Opinion
Cause No. IP 99-0447-C M/S.
February 23, 2000.
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of defendant, Raytheon Technical Services Company ("Raytheon"), seeking judgment in its favor as a matter of law on all of the claims presented in the complaint filed by Steven Hassler ("Hassler") on March 31, 1999. Hassler brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Hassler alleges that he suffered sex and age discrimination when Raytheon terminated his employment for deficient job performance and sexually harassing several female coworkers. Compl. ¶ 15. In addition, Hassler asserts several state law claims in which he contends that he suffered emotional distress as a result of his termination and that he was defamed when Raytheon published information about his peformance as an employee. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24. The Court has fully considered the parties' arguments and, for the reasons discussed below, GRANTS the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
I. FACTUAL PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hassler was hired by the U.S. Navy as a civilian employee on October 26, 1981, to work as a physicist at the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, Indiana. Hassler Dep. at 21. His job title later changed to electronic engineer, then staff engineer. Id. In January of 1997, Hassler became an employee of Hughes Technical Services when the Navy's facility was privatized. Id. at 22. He became a Raytheon employee in late December 1997 or early January 1998 when Raytheon acquired Hughes. Id. At all times, Hassler was an at-will employee. Id. at 50.
In July of 1997, Hassler was temporarily assigned to work as an outpricer in the Procurement Support Section to assist in processing a significant backlog of supply requisitions. Id. at 25; Hassler Aff. Ex. 2, "Notice of Suspension." In this position, Hassler's duties included receiving requisitions from the company supervisors for various parts and contacting vendors for pricing information which would then be given to an employee assigned to make the actual purchase. Hassler Dep. at 25. Less than thirty days into his assignment, Hassler's temporary supervisor advised Hassler's permanent supervisor that he wished to terminate Hassler's assignment to the Procurement Support Section for lack of acceptable performance. Notice of Suspension at 1. Hassler was released from his temporary assignment on September 10, 1997. Id.
On October 6, 1997, Hassler was suspended for two weeks without pay. Id. The grounds for his suspension were careless performance of his job duties and the unauthorized removal of company records or property from his assigned work area. Id. The latter violation stemmed from an incident in which Hassler allegedly removed a large number of requisition stubs and files from the procurement work area. Id.
Later that fall, several female employees complained to Raytheon management that Hassler was sexually harassing them. On November 3, 1997, Carl Radford, a company human resources specialist, received an email from the supervisor of Cynthia Lewis regarding a complaint from Lewis that she was being harassed by Hassler. Radford Aff. ¶ 3 and Ex. 1. The next day, Radford met with Lewis to discuss her concerns. Radford Aff. ¶ 4. Following the meeting, Lewis submitted a written statement in which she alleged that Hassler had been following her around the building for approximately three months. Radford Aff. Ex. 2. She also stated that she had received a phone call at her home several weeks prior to making this report in which she identified Hassler's name and phone number on the "Caller I.D." display attached to her phone. Id. In addition, she claimed to have received numerous hang-up calls. Id.
During this same time frame, Sheryl Bridges, another female employee, complained of similar conduct. Radford Aff. ¶ 5. Radford met with Bridges and requested that Bridges provide him with a written statement of her complaints, which she did. Id. In her statement, Bridges alleged that Hassler had asked her to go to lunch on several occasions and followed her around the Raytheon facility to such a point that other employees took notice. Radford Aff. Ex. 3 at 1-2. She also described an incident in which Hassler followed her to a restaurant where she was meeting a coworker after work. Id. at 2. When she returned to work to retrieve her vehicle, Hassler followed her to the building and stated "I'll hate you until the day I die!" Id. Bridges alleged that when she kept walking towards her car, Hassler said, "God, and you wouldn't even go to lunch with me!" Id. Bridges described Hassler's voice as "groveling, hateful and evil." Id.
On November 12, 1997, Radford met with Hassler and his supervisor. Radford Aff. ¶ 7. Radford informed Hassler that he had received several complaints from female coworkers alleging that he was harassing them and following them around the facility. During the meeting, Hassler denied following any women. Id. He also maintained that he did not know who Cynthia Lewis was. Id. In light of the information he had received, Radford did not believe Hassler and instructed him not to harass or follow any of his coworkers. Id.; Frazier Aff. ¶ 3.
Despite Radford's instruction, Raytheon soon began receiving complaints that Hassler was again harassing female employees. In mid-December, Dinah Commons complained to company security that Hassler had driven up and down the street in front of her house. O'Dell Aff. Ex. 1. Shortly thereafter, Cynthia Lewis complained that Hassler had come up behind her in line in the employee cafeteria and called her a "f------ bitch." Radford Aff. ¶ 8. She also stated that Hassler had been staring at her and following her around the plant. Id.
On December 30, 1997, Hassler was called to a meeting with his supervisor and a human resources representative regarding the recent allegations of harrassment. Hassler Dep. at 39. There, Hassler denied speaking to Lewis. Id. at 40. Nevertheless, he was given a written warning to refrain from any contact with Lewis, Bridges or Commons. Hassler Dep. Ex. 6. The order warned Hassler that an investigation was being conducted with respect to the latest complaints and a determination would be made as quickly as possible as to whether any sexual harassment had in fact taken place. Id. On January 30, 1998, Hassler received notice that his employment was terminated for harassing female employees in violation of company rules and for less than satisfactory job performance. Hassler Dep. Ex. 8.
Hassler filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that his employment was terminated on the basis of his sex and age on February 4, 1998. Hassler Dep. Ex. 2. The EEOC dismissed the charge. Hassler Dep. Ex. 3. This action followed, accompanied by a state law defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, on March 31, 1999. The Court has jurisdiction over the Title VII and the ADEA matters pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), 29 U.S.C. § 621 and 623, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has jurisdiction over the state defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, authorizing supplemental jurisdiction over state claims arising out of the same event or connected series of events.
Hassler's complaint also included a disability discrimination claim in which Hassler contended that Raytheon had discriminated against him based on his severe nearsightedness and a state law wrongful discharge claim. These claims were later dismissed with prejudice by stipulation.
Raytheon filed a motion for summary judgment on December 17, 1999, asserting that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both of Hassler's discrimination claims as well as his state law actions. On January 10, 2000, Raytheon filed a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requesting the Court to award reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by Raytheon in defending this action. Having reviewed the factual background, the Court now turns to a brief overview of the standards governing its decision.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A disputed fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law. Id.
The moving party has the initial burden to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Schroeder v. Barth, 969 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1992). This burden does not entail producing evidence to negate claims on which the opposing party has the burden of proof. See Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1994). The party opposing a summary judgment motion bears an affirmative burden of presenting evidence that a disputed issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 975 F.2d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 1992). The opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and set forth specific facts to show that a genuine issue exists. See Hong v. Children's Mem. Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994). This burden cannot be met with conclusory statements or speculation, see Weihaupt v. American Med. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 428 (7th Cir. 1989), but only with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence. See Local Rule 56.1; Brasic v. Heinemann's Inc., Bakeries, 121 F.3d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1997); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923-24 (7th Cir. 1994). Evidence sufficient to support every essential element of the claims on which the opposing party bears the burden of proof must be cited. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must draw all reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable" to the opposing party. Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1992). If a reasonable factfinder could find for the opposing party, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992). When the standard embraced in Rule 56(c) is met, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., 975 F.2d at 1294.
The summary judgment standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases because of the crucial role played by motive, intent and credibility in resolving such cases. Pitasi v. Gartner Group, Inc., 184 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 1999). However, even when discriminatory intent is at issue, the evidence must not only address the issue of intent, but also relate to the specific employment decision in question. Cowan v. Glenbrook Security Serv., Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 443 (7th Cir. 1997). Further, the nonmovant will not defeat summary judgment merely by pointing to self-serving allegations without evidentiary support. Cliff v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION A. Discrimination Claims
Hassler contends that Raytheon discriminated against him in its review and assessment of both his job performance and alleged sexual harrassment of female coworkers because of his sex and his age. During his deposition, he testified that it is his belief that Raytheon wanted to get rid of a man that made too much money. Hassler Dep. at 47. He reasoned that it is much more difficult to fire a woman than a man. Id. at 46. Further, he stated that Raytheon saw him as being too old "to suit the corporate structure." Id. at 48.
To ultimately prevail on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII or the ADEA, Hassler must prove that he was a victim of intentional discrimination. Hong v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1372 (1994). The record in this case fails to reveal any direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of sex or age. Therefore, Hassler can prevail only by using the indirect method of proof first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and refined in Texas Dept. Of Community Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993). Although this framework was originally applied only to Title VII claims, it has been adapted to age discrimination claims under the ADEA. McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Under this analytical framework, Hassler initially must introduce sufficient evidence that, if believed or undisputed, would support a prima facie case of sex or age discrimination. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2746-47. Once Hassler makes a showing sufficient to prove a prima facie case he will enjoy a rebuttable presumption of discrimination that shifts the burden of production to Raytheon to "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the termination of his employment. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994). Raytheon may do so by producing evidence, whether or not persuasive, of a nondiscriminatory reason. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2747 (noting that the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimination). If Raytheon succeeds in this task, the presumption dissolves and the burden of production shifts back to Hassler "to show that the employer's proffered reasons are a pretext for . . . discrimination." Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122 (citing Weihaupt, 874 F.2d at 426-27); Lloyd v. Bridgeport Brass Corp., 811 F. Supp. 401, 405 (S.D.Ind. 1993). Absent direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, Hassler can prove pretext by showing that, 1) Raytheon's stated reason has no basis in fact; 2) although based on fact, the stated reason was not the real reason; or 3) the stated reason was insufficient to warrant his termination. Hughes v. Brown, 20 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1994); Samuelson v. Durkee/French/Airwick, 976 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1992); Lloyd, 811 F. Supp. at 405.
The McDonnell-Douglas presumption is only a "procedural device" intended to establish an order of proof and production, not a means of deciding the merits. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2755.
To show pretext at the summary judgment stage, Hassler must produce sufficient evidence from which a rationale fact-finder could infer that Raytheon lied about its proffered reasons. Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995) (pretext does not mean mistake, "[i]t means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action."); Schultz v. General Elec. Cap. Corp., 37 F.3d 329, 334 (7th Cir. 1994). "There is a fine line between evidence that appropriately challenges the employer's proffered reasons as being unworthy of credence and evidence that merely shows that the employer made a mistake or a bad business judgment." Schultz, 37 F.3d at 334 (quoting Kralman v. Illinois Dep't of Vet. Aff., 23 F.3d 150, 156 (7th Cir. 1994). Absent some showing of discriminatory motive, courts do not question an employer's good faith business decisions. Id.
1. Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Hassler must present facts which tend to show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) his job performance was satisfactory at the time of his termination, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly-situated female employees were treated more favorably. Hughes, 20 F.3d at 746. Similarly, to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Hassler must prove that: (1) he is a member of a protected group (age 40 or over), (2) he was doing the job well enough to meet Raytheon's legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that substantially younger, similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1122. If Hassler cannot establish any one element of a particular claim, summary judgment on that claim for Raytheon is proper. Lloyd, 811 F. Supp. at 405.
In this case, Hassler has failed to establish a prima facie case on either of his claims because he has not demonstrated that he was treated less favorably than other similarly-situated employees as a result of his sex or his age. In fact, in addressing his sex discrimination claim, he wholly fails to provide any evidence that Raytheon treated similarly-situated female employees in a different manner. On his claim of age discrimination, Hassler points to Darrell Finkton and Steven Kirk, two employees who were disciplined for sexually harassing their coworkers, but he offers no evidence regarding their ages from which the Court could determine that either employee was "substantially younger" than he. In addition, he alleges no facts which support his assertion that Finkton and Kirk were similarly situated. Specifically, Hassler has not shown that Finkton or Kirk was a Raytheon employee at the time they were disciplined. Indeed, the record indicates that both incidents occurred at least five years before Raytheon acquired the facility at which Hassler was employed. Johnson Aff. ¶ 4; Kirk Aff. ¶ 2. Further, Hassler has not demonstrated that the purported conduct of Finkton or Kirk was the same as, or even comparable to, his own. In contrast to Hassler's situation where Raytheon received complaints about Hassler from three different women alleging multiple instances of stalking and harrassment, the situations to which Hassler refers involved single instances of relatively minor conduct. Finkton allegedly grabbed a female coworker's arm and spanked her own bottom with it. Johnson Aff. ¶ 4. Kirk asked a female coworker for a date and placed his hand on her shoulder. Kirk Aff. ¶ 2. Without more, Hassler has failed to meet his burden in putting forth evidence to support a prima facie case.
2. Pretext
Even if the Court had found that Hassler had established a prima facie case, summary judgment for Raytheon is still proper because Raytheon has proffered a legitimate, non-pretextual and well-supported reason for terminating Hassler's employment. In its notice of termination, Raytheon stated that it was discharging Hassler from employment for violation of its company policy against sexual harassment of other employees as well as previous misconduct, for which Hassler was given a two-week suspension without pay in October of 1997, involving careless performance of his job duties and the unauthorized removal of company files and other materials from the work area. Hassler responds that the women accusing him of sexual harassment are lying and that he has performed his job duties satisfactorily.
Hassler also asserts that Raytheon has misapplied its own policy in that the rules prohibit harassment on company premises and he was terminated based on conduct which occurred off premises. However, his argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, Hassler's termination notice specifically states that Hassler was being discharged for "purposefully pursuing and following [three female employees] around the plant." Hassler Dep. Ex. 8 (emphasis added). Thus, even if Raytheon viewed the complaints it received regarding harassment or stalking which occurred off company premises as corroborative of the on premises allegations, it specified that Hassler was being terminated for harassing other employees on company premises. Second, the company rules also include a catch-all provision which states: "The above rules and regulations are illustrative of conduct that may be subject to disciplinary action. The Company reserves the right to discipline or discharge employees in connection with other unacceptable conduct which it deems detrimental to the interests of the Company or its employees." Id. at 3. Here, Raytheon determined that Hassler's actions had created "significant personal distress and concern" for the individuals Hassler allegedly harassed. Id. at 1. The company did not misapply its policy.
At this juncture in the Court's analysis, the burden Hassler has to meet is well-established. See Kariotis v. Navistar Inter. Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1997). To challenge the honesty of Raytheon's reasons, Hassler must specifically rebut the company's reasoning. Id. But an opportunity for rebuttal is not an invitation to criticize the company's evaluation process or question its conclusions about the quality of Hassler's performance. Id. Rather, rebuttal must include facts tending to show that Raytheon's reasons for terminating Hassler's employment are false, thereby implying that the real reason is illegal discrimination. Id. In other words, the question is not whether Raytheon's reasons for termination are right but whether the company's description of its reasons is honest. Id.
To counter the reasons given by Raytheon for his termination, Hassler designates a letter that he had sent to Raytheon management in which he responded to the grounds for his previous suspension without pay. He also offers his own affidavit in which he disputes the allegations of sexual harassment, as well as the affidavits of coworkers Avis Stephany, Greg Robison and Steven Kirk, who state that Hassler was performing his work satisfactorily and was not harassing other employees. The Seventh Circuit has held that an employee's self-serving statements about his ability are insufficient to contradict an employer's negative assessment of that ability. Gustovich v. AT T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992). The cases also give little weight to statements by coworkers that generally corroborate a plaintiff's own perception of satisfactory job performance. Dey v. Colt. Const. Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1994). While such statements may indicate a dispute about the employee's performance, they do not cast doubt on whether the employer honestly based its employment decision on performance-related considerations, which is the key inquiry in these cases. Id.; Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124. Applying these standards, the Court finds insufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Raytheon's reasons for Hassler's termination were pretexual. Neither Hassler's own statements nor the affidavits of his coworkers suggest that Raytheon was motivated to terminate Hassler by discriminatory intent based on his sex or age or was otherwise dishonest in its reasoning for his discharge. At most, the facts alleged in these statements support a conclusion that the result of Raytheon's investigation did not satisfy Hassler. Accordingly, summary judgment would be appropriate on this ground as well.
B. State Law Claims
Hassler argues that the termination of his employment and the disclosure of facts regarding his job performance constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also asserts that he was defamed when Raytheon published negative comments to other employees and prospective employers regarding his work. Raytheon is entitled to summary judgment on both claims.
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27 (Ind. 1991), the Indiana Supreme Court stated that "one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress." Id. at 31 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46). The Court emphasized that it is the intent to harm one emotionally that constitutes the basis of liability for the tort. Id. Liability is found only where the conduct "has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Gable v. Curtis, 673 N.E.2d 805, 810 (Ind.App. 1996).
The facts presented by Hassler in this case do not support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To the extent that Hassler's claim of emotional distress results from his termination, his claim fails because Indiana does not recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in at-will employment termination situations. See Mehling v. Dubois County Farm Bureau Coop., 601 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ind.App. 1992). Similarly, to the extent that Hassler contends he suffered emotional distress from Raytheon's disclosure of information about his work, Hassler has failed to establish a prima facie case because he has not shown that Raytheon intended to harm him emotionally. Hassler states that Juan Canales, his supervisor when he was temporarily assigned to Raytheon's Procurement Support Section, sent an email to all of the company's email subscribers in which he "labeled" Hassler the "worst" procurement pricer in the section. However, upon review of a printout of the communication, the Court finds that Hassler has substantially mischaracterized its content. In essence, the email is nothing more than a compilation of figures which summarizes the work assigned and work completed by each procurement outpricer. Nowhere does Canales identify Hassler as the "worst employee" in his department. In fact, he does not even describe the quality or quantity of Hassler's work, or otherwise convey an opinion about it.
The text of the email reads:
From: Canales, Juan
Sent: Friday, August 29, 1997 10:26 AM
To: Casey, Shon D.; Hassler, Steven L.; Wells, Coolie E.
CC: Porter, Charles L; Frazier, Kevin L.; Hoff, Keith
Subject: OUTPRICER.XLS
File: OUTPRICER.XLS
Gentleman I was requested to keep you informed on the performance of the individuals on loan to use in Procurement. Page 20 of the attached file is a summary. Thank you for loaning these people to us . . . I'll keep in touch with you Kevin and with Charles Porter to give you further status in the near future.
Deena Richards is doing different tasks; she is performing very well.
Juan
The Court finds that Hassler has also misrepresented the individuals to whom the email was sent. Contrary to Hassler's assertion that the email was sent to "all facility email subscribers," a printout of the email reveals it was sent only to Canales' supervisor, the other two employees who had been temporarily assigned to the Procurement Support Section with Hassler, and to the employees' regular supervisors. In sum, the communication appears to be nothing more than a routine status report that Canales completed in the course of his supervisory duties. This evidence is insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to whether Raytheon, through the actions of Canales, intended to inflict emotional injury on Hassler.
2. Defamation
To maintain an action for defamation, a plaintiff must show a communication with four elements: (1) defamatory imputation, (2) malice, (3) publication, and (4) damages. Schrader v. Eli Lilly and Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ind. 1994). Here, Hassler has failed to supply specific facts demonstrating there was a publication. To prove publication, a plaintiff must show that defamatory information was communicated to a third person or persons. Id. In his deposition, Hassler stated that he believed that Raytheon communicated false information about his job performance and false allegations about sexual harassment to prospective employers. Hassler Dep. at 50. But, when asked to specify facts which support his allegations, Hassler admitted that he had no knowledge of any specific comments made by Raytheon to any prospective employers. Id. at 52. Rather, he stated that he was assuming that something had been said because he had made application to over 150 employers and he was told repeatedly that there were no positions available. Id. at 51. Likewise, Hassler also stated that he believed that Raytheon had communicated information about the events surrounding his termination to his fellow employees. Id. However, when asked to detail the factual basis underlying his accusation, Hassler responded that there had been an "incredible amount of scuttlebutt and rumor" going around the plant after he was discharged and "[he] didn't tell them, so management had to." Id. Hassler's speculations are insufficient to preclude summary judgment. To the extent that Hassler asserts that he was defamed by Juan Canales' email communication described above, summary judgment is also proper because the law of defamation imposes liability only for statements that are false as well as defamatory. Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 687 (Ind 1997). Truth is a complete defense in defamation actions. Id. As noted earlier, Canales' email was a status report on the amount of work completed by each employee under his supervision. Hassler alleges that the report was miscalculated because it does not reflect requisitions for which he had requested a quote but the supplier had not responded. Hassler Aff., Ex. 3. However, without any evidentiary support for his assertions, Hassler's self-serving allegations do not create a genuine issue of fact.
III. CONCLUSION
Hassler has failed to present sufficient evidence from which to find a genuine issue of material fact for trial each of the claims in this matter. The motion for summary judgment filed by Raytheon is GRANTED.