Opinion
2:19-cv-02521 MCE AC PS
07-19-2021
ALLEN C. HASSAN, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA MEDICAL BOARD, et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se. Pre-trial proceedings were accordingly referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). Id. Pending before the court are two motions to dismiss plaintiff's operative Third Amended Complaint: (1) a motion by defendants Medical Board of California, Susan F. Friedman, Dev Gnandev, Randy W. Hawkins, Howard R. Krauss, Ronald Lewis, Laurie Rose Lubiano, Asif Mahmood, Denise Pines, David Warmoth, Eserik Watkins, and Felix C. Yip (collectively “MBC defendants”), ECF No. 38; and (2) a motion by defendant UC San Diego PACE Program, ECF No. 40-1. Plaintiff has opposed only the motion brought by the PACE program. ECF No. 42. The PACE program replied. ECF No. 43. The matter was heard before the undersigned on July 7, 2021, with all parties appearing remotely. ECF No. 44. At the hearing, plaintiff confirmed that he does not oppose the motion brought by the MBC defendants. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that both motions be GRANTED and that this case be DISMISSED in its entirety because plaintiff's only federal claims are time-barred.
Defendants the Regents of the University of California and its employees or former employees Martin Shulman, M.D., David Bazzo, M.D. and William Norcross, M.D., were not added as parties to the case until plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint. However, because the SAC was not properly filed, the Court did not issue a Summons to these four defendants at that time. The court did not issue a Summons to these four defendants until after plaintiff filed his TAC. ECF No. 32. This Summons has not yet been served. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss is filed only on behalf of PACE. Defendant Kimberly Kirchmeyer also does not appear to have been served and is not party to any of the pending motions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Operative Complaint
Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) on April 4, 2021. ECF No. 31. Plaintiff sues the California Medical Board (“MBC”), multiple individual members of the California Medical Board, The Regents of the University of California, the UC San Diego PACE Program, and professors associated with the UCSD PACE Program. ECF No. 31 at 2-4. The TAC alleges in relevant part as follows.
Plaintiff was a licensed physician in the state of California from 1966 through December 16, 2016. Id. at 4. In November of 2014, plaintiff entered an agreement with the Medical Board which required him to take and complete a Prescribing Course and course equivalent to PACE. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff completed the program, and PACE program evaluators ranked his performance as “Successful to Superior.” Id. at 5. Though the objective numeric scoring placed plaintiff well within the range of PACE's performance standard, PACE reported to the Medical Board that plaintiff's performance was equivalent to a “fail.” Id. at 6. The MBC held a contested administrative hearing to revoke plaintiff's probation on September 26 and 27 of 2016, with Dr. William Norcross serving as the primary witness. Id. Dr. Norcross testified that plaintiff failed to pass the PACE program, testifying to incorrect numbers. Id. The ALJ, applying the incorrect legal standard and using incorrect scoring information regarding the PACE program, revoked plaintiff's license to practice medicine and published the decision on the Medical Board's website. Id. at 9.
The PACE (Physician Assessment and Clinical Education) program is an assessment and remediation program for physicians, offered by the UC San Diego School of Medicine.
Plaintiff's TAC presents five putative causes of action: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and §1981, Racial Discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Retaliation in Violation of the First Amendment; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Malicious Prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and §1981, Deliberately Indifferent Policies, Practices, Customs, Training, and Supervision in violation of the Forth, Fourteenth, and First Amendments; and (5) Fraud. Id. at 11-23.
B. Motions to Dismiss
The MBC defendants move to dismiss the TAC in its entirety, arguing that (1) the § 1983 claims are time-barred, (2) the MBC defendants are immune from plaintiff's claims, (3) the TAC is conclusory and fails to state a cognizable claim, and (4) the state law fraud claim fails for want of particularity. ECF No. 38-1. With respect to the timeliness of the federal claims, the MBC defendants anticipate the issue of equitable tolling and state that plaintiff brought a writ of mandamus petition before filing his federal case. Id. at 11-12. The writ petition is not mentioned in the TAC. See ECF No. 31 at 1-8. The MBC defendants argue that the writ petition did not stop the statute of limitations from running because the petition itself was untimely by over a year, therefore depriving the MBC defendants of timely notice of plaintiff's claims. ECF No. 38-1 at 12. The MBC motion is unopposed.
The PACE motion also contends that plaintiff's § 1983 and fraud claims are time-barred and asserts immunity from suit. ECF No. 40-1 at 5-8. Plaintiff argues the PACE motion should be rejected because it is untimely, and he substantively disputes the asserted grounds for dismissal. ECF No. 42. As a preliminary matter, the PACE motion will not be rejected for untimeliness. The MBC defendants were specifically granted an extension of time until June 8, 2021 to file an opposition to plaintiff's TAC. ECF No. 36. The MBC defendants filed their motion on that date. ECF No. 38. PACE filed its motion on June 9, 2021, to be considered together with the MBC motion. ECF No. 40. Plaintiff had an opportunity to oppose the PACE motion substantively, and he did so. ECF No. 42. In the interest of justice, both motions to dismiss will be considered on the merits. Moreover, as discussed below, the MBC motion is dispositive of the entire case against all defendants.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards
“The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It is insufficient for the pleading to contain a statement of facts that “merely creates a suspicion” that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action. Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-35 (3d ed. 2004)). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, ” construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 3055 (2011); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, or allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), as amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001). The court may also consider facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987), and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Facts subject to judicial notice may be considered by a court on a motion to dismiss.
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se complaints are construed liberally and may only be dismissed if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014). The court's liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint, however, may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).
When the facts and dates alleged in a complaint indicate that a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, untimeliness may be asserted on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). A time-barred complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Von Saher, 592 F.2d at 969.
B. Plaintiff's Federal Claims Are Time Barred
1. Applicable Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff's claims fall into two categories: (1) claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) a state law fraud claim. Because § 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In California the applicable statute is two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; see also Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). “Federal courts also apply a forum state's law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling when not inconsistent with federal law.” Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1999), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Dec. 13, 1999). However, “[w]hile state law determines the period of limitations, federal law determines when a cause of action accrues.” Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir.1981). A cause of action accrues under federal law when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury. Canatella, 486 F.3d at 1133.
Though plaintiff also references § 1981, the Supreme Court has held that that § 1983 “provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989). Here, the California Medical Board is a state agency and PACE is a program of the University of California: all defendants are state actors.
2. Absent Tolling, Plaintiff's Claims are Untimely
Plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury no later than December 16, 2016, when the Medical Board revoked his license to practice medicine based on the ALJ's recommendation. All of the various defendants' alleged misdeeds had occurred by that time, and their adverse consequences for plaintiff were fully realized when his professional license was revoked. Accordingly, plaintiff's various § 1983 claims related to the license revocation, or arising from underlying events, can have accrued no later than December 16, 2016. The complaint in this case was filed on December 16, 2019, exactly three years after accrual. The complaint was thus filed one year after the limitations period had expired. Absent tolling, the complaint is time-barred.
3. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling
California provides equitable tolling for the limited purpose of accommodating the timely pursuit of alternative remedies. “The equitable tolling of statutes of limitations is a judicially created, nonstatutory doctrine . . designed to prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits when the purpose of the statute of limitations - timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff's claims - has been satisfied.” McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal.4th 88, 99, (2008) (internal citations omitted). “A plaintiff's pursuit of a remedy in another forum equitably tolls the limitations period if the plaintiff's actions satisfy these factors: 1) timely notice to the defendants in filing the first claim; 2) lack of prejudice to the defendants in gathering evidence for the second claim; and 3) good faith and reasonable conduct in filing the second claim.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). With respect to the “whether a plaintiff provided timely notice, courts focus on whether the party's actions caused the defendant to be fully notified within the statute of limitations of plaintiffs' claims and their intent to litigate.” Saint Francis Mem'l Hosp. v. State Dep't of Pub. Health, 9 Cal. 5th 710, 726 (2020). With respect to the third element, the Supreme Court of California held it “encompass two distinct requirements: A plaintiff's conduct must be objectively reasonable and subjectively in good faith.” Id. at 729. Whether a plaintiff acted “reasonably” is an objective question; the focus is “not on a party's intentions or the motives behind a party's actions, but instead on whether that party's actions were fair, proper, and sensible in light of the circumstances.” Id. Good faith, in contrast, depends on a party's subjective intentions. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the limitations period for his § 1983 claims was equitably tolled because he filed a writ of mandamus on May 25, 2018, challenging the California Medical Board's adoption of the ALJ decision; the writ was ultimately denied on February 18, 2020. ECF No. 42 at 7-8. Anticipating this argument, the MBC defendants accompanied their motion with a request for judicial notice of: (A) the Medical Board's 2016 decision; (B) plaintiff's petition for writ of mandamus filed with the Sacramento County Superior Court; (C) the Superior Court's notice of entry of judgment against plaintiff dated May 24, 2019; (D) a copy of the Superior Court docket; and (E) a copy of the California Court of Appeal's website search demonstrating plaintiff did not appeal the Superior Court's decision. ECF No. 19. The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, including matters of public record outside the pleadings. Fed.R.Evid. 201(b); Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). The court accordingly takes judicial notice of Exhibits A-D as matters of public record.
PACE joined the MBC's arguments, and relies on the same records.
Plaintiff's pursuit of a mandamus remedy does not support equitable tolling under California law. First, the writ petition was dismissed for untimeliness. The Superior Court order explains that the “petition was filed on May 25, 2018 - over 17 months after the Board's decision became effective, ” and far exceeding the applicable 30-day limitation period to file. ECF No. 19-3 at 4-5. The untimely pursuit of an alternative remedy does not easily square with the requirement of timely notice to defendants. But even if the notice requirement is assumed to be satisfied, on the theory that the untimely mandamus action nonetheless provided notice of plaintiff's claims within the limitations period for bringing a §1983 suit, the second two requirements for tolling are not satisfied.
As to the second requirement, lack of prejudice to defendants, there is no indication that the writ petition and this federal case are so similar that defendant would not be prejudiced in evidence collection for this untimely federal lawsuit. Indeed, because the first action was dismissed on untimeliness grounds, there was no development of an evidentiary record. Accordingly, defendants would need to start gathering evidence from scratch on this stale claim if the case were to proceed.
Third and finally, plaintiff cannot show that he acted reasonably in failing to file his federal claims within the limitations period. Plaintiff, who until recently was a licensed attorney in this state, can fairly be expected to understand, calculate, and comply with statutes of limitation and with the rules applicable to mandamus. However, he filed both the mandamus action and the lawsuit a year or more after their respective deadlines. There is nothing reasonable about delaying the filing of a lawsuit beyond the applicable limitations period due to the pendency of a mandamus petition that was itself quite obviously untimely. Moreover, even if equitable tolling could be supported by a sincere though unreasonable belief that the mandamus petition was procedurally proper and that the lawsuit could not be filed until it was resolved - and California law provides no such thing - plaintiff commenced this action before there was a ruling in the mandamus matter. See ECF No. 19-4 (judgment entered February 18, 2020). Plaintiff clearly was not waiting for a ruling on his mandamus petition to file his §1983 claims. It was objectively unreasonable for plaintiff to file an untimely writ petition and then months later, while that petition was still pending, file an untimely federal lawsuit. The court need not reach the issue of plaintiff's subjective good faith; regardless of his subjective intentions, plaintiff's objectively unreasonable course of conduct precludes tolling.
As the docket reflects, plaintiff has been suspended from the practice of law.
At hearing, plaintiff argued that equitable tolling nonetheless saves his claims because equitable means being “fair minded in all circumstances.” This court lacks authority to grant equitable tolling except in the circumstances specified by the California courts. The circumstances of this case do not qualify for equitable relief from the statute of limitations, for the reasons already explained. In broadly arguing the equities, plaintiff emphasized the merits of his claims and the value of the good works that he has done as a doctor, including extensive humanitarian efforts. Unfortunately for plaintiff, evaluation of a lawsuit's timeliness is independent of the merits of the case or the character of the litigants. As the California Supreme Court has acknowledged:
[A] statute of limitations. . . operates conclusively across-the-board. It does so with respect to all causes of action, both those that do not have merit and also those that do. That it may bar meritorious causes of action as well as unmeritorious ones is the price of the orderly and timely processing of litigation - a price that may be high, but one that must nevertheless be paid.Norgart v. Upjohn, 21 Cal.4th 383, 410 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
C. The Court Need Not Determine the Timeliness or Sufficiency of the Fraud Claim
Plaintiff's state law fraud claim is governed by a three-year statute of limitations, and the claim does not accrue “until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d); Samuels v. Mix, 22 Cal.4th 1, 14 (1999). Here the parties dispute the accrual date and the running of the statute. The MBC defendants also contend that the claim is not pled with sufficient particularity. These issues need not be reached, however.
This court's jurisdiction is predicated on plaintiff's federal claims, all of which are time-barred. Because plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief under federal law, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's putative state law fraud claim. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction).
D. No Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs complaint is fatally flawed because it does not present a timely federal cause of action. No. amendment can remedy this defect. Though a pro se plaintiff is generally entitled to an opportunity to correct defects in a complaint by amendment, that step is not appropriate where, as here, the defects cannot be cured. Noll 809 F.2d at 1448.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends as follows:
1. That the motions to dismiss at ECF Nos. 38 at 40 be GRANTED; and
2. That the operative Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31) be DISMISSED in its entirety for the reasons set forth above, and the case be closed.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).