute immunity from liability for their allegedly perjured testimony. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 346, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1121, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Applying Briscoe, some Courts have held that witnesses who testify before a grand jury are entitled to absolute immunity. See, e.g., Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 426 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1988); Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883, 890 (7th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff's allegations against the Mayers, based upon their testimony as witnesses, fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs' Allegations Involving Ms. Hatch's Bankruptcy
Plaintiffs allege that the Mayers filed false claims in the Bankruptcy Court. It appears that Plaintiffs' allegations against these defendants are an attempt to bring claims in this Court which should have been brought in the bankruptcy court and to circumvent the normal channels of appealing bankruptcy orders. The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, like that of other federal courts, is grounded in, and limited by, statute. The terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) provides that the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under Title 11, United States Code, or arising in or related to cases under Title 11. The district courts may, in turn, refer any or all proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to a case under Title 11 to the bankruptcy judges for the district. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). The jurisdictional grant in § 1334(b) was a distinct departure from the jurisdiction conferred under previous Acts, which had been limited to either possession of property by the debtor or consent as a basis for jurisdiction. See S.Rep. No. 95-989, 2nd Sess., pp. 153, 154 (1978) U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 5939, 5940. The United States Supreme Court agrees with the views expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3rd Cir. 1984). Celotex v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995). "Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate," Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 43-48 (1977). The "related to" language of § 1334(b) must be read to give district courts (and bankruptcy courts under § 157(a)) jurisdiction over more than simple proceedings involving the property of the debtor or the estate. Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308.
"The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. . . . Thus, the proceeding need not necessarily be against the debtor or against the debtor's property. An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate."Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the Pacor test with little or no variation. See Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987).
With respect to Plaintiffs' broad conclusory allegations that these defendants have filed false claims, these are matters which will have an effect on the estate being administered in Bankruptcy Court and are within the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction or the District Court's appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. For these reasons, to the extent the Mayers have been named as defendants because of their involvement in the bankruptcy proceedings, the claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice.
RECOMMENDATION
The Motion to Dismiss of Ramona Mayer and Vincent Mayer, filed August 2, 2001, should be granted for the reasons stated above and Ramona Mayer and Vincent Mayer should be dismissed from this action.
FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS. AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an Order 2001, this case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial management.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Allen Taylor (City Attorney for the City of Mansfield, Texas); David Harry (Mayor of the City of Mansfield, Texas) and Shirley Hensiek (Captain, Mansfield Law Enforcement Center), filed July 18, 2001, is before the Court for consideration. In an Order and Notice entered July 16, 2001, the District Court stated that any summons for an individual listed only in the caption of a Complaint, but not in the body of that Complaint, will not be valid. In the original complaint, filed February 26, 2001, Plaintiffs sued twenty-five defendants in four causes of action. In a first amended complaint, filed March 6, 2001, Plaintiffs added thirty-seven defendants and a fifth cause of action, specifically incorporating by reference the first four causes of action in the original complaint. In a second amended complaint, filed July 6, 2001, Plaintiffs added forty-three more defendants and attached some exhibits. The July 6 Amended Complaint did not incorporate by reference any of the previous complaints. Moreover, it consists of pages one through 3, a second page 3, page 4, page 4a, and pages 9a through 9r. On October 31, 2001, the District Court noted the deficiencies in the July 6, 2001 complaint and ordered Plaintiffs to file a complete amended complaint. Plaintiffs declined to file a complete amended complaint. Rather, they have elected to stand on their July 6, 2001 amended complaint. Despite the liberal interpretation afforded pro se plaintiffs, a plaintiff retains the burden of proof to show that federal jurisdiction has properly been invoked. See Hooks v. Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., 944 F. Supp. 503, 506 (N.D. Tex. 1996). An amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading. King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994).
Additionally, the Defendants filed a notice to the court on February 4, 2002, essentially reurging their motion to dismiss.
The Court has warned Plaintiffs that merely listing a party's name is insufficient to invoke the Court's jurisdiction over that party. Plaintiffs have been given every opportunity to comply with federal procedure, but they have declined to do so. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the following parties whose names Plaintiffs list in the July 6, 2001 amended complaint and against whom Plaintiffs make no allegations: City of Mansfield, Texas; Mayor David Harry, Mansfield City Attorney Allen Taylor; Captain Shirley Hensiek; and Mansfield Law Enforcement Center. Additionally, the Motion to Dismiss of Taylor, Harry and Hensiek, should be granted for the reasons stated in the motion, and Plaintiffs' claims against Mayor David Harry, Mansfield City Attorney Allen Taylor; and Captain Shirley Hensiek should be dismissed.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. Lowrey v. Texas AM Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). A district court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the face of the pleadings. Baker, 75 F.3d at 196; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). Dismissal is warranted if a plaintiff has (1) been given the opportunity to amend her complaint, (2) made specific and detailed allegations constituting her best case, and (3) still fails to state a claim. See Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that dismissal is required if a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his case, but has failed); Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1985) (assuming that the specific allegations of the amended complaint constitute the plaintiffs' best case).
Analysis
Plaintiffs do not allege any facts to show Taylor, Harry or Hensiek violated their civil rights. At most, the complaint states Ms. Hatch was incarcerated in the Mansfield Law Enforcement Center on February 6, 1999 and detained for a period of six days. Assuming these facts are true, they do not constitute a violation of Plaintiffs civil rights by these defendants. Defendants, as public officials, have asserted their good faith immunity defense and Plaintiffs have failed to state any facts to overcome the immunity defense. See Shultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995). Additionally, even assuming Plaintiffs state a cause of action arising from Ms. Hatch's confinement in Mansfield in February, 1999, Plaintiffs' claims against these defendants are barred by the two-year statue of limitations for civil rights actions. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). Ms. Hatch's confinement at Mansfield occurred more than two years before Taylor, Harry and Hensiek were named as defendants on June 22, 2001.
RECOMMENDATION
The Court should dismiss the City of Mansfield and Mansfield Law Enforcement Center because Plaintiffs merely name them in the July 6, 2001 complaint and state no facts in support of a claim against them. Additionally, the Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Taylor, Harry and Hensiek for the reasons stated in the motion, and Plaintiffs' claims against Mayor David Harry, Mansfield City Attorney Allen Taylor; and Captain Shirley Hensiek should be dismissed.